The Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper Hangers of America

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1952

99 N.L.R.B. 1391 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

GLAZIERS UNION' LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1391
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL -No. -27 OF THE' BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS,
DECORATORS AND PAPER HANGERS OF AMERICA, AND GEORGE H.
MEYERS AND JOHN R. HOFFMAN, ITS AGENTS and JOLIET CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION, FOR ITSELF AND ON BEHALF OF ITS MEMBERS
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL No. 27 OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS,
DECORATORS AND PAPER HANGERS OF AMERICA, AND GEORGE H.
MEYERS AND JOHN R. HOFFMAN, ITS AGENTS and THE NEW LUMBER
COMPANY, ALEXANDER LUMBER COMPANY, I. N. R. BEATTY LUMBER
COMPANY, JOLIET LUMBER & FUEL COMPANY, LEACH BROTHERS, INC.,
HACKER-S1ME COMPANY, ALL ILLINOIS CORPORATIONS, E. DURBIN
COLLINS AND CATHRYN COLLINS, CO-PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS AS
LYONS BROTHERS LUMBER & FUEL COMPANY, P. C. RYAN, T.' F.
RYAN, M. L. RYAN AND A. L. RYAN, CO-PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS
As THOMAS F. RYAN COMPANY, AND ARNOLD R. WELSCH AND WALTER
W. WELSCH, CO-PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS AS JOLIET CASH AND
CARRY LUMBER COMPANY. Cases Nos. 13-CC-Z and 13-CC-7.
Jvim 30,1952.
Supplemental Decision and Order -
On July 18, 1949, Trial Examiner David London issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceding, finding that the
Respondents Glaziers' Union' Local No'. 27 of the Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators and Paper Hangers of America, herein called
the Glaziers, and George H. Meyers, its agent, had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices in violation' of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto?
Thereafter, the Respondents Glaziers and ' Hoffman, the General
Counsel, and the charging parties filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and supporting briefs.
On June 26, 1950, the Board issued a Decision and Order in this
proceeding,2 dismissing the complaint solely on the ground that "it
would not effectuate the purposes or policies of the Act to exercise
jurisdiction. . . ." On a motion for reconsideration, this action was
later affirmed, Chairman Herzog' and' Member Reynolds dissenting.
1 The Trial Examiner also recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to
Respondent John R . Hoffman.
2 90 NLRB 542 (Member Reynolds dissenting).
99 NLRB No. 146.
1392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On January 7, 1952, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
holding that "the unfair labor activities shown and found had a sub-
stantial effect upon commerce, and the Board's conclusion to the
contrary is clearly erroneous," remanded the case to the Board "for
such further proceeding as may, under the Act, be appropriate." 3
Accordingly, in view of the court's commerce finding, we assert
jurisdiction in this proceeding.
The Board heard oral argument on the merits of the case on May
20, 1952 ; ' the General Counsel, the charging parties, and - the -^Re-
spondents participated therein.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, to the extent that they are consist-
ent with this Decision and Order.
The complaint alleges that the Respondents violated Section 8 - (b)
(4) (A) of the Act by a series of related incidents in the Joliet,
Illinois, area, designed to enforce the Union's bylaws and working
rules. The bylaws themselves, and the Union's publication of a list
of "fair" employers, are also alleged as separate violations of this
section of the Act.
1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Union's refusal to
furnish glaziers to member-employers of the Joliet Contractors Asso-
ciation did not violate Section 8 (b) (4) (A).6 The General Counsel
and the charging parties argue that general congressional intent to
outlaw "secondary boycotts" of the type allegedly existing here
requires that we find such refusals violative of the Act. The lack of
merit in this argument appears, however, upon a careful scrutiny of
the very language of this section of the statute.6 Although it is ele-
mentary that congressional intent should be, utilized in construing a
statute, and "while the primary purpose of interpretation and con-
struction is to ascertain . . . intention . . . , this intention and mean-
8193 F. 2d 833 (C. A 7).
' C1cairman. Herzog , although not present at the oral argument , has read and fully con-
sidered the complete transcript of that proceeding.
We need not decide , therefore, whether an object of the alleged refusal to furnish
glaziers was one proscribed by the Act, whether Hoffman was an agent of the Respondent
Union, or whether the Respondent actually refused any request for glaziers.
' I. e., "to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport , or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles , materials , or com-
modities or to perform any services , where an object thereof is : . .
GLAZIERS ' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1393
mng is to be determined , if possible , primarily from the language of the
statute itself."'
Tlie General Counsel and charging parties urge us either to construe
the words "engage in . . . a strike' ' so as to encompass a union's
refusal to furnish workers, or to construe "induce or encourage .. .
employees . . , in the course of their employment . . ." so as to
include workers sought by an employer . Section 501 (2) of the Act
defines "strike" as a "concerted stoppage of work by employees .. .
and any concerted slow-down or other concerted interruption of oper-
ations by employees ." The broadest definition of strike includes
"quitting work" or "a stoppage of work ."" Men cannot quit before
they are hired ; they cannot stop work before they start. We reject,
therefore , the contention that the alleged refusal to furnish employees
should be construed as a strike .9
The other facet of the General Counsel's and charging parties' legal
argument-that the alleged refusal by the Union to furnish workers
constituted "inducement and encouragement of employees in the
course of their employment"-also must fall upon consideration of the
language of the Act. The gist of the argument is that all glazing work
in the Joliet area is performed by a group of "employees " regularly
working for a group of employers, and moving from job to job as
glazing work iC available, and that "'the course of employment' of a
given glazier is his intermittent work for the several contractors he
regularly serves. . . ." Assuming, arguendo, that the glaziers who
work in the Joliet area are employees within the meaning of Section 2
(31 of the Act," there is no evidence that the Respondent Union
induced or encouraged their "refusals ," other than by the existence
' Julius v. Druckrey, 254 N . W. 358, 361 ; Ea parte The Public National Bank of New
York, 278 U. S. 101 (1928 ). See also Payne v. Ostru8 et at., 50 F. 2d 1039, 1042 (C A. 8),
"the plain , obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any
curious, narrow , hidden sense. . .
Thus, in D,Gwrgio Fruit Corporation, 87 NLRB 720; affd. 191 F 2d 642 (C. A. D. C.),
cert . denied 342 U. S. 869 , the Board rejected a substantially similar contention to the
effect that the congressional intent to outlaw certain forms of union conduct should override
the plain statutory language making only labor organizations or their agents subject to the
prohibitions ,of Section 8 (b). The Board refused to find a union guilty of a violation
because it was not a "labor organization " within the meaning of the Act. Similar conduct
ln,ik)at case byFanother union , which was a labor organization as defined in Seetitn "2' (5),
was.found violative.
e Merriam Webster Dictionary , 2d Ed , unabridged.
° Where "a definition of the word is given in the statute, that definition is controlling "
Von Weise v . Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 69 F. 2d 439 ( C. A. 8), cert. denied , 292 U. S.
655. "There would be little use in such a glossary if we were free in despite of it to choose
a meaning for ourselves ." For v. Standard Oil Company, 294 U. S. 87, 96.
"Section 2 ( 3) is as follows : "The term `employee ' shall include any employee, and
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer , unless the Act explicitly
states otherwise , and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of , or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, . . 11
1394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of bylaws. As more fully discussed below, the Union's bylaws, stand-
ing alone, cannot constitute inducement and encouragement within the
meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act. In any event, the words
"in the course of their employment," in our opinion, remove this
particular activity from the ambit of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)'s pro-
hibitions. .The alleged inducement here was not in the course of
employment of any of the glaziers, but occurred before they accepted
employment. We cannot construe "in the course of their employment"
to include employment by several unrelated employers for varying
periods, with no continuity or assurance of renewal at any definite
period or time.
For the above reasons, we find no merit in the General Counsel's
and charging parties' arguments and, like the Trial Examiner, find
that the Respondent has not violated the Act by its alleged refusal to
furnish employees to the contractors in the Joliet area.
2. (a) Like the Trial Examiner, we do not find the bylaws are
per se violations of the statute; nor, unlike the Trial Examiner, do
we find that their use in an illegal manner-as set forth below-made
them illegal. The Union's bylaws, in effect since before August 22,
1947, the effective date of the amendments to the Act, provide that no
member of the Union will be allowed to glaze any sash for any build-
ing in the course of construction or repair in the warehouse of any
glazing contractor, but that such glazing work must be done on the
job site. They provide further that no member will be allowed to
work for any firm or contractor who does not do all his glazing work
on the job site, using only members of the Union. These bylaws have
a clearly legitimate purpose-to provide as much work as possible for
01lazing employees in the Joliet area. Nothing contained therein
prohibits glaziers from working for a "secondary" employer. Thus
the bylaws are not inherently illegal. Nor, in our opinion, did the
illegal use of the bylaws, hereinafter described, operate to convert the
bylaws themselves into a violation. As in the Grauman case," where
as here, the Board found a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) based
in part on the use of a document-an "unfair list" in that case-itself
perfectly legal, ". . . [the bylaws] may indeed be relied upon as
evidence in assessing the propriety of the union's other conduct. How-
ever, the legality of the . . . [bylaws themselves] can no more be
impaired than primary picketing can itself become unlawful because
union agents refer to it in calling a secondary strike."
(b) The General Counsel, who originally excepted to the Trial
Examiner's failure to find that the "fair list" violated Section 8 (b)
(4) (A), conceded at oral argument that the fair.list was not a viola7.
11 Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 87 NLRB 755; enfd. 193 F. 2d 421
(C. A. 10).
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1395
tion, because it was shown only to employers and therefore did not
constitute inducement and encouragement of employees. The charg-
ing parties, however, maintain their initial position-that the list
violated the statute. We agree with the Trial Examiner that, be-
cause it was furnished only to employers, the fair list did not violate
the Act. Although one glazier "knew" of the list, for all that the
records reveals he may have obtained his information from an
employer.
3. We turn now to seriatim examination of the various incidents,
other than those involving a refusal- to furnish glaziers, alleged as
separate violations of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) :
. (a) A majority of the Board agrees with the Trial Examiner that
the Grant Hardware incident, the facts of which are accurately re-
ported in the Intermediate Report, did constitute a violation of Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A). Only in this one respect is the Board not unani-
mous, or is a violation of the Act found.
Briefly, the record shows that three glaziers employed by Joliet
Paint and Glass Company were engaged in installing plate glass store-
fronts for Grant Hardware Company, Mazzucco Construction Com-
pany having been the general contractor on the project, when they ob-
served preglazed sash on the second floor of the building. Berger, one
of the glaziers , called Union Agent Meyers in Chicago and told him
the circumstances. Meyers said: "You know the conditions of the
job and you know the Union rules. Do what is right." 12 The three
glaziers then refused to do the glazing work until Mazzucco agreed
to remove the offending preglazed sash, procure new sash, and have
it glazed by the glaziers. We agree with the Trial Examiner that
in their context, including the existence of the Union's bylaws, Meyers'
response was intended and calculated to induce and encourage Joliet's
employees to cease work. Not because, as our dissenting colleagues
suggest, the Union's ultimate objective was what they term "unappeal-
ing," but simply because an object of its conduce was to cause Joliet
to cease doing business with Mazzucco,13 the conduct of the Respond-
ent Union fell squarely within the 8 (b) (4) (A) prohibitions.
" Hacker, who owned Joliet Paint and Glass Company , was with Berger during the
latter's 'conversation with Meyers , and called Meyers to discuss the situation . Meyers told
Hacker .virtually the same thing he had told Berger; i. e., "Hacker , the glazier's are on the
job. They know the conditions of the job. They know whether they will finish the job
or not."
13 As stated by the Supreme Court in Local 74 , United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, AFL et al. v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 707, ". . . it is enough that one of
the objects of the action complained of was to force Stanley to cancel Watson 's contract.
It does; not immunize such action from Section 8 (b) (4) (A ) to show that it also had
as an. object the enforcement of a rule of the union that its members should not work on
a project on which nonunion men were employed . . . . 11 Although a desire to "make
work" and its implementation do not necessarily violate Section 8 (b) (4), when the
implementation involves requiring one employer to cease doing business with another, its
illegality becomes plain.
1396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) The remaining incidents each generally involve activity by
the Respondent Union similar to that indulged in in the Grant Hard-
ware incident. However, each fails in one or more respects to con-
tain all the elements of an 8 (b) (4) (A) violation.
Thus, the Bocklioldt incident, discussed in the Intermediate Re-
port, contained no overt inducement or encouragement of any em-
ployees by the Respondent Union. The glaziers removed glass from
two preglazed doors without instructions from either their employer
or the Union. Only the mere existence of the bylaws of the Union
could constitute inducement and encouragement. However, as al-
ready indicated, the bylaws do not, standing alone, constitute induce-
ment and encouragement within the meaning of the statutory
prohibitions.
The Ice incident, discussed by the Trial Examiner in his Inter-
mediate Report, falls short of constituting a violation on two grounds:
(1) Any alleged inducement and encouragement could only have been
of one employee, Ahrens, the only employee of Joliet Paint and Glass
at that time; and (2) the only evidence of the Union's having in-
duced and encouraged even that one employee consists of Ahrens'
"suspicion" that he was transferred from Joliet's employ to Porter
Glass because Joliet had sold glass to Roy Ice. The Board held in
the Gould and Preisner case" that the words "concerted" and "em-
ployees in the course of their employment" in Section 8 (b) (4) re-
quire that more than a single employee be involved in order that a
violation be found.
The Sears Roebuck incident, like the Ice incident, lacks proof of
inducement and encouragement or that more than one employee was
involved. We therefore find, unlike the Trial Examiner, that the
Respondents did not thereby violate Section 8 (b) (4) (A). Only
the bare existence of the Union's bylaws could constitute the necessary
inducement and encouragement-a possibility already rejected as to
other incidents in this case, as well as in earlier Board and court
cases.
One incident remains for discussion, concerning which the Trial
Examiner reached no conclusion. The General Counsel and the charg-
ing parties have excepted to the Trial Examiner's failure to find it
violative of the Act. In April 1948, Joliet Glass was requested, by
general contractor Strandberg, to perform certain glazing work on
a. residence. Hacker, of Joliet Glass, asked the glaziers then in his
employ if they would do the glazing; he told them that the job had
preglazed sash installed. The glaziers refused, although Hacker told
them that Hoffman, an alleged agent of the Union, had "0. K.'d" the
34 Denver Building & Construction Trades Council , et at., 82 NLRB 1195; affd . 341 U. S.
675 (reversing 186 F. 2d 326 . C. A. D. C.).
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1397
job. Subsequently, the Chicago office of the union also "0. K.'d"
the job, and it was then done by the glaziers. Clearly, this incident
did not constitute a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) by the Respond-
ents. There is no evidence that the Respondents induced a strike; on
the contrary, they "0. K.'d" the job.
tr. We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons stated in
the Intermediate Report, that the Respondents have not violated
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
The Remedy
Respondent Meyers died after the hearing herein. Therefore, our
order shall not be directed against him.
The Trial Examiner found it unnecessary to determine whether or
not Hoffman, another Respondent, was an agent of the Respondent
Union. A finding of agency, in view of our disposition of the vari-
ous incidents herein on their merits, could not affect any of the results
reached. Furthermore, our order applies, without considering Hoff-
man as a separate respondent, against all agents, of the Respondent
Union, including Hoffman if he is an agent. We agree, therefore,
that no useful purpose would be served by here resolving the question
of Hoffman's individual agency.
We believe that it would best effectuate the policies of the Act,
in view of the nature of the violations herein found, to order the
Respondent Union to cease and desist from using its bylaws in the
illegal manner described in the Grant Hardware incident, and shall
frame our order accordingly. Having rejected the contention of the
General Counsel and the charging parties that the bylaws themselves,
or as applied, violated the Act, we shall also reject their request that
the Board order certain provisions of these bylaws expunged.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10
(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board hereby orders that Respondent Glaziers' Union Local
No. 27 of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper Hangers
of America, and its agents, shall :
1. Cease and desist from applying its bylaws in such a manner as
to induce and encourage the members of Local No. 27, or otherwise
inducing or encouraging the members of Local No. 27, to engage in a
strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
perform services for Joliet Paint and Glass Co., or any other employer,
where an object thereof is to require their employer or any other
employer or other person to cease doing business with any other
215233-53-89
1398 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employer or any person who uses or sells preglazed sash, or has used
or sold preglazed sash.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at its business office in Chicago, Illinois, copies of the
notice attached hereto as an Appendix 15 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, shall,
after being duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members.
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, in
writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges
that the Respondents otherwise violated Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act,
be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
AND IT IS FURTI-LER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges
that the Respondents violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, be,
and it hereby is, dismissed.
MEMBERS HOUSTON and MURDOCK , concurring in part and dissenting
in part :
We agree with the result reached by our colleagues except as to the
Grant Hardware incident, which we believe did not constitute a viola-
tion of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. We would, therefore,
dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
In all respects, however, including the Grant Hardware incident,
we find it unnecessary to consider the particularities of the Respond-
ents' conduct, for, unlike our colleagues, we believe that the Union's
object in all its activities was primary, and that the Union sought to
achieve its objective by primary means."'
The evidence in this case clearly establishes that the Union's objec-
tive was to obtain as much work as possible for its members residing
16 In the event this Ordei is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals
there shall be insetted in the notice , before the words "pursuant to a decision and order"
the words "pursuant to a decree of the United States Court of Appeals, enforcing an order."
16 Our discussion herein is keyed to the Grant Hardware incident, the single instance
of inducement and encouragement found illegal by the majority Our finding that there
was no illegal object is not, however , limited to that incident ; but, applies to the Union's
conduct in all respects revealed by the record
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1399
in the Joliet area. The employees of Joliet Paint and Glass Company
had no dispute with general contractor Mazzucco merely because
preglazed sash had been used on the Grant Hardware project; all
they were interested in was more work for themselves from their own
employer-Joliet. The record does not show that the Union knew,
or was interested in knowing, who manufactured preglazed sash or
whether the manufacturers were unionized, thus negating any possible
inference that the Union's dispute was with the manufacturers.
Mazzucco , the general contractor, did not employ anyone. Further-
more, the employees of Joliet indicated their willingness to work for
Joliet on another Mazzucco job where no preglazed sash had been
used. Thus, the Union could have had no dispute with Mazzucco._
These facts leave only one employer with whom the Union can be said
to have had any dispute-the employer for whom its members were-
working, Joliet Paint and Glass Company. As the only pressure used
was upon Joliet and its employees, the inducement and encouragement
was limited to employees of the primary employer. Even assuming,
therefore, that Union Agent Meyers induced the Joliet employees to
cease work at the Grant Hardware store, such inducement involved
no secondary activity 17
The majority, by finding the inducement and encouragement of
Joliet's employees unlawful, impliedly demiss the existence of a labor
dispute between Joliet and the Union. We believe that an attempt
to obtain as much work as possible from an employer possesses all
the attributes of a labor dispute. The Board has held that an
employer's system of subcontracting work is a proper subject of col-
lective bargaining 18-necessarily a strike against such subcontracting
would be protected and would constitute a "labor dispute." That
situation, like the activities of this Respondent, involves no more than
an effort to obtain more work for incumbent employees.
The difficulty with this case, it seems to us, lies in the nature of the
Union's objective, which might be regarded as unappealing. But
surface appeal , or lack of it, cannot constitute the criterion for judg-
ing conduct vis-a-vis Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. It is in-
cumbent upon us, rather, to scrutinize carefully the conduct by which
a union seeks to foster its object. Illegal conduct is "bad" however
appealing the object; legal conduct is "good" however unappealing
"Because the incident involved only a primary employer , we find it unnecessary to
decide whether or not Meyers in fact "induced and encouraged the Union members."Is The Timken Roller Bearing Company, 70 NLRB 500, reversed on grounds not here rele-
vant, 161 F . 2d 949 (C A. 6).
1400 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the object."' This case exemplifies the latter situation ; even though
the Union's object was not appealing, the means it used to effectuate
that object were primary and hence did not violate Section 8 (b)
(4) (A) of the Act.
Appendix
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our members and employees of JOLIET
PAINT AND GLASS COMPANY, INC., that :
WE WILL NOT, by application of our bylaws or by any other
means, induce or encourage our members to engage in a strike or a
concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform
services for JOLIET PAINT AND GLASS COMPANY, INC., where an
object thereof is to require their employer or any other employer,
to cease doing business with any other employer or person be-
cause such other employer uses, sells, or has used or sold pro-
glazed sash.
GLAZIERS ' UNION LOCAL No. 27 OF
THE BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS,
DECORATORS AND PAPER HANGERS
OF AMERICA,
Labor Organization.
By ----------------------=--------------
(Title of Officer)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the
(late hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 27, 1948, the Joliet Contractors Association, hereinafter called the
Association, by its labor bargaining committee, filed, in its own behalf and for
19 Suppose , for example , that painters , because of noxious fumes of a brand of paint,
strike to compel their employer to cease using that brand , and necessarily, though inci-
dentally, to cease doing business with the manufacturer . The "primary" character of this
employer and strike could not be disputed , and no illegality would be involved. Yet if the
union were to strike some other employer in an effort to force the employer of its members
to cease using the objectionable brand of paint , such action would violate the Act, even
though a desire not to be offended further by paint fumes is not repugnant to technological
development , but has an "appealing" object. By the same token , had the Union herein
induced and encouraged employees of a neutral employer to seek doing business with Joliet,
the object-to insure more work for union members-remaining the same, Section 8 (b)
Q4) (A) would have been violated.
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC . 1401
its members, a first amended charge against Glaziers' Union Local No. 27 of the
Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paper Hangers of America, and George
H. Meyers and John R. Hoffman, its agents, hereinafter referred to as the Re-
spondents, charging that said Respondents were engaged in and are engaging in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, hereinafter called the Act.
On August 30, 1948, certain lumber and building material dealers of Joliet,
Illinois, designated by the name in the margin,' likewise filed a charge aginst Re-
spondents, alleging that the latter were engaged in and are engaging in unfair la-
bor practices within the meaning of the same section of the Act. On October 5,
1948, the Acting Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region (Chicago, Illinois),
issued his order, pursuant to Section 203.33 (b) of the Rules and Regulations
of the National Labor Relations Board, Series 5, as amended, consolidating said
cases. With the issuance of the order last afore-mentioned, the said Acting Re-
gional Director issued a complaint against Respondents, dated October 5, 1948,
alleging that Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in. unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A), Section 8 (b) (4) (A),
and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, the allegations of
which are more fully hereinafter described, alleged in substance that the Re-
spondents "have called, engaged in, and by promises of benefit, coercion, intimi-
dation, directions, orders, threats, `fair' and `unfair' designations, union by-laws,
working rules, regulations and disciplinary measures, and by permitting such
to remain in existence and in effect, having induced and encouraged the employees
of [Joliet Paint and Glass Company, Inc., a member of the Association, herein-
after called] Joliet Glass, and of [Maurice Adler, d/b/a Porter Glass Co., herein-
after called] Porter Glass, to engage in strikes and concerted refusals, in the
course of their employment, to perform any services, an object thereof being to
force and require their employers, and other employers and persons, namely, the
members of the Association and their suppliers of preglazed sash and other pre-
glazed materials (including the Joliet Lumber Companies aforesaid), to cease
using, selling, handling or otherwise dealing in preglazed sash and other preglazed
materials, the products of other manufacturers, and to cease doing business with
such manufacturers and suppliers of preglazed sash and other preglazed materi-
als, and with the owners and building contractors (including members of the Asso-
ciation) who use preglazed sash and other preglazed materials in construction
work, or, who have glazing work done by other than members of Local No. 27."
Copies of the charges,' the order consolidating the cases, the complaint, accom-
panied by notice of hearing thereon, were duly served upon all the parties hereto.
On December 6, 1948, the Respondent filed a "Motion to Dismiss the complaint,
or to strike the complaint or certain designated parts thereof," substantially
on the grounds that : (1) "the activities charged did not and do not affect
I The New Lumber Co., Alexander Lumber Co., I. N. R. Beatty Lumber Co., Joliet
Lumber & Fuel Co., Leach Brothers, Inc., Lyons Brothers Lumber & Fuel Co., Thos. F.
Ryan Co., Hacker-Sime Co., and Joliet Cash and Carry Lumber Co.
2 At the hearing, the General Counsel offered in evidence, as his exhibit 1-C, proof of
service of the charges involved herein. The proof , however , failed to include copies of
such charges . Leave was granted to supply the omissions . On January 3, 1949, the
General Counsel supplied copies of such charges to counsel for the Respondents , the charg-
ing parties , and the Examiner , with the request that they be attached to and made a
part of General Counsel's exhibit 1-C. The request is granted, and it is hereby ordered
that the attachment be made.
1402 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
commerce within the meaning of" the Act; (2) the entire Act, by reason of
the amendments made by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, is un-
constitutional because "its provisions are so mutually interdependent and con-
nected with each other that they form a unified scheme which makes the entire
Act invalid"; (3) the provisions of Sections 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (4) (A)
of the Act are unconstitutional; (4) there is no allegation in the complaint
charging that employees were "restrained or coerced" in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act; (5) "the provision in the Respondent
Union bylaws that all glazing work to be performed by the union members must
be done on the job site is lawful and not in violation of the provisions of
Sections 8 (b) (1) (A) or 8 (b) (4) (A)"; (6) the alleged requests by Re-
spondent Hoffman upon the Association that the general contractors belonging
to the Association agree that all glazing work be done by union members on
each respective job, and that the contractors agree to discontinue the use of
preglazed materials, was lawful and not in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) or
8 (b) (4) (A) ; (7) the alleged communication to Joliet glazing contractors by
Respondent Hoffman of the names of "fair" general contractors was lawful and
not in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) or 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act; (8)
Respondent's alleged refusal to furnish union members to Joliet Glass and
Porter Glass was lawful; (9) the incidents wherein the Respondents allegedly
by means of bylaws, working rules, and regulations and the enforcement thereof,
induced employees of glazing contractors to refuse to perform certain types of
work is not a violation of the Act; (10) the complaint was issued in violation
of Section 10 (b) of the Act; (11) Porter Glass nowhere appears as a party
registering any grievance against Respondents; (12) "the alleged unlawfulness
of activities . . . are expressly declared lawful by Section 20 of the Clayton
Act"; (13) the complaint was instituted by the General Counsel of the Board,
and not by the Regional Director in the name of the Board, as required by
Section 203.15 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board, Series 5, as amended ;
and (14) 16 specified allegations in the complaint are irrelevant, immaterial, re-
dundant, and indefinite.
On December 6, 1948, the Respondents filed an answer, incorporating therein
and pleading as a defense all the matters described in the aforesaid "motion
to dismiss the complaint, or to strike said complaint, or portions thereof."
The answer further pleaded that "the real parties in interest, Joliet Paint and
Glass Company, Inc., Porter Glass Company, and Kaiser, Ducett Company, re-
spectively, did neither file any unfair labor practice charges either for itself
or on behalf of any of its members" ; that no copy of the charges had been served
on the Respondent Hoffman. The answer admitted that Respondent Meyers
"is and has been the Business Manager of Local 27," but with respect to all
other allegations of the complaint, Respondents either expressly denied the
same or claimed to be without knowledge as to the truth of such allegations,
and therefore demanded strict proof thereof.
Pursuant to notice, hearings were held at Joliet, Illinois, and Chicago, Illinois,
on various dates between December 16, 1948, and March 21, 1949, before the
undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner.
At the opening of the hearing, the afore-described motion of Respondents to
dismiss the complaint or to strike the same, or portions thereof, was denied
insofar as it pertained to the matters described in (1) to (4), inclusive, and
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1403
(9) to (13), inclusive, of the above-described summary of said motion! Ruling
was reserved on Respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as it
alleged a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) of the Act, and on their motion to strike
from the complaint the allegations described in (5), (6), (7), and (8) of the
above-described summary of said motion. These matters are disposed of by the
recommendations hereinafter made. At the hearings, the General Counsel, the
Respondents,' the Association, and the other charging parties were represented
by counsel and participated in the hearings.
Prior to the hearing conducted by the undersigned, the General Counsel
instituted an action in the United States Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, pursuant to Section 10 (1) of the Act, entitled
"George J. Bott, Regional Director for Thirteenth Region of the National Labor
Relations Board, Plaintiff vs. Glaziers Union, Local No. 27, etc., George H. Meyers
and John R. Hoffman, its agents, Defendants, Case No. 48-C-1240." At the
hearing before the Trial Examiner herein, it was stipulated that the testimony,
exhibits, and stipulations adduced in said Federal court action "shall stand
as evidence, testimony, exhibits, stipulations and agreements in this present
proceeding (Cases 13-CC-5 and 7), as if all of the proceedings and testimony
[as reported in a transcript of said Federal court action], had been had before
the Trial Examiner in the instant proceeding," reserving, however, to all the
parties, "the right to argue with reference to the [admissibility and effect] of
-the above evidence."
Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to
introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded all parties at the hearing
before the undersigned. Prior to the close of the hearings, the General Counsel
moved to conform the pleadings to the proof with respect to formal matters ;
the motion was granted. At the request of Respondents, and without objection
from the other parties, the time to file briefs was extended to May 13, 1949.
9 (1) of said summary deals with the subject of jurisdiction. The matter being raised
-merely on the pleadings, I deemed them sufficient for that purpose. The question of juris-
diction, as developed by the evidence, is dealt with in a subsequent portion of this Report.
(2) and (3) of the summaiy. dealing with the claimed unconstitutionality of the Statute,
-were denied on the authority of Rite-Poi m Corset Company, Inc., 75 NLRB 174. (4) urges
that the,absence of any allegation charging that employees were "restrained or coerced"
is fatal to the complaint Such an allegation, or its equivalent, is undoubtedly necessary
to sustain a complaint under Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. With respect to a
violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A), however, no allegation of "restraint or coercion" is
-necessary. Under that section it is sufficient to allege that employees were "induced" or
"encouraged" to take the violative action. As will appear hereafter, the allegation charg-
ing a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) is dismissed The matters raised by (9) of said
.summitry are dealt with at greater length in subsequent portions of this Report. By
(10) of said summary, Respondents urge that there is no such things as an "amended
charge" ; that "if a charge . . I.,; not followed by a formal complaint, it may not consti-
tute the basis of any foimal proceedings" , that to allow a complaint on an amended charge
which incorporates matters contained in the original charge, would do violence to the
6 months limitation prescribed by Section 10 (h) of the Act. The contention is without
merit ; "the second charge was clearly an amended and not a substitute charge " Joanna
•Cotton Mills Company, 81 NLRB 1398, Erving Paper Mills. 82 NLRB 434. While it is
true that the original charge pled on June 2, 1948, did not charge Meyers as one of those
engaged in the violative conduct, lie being first mentioned in the amended charge filed
August 27, 1948, that variance is not fatal. The specific acts attributed to Meyers were
all committed within 6 months prior to the service of the amended charge on him. Further-
more, the answer having admitted that "Meyers is and has been the business manager of"
Respondent Union, any tinal order entered herein against the Union would be binding on
Meyers, even if no amended charge had ever been served on him.
i Respondents. however, noted their appearance as a "special appearance" to test the
jurisdiction of the Board
1404 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Within that time, the General Counsel, the Respondents, and the charging
parties filed briefs with the undersigned.
Upon the entire record in the case, including that portion of the Federal court
proceeding which was by stipulation incorporated into this record, I make the
following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION--THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANIES
Joliet Contractors Association, hereinafter called the Association, is a non-
profit corporate membership association, incorporated under the laws of Illinois.
Its membership consists of approximately 22 general contractors and 44 specialty
or subcontractors, all engaged in business in the Joliet, Illinois, area. Among
the association members are the general contractors listed in Appendix A hereto
attached, engaged in the construction and repair of industrial, commercial, and
residential buildings. Said appendix contains detailed information as to the
activities of each of these contractors for a consecutive 12-month period com-
mencing in the latter part of 1947 and ending in the corresponding month of
1948, and covering the following items: (1) Annual volume of business; (2)
value of building materials purchased; (3) value of purchases received directly
from outside Illinois; and (4) percentage of purchases originating outside of
Illinois. Item (4) includes materials which, while purchased from jobbers,
dealers, or manufacturers' agents located within Illinois, were manufactured
outside the State of Illinois.
Among the lumber and builders' supply companies engaged in Joliet, Illinois,
in the sale of lumber, millwork, sash, roofing, preglazed and other building
materials and supplies, are the concerns listed in Appendix B hereto attached.
Said appendix contains detailed information as to the activities of each of
these companies as follows: (1) Total purchases of building materials; (2) per-
centage of all purchases received from out of the State; (4) total purchases of
preglazed materials; (5) percentage of preglazed materials originating outside
the State; and (6) percentage of preglazed materials received directly from
outside Illinois. -
Decisions by the courts and the Board make it unnecessary to indulge in any
lengthy discussion in disposing of Respondents' objections to the jurisdiction of
the Board on the ground that "the activities charged did not, and do not, affect
commerce within the meaning of [the Act]." These decisions were fore-
shadowed by earlier opinions of the Supreme Court which gave content and
emphasis to "the full sweep of constitutional authority" vested in the Board
"in order to protect interstate commerce from the adverse effects of labor
disputes. . . . In this Act, Congress has explicitly regulated not merely trans-
actions or goods in interstate commerce, but activities which in isolation may
be deemed to be merely local but in the interlacings of business across state lines
adversely affect such commerce." Polish National Alliance v. N. L. R. B., 322
U. S. 643, 647; N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 41;
N. L. R. B. v. Faenblatt, 306 U. S. 601.
Guided by these milestones, the circuit courts of appeals have not hesitated in
sanctioning the exercise of jurisdiction by the Board over persons engaged in
the construction industry. Shore v. Building Trades Council, 173 F. 2d 678,
(C. A. 3) ; United Brotherhood of Carpenters, et al., v. Sperry, et al., 179 F. 2d
863 (C. A. 10) ; N. L. R. B. v. Austin Co., 165 F. 2d 592 (C. A. 7). For the
detailed rationale which underlies the Board's exercise of jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings involving construction work by general contractors, notwithstanding
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1405
objections similar to those urged here by Respondent, see Ira Watson Co., 80
NLRB 533; Wadsworth Building Co., 81 NLRB 802; Samuel Langer, 82 NLRB
1028.` ,
Because the sale of lumber and mill work "is closely related to the building
,construction industry," it was also the judgment of the Board that the policy
of the Act will be effectuated by exercising jurisdiction over labor relations
of those engaged in that business and occupation. National Lumber Co., 82
NLRB 565; Oettinger Lumber Co., 81 NLRB 632; Longhorn Sash & Door Co.,
79 NLRB 1430; J. H. Patterson Co., 79 NLRB 355.
Application of the principles enunciated by the foregoing cases to the activi-
ties of the contractors and companies involved herein can lead only to the
conclusion that a disruption of their activities would seriously affect the flow
of commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and I
so find.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent, Glaziers' Union Local No 27 of the Brotherhood of Painters,
Decorators and Paper Hangers of America, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. Its jurisdiction extends to and includes
the city of Joliet, Illinois.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Union's bylanos and rules
For a long time prior to and ever since the enactment of the Labor Relations
Management Act, 1947, the members of the Respondent Union deemed it to be
in their economic interests not to permit any of them to work on projects that
used preglazed sash e To make the prohibition effective, the Union adopted
certain' "Bylaws and Working Rules." Article XVI, section 1, of said bylaws,
reads as follows :
-No member of this Union will be allowed to glaze any sash for any building
in the course of construction or repair within the jurisdiction of Glaziers'
Local No. 27, in the warehouse of any glazing contractor. All sash and
glazing work must be done on each respective job site or building.
Article XVII, section 1, prohibits union members from working "for any firm
or contractor who has not signed this agreement or lived up to the provisions
of same." Article XVIII, section 9, incorporates therein the provisions of an
agreement made on May 1, 1947, between the Union and the glazing contractors
of Chicago. By articles VI and VII of that agreement, the glazing contractors
agree that none but members of the Union will be employed by the glazing
contractors to set or glaze all types of glass and mirrors contracted for by said
contractors, and that all glass and glazing work undertaken by them shall be
glazed on each respective job my members of the Union. Article XVIII, section
6 Walter J. Mentzer, 82 NLRB 389, is not inconsistent with the cases just cited. Juris-
diction was there declined because "the operations of Mentzer, a small [ plastering] con-
tractor [annual gross income, $33,000], are essentially local in character, and . . . their
interruption by a labor dispute could, at most, have only very remote and insubstantial
effect on commerce "
6 The term "preglazed sash" as used in this Report includes doors, windows, etc., in
which the glass or mirrors have been installed in frames elsewhere than on the site of
the building in which the same are to be used ; "open sash" are doors, window frames,
etc., in which the glass or mirror has not yet been installed.
1406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5, of the bylaws provides that "any member refusing to leave job when ordered
to do so by the Business Agent, or failing to remain away from job until
ordered back by the Business Agent, shall be fined or expelled as the Local may
decide."
B. The proposed contracts with the general contractors and the glazing
contractors
Though the foregoing conditions had been adhered to in the city of Chicago
for many years, insofar as this record shows, no attempt was made by the
Union, prior to 1947, to make said working conditions effective in the Joliet
area. In March of that year a meeting was called in Joliet and was attended
by Max Glass, the Union's vice president, several representatives of the Associa-
tion, representatives of Joliet Glass and Porter Glass (the only two glazing con-
tractors in Joliet), and representatives of the Joliet Building Trades Council.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a ,contract between the contractors
and the Union. Max Glass informed the meeting that the Union "had at-
tempted to eliminate the use of preglazed sash in the Joliet area for some
time and that the time had now come when they were definitely going, to
eliminate it. If [the glazing contractors] were going to employ union glaziers
[on their] jobs [they] would have to stop the use of preglazed sash, and that
they [the Union] were going to enforce that if it was necessary to police the
area." No agreement was reached at that time.
A further meeting was held in J1zne 1947 at the office of the Union in Chicago,
attended by George H. Meyers, its business manager for 27 years and-Its-presi-
dent for an additional 14 years, Max Glass, Respondent Hoffman, and several
contractor members of the Association. The contractors complained that the
working conditions and rules outlined by Mr. Glass at the previous meeting
would work a hardship on them. Either Max Glass or Meyers informed the
contractors that "these conditions were being enforced in Chicago, and that
[the contractors] would definitely have to live up to those rules in Joliet if
[they] were to get union glaziers." One of the contractors asked for a draft of'
the contract proposed by the Union and Meyers gave him a copy of the agree-
ment in use in Chicago between the Union and certain glazing contractors in
that area. This contract was identical in terms with the contract incorporated,
into the Union's bylaws and working rules afore-mentioned. Again the meet-
ing adjourned without reaching agreement.
A third meeting was held in Joliet in November 1947 between Hoffman and
a committee of the Association. The contractors inquired of Hoffman whether
he "had any communication from Chicago changing the contract, changing the
working rules and working conditions of the glaziers." Hoffman replied that
he had received no such advice. Upon being informed that the contractors had
received legal advice that it would now be illegal for them to sign such a con-
, tract, Hoffman replied, "I have nothing to do with the law part of the thing,
but I can not let you have men unless you agree to these rules and this contract."
On January 5, 1948, Hoffman wrote the Association requesting that it sign
the contract afore-mentioned and informing the contractors that unless it was-
signed and returned by February 1, 1948, that "Glaziers Local 27 will be unable
to furnish union glaziers to nonsignatories of this agreement."
Shortly after February 1, 1948, the Association asked Hoffman to call another
meeting with the Union "to see if they could negotiate a contract that the
[contractors] could sign and be within the law." Hoffman arranged for such
a meeting and it was held in Joliet early in February 1948. The meeting was-
attended by Hoffman, W. A. Welbourn, assistant business representative of
the Union and its recording secretary since 1921 or 1922, Mr. Hacker of Joliet
GLAZIERS ' UNION LOCAL NO. 27) ETC. 1407
Glass, Maurice Alder of Porter Glass, Ahrens, Meurer, and Fumigalli, three
journeymen glazier members of the Union, and several members of the Joliet
Building Trades Council. The proposed contract was discussed article by
article. No apparent insurmountable obstacle was reached until the discussion
of preglazed and open sash came before the meeting. On this point Welbourn
remained adamant and said that while the Union might "forgive" the past use
of preglazed sash, "from this time on, there could be no more preglazed windows
used by contractors if they expected to have the use of journeymen glaziers on
their jobs. That is final." The meeting thereupon adjourned without formal
termination and "everybody got up and went home."
C. The "fair" and "unfair" lists
Further evidence of the Union's determination to make its campaign against
the use of preglazed sash effective is provided by its use and publication of.a
so-called "fair" list of contractors on whose projects the Union would permit
its members to work, all others to be deemed "unfair." The list was first
promulgated orally. In the fall of 1947, Respondent Hoffman told Hacker of
Joliet Glass that the latter would not be able to work for any general con-
tractor that did not sign a contract with the Union. In January 1948, Hoffman
called Hacker and told him that from then on Hacker could "work for no one
only Paul O'Neil' . . . because he is the only person that is using open sash."
Three or four days later, Hoffman called Hacker again and advised that the
names of Arnold Welsch, Ernie Swenson, Al Bockholdt, and Vic Mazzuco could
be added to the list of eligible contractors for whom Joliet Glass could work.
Because oral additions and deletions were being made on the list from time
to time, Hacker asked Hoffman to send him "something more definite to work
on." Hoffman promised to do so by sending Hacker a booklet on which he
(Hoffman) would check the contractors for whom Joliet Glass could work. A
day or two later, on May 25, 1948, Hacker received part of a "Union Contractors
Directory, 1947," issued by the Building and Constructions Trades Council of
Will County (in which Joliet is located), on which were checked the names of
14 general contractors. Attached to the booklet was a note in Hoffman 's hand-
writing, reading as follows: "Friend Geo.-all names mark (sic) are O. K., as
we go along will notify of any changes."
D. The Union's alleged refusal to furnish glaziers and the inducement or
encouragement of its members not to work on "unfair" fobs
(1) In November 1947, Magnus T. Strandberg, general contractor and member
of the Association, was engaged in erecting a one-story building for the Reliable
Poultry Company. Strandberg sublet the glazing work, which involved no pre-
glazed sash, to Joliet Glass. Hacker asked Strandberg to see Hoffman before
the glazing work was commenced, and Strandberg thereupon went to Hoffman's
office. The latter showed Strandberg a contract with the Union, similar
to that employed with the Chicago contractors to which reference has
heretofore been made, and asked Strandberg to sign it. Strandberg declined
and was told by Hoffman that if he did not sign the contract, "the Glaziers"
would not permit the installation of the glass.
. (2) During a week end in February 1948, a fire occurred on the premises of
the Joliet Mattress Company, owned by one Sohn. On the following Monday
morning, Sohn called Hacker of Joliet Glass and asked him to replace windows
broken by the fire in a part of the building that was still intact. Hacker com-
' Sometimes referred to in the record as Paul G. O'Neil or Paul O'Neil.
1408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plied and the temporary glazing was completed. Sohn then employed Matt
Gregory, a general contractor and member of the Association, to repair the re-
mainder of the damage caused by the fire. About 3 weeks after the first glass
was installed by Joliet Glass, Sohn called Hacker and asked him to furnish
the glazing for the remainder of the building which was then being repaired
by Gregory. Because Gregory was then not on the "fair" list, Hacker called
Hoffman, apprised him of the foregoing facts, and said : "I want you to know
that I am working for Sohn, the owner, not for Gregory. As you know, Gregory
is not on the list of contractors that I can work for. Can I do it?" Hoffman
replied, "George, if you are telling me the truth that you are working for the
owner, I can see no reason why working for the owner on this particular job
would be wrong." Hacker then sent his glazier, Ahrens, to complete the glazing,
no part of which involved the use of preglazed sash.
(3) In the same month, February 1948, Joliet Glass was given another fire-
repair job by one Costa. The carpentry work was awarded by Costa to Walter
Harshbarger, a general contractor, who was not then on the union "fair" list.
Because of that fact, Hacker called Hoffman to ascertain if his men could work
on the job. Hoffman replied that he "would have to get an O.K out of Chicago
on that." Hoffman called back shortly thereafter and informed Hacker that he
"could not work with Walter Harshbarger on that job."
(4) On or about March 26, 1948, Gregory was engaged in building a group of
9 or 10 houses, in most of which preglazed sash had been installed. It became
necessary, however, to employ a glazier to install some thermopane basement
sash and picture windows in several of these houses. Gregory gave the order
for this work to Porter Glass who accepted the contract. About a month or two
later, when the houses were ready for the installation of the glass, Porter told
Gregory he could not do the work because the latter was then on the "unfair"
list.
(5) A similar occurrence took place in April 1948, when Hoffman refused to
sanction the use of Joliet Glass employees on a residence general contractor
Stonitsch was building because the latter was using preglazed sash.
(6) In May 1948, when Joliet Glass had a contract with general contractor
Roy Ice, a member of the Association, to furnish and install plate glass on a
job that the latter had for one Honiotes, Hoffman told Hacker that because Ice
"has never agreed to use open sash, [Hacker could not] install this glass on the
job."
(7) In May 1948, Sverre Ugland, also a general contractor and member of the
Association, had a contract to remodel the Brewster Printing Plant and awarded
the glass contract to Joliet Glass. Because Ugland was not then on the "fair"
list, Hacker called Hoffman and was told by him that he (Hacker) could not
"install glass for Ugland, because he has not agreed to use open sash yet."
(8) In April 1948, general contractor Bockholdt was engaged in remodeling
a gasoline station for one William Smithe.8 Bockholdt's carpenter had previously
installed two preglazed doors but Joliet Glass was engaged to set some large
thermopanes in open sash. Hacker sent Ahrens, his steady employee, and three
glaziers obtained through the Respondent Union's office in Chicago, to set the
thermopanes. After one of the thermopanes was installed, the glaziers, without
instruction from Hacker, removed the glass from the preglazed doors hung by
the carpenters, scraped the back putty, put the glass back in the doors, and re-
placed the molding.
(9) On or about June 17, 1948, Hacker received an order from the Mazzucco
Construction Company to install a number of glass plates in 2 storefronts of
8'Sometimes referred to in the record as William Smythe.
GLAZIERS ' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1409
the building occupied by the Grant Hardware Company. Hacker secured 3
glaziers (Berger, the foreman, Freislinger, and Coyne) from the office of the
Respondent Union in Chicago to perform this job in Joliet. After the glaziers
had installed 1 plate, they observed some preglazed sash on the second floor of the
building. In reply to questions by the glaziers, Hacker informed them that
he did not know who had installed this preglazed sash. After the glaziers
installed a second plate glass, Hacker and Berger went to the second floor
and found 14 windows with preglazed sash. Berger then advised Hacker that he
would have to report the situation to Chicago. The 2 men thereupon went
to a drug store and Berger made a telephone call. Upon its completion, Hacker
and Berger returned to the job, and Berger said to the other glaziers : "I just
called Chicago and talked to Meyers. I explained the situation on the job_
Meyers told me, `you are on the job. You know the conditions of the job and
you know the union rules. Do what is right.'" The glaziers all agreed to leave-
the job. Although the owner of the building told the glaziers that the glazed-
windows were in the building when he had purchased it 2 years before, the
glaziers still continued in the refusal to work. Hacker thereupon called Meyers
in Chicago, discussed the situation with him, and was told by Meyers : "Hacker.
the glaziers are on the job. They know the conditions of the job. They know
whether they will finish the job or not." By this time, Victor Mazzucco, the
general contractor, arrived at the scene. After a discussion with the owner.
Mazzucco told the glaziers that he would smash out the glass in the preglazed
sash and that the glaziers could do the entire job. The glaziers did not give
their consent to such an arrangement: But finally, Mazzucco promised to remove
the preglazed sash, have new open sash delivered, and have the same glazed by
the glaziers. This was agreeable to the men and they departed to work on an-
other job for Mazzucco. In the afternoon of the same day, the open sash to
replace the preglazed windows was delivered and installed on the Grant Hard-
ware Company job. The glaziers thereupon glazed all the sash on both floors of
the building.
(10) In mid-summer of 1948, Porter Glass received a contract from Kaiser-
Ducett Co., a Chicago general contractor, to do all the outside glazing work
on a new store that was being built for Sears Roebuck & Company in Joliet.
On or about July 14, 1948, Leonard Ahrens, a union member then in the employ
of Porter Glass, was sent to the job to begin the glazing work. After a day
or two, Ahrens requested of Porter that he not be sent back on that job because
preglazed interior showcases were being delivered in the store. Maurice Adler,
president of Porter Glass, called Respondent Meyers at the Union's office in
Chicago. When he told Meyers that the glaziers walked off the job and would
not go back to work unless the "cases in the interior were glazed union," Meyers
asked him if he could do the interior work, to which Adler replied that he
could, if Meyers would supply him with men. Meyers told Adler that he
would let him know.what to do. Thereafter, Adler made arrangements with
the owners and the contractor to do all the interior glazing work, including
the showcases. The entire job was subsequently performed. Ahrens, who
had stopped working on a Wednesday or Thursday, returned to the job with
the other glaziers the following Monday. As the job progressed and more men
were needed, Adler obtained them by calling the office of the Respondent Union
in Chicago.'
O The complaint pleaded and the record contains testimony of other incidents in
addition to those narrated in D (1) to (10) inclusive, supra Such testimony, however, is
merely cumulative as to conduct which I hereafter find not to be violative of Section 8
(b) (4) (A). For that reason , no detailed findings have been made as to such similar
events.
1410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. Respondents' inducement and encouragement of Ahrens to leave employment
of Joliet Glass
As previously indicated, Joliet Glass and Porter Glass were the only glazing
contractors in Joliet, a city having a population of approximately 42,000.
Both contractors employed only glaziers who were members of the Respondent
Union, and there were but 4 glaziers who resided in Joliet. Joliet Glass em-
ployed 1 resident glazier regularly, and called on the Union in Chicago for
additional men when necessary. Porter Glass steadily employed the other 3
resident glaziers and likewise called on the Union in Chicago for more men
if the need arose.
Ahrens went to work for Joliet Glass in the summer of 1946 and continued in
that employment until June 1, 1948. In mid-May 1948, general contractor
Roy Ice was engaged in remodeling the Honiotes Food Market, in which no
preglazed sash was used. Ice discussed with Hacker a proposal to have the
latter furnish and install nine plates of glass. Hacker, in the presence of Ice,
called Hoffman and asked him whether he (Hacker) could install the glass.
Hoffman replied "George, [Roy Ice] has never agreed to use open sash. You
cannot install this glass on the job." Ice was put on the wire and talked to
Hoffman, apparently without avail. Ten to fifteen minutes later Hoffman
called Hacker again and repeated the admonition that Hacker refrain from
installing the glass on Ice's job. Hacker did not install the glass, but instead
sold it to Ice, who made other arrangements for its installation. Two days after
the sale, Hoffman called Hacker and inquired whether the latter had sold the
glass to Ice. Hacker answered affirmatively, to which Hoffman replied : "You
have got me in a barrel.of trouble now " Prior to that conversation, Hacker
had informed Ahrens that he was going to sell the glass to Ice. Thereafter, on
Saturday, May 29, Ahrens called Hacker, told him he would not report for work
on the following Tuesday (the next workday, Monday, was observed as Decora-
tion Day), and said: "I have been called into the Glaziers' Union in Chicago.
I will come to work as soon as I get through there." Ahrens went to Chicago
on Tune 1, where Meyers told him that he had been called to the union office
to find out if he (Ahrens) was on the Honiotes job, to which Ahrens replied in
the negative. Meyers wanted to know who sold the glass. Ahrens told him
and also informed him that glass was being sold by Hacker "and not being set
by the glaziers." Meyers then called Adler of Porter Glass, in Joliet, on the
telephone and made arrangements for Ahrens to go to work for Adler.
At about 4 p. in. of June 1, Ahrens came to Hacker's office and told him he
was quitting. Hacker, reminding Ahrens of the friendly relationship that had
existed between them, asked for an explanation. Ahrens seemed reluctant to
discuss the matter, but finally said : "I have been taken out of the job by Meyers.
He has placed me over in the Porter Glass Company shop." Upon being further
pressed as to why he had been ordered to leave Joliet Glass, Ahrens replied,
"George, you sold the glass to Roy Ice. There is an unwritten rule in the
Union you cannot do that and I suspect that is the reason I have been taken
out of your shop." Ahrens went to work the following day for Porter Glass,
who was cooperating with the Union in the enforcement of its rule against the
use of preglazed sash.
IV. CONCLUDING FINDINGS
A. The general objective of the Union
There can be no question, if indeed it was not tacitly admitted, that one of
the organizational objectives of the Union was to do all within its power to
GLAZIERS ' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1411
prevent the use of preglazed sash in the area over which it had jurisdiction.
This is apparent from its bylaws to which its members owed adherence, from
its contract of many years standing with the glazing contractors of Chicago and
which it sought to impose on the general contractors in Joliet, and from the
testimony of its president for the past 30 years. Although the Union attempted
to justify its position against the use of preglazed sash on another ground,''
I believe it was its purpose, as it could legitimately and appropriately be, to
provide as much work as possible for its members resident in the Chicago area.
Because, however, a substantial part, if not most, of the sash that was being
used in Joliet was procured from outside the Chicago area, it could achieve its
goal only by insisting that no preglazed sash, whether assembled by machine
or by hand, be used in the area over which it had jurisdiction.
B. The scope of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
The general objective of the Union being a legitimate one;1 more than that
must be proved to make out the case which the General Counsel has pleaded
herein as a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. The Taft-Hartley
Act which brought the section into the Act, while greatly reducing the economic
weapons available to labor, does not make it illegal for the Union, under all
circumstances, to make the desired prohibition effective. Thus, the Union
could, without violating the statute, induce and encourage its members to en-
gage in a primary strike, or refrain from manufacturing preglazed sash, as a
means of compelling their employer to have his sash glazed on the job where it
is to be finally installed. "Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was [not] intended to curb
traditional primary action by labor organizations ;-the section does not outlaw
any of the primary means which unions traditionally use to press their demands
on employees." 11 The section, however, limits the economic area within and
the means by which the Union, or its agents, may seek to effectuate their other-
wise legal objectives under the Act. By the relevant portions of that section
it is made illegal for a union, or its agents, "to engage in, or to induce or en-
courage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or concerted re-
fusal in the course of their employment to use-or otherwise handle or work on
any-articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an
object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring-any employer or other person to
cease using, selling, handling-or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person ." It seems clear, therefore, from the language of the statute, abun-
dantly suported by its legislative history, that in enacting this section, Congress
deprived labor of the right to resort to the secondary boycott in the furtherance
of its objectives.
The Board recently had occasion, in a case similar to the one under con-
sideration, to summarize the two factors which must combine to warrant a
finding of an unfair labor practice under the quoted section. "(1) The alleged
activities must have as an object the forcing or requiring any employer, inter
alia, to cease using the products of any manufacturer or to cease doing business
10 The Union's president testified that its motive in adopting this policy was that pre-
glazed sash, being primarily the result of a machine operation , was inferior in quality to
sash glazed by hand. If that were its motive, it would seem to me that there was no
justification for insisting that there be no preglazed sash , because that type of sash does
not preclude sash glazed by hand. The assigned goal of a better product would be attained
by insisting that all glazing be done by hand , without regard for its ultimate designation.
11 To provide as much work as possible for its members in the Chicago area.
12 Oil Workers International Union and The Piire Oil On.. Rd NLIR 315.
1412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with any person ; and (2 ) the activities must constitute inducement and en-
couragement of employees in the course of their employment within the meaning
of Section 8 (b) (4) (A ). The absence of either factor will defeat the charges
thereunder." '3
C. The Union's refusal to furnish glaziers upon request and the demands
upon the contractors
The crux of the complaint against the Respondents is that they induced and
encouraged employees of Joliet Glass and Porter Glass to engage in concerted
refusals , in the course of their employment , to perform any services , an object
thereof being to force and require their employers , and other employers and
persons, to cease using preglazed sash, the product of other manufacturers. To
substantiate that theory of his case , the General Counsel in paragraph 5 of
his complaint alleges that a large number of incidents , and "each of them,"
pleaded seriatim in subparagraphs "( a)" to "(t )," inclusive , constitute viola-
tions of Section 8 (b) (4) (A ) of the Act . Thus, for example, numerous allega-
tions plead that : ( 1) the Union has refused , on request , on a number of occasions,
to furnish member glaziers to "unfair" employers or for work on "unfair" jobs ;
(2) the Union, on various dates, demanded of the contractor members of the
Association that they refrain from using preglazed sash , that they sign a con-
tract with the Union to the same effect, and that failing to do both, the'Union
would refuse to furnish member glaziers on any job in which such recalcitrant
or defaulting contractors were engaged ; and (3 ) Respondents on various oc-
casions informed the glazing subcontractors that the latter could not accept
contracts on jobs that used preglazed sash or work for general contractors who
were not on the Union 's "fair" list. While these incidents have evidentiary value
in proving the General Counsel 's case, standing alone, they do not, as he pleads,
constitute violations of the section under consideration"
As to the first group of allegations that the Union has refused to furnish mem-
ber glaziers to "unfair " employers , or for work on "unfair" jobs, I find nothing
in Section 8 (b) (4) (A ) which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union,
or its agents, to initially refuse the services of its members to "unfair" con-
tractors , or on "unfair" jobs, or indeed for any reason found satisfactory to
the Union . The invoked section of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents to induce or encourage "the employees of any employer
to engage in-a concerted refusal in the coarse of their employment-to perform
any service" where the object of such refusal is proscribed by statute. The
factual situation under consideration here antedates an employer-employee re-
lationship . True, the persons alleged to have been induced and encouraged are
members of the Union, but they are not yet "employees of any employer."
Furthermore , not having reached that status, their "concerted refusal" could
not be "in the course of their employment ." "Course of employment" contem-
plates an existing employment relationship to be disrupted by the inducement.
13 Unroted Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, District Council of Kansas
City, Missouri, et al and Wadsworth Building Covnpanv . Inc, 81 NLRB 802
14 Proof of these incidents , though unnecessarily pleaded, have evidentiary value in
proving the over-all objective of the Union and its effect as a factor in determining whether
Respondents induced and encouraged the secondary boycott herein found , and I have so
considered them.
GLAZIERS ' UNION LOCAL NO. 27 , ETC. 1413
Such persons are therefore not yet amenable to the proscriptions found in
Section 8 (b) (4) (A).'6
As to the second group of allegations, viz, demands made on contractors to
refrain from using preglazed sash and that they sign contracts agreeing to so
restrict themselves, I am likewise of the opinion that these allegations do not
constitute violations of the Act. Standing in isolation, as they do for present
consideration, it was not a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) for the Union
to make such demands on the contractors. As previously noted, the applicable
section declares it to be an unfair labor practice to induce or encourage "em-
ployees" to engage in the proscribed conduct. The section does not make it un-
lawful for a union , or its agents, to induce or encourage "employers" to cease
using preglazed sash or merely to demand that they sign contracts agreeing to
abstain from such a practice le
As to the third group of allegations pertaining to the directions given to the
glazing subcontractors, I likewise find such conduct not proscribed by Section
8 (b) (4) (A). The prohibition of the section is specifically limited to the
inducement and encouragement of "employees of any employer" to engage in a
secondary boycott. The section imposes no prohibition against the inducement
or encouragement which a union may direct towards an "employer." It is
therefore clear that there is a notable "absence" of the second factor which
the Board, in the Wadsworth ease, ruled must be present to warrant a finding
of an unfair labor practice under the section in question-"the activities must
constitute inducement and encouragement of employees in the course of their
employment within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)." (Emphasis
supplied.)
D. The "fair" and "unfair" lists
The complaint charges that Respondents violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) when
it "notified said Joliet Glazing Contractors of the names of various general
contractors in the Joliet Area who were approved, or `fair,' and for whose
projects Local 27 would furnish the glazing contractors with glazier employees
and permit its members to work." Having found that Respondents did not
violate Section 8 (b) (4) (A) by refusing to initially furnish member glaziers
for work on jobs of "unfair" general contractors, I likewise find that there was
no violation of the section by the promulgation of the so-called "fair" and "unfair"
general contractors list. The list was furnished to Joliet Glass only to advise
it that the Union would not furnish its members as prospective employees for
employment at an "unfair" job. The list was not used, as it was in the Wads-
worth and Osterink cases cited by the General Counsel, " as a means of inducing
and encouraging employees in the course of their employment to withhold their
services in order to force or require their employer to cease doing business with
the listed employer." I therefore find that the Respondents did not violate
w I am not unmindful of Section 2 (3) of the Act which defines "employee" as follows :
"The term `employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees
of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, ... ' The connota-
tion I have given to the term "employee" Is consistent with the permitted statutory
differentiation.
16 The allegations of the complaint and the supporting evidence seeking to charge Hoffman
as an agent of the Union with conduct allegedly violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was
confined to conduct which I find not to be violative of that section. I therefore find it
unnecessary to pass on the question of whether Hoffman was an agent of the Union within
the meaning of the Act so as to make the latter responsible for his conduct.
215233-53-90
1414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) by the promulgation and maintenance of the "unfair"
lists more particularly described in III , C, supra.
E. The secondary boycott
The complaint, however, does charge that the Union and its agents induced
and encouraged employees of Joliet Glass and Porter Glass to engage in the
secondary boycott proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act and I find
substantial evidence in the record to support that allegation.
1. The Union's bylaws and rules
Even after enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, it was not, per se, a violation of
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) for the Union to keep in effect, for all purposes, its long
standing bylaws and rules 17 which had for their objective the prohibition
against the use of preglazed sash. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act, however,
was "aimed at eliminating all secondary boycotts and their concomitant activi-
ties which Congress thought were unmitigated evils and burdensome to commerce.
It was Congress' belief that labor disputes should be confined to the business
immediately involved and that unions should be prohibited from extending them
to other employers by inducing and encouraging the latters' employees to exert
economic pressure in support of their disputes."" By making it unlawful
to "induce or encourage" employees to engage in a secondary boycott, Congress
used the broadest generic terms to bring within the sweep of its proscription
"the whole gamut of union activities by which such boycotts are achieved."
Thus, notwithstanding the apparent guarantee to engage in peaceful picketing
as an exercise of free speech, and the judicial protection generally accorded
such activity, the Board and a number of courts have held that Congress can
constitutionally, and in fact did, prohibit the prosecution of secondary boycotts,
by speech as well as by other methods." Similarly, the Board has held that the
mere circulation of an "unfair list" of contractors among union employees,
"irrespective of whether or not a threat of discipline inhered" therein, consti-
tutes a form of inducement and encouragement now outlawed by Section 8 (b)
(4) (A) " I cannot draw a distinction between the effect which "unfair" lists
have on the recipients thereof, and the application of the Union's bylaws, by
which its members are bound, in the instant proceeding.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the section prohibits all peaceful means
of inducement and encouragement in furtherance of the secondary boycott
proscribed therein, and that this prohibition includes the application by a union
of its bylaws as an aid to the enforcement thereof.
1' See III , A, supra - -
is United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, et at and Wadsworth
Building Company, Inc, et at., 81 NLRB 802.
19 Wadsworth Building Company , supra ; Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union,
Local 388 V. LeBaron, 171 F. 2d 331 (C A. 9) ; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America v. Sperry, 170 F 2d 863 (C A. 10) ; Douds v. Local 1250, Retail-Whole-
sale Department Store Union, 170 F. 2d 700 (C. A. 2).
20 Wadsworth Building Company, supra; Bricklayers, Stone Masons, Marble Masons, and
Tile Layers Benevolent & Protective Union No. 1 and Osterink Construction Co., 82 NLRB
228.
GLAZIERS' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1415
I therefore find that the application of the bylaws and rules of the Union as an
aid to the enforcement of a secondary boycott by employees of any employer are
in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act"
2. The Grant Hardware Company incident
I find that the Union and Meyers, in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the
Act, induced and encouraged Foreman Berger and Glaziers Freislinger and
Coyne, employees of Joliet Glass, to engage in a concerted refusal, in the course
of their employment, to work on the Grant Hardware Company building then
being remodeled by the Mazzucco Construction Company, and that the,object of
said refusal was to force or require Mazzucco to cease doing work on buildings in
which preglazed sash had been installed 22 Respondents claim that the refusal
was the voluntary decision and act of the individual workmen themselves, and
not 'the result of any inducement or encouragement by Respondents. The evi-
dence, however, compels a contrary finding. Significantly, the workmen did not
stop work as soon as they realized that preglazed sash had been installed in the
building. It was only after Berger called Meyers in Chicago, told him about the
preglazed sash, and was instructed by Meyers that he (Berger) "know[s] the
union rules" that the men refused to continue the work. I therefore find that
the Union and Meyers provided the inducement and encouragement proscribed by
the Act.
3. The Sears Roebuck incident
I likewise find that the Union and Meyers, on or about August 1, 1948, induced
and encouraged Leonard Ahrens to cease work on the Sears Roebuck job because
preglazed interior showcases were being delivered for use on the same premises.2d
Though Ahrens testified that be voluntarily requested of his employer that he
not be sent back on that job, it would be extremely unrealistic to forego giving
effect to Ahrens' termination of employment with Joliet Glass about 6 weeks
21 It is immaterial that these bylaws were adopted prior to the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act. The inducement and encouragement they furnished to further a secondary
boycott after August 22, 1947, "was subject to the interdiction of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)."
Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and Ira A. Watson Co,
SO NLRB 533 ; Bricklayers, Stone Masons, Marble Masons, and Tile Layers Benevolent and
Protective Union No 1 and Osterink Construction Co., 82 NLRB 228; Local 1796, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, A. F. of L. and Montgomery Fair Co.,
82 NLRB 211.
22 See III, D , ( 9), supra. Respondents in their brief argue that "No bylaws , working
rules and regulations were in existence which prohibited the installation of preglazed sash
or the performing of work in those cases where preglazed sash had been previously installed
on the job site." While a literal reading of article XVI, section 1, of said bylaws lends
color to such a view, consideration of the remainder of the bylaws and the interpretation
thereof by its officers compel a contrary conclusion . Thus, article VII, section 1, specifically
prohibits any union member from working for any firm or contractor who has not "lived up
to the provisions" of the bylaws, the preceding article of which requires that " all sash
and glazing work must be done on each respective job site or building." This can only
mean that union members are not, under its bylaws , permitted to work for a contractor
who, in the past has used, or is currently using, preglazed sash. That it was so interpreted
by the Union is made evident by the statement of Welbourn , the Union ' s assistant business
representative, at the meeting with the contractors, attended by three glazier members of
the Union , in February 1948, in which Welbourn stated that the Union might "forgive the
past use of preglazed sash" if the contractors would sign a contract to abstain from its use
thereafter.
13 See III, D , ( 10), supra.
1416 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
earlier, because, in Ahrens' opinion, with which Meyers agreed, Joliet Glass had
not abided by the Union' s rules 2'
I therefore find that the Union and Meyers induced and encouraged Ahrens'
work stoppage at the Sears Roebuck job and that such conduct was in violation
of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) ?6
4. The transfer of employment by Ahrens
I also find that the Union and Meyers violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) by in-
ducing and encouraging Ahrens to leave his job with Joliet Glass and to go
work instead for Porter Glass2B There can be no question but that Meyers
induced and encouraged Ahrens to engage in a "refusal . . to perform serv-
ices" for Joliet Glass. Nor do I have any hestitation in finding that the "object"
thereof was to "force or require [Joliet Glass] to cease doing business with"
general contractor Roy Ice. Respondents in their brief deliberately avoid dis-
cussing the "merits" of this incident, but contend that because only one work-
man was involved the conduct is not violative of Section 8 (h) (4) (A) They
argue that because the section makes it an unfair labor practice for a union
to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employee to engage
in, a strike or a concerted refusal to handle certain goods, "that the Union will
be guilty of an unfair labor practice only if more than one employee is involved."
A similar contention was rejected by the Board in the Wadsworth case, supra,
where, as here, "the Respondents . . . also induced and encouraged other em-
ployees to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in order to compel [their
employer] to cease doing business with [any other person]. The Respondents'
conduct in calling [the single employee] off his job was part of these total activi-
ties." Under these circumstances I conclude that the Union and Meyers violated
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act by calling Ahrens off his job with Joilet Glass.
F. Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
The General Counsel also pleads that each of the acts alleged to be in violation
of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act is likewise a violation of Section 8 (b) (1)
(A). The latter section makes it an unfair labor practice for a union, or its
agents, to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of their rights under
Section 7 of the Act. At the opening of the hearing, on the argument of Re-
spondents' motion to dismiss that portion of the complaint alleging a violation
of Section 8 (b) (1) (A), the General Counsel took the position that the facts
alleged "set up virtually a closed shop situation" and therefore constitute "a
specific violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)." Assuming, arguendo, that such a
conclusion can be drawn from the facts pleaded, and accusing them of such a
violation as required by Section 10 (b) of the Act, the conclusion drawn by the
General Counsel is not sound.
In National Maritime Union of America, 78 NLRB 971, the Board specifically
rejected a similar contention "that an [activity] for an illegal objective neces-
24 See III, E , supra.
26 Respondents in their brief contend that this incident "may not be considered in the
present proceedings , since [ it] Is not mentioned in any of the unfair labor practice charges
which are attached to and form the basis of the complaint ." Factually the contention is
correct, but the conclusion is erroneous . A charge need not set out in detail every act of
violation . N. L. R. B. v. Pacific G as & Electric Company, 118 F. 2d 780, 788-9 (C. A. 9) ;
N. L. R. B. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 114 F . 2d 376, 379 (C. A. 2).
26 See III, E , supra. I do not find that Hoffman 's activity in connection with this inci-
dent, or any others described in this Report , to be in violation of the section under con-
sideration . I consequently find it unnecessary to pass on the question of whether or not
he was "the agent" of the Union , within the meaning of the Act, so as to make the latter
responsible for his conduct.
GLAZIERS ' UNION LOCAL NO. 27, ETC. 1417
sarily restrains and `coerces ' employees , as those terms were intended to be
applied in Section 8 (b) (1) (A). The touch stone of the [activity ] which is
violative of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) is normally the means by which it is accom-
plished, so long as its objective is directly related to the interests of the strikers
and not directed primarily at compelling other employees to forego the rights
which Section 7 protects . . . . [The activity ] having been peacefully conducted,
it did not violate Section 8 (b) (1) (A)." 27
I shall therefore recommend that the allegations of the complaint , insofar
as they allege a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act , be dismissed.
V. THE EFFECT OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Union and Meyers set forth in Section IV, above, occur-
ring in connection with the operations of the general contractors and subcon-
tractors described therein whose activities are set forth in Section I, above,
have a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead and have led to labor disputes burden-
ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
VI. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent Union and Respondent Meyers have violated
Section & (b) (4) (A) of the Act, it will be recommended that they cease and
desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record
in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Glaziers' Union Local No. 27 of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators
and Paper Hangers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. George M. Meyers is an agent of the aforesaid labor organization within
the meaning of the Act.
3. By inducing and encouraging employees to refuse in the course of their
employment to cease work on the Grant Hardware job and the Sears Roebuck
job, by inducing and encouraging Ahrens to leave the employment of Joliet
Glass, and by applying the Union's bylaws and rules as an aid to such induce-
ment and encouragement, an object thereof being to force and require their
respective employers to cease doing business with certain general contractors,
the Union and Meyers have engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondents have not engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. '
6. Respondent Hoffman has not engaged in any of the unfair labor practices
charged in the complaint.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
S7 See also International Union United Mine Workers of America and Jones and Laughlin
Steel Company, 83 NLRB 916; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
dmodoa"and Ira A. Watson "Company; 80 NLRB 533.
1418 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Appendix A
General Contractors-Members of Joliet Contractors Association
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ame
Annual
volume of
business
(cents
omitted)
Value of
building
materials
purchased
(cents
omitted)
Value of
purchases
shipped
directly from
outside of
Illinois
(cents
omitted)
Percent of
purchases
originating
outside of
Illinois
Joliet Construction Co__________ $228, 000 $92, 000 $9, 200 85
Mazzucco Construction Co ------ 272, 000 83, 000 8, 200 50-70
Hansen & Peterson ------------ 667, 200 135, 800 12, 864 65
E. H. Swenson---------------- 193, 000 112, 000 5, 600 70
Matt Gregory_________________ 166, 250 60, 000 3, 000 85
Sverre Ugland_________________ 156, 000 70, 000 3, 500 80
Stonitsch & Son_______________ 97, 000 29, 000 60,
Richard Berti_________________ 85, 000 46, 000 80-85
Arnold Welsch________________ 228,'000 145, 000 13, 000 70
Magnus Strandberg -------_____ 135, 000 40, 000 70
W. R. Harshbarger ------------ 46, 000 18, 000 90
Albert Bockholdt______________ 93, 000 90
Lindblad Construction Co _ - _ _ _ _ 69, 987 49, 668 30
Appendix B
Lumber d Building Supply Companies
ame
Total pur-
chases of
building
materials
(cents
omitted)
Percent
of all
purchases
originating
out of
State
Percent
of all
purchases
directly
shipped
from out
of State
Total pur-
chases of
preglazed
materials
(cents
omitted)
Percent of
emat rials
originating
out of
State
Percent of
preglazed
aterialsm
shipped
from
outside
Leach Bros. Inc_____ $174,293 94 _ -------- 45
Hacker-Sime Co ----- 268, 197 70 60 25, 000 40 40
Lyons Bros. Fuel &
Lumber Co _ _ - - _ - _ 231, 565 95.3 80 23, 907 - 9
Joliet Lumber & Fuel
Co_______________ 347,804 91 52 40,560 100 10
Alexander Lumber
Co_______________ 241,610 87 70 11,007 100 1
I. N. R. Beatty Lum-
ber Co----_--__-__ 113,843 - 8,555 ________ ____
Joliet Cash & Carry
Lumber Co_______ 286,713 -------- 40 26, 189 100 --------
Joliet Paint and Glass
Co., Inc---------- 91,000 50 --- -------- -------- --------