Stericycle, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 10, 2016

04-CA-137660 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 10, 2016)

JD–110–16
Morgantown and Southampton, PA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
STERICYCLE, INC.
and Cases 04–CA–137660
04–CA–145466
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 628 04–CA–158277
04–CA–160621
Lea Alvo-Sadiky, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles P. Roberts III, Esq. (Constangy, Brooks, Smith &
Prophete LLP) of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for the Respondent.
Claiborne S. Newlin, Esq. (Meranze, Katz, Gaudioso &
Newlin, PC), of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MICHAEL A. ROSAS, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania on August 24–25, 2016.1 This controversy involves employees represented by
Teamsters Local 628 (the Union) at Stericycle, Inc.’s (the Company or Respondent)
Southampton and Morgantown, Pennsylvania facilities. The complaint, as amended,2 alleges
that the Company violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act)3 by: (1) refusing to bargain with the Union before unilaterally recouping health care
premiums from employees; (2) refusing or failing to provide relevant and necessary information
to the Union; and (3) unilaterally imposing a team member handbook that changed numerous
terms and conditions of employment. The complaint also alleges that the Company engaged in
coercive conduct and violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining policies and rules that interfered
with Section 7 rights. The Company admits taking the alleged unilateral actions, failing to
provide information requested and implementing the policy and rules at issue. It denies,
however, that its conduct constituted unfair labor practices.

1 All dates are in 2014 unless otherwise indicated.
2 At the hearing, the General Counsel amended the Second Consolidated Complaint to eliminate
paragraphs 8(b) and 11 of the complaint. (Tr. 8, 28–29.)
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.
JD–110–16
2
The Company also raised an affirmative defense alleging that the complaint “is tainted by the
involvement of the Regional Director of Region 4 and should be transferred to a different region
for independent review, reconsideration, and processing.” This defense referenced the Board’s
Inspector General Report OIG-I-516 of his investigation into an alleged conflict of interest on the
part of the Regional Director while volunteering on behalf of a nonprofit organization. On5
August 24, 2016, I entered an order denying the Company’s motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, disqualify all Region 4 staff in prosecuting this case. I also denied the General
Counsel’s motion in limine and permitted the Company to introduce the OIG report into
evidence under seal for further consideration on exceptions or appeal. However, I precluded the
Company from calling Office of General Counsel staff or other witnesses in order to further 10
litigate its conflict of interest defense.4 At the outset of the hearing, I provided the parties with
an opportunity to reargue the General Counsel’s motion in limine and the Company’s motion to
dismiss the complaint due to the conflict of interest. The argument produced nothing new,
except to clarify that the Company conceded that it did not possess evidence of an actual conflict
of interest on the part of staff litigating the case. As a result, I reiterated my ruling that the 15
Company was precluded from offering any other evidence in support of its eighth affirmative
defense.
On the entire record,5 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following20
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
25
The Company, a corporation, is engaged in providing medical waste and collection
treatment services to commercial customers throughout the United States, including to and from
its facilities in Southampton and Morgantown, Pennsylvania, where it annually purchases and
receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. The Company admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce 30
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
35
A. The Company’s Operations
The Company is the largest medical waste disposal company in the United States. The
Company performs waste treatment at its Morgantown facility involving the collection,
processing and disposal of regulated medical waste (RMW), including bandages, bodily fluids, 40
and sharp containers of needles, from hospitals, nursing homes, and medical, dental and

4 ALJ Exh. 1.
5 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct the transcript, dated October 7, 2016,
is granted and received in evidence as GC Exh. 33.
JD–110–16
3
veterinary offices. Once delivered to the Morgantown facility, RMW is processed, chemically
treated, shredded in a treatment system, placed in containers and disposed of in landfills.
The Company also operates a transfer station at its Southampton facility, where drivers
pick up trash which is then consolidated and brought to the Morgantown facility. These 5
employees pick up RMW from hospitals, doctor/dentist offices, and other medical facilities. The
RMW is transported to facilities for processing prior to disposal.
B. The Collective-Bargaining Agreements
10
1. The Southampton facility
The union represented Company employees at its former Montgomeryville, PA transfer
station from 1999 until 2006, when the Company moved those operations to Southampton. On
September 1, 2006, the Union was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative 15
of employees at the Southampton facility (the Southampton unit). At all times since then, the
Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the following employees in
the Southampton unit:
All full-time and regular part-time drivers, driver techs, in house techs, helpers, 20
dockworkers and long haul drivers of the Company at its Southampton, Pennsylvania
location; but excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
On April 4, 2014, the Company and Union negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement25
covering the Southampton unit, retroactive to November 1, 2013, and expiring on October 31,
2016 (the 2014 Southampton Agreement). The 2014 Southampton Agreement provided, in
pertinent part, that Southampton unit employees would be required to make contributions
towards their health insurance:
30
22.3 Upon ratification, employees will contribute on a pre-tax basis one (1%) of their straight
time hours paid per week to the cost of health coverage. The employer shall deduct this amount
bi-weekly and offset it against the employer’s monthly contributions to the Teamsters Health and
Welfare Fund as specified in 22.2 above . . .6
35
2. The Morgantown facility
On September 1, 2011, the Union was certified as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the Morgantown unit. Respondent and the Union subsequently entered into an
initial collective-bargaining agreement for the term of September 6, 2013, to February 29, 2016.740
A new CBA was ratified in June 2016.

6 GC Exh. 2.
7 GC Exh. 3 at 1.
JD–110–16
4
At all times since September 1, 2011, the following employees at the Morgantown
facility have constituted a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time regulated medical waste (RMW) plant workers, sharps 5
plan workers, RMW Shift Supervisors, Sharps Shift Supervisors/quality control
representatives, drivers, dispatchers, yard jockey, maintenance mechanics, Maintenance
Supervisor and painters employed by Respondent at its Morgantown, Pennsylvania
facility; but excluding all office employees, confidential employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.10
C. The Recoupment of Health Care Premiums from the Southampton Unit
Although the Southampton CBA was ratified on April 13, 2014, the Company’s payroll
contractor, ADP, encountered initial difficulties integrating the health insurance premium data 15
for the hourly union employees with that of nonhourly employees. After several test runs, ADP
was finally able to process the health care premium deductions of one percent health insurance
cost in until the September 12 payroll.8
John Dagle, the Union’s Secretary/Treasurer, brought the missing deductions to the 20
attention of Willie Riess, Southampton’s Facility Manager, in late June or July 2014. Reiss
initially was unaware that the employees’ share of their health insurance was not being
deducted from their pay and agreed to look into it. By July, Reiss ascertained the problem and
updated Dagle regarding the payroll processing issues.9
25
On September 3, Riess emailed Dagle and informed him that the Company had
“completed the work and tests necessary for the payroll deductions for Health and Welfare as
per Article 22.3 of the CBA” and planned “to deduct these amounts evenly over the next three
pay days for each employee starting with the September 12, 2014 payday. If you have any
questions or concerns, [p]lease let me know.” A spreadsheet detailing the amount of each 30
employee’s deductions was attached.
Dagle replied on September 5, opposing the Company’s “unilateral decision to recoup
unpaid health care deductions beginning September 8, 2014.” He added that the “recoupment
decision” violated the [CBA] and [Company’s] obligations under federal law.”10 Riess replied 35
on September 8:

8 The parties do not dispute the legitimacy of the difficulties encountered by the Company’s payroll
contractor in timely processing the new payroll changes. (Tr. 188–189.)
9 Dagle and Reiss provided consistent testimony regarding their discussions about the missing
health care deductions, but disagreed as to whether the issue of recoupment came up prior to Dagle’s
September 3 email. I credit Reiss’ denial that Dagle raised the recoupment issue prior to September 3.
Dagle was vague as to the timeframe when he allegedly told Reiss that the Company forfeited its right
to recoupment or would, at the very least have to bargain over the issue first. (Tr. 38–40, 113–114, 130,
188–195). Moreover, the emails exchanged between Reiss and Dagle on September 3 make no
reference to previous discussion about recoupment. (R. Exh. 1 at 1–5.)
10 R. Exh. 1 at 5.
JD–110–16
5
Thanks for your email. I am sure it won’t surprise you that we do not agree.
As you know, for the past few months employees have been receiving health benefits. . .
without interruption, however, the employees have not been making their contributions
due to some administrative issues on our end. Nonetheless, the employees have an 5
obligation under the CBA to make their 1% contribution and there is nothing in the
contract that prevents the Company from making catch-up contributions to collect what
they are legally obligated to pay. This is no different than the monthly arrears balances
the Union demands from the Company for the dues obligations of employees.
10
We can resolve this in a number of ways. You can keep insisting on your position and
then, I guess I will have to ask you to justify how the dues situation is any different. If
you do not want the Company to pursue the employees for moneys it owes the
Company per the Agreement you signed, then the Company can pursue the amounts
owed directly from the Union if you want to agree to indemnify the employees for this 15
commitment.
Right now, we will be proceeding as planned, unless I hear that you agree to my last
suggestion. Of course I am available to discuss.11
20
Dagle responded on September 9, citing Section 22.3 of the CBA and the Company’s
failure to implement it:
Stericycle failed to exercise its rights under the agreement. Moreover, Stericycle’s
decision to unilaterally deduct from employees’ bi-weekly paychecks contributions 25
retroactively for a seventeen week period (4/13/14 through 8/9/14) over the next six
weeks is a violation of the company’s obligations under the [CBA]. For those six weeks,
the Stericycle will pay its employees at rates below those expressly required by the
agreement. The Union will forward a grievance regarding this matter under separate
cover. 30
Any employee medical contribution recoupment schedule must be negotiated with the
Union. Stericycle does not have the legal right to unilaterally impose its own schedule.
As a precondition for bargaining, Stericycle must first rescind its decision to commence 35
recoupment and forgo any further action pending agreement. Once the recoupment
decision is rescinded, the union will, without prejudice to its position on the grievance,
negotiate on this . . . matter on September 23, or September 29, 2014. Please contact me
to schedule negotiations.
40
In addition, in order for the Union to prepare for bargaining, please provide the
following information:
1. All backup documentation utilized by the Company to determine the retro amounts
due for the period 4/13/14 through 8/9/14.45

11 Id. at 7–8.
JD–110–16
6
Please forward the requested information directly to the Union office by no later than
Friday, September 19, 2014.12
Riess replied a few hours later, reiterating the Company’s disagreement with the
Union’s position, but offering to bargain over the issue:5
Obviously, the Company disagrees with you . . . Nevertheless, any threatened grievance
over the Company’s alleged failure to follow the CBA as it pertains to making these
deductions on a bi-weekly schedule is time-barred by the CBA.
10
All these defenses to the Company’s actions aside, we are willing to bargain with the
union over the timing of the catch-up deductions as announced in our September 3 letter
to you and as you request in your communication today. Since we did not hear anything
from you for days following that communication, the first payment on the schedule has
already been processed in our payroll for this coming Friday. We will hold off on 15
making any further deductions—notwithstanding our right to do so—until you and I
have had a chance to further discuss.
Dagle replied a few hours later, reiterating the Union’s position and demanding the
Company restore the status quo:20
To create the preconditions for bargaining over its recoupment proposal, Stericycle must
maintain the status quo pending resolution of the dispute. This requires that you cancel
the extra deduction set for this Friday or that you make employees whole for the shortage
in accordance with section 21.2 of the contract. Please inform me tomorrow of what 25
action Stericycle intends to take to restore the status quo.13
Riess and Dagle met on September 10 to discuss the Company’s recoupment proposal.
At that time, Riess explained that it was too late to reverse the first payroll deduction on
September 12, but offered to discuss the remaining two recoupment payments. Dagle refused 30
the offer, insisting that the Company restore the status quo by reversing the first deduction
before the Union would agree to bargain over the recoupment issue. A contentious email
exchange followed over the next 2 days reflecting the standstill. The end result was that the two
final deductions were processed in the September 26 and October 10 payrolls.14
35
D. Information Request Relating to the Recoupment of Health Care Contributions
Unsuccessful in preventing the Company’s implementation of the recoupment process,
Dagle took steps to grieve the action through a series of requests for information related to the
Company’s difficulties in implementing the health insurance premium deductions.15 On 40

12 Id. at 9–11.
13 Id. at 12–13.
14 Notwithstanding Dagle’s contention that Riess informed him of “corporate’s” intention to proceed
with the 3 recoupment payments, the latter’s September 12 email refuted that and reiterated the
Company’s offer to bargain over the 2 remaining recoupment payments. (Tr. 40–45, 48, 127–132, 193–
194; GC Exh. 6; R. Exh. 1 at 14–15.)
15 Dagle credibly testified that the information requests sought to determine and/or confirm the
JD–110–16
7
September 11, in connection with his “investigation” of the Company’s recoupment actions and
the potential filing of a grievance by the Union, Dagle requested, in pertinent part, the following
information by September 23:
1. Provide copies of any communications, written or electronic 5
between any Stericycle representatives or agents concerning or related to
Stericycle’s decision to deduct the amounts (copy enclosed) evenly over the next
three (3) paydays for each employee starting with the September 12, 2014
payday.
10
5. Provide copies of any communications, written or electronic
between any Stericycle representatives or agents regarding Stericycle’s
implementation of Article 22 subsection 22.3 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement.16
15
On September 22, Carol Fox, the Company’s Labor Relations Manager, denied Dagle’s
information requests on the grounds that were either unclear or constituted irrelevant,
confidential and privileged internal Company communications that were not provided to
employees or the Union.17
20
Dagle took a different tack for recoupment-related information on September 26 by
requesting “copies of Stericycle’s bargaining notes, including notes of side bar discussions
or other contacts with union representatives concerning, or relating to discussion of employee
health coverage deductions.”18 Fox declined the request on October 17 on the grounds that they
were overly broad, confidential and irrelevant on the issue of whether the recoupment payments 25
violated the CBA. Dagle explained the relevance of his request in a follow up email on October
20:
The documentation requested should shed light on the reasons for the delay, the
difficulties involved in instigating the deductions, the company’s diligence in working30
for a solution and why the solution took as long as it did. It should also provide
information on who was involved and the roles they played in working out a
resolution Such information is essential to a fair evaluation of the employer’s
unilateral decision to recoup missed contributions through three unauthorized
employee payroll deductions.35
The union is prepared to review and bargain over a specific Stericycle
proposal to address its claimed confidentiality concerns.
Finally, with respect to the request for notes (other than the bargaining notes40

legitimacy and details underlying the extent of the Company’s explanation for the delays in processing
the health insurance premium deductions. (Tr. 43–44, 47.)
16 GC Exh. 5.
17 GC Exh. 7.
18 GC Exh. 8.
JD–110–16
8
to which the union is entitled), the union requests notes (and/or other
documents) related to conversations between Stericycle representatives and
the union over the employer’s failure to deduct employee health contributions
from the date of ratification to the date of this letter.
5
Although the parties entered into a confidentiality agreement on November 17, it
pertained only to item 2 requested in the Union’s September 26, letter, having to do with
nonpublic information of the Company’s payroll vender.19 The information, subject to the
confidentiality agreement, did not cover the bargaining notes requested in the September 26
letter or internal communications between the Company’s personnel regarding implementation 10
of the recoupment of the health care deductions.
E. Information Requests Relating to Employees’ 401(k) Contributions
Article 23.3 of the Southampton CBA provided that unit employees would receive 15
biweekly an amount consisting of $0.3125 per hour on a “pre-tax” basis for all straight-time
hours paid per pay period provided that employees made an appropriate election into either the
Company’s 401(k) Plan or Employee Stock Purchase Plan (the investment plans). The amounts
were to be treated as “employee deferral contributions” subject to the terms and conditions of the
relevant Plan[s], as applicable. 20
Implementation of the investment plans did not go smoothly and a dispute arose in May
2014, as to whether the contract required Company payments to be paid directly into both
investment plans on a pretax basis. The Company interpreted the CBA as merely requiring it to
remit the benefit amounts directly to employees and giving them the option to designate it for the 25
401(k) plan or stock purchase plan. If employees opted for the 401(k) plan, the Company
remitted the amount on a pretax basis. However, if employees chose the stock purchase plan, the
payments were taxed at the applicable rate.20
On June 2, the Union filed a grievance alleging that the Company “failed to remit the 30
$0.312 per hour on a pre-tax basis for all straight-time hours paid to each active non-
probationary bargaining unit employees’ 401k account or Stock Purchase Plan as required by the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.”21 On September 4, the Union filed for arbitration over the
grievance.22
35
1. The September 5th information request
On September 5, the Union submitted a request for information entitled “Grievance –
Violation of Article 23, subsection 23.3 Dated June 2, 2014.”23 On September 22, the
Company provided certain information responsive to the request but objected to other portions.40
Paragraphs 1 and 2 essentially requested copies of “all bargaining unit employees’ bi-

19 R. Exh. 9 at 1–4.
20 R. Exh. 7; GC Exh. 13.
21 GC Exh. 11.
22 R. Exh. 5.
23 GC Exh. 12.
JD–110–16
9
weekly earnings statements to include all earnings, deductions and year to date totals” between
April 13 and September 6, and from September 7 on an ongoing basis. The Company attached
a printout containing payroll information, but not earnings statements, which it has provided to
the Union in the past.24 The Company also objected to the need for such information “on an
ongoing basis” as “not clear” and “unduly burdensome.” The Company requested that the 5
Union “identify any specific time periods and how each is related to the Union’s investigation
of this grievance or any particular grievance and the company will re-evaluate the
reasonableness of the request.”25
Paragraph 6 and 8 requested copies of any communications between the parties regarding 10
the Company’s implementation of Article 23.3. The Company objected on the grounds of
relevance to the arbitration and was “aimed solely at discovering the Company’s legal theory and
strategy in the arbitration of the same.” 26
2. The September 18th information request15
On September 18, the Union submitted an additional information request, entitled
“Grievance -- Violation of Article 23, subsection 23.3,” seeking copies of the Company
bargaining notes, proposals, agreements or understandings between the parties relating to
Article 23.3.27 In Fox’s reply, also contained in her September 22nd email, she rejected the 20
Union’s request on the grounds that the Company’s bargaining notes were irrelevant and
confidential, and were sought solely for the purpose of ascertaining the Company’s legal
theories and defenses related to the arbitration. With respect to proposals, agreements or
understandings during bargaining, the Company referred the Union to its own records and
further characterized the request as unauthorized pre-arbitral discovery.2825
3. Documents provided pursuant to arbitration subpoena
The Union did not respond or follow up further regarding these requests at any time until
on or about August 18, 2015, when the Union’s counsel issued a subpoena to the Company 30
relating to the arbitration of the Union’s grievance, which was scheduled to commence on
September 10, 2015. In many respects, the subpoena mirrored the Union’s prior information
requests. Paragraph 2 of the subpoena sought documents relating to the Company’s
“implementation of Article 23.3,” clearly encompassing the documents requested in paragraphs 6

24 Fox corroborated Dagle’s explanation regarding the difficulty in gleaning the appropriate pretax
wage information from the payroll documents provided in contrast to the more detailed earnings
statements requested. (Tr. 52–53, 299–301, 316–319; GC Exh. 13.)
25 Dagle’s testimony that the Company previously provided it with copies of earnings statements was
undisputed. (CP Exh. 3; Tr. 309.) On the other hand, the Company correctly points out that the process of
printing out the requested earnings statements for approximately 100 Southampton employees for 15 pay
periods would have been significantly time consuming – 1,500 earnings statements at 4 minutes each—
would have taken a payroll clerk up to 100 hours to produce. (Resp. Exh. 7; Tr. 277–278.) Thus,
complying with the Union’s request would have taken between 75 and 100 hours of clerical time.
26 GC Exh. 15B.
27 Dagle credibly explained that the purpose of these also sought to determine if any issue came up
during bargaining regarding Article 23.3. (GC Exh. 14; Tr. 58–59.)
28 GC Exh. 15B.
JD–110–16
10
and 8 of the September 5th request, as well as paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the September 18th
request. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the subpoena mirrored paragraphs 1 and 2 of the September 5th
request.29
On September 4, 2015, Company Counsel Dawn Blume responded to the subpoena. The 5
documents included a payroll report (in Excel spreadsheet format) “containing everything found
on the ‘earnings statements’” sought by the Union. With respect to the actual earnings
statements, Blume explained “that it takes a payroll clerk in our department 3–4 minutes to
download and print out a single earnings statement which is the equivalent of 8 hours of time for
a single payroll period for the entire unit in Southampton” and that “we simply do not see the 10
point in engaging in this manual exercise when the information on the earnings statements is
identical to what is contained in the report I have attached hereto.” Despite the Company’s
unwillingness to perform this manual exercise, Blume noted that she had “arranged for John
Dagle, your client to have access to our payroll system for the limited purpose of accessing and
printing (if he desires) the ‘earnings statements’ he continues to demand from the Company.”15
Blume advised that his credentials and log-in information would be forthcoming.30
On September 8, 2015, Blume again emailed Newlin. As she had indicated she would in
her September 4 email, Blume attached a summary payroll report for 2014 and 2015, and she
provided the log-in information for the Union to directly access the employees’ earnings 20
statements.31
The arbitration commenced on September 10, 2015. At the hearing, the arbitrator
revoked the Union’s subpoena to the extent it sought the Company’s bargaining notes. Two
hearing days have occurred, but the hearing had not concluded as of the date when the unfair 25
labor practice hearing.
In mid-September 2015, the Company was advised by the Union that it was having
trouble printing out the earnings statements. On October 5, 2015, Dave Beaudoin, the
Company’s Human Resource Information Systems (HRIS) Manager, contacted the Union’s 30
administrative assistant by email to offer his assistance.32 Beaudoin inquired as to whether he
“could jump on a WebEx meeting, so [he] could log on to your computer and verify that you are
appropriately configured to run the software.” The Union, however, was unwilling to allow
Beaudoin to access its computer. After further discussions, Beaudoin forwarded a file on
November 5, 2015, that the Union needed to install.33 On November 17, 2015, Beaudoin spoke 35
with Liz Sterling, the Union’s Secretary and office manager. Sterling informed her that she was
able to view the earnings statements on a computer screen, but was unable to print them.34
F. The Ebola PowerPoint Presentation
40

29 CP Exh. 1; R. Exh. 7.
30 R. Exh. 7.
31 R. Exh. 8 at 6–21.
32 R. Exh. 11 at 3.
33 Id. at 2.
34 There is no indication that Sterling requested additional assistance from Beaudoin in printing copies
of the files. (Tr. 163, 206–208; Id. at 1.)
JD–110–16
11
The Company does not handle Class A medical waste, which includes waste
contaminated by the Ebola virus. On or about November 12, Safety Manager Ron Maggiaro
gave a 10–15 PowerPoint presentation to Morgantown employees on how to recognize Ebola
waste packaging and avoid handling it. Employees were not given copies of the presentation.35
The Union learned about the employee presentation and in emails, dated November 13 and 18, 5
Dagle requested the Company provide it with a copy of the “Ebola video.”36
On November 18, Fox responded, requesting that Dagle copy her on future requests and
proceeded to reject his request:
10
First, Ebola is Category A waste, not [RMW], so it falls outside the span of the [CBA].
Although the Morgantown employees will not be transporting or handling this waste, we
decided to educate our employees on the Company’s activities related to Ebola. The
presentation shown to the employees is confidential and proprietary. This type of
information could cause a great deal of speculation and public concern if it was released 15
to third-parties outside our organization. Consequently, we are more than happy to review
the power-point presentation with you that we shared with the employees in person, at a
mutually convenient time at our offices, but we are not providing a copy to you or anyone
else for reasons I stated. 37
20
Dagle responded the following day, November 19, disputing Fox’s confidentiality
concerns and assuring her that the Union would “agree that the power-point presentation will not
be shared with anyone outside the union’s officers, representatives and agents.” He noted that the
employees were given the presentation without any mention that the information was
confidential or proprietary. Nevertheless to meet Fox’s claim of confidentiality, he pledged that 25
the Union would not show the PowerPoint to anyone outside of its officers, representatives, and
agents. He then again requested a copy.38 On November 25, Fox responded as follows:
Under common law, employees of Stericycle are required to keep nonpublic information
confidential. Employees also agree to this requirement when they sign our Handbooks. 30
The Union has no such obligations to preserve the confidentiality of Stericycle materials
(except, as I understand, for a limited agreement we recently reached over internal
payroll processing data you requested). I appreciate the effort you have made to extend
me these assurances, however, I also understand that you cannot personally guarantee
that anyone you share these materials with will also keep the materials confidential.35
As I previously stated, these materials are extremely sensitive and you should know that
Stericycle has spent a great deal of time answering questions from the public and other
regulators surrounding whether EBOLA contaminated waste will be transported and/or
treated within their town, municipality, jurisdiction etc. Many of these questions came 40
from mere speculation and panic a situation that we are trying to avoid. For this reason,
we did not permit any of the Morgantown employees to receive copies of the materials

35 Tr. 227–230.
36 GC Exh. 17.
37 GC Exh. 18 at 3.
38 Id. at 2–3.
JD–110–16
12
we presented to them. We only shared with them the presentation in person that I already
offered to share with you. As I already stated to you, these employees will not transport
the waste as it is outside their position duties. We simply presented them with the
information because we want to educate all the employees on our activities in this area.
5
Again, my offer to present to you, at a mutually convenient time, the same materials that
we presented the employees still stands.39
On December 1, Dagle responded, disagreeing with Fox’s interpretation of the law and
her proposed compromise:10
I am not aware of any enforceable common law requirement that would
prevent a Morgantown or Southampton employee from sharing information
presented by Stericycle concerning handling of Ebola waste and ensuring
the safe handling that waste by its employees. If there is some prohibition on 15
sharing “non public” Stericycle information with third parties in the
handbook that applies to the Ebola presentation, I would like to see it.
Please provide me a copy of the current Employee Handbook employees
must sign.
20
Your proposal to just let me view the presentation is inadequate. Local 628
needs to verify the accuracy of the information you are providing
represented employees to ensure that their safety is being adequately
protected. To verify the presentation’s accuracy, Local 628 must submit a
copy to professional experts in the infectious disease and biosafety field for 25
their review. It would be neither cost effective no practical to insist that such
experts attend a presentation at a Stericycle facility.
I repeat Local 628’s willingness to bargain over an appropriate agreement to
address any legitimate Stericycle confidentiality concerns. Please provide a 30
copy of the presentation.40
The Company did not respond to Dagle’s December 1st email. Nor did it provide him
with the employee handbook referred to in Fox’s November 25th email. It did, however, post a
notice at the Morgantown facility on January 16, 2015, explaining that employees were not to 35
handle Ebola waste and that the Ebola presentation had been given for informational purposes
only. The Company provided Dagle with a copy of the notice on January 20, 2015.41
Additionally, on March 2, 2015, Fox provided Dagle with a copy of the recently implemented
employee handbook at the Morgantown facility.42
40
G. Vehicle Backing Program
Sometime in November, the Company issued employee James Clay a counseling report

39 Id. at 1–2.
40 Id at 1.
41 R. Exh. 4.
42 GC Exh. 21–22.
JD–110–16
13
after he was involved in a vehicular accident. The discipline subjected Clay to retraining for
repeatedly violating the Company’s vehicle backing program. Dagle and Transportation Manager
Robert Schoennagle agreed to meet to discuss Clay’s discipline. Prior to meeting, on
November 24, Dagle requested several documents, including a “copy of the Company’s
vehicle backing program.”43 Schoennagle forwarded the information, except for the vehicle5
backing program, to Dagle on November 25.44
Schoennagle and Dagle met again on November 28. Dagle renewed his request for a
copy of the vehicle backing program. Schoennagle said he did not have a copy of the program,
but would look into it. At a subsequent meeting on January 22, 2015, with Schoennagle, 10
Transportation Supervisor Glenn Oesyterling, Transportation and Human Resource Manager
Susan O’Connor, Dagle renewed his request for vehicle backing program information.
Shoennagle replied that the program consisted of a power point presentation and a video. He
added, however, that the Company refused to produce the information because the PowerPoint
presentation was “proprietary information” and the video was a “copyrighted item” that the 15
Company purchased from an outside vendor, J.J. Keller & Associates, Inc.45
On January 29, 2015, Shoennagle reaffirmed the Company’s refusal to provide vehicular
program information, which it considered “a proprietary company training tool,” but offered
Dagle or union shop stewards the opportunity to “sit in on a presentation of this program with a 20
proper written request from the Union.”46 On January 30, 2015, the Union filed a charge over
the Company’s refusal to provide the vehicle backing program information.
On March 2, 2015, Fox responded by reiterating the Company’s position that the
PowerPoint presentation proprietary and confidential, are irrelevant because Clay had seen the 25
video several times and did not file a grievance over the discipline. She added that, without
waiving future objection to any of these items, the Company was providing the PowerPoint
presentation. With respect to the video, she reiterated that it was the licensing agreement with
the vendor that prohibited copying and limited viewing to employees. Under these limitations,
the Company offered Dagle the option of viewing the video at a mutually convenient time or 30
visiting the J.J. Keller & Associates website. Dagle did not take Fox up on her offer.47
Finally, Fox also addressed Dagle’s December 1st request for a copy of the employee
handbook:
Stericycle employees sign copies of the employee handbook at hire which is what I 35
previously referenced when I relayed that employees are bound by prohibitions in the
handbook on releasing confidential, proprietary and non-public information of the

43 GC Exh. 19; R. Exh. 10.
44 R. Exh. 10 at 2–4.
45 The testimony by Dagle and Shoennagle was consistent on regarding the discussions at these
meetings. (Tr. 66–70, 167–168, 215–217, 223–224.)
46 GC Exh. 20.
47 Dagle speculated that he would have no way of knowing whether the video link referenced in the
letter was the same as the one shown to employees. That explanation defied common sense since he
would have encountered the same uncertainty, requiring confirmation by a unit member, if the Company
had provided him with a video. (Tr. 69-72.) Nor is there any evidence that he considered the cost of
purchasing the video, for which no credible evidence of cost was offered. (Tr. 304–305.)
JD–110–16
14
Company. When you requested a copy of the Handbook, we searched our records and it
appears that the Company has not distributed or maintained Handbooks in Southampton
since 2009 and Morgantown since 2011. As a result, the Company is now distributing its
2015 handbooks in these locations. I am attaching a copy here for your reference. Please
let me know if you have any questions.485
H. Harassment Training Video
On December 30, Dagle requested “a copy of the Code of Conduct and Harassment
Training video which the Company had bargaining unit employees view in its training.” The 10
video itself is a 10 to 15 minute harassment training video that was commissioned by the
Company from a law firm in Chicago. Morgantown Plant Manager Mike Valtin responded later
that day as follows: “The Code of Conduct and Harassment Training video are proprietary and
can be available for you to view; however, the Company cannot give you a copy.”49 Dagle made
no effort to view the video.5015
I. The Soubra Grievance
On November 20, the Union filed “a formal grievance on behalf of Local 628, Ryan
Suobra and the bargaining unit” alleging that “supervisor Ron Lobb egregiously and forcefully20
placed his hands on, grabbing, pushing and pulling employee Ryan Suobra on Saturday,
November 15, 2014.”51 On December 5, Plant Manager Mike Valtin responded to the
grievance as follows:
While the Company does not necessarily agree with the Union’s statement that Ron 25
Lobb’s action toward Ryan Soubra was egregious or forceful, we believe that no
Manager or Supervisor should touch an employee. The Company agrees that this
behavior is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Therefore, Mr. Lobb’s unacceptable
behavior has been addressed with him per company policy. Harassment Training will be
held for all Morgantown Plant Supervisors and Team Members by January 1st 2015.5230
Not satisfied with the Company’s response to the grievance, on December 11, Dagle
informed Valtin that the Union intended “to proceed to Step 2 regarding the Ryan Suobra
grievance.” Dagle proposed the Step 2 meeting for December 15 and “in order for the Union to
properly investigate this grievance,” requested the following information:35
1.Copies of all video tapes, photographs, or other similar media containing
information relevant to the Company’s investigation of . . .
2. The names and statements of any witnesses of which the Company40
is aware that have knowledge of the facts and circumstances
regarding supervisor Ron Lobb’s egregious and unacceptable

48 GC Exh. 21.
49 GC Exh. 26.
50 Tr. 150, 252–253.
51 GC Exh. 23.
52 GC Exh. 24.
JD–110–16
15
action on Ryan Suobra on November 15, 2014.
3. Copies of all investigative reports concerning supervisor Ron
Lobb’s egregious and unacceptable action on Ryan Suobra on
November 15, 2014 which are in the possession of the company5
including the company’s investigative notes of interviews of
witnesses or persons interviewed regarding this incident.
4. Copies of all documents, reports, emails, etc., relevant to the
Company’s investigation of supervisor Ron Lobb’s egregious10
and unacceptable action on Ryan Suobra on November 15,
2014.
5. Copies of all documents, reports, emails, etc., related to
Steicycle’s discipline and reprimand of supervisor Ron Lobb for15
his egregious and unacceptable action on Ryan Suobra on
November 15, 2014.
6. Copies of all documents, reports, email, etc., in supervisor
Ron Lobb’s personnel file regarding similar previous 20
instances of egregious and unacceptable actions on
employees.53
Dagle and Valtin met for a Step 2 grievance meeting on December 22. Valtin provided a
copy of the video tape requested in item and permitted Dagle to read the disciplinary notice 25
issued to Lobb. He also provided him with the names of at two witnesses and a written
statement by one of them.54 However, the Company refused to provide any further information
responsive to items 2 through 6. Valtin confirmed the Company’s position on December 30:
Your request regarding the Company’s investigation into misconduct and personnel 30
information of a non-bargaining unit employee (items 2-6) are denied because they are
not presumptively relevant and you have not provided any reasons to justify their
relevance as to any grievance or discipline issued to a bargaining unit employee.
Further, the Union does not have any right to access the Company’s premises to attend 35
training or otherwise – other than as negotiated in the CBA. Article 28 does not provide
the Union with access rights to attend Company trainings with employees or to otherwise
disrupt the Company’s normal business operations.55
Dagle replied on January 7, 2015, insisting that the requested information was relevant to 40
the Union’s “investigation and evaluation” of the Soubra grievance:

53 GC Exh. 25.
54 I credit Dagle’s testimony regarding his awareness of prior incidents involving Lobb, but not his
speculative testimony as to what the action form stated or vague testimony that Lobb just got a “pat on the
back.” (Tr. 151–153.)
55 GC Exh. 27 at 2.
JD–110–16
16
You have represented to me that Stericycle has disciplined Mr. Lobb for his conduct. In
order to evaluate whether the discipline is sufficient to deter future misconduct against
bargaining unit members, I have requested information related to Stericycle’s
investigation into the assault, Mr. Lobb’s disciplinary record for similar incidents and 5
Stericycle”s evaluation and consideration of the appropriate discipline under the
circumstances.56
On January 12, Valentin acknowledged Dagle’s explanation for the request but
reaffirmed the Company’s position denying the request:10
The Company has previously provided you access to the discipline issued to Lobb
resulting from his interaction with Mr. Soubra. As you know, Mr. Soubra received no
disciplinary action resulting from the incident. The reason the Company provided the
Union with the discipline was to demonstrate its good faith and commitment to its 15
policies and to assure the Union that Mr. Lobb will continue to suffer consequences for
violating Company policies, which include inappropriate interactions with coworkers.
The Union does not have any right to grieve or challenge any discipline issued to a non-
bargaining unit member. Consequently, your rationale for wanting to review the 20
personnel file of Mr. Lobb—to detetmine if the discipline issued was appropriate and
sufficient—is not related to the Union’s representational duties. As a result, your reasons
for wanting the requested information does not overcome Mr. Lobb’s right to
confidentiality of his personnel information. Therefore, your request is denied.57
25
J. TMX Team Meetings
On July 9, Dagle observed a new notice posted at the Morgantown facility soliciting
volunteers for a new workplace group called the TMX (Team Member Experience) Team. The 30
notice sought employee participation to discuss and feedback in employee surveys.
Concerned that the meetings may have involved discussions of employees’ terms and
conditions of employment, Dagle submitted an information request to District Manager Steve
Pantano on July 15, 2015. The request sought all documents relating to TMX team related 35
planning, meetings, employee surveys, employee selection and participation criteria, employee
attendance lists and compensation for attending, as well as similar documents used at other
facilities.
Fox responded on August 7, 2015, explaining that the sign-up sheet had been posted in 40
error at Morgantown and that a notice had been posted informing employees of the retraction.
She added that “[s]ince there is no employee workgroup being formed in Morgantown, we
feel most of the information you are requesting is irrelevant.” Fox did, however, provide a
copy of the TMX meeting notice and the PowerPoint presentation given to employees in
response to paragraph 4 of the request. Omitted from the PowerPoint presentation were “slides 45

56 Id. at 1–2.
57 Id. at 1.
JD–110–16
17
that show comparative data with [the Company’s] non-represented locations.”58
K. The Employee Handbook
On December 1, Dagle requested a copy of the current Morgantown employee handbook5
referred to in Fox’s November 25th email.59 Fox did not respond to this request until March 2,
2015, when she wrote:
Finally, the Company wants to address your November 25, 2014
request for the employee handbook. Stericycle employees sign copies10
of the employee handbook at hire which is what I previously
referenced when I relayed that employees are bound by prohibitions
in the handbook on releasing confidential, proprietary and non-public
information of the Company. When you requested a copy of the
Handbook, we searched our records and it appears that the Company15
has not distributed or maintained Handbooks in Southampton since
2009 and Morgantown since 2011. As a result, the Company is now
distributing its 2015 handbooks in these locations. I am attaching a
copy here for your reference.60
20
As referenced in Fox’s email, the Company’s current employee handbook was initially
distributed to Morgantown employees on February 26 and 27, 2015. Since then, the handbook
has been issued to and receipt acknowledged by all new United States-based employees.61
The current employee handbook is inconsistent with numerous provisions in the25
Morgantown CBA, including those relating to overtime, attendance policy, work schedules,
paid time-off, paid holidays, personal time-off, work rules, disciplinary policy, use of
bulletin boards, recoupment, drug testing, grievance procedure, employee probationary
period, employee status and vehicle collision reporting.62 These inconsistencies are
recognized on page 1 of the handbook, which states that “[s]ome benefits may not apply to30
union team members and in some cases the policies may be impacted by collective bargaining
agreements . . . No person is authorized to make any representations contrary to, in addition to,
or to modify in any way this Team Member Handbook with the written approval of the
Corporate Human Resources Department.”63
35
The Company has not applied the nationwide employee handbook in a manner
inconsistent with the Morgantown CBA. On the other hand, while all employees must
acknowledge receipt of the employee handbook, the Company does not provide them with copies
of the CBA. The Union provides current employees copies of new CBAs, but employees are not
customarily provided with a copy of the CBA during the midst of a contract term unless they40

58 GC Exh. 28, 29B.
59 GC Exh. 18.
60 GC Exh. 21–22.
61 GC Exh. 32.
62 These inconsistencies are not disputed. (Tr. 90–106, 326.)
63 GC Exh. 22 at 1.
JD–110–16
18
request it from Dagle.64 The portions of the handbook at issue include the following:
Retaliation—”All parties involved in the investigation [of a harassment
complaint] will keep complaints and the terms of their resolution confidential
to the fullest extent practicable.”655
Electronic Communication Policy—”A substantial portion of our business is
transacted by telephone and over the wide area network. Therefore in order to
maintain the efficiency of these systems non-business usage must be restricted.
Phone and data lines must be kept open for business purposes. Accordingly, 10
personal telephone calls and e-mails should be infrequent and brief, and limited
to urgent family matters.”66
Use of Personal Electronics— “The use of personal cell phones or other
personal electronic devices such as MP3 players is prohibited in waste 15
processing, warehouse, loading and unloading areas during operating hours and
any areas subject to vehicle movement at any time….Personal mobile phones
and all other personal mobile electronic devices are to be kept in team
member’s lockers. Personal phone calls and use of personal electronic devices
shall be restricted to meal and break periods. Violation of this policy may result 20
in disciplinary action up to and including termination.”67
Personal Conduct—”In order to protect everyone’s rights and safety, it is the Company’s
policy to implement certain rules and regulations regarding your behavior as a team
member. Conduct that maliciously harms or intends to harm the business reputation of 25
Stericycle will not be tolerated. You are expected to conduct yourself and behave in a
manner conducive to efficient operations. Failure to conduct yourself in an appropriate
manner can lead to corrective action up to and including termination.”
The following are some examples of infractions which could be grounds for 30
corrective action up to and including termination, however this list is not all-
inclusive . . . Engaging in behavior that is damaging to Stericycle’s
reputation.”68
Conflict of Interest—”Stericycle will not retain a team member who directly or 35
indirectly engages in the following:
An activity that…adversely reflects upon the integrity of the Company or its
management.”69

64 There is no evidence that the handbook was applied in a manner inconsistent with the CBA. Nor
did I credit Dagle’s hearsay testimony regarding the speculation conveyed by some employees about the
effectiveness of handbook provisions inconsistent with the CBA. It is also undisputed that not all
employees would be in possession of the CBA. (Tr. 110, 131–137.)
65 GC Exh. 22 at 10.
66 GC Exh. 22 at 26.
67 GC Exh. 22 at 28.
68 Id. at 30.
69 Id. at 33.
JD–110–16
19
The electronic use-related provisions in the employee handbook are not the only policies
at issue. On May 21, 2015, Reiss approached Dagle about negotiating over policies relating to
use of personal electronics, cameras and videos in the Southampton facility. Reiss explained at
the time that the Company’s policy manual was already implemented at all of the Company’s 5
other U.S. facilities, including Morgantown, and “corporate” required that Reiss implement them
at the Southampton facility. In fact, the personal electronics policy listed an effective date of
“4/1/2014,” while the camera and video use policy became effective on “01-01-2012.”70
The Camera and Video Use Policy provides, in pertinent part:10
3.1 Team members are prohibited from taking pictures with a personal or
company-issued cell phone camera of any Stericycle property, operation, or
equipment without the permission of their supervisor/manager.
15
4.1 Team members are prohibited from taking video or audio recordings
with a personal or company camera, camcorder, or other device of any
Stericycle property, operation or equipment without the permission of their
supervisor/manager.”
20
The Use of Personal Electronics in the Workplace Policy provides, in pertinent part:
Section 5.1 Team members, visitors and vendors are prohibited from using
personal mobile phones or other personal electronic devices such as MP3
players, (i.e. iPods) in waste processing, warehouse, loading and unloading25
areas during operating hours, and any area subject to vehicle movement at any
time.
Section 5.3 Personal phone calls and use of personal electronic devices shall be
restricted to meal and break periods.30
Section 5.5 Violation of this policy may result in disciplinary action up to and
including termination.
The Company’s personal electronics policies prohibit employees from carrying cellular
telephones at any time into the facility beyond their lockers, although managers or supervisors 35
have been observed using their phones in the facility. A relevant consideration is the fact that
employees handle infectious medical waste and are required to wear protective clothing,
including gloves. While this restriction prevents employees from photographing safety hazards,
it does not preclude them from reporting dangerous conditions. In fact, Dagle confronted
Company officials 2 years ago in response to a complaint from a Southampton employee about 40
an alleged electrical hazard. The complaint triggered an OSHA investigation and the Company
was fined for a safety violation.71

70 Dagle’s credible testimony on this point is not disputed. (GC Exh. 30-31; Tr. 87–89.)
71 I credit Dagle’s hearsay testimony regarding the employee complaint about a safety hazard because
Dagle confronted the Company about the allegation and acknowledged that it was not good working
practice to use cell phones while working. However, I do not credit his speculative assertion that the
employee feared for his job. (Tr. 139–145, 171–172, 239–241.)
JD–110–16
20
LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. The Company’s Recoupment of Employee Health Insurance Premiums
5
The complaint alleges that on or about September 12, the Company unilaterally changed
employee terms and conditions of employment at the Southampton facility by implementing a
plan to recoup employee health care premiums over three pay periods. The Company denies that
it unilaterally changed employees’ wages, as the amounts deducted were exactly what the
employees were required to contribute and the Company was entitled to deduct. 10
Moreover, the Respondent insists that it gave the Union adequate notice and an opportunity to
bargain over the action, but the Union waived that right.
It is well settled that an employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act when it makes
substantial and material unilateral changes during the course of a collective-bargaining 15
relationship on matters that are mandatory subjects of bargaining. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736, 743 (1962). Mandatory subjects of bargaining include those delineated in Section 9(a) as
“rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment” and in Section
8(d) as “wages, hours, and other terms or conditions of employment.” Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,
441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979). Changes to payments of wages are mandatory subjects of bargaining. 20
JPH Management, Inc., 337 NLRB 72, 73 (2001).
Good-faith bargaining requires timely notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain
regarding an employer’s proposed changes, as no genuine bargaining can be conducted where
the decision has already been made and implemented. Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals Division, 25
264 NLRB 1013 (1982), enfd. 722 F.2d 1120 (3d Cir. 1983); Pontiac Osteopath Hospital, 336
NLRB 1021, 1023–1024 (2001); Castle Hill Health Care Center, 355 NLRB 1156, 1189 (2010);
S & I Transportation, Inc., 311 NLRB 1388 (1993). An employer’s unilateral change that affects
numerous bargaining unit employees certainly constitutes a Section 8(a)(5) violation. USC
University Hospital, 358 NLRB 1205, 1213 (2012), citing, Carpenters Local 1031, 321 NLRB30
30, 32 (1996).
The CBA subjected Southampton employees to biweekly health insurance deductions of
1 percent starting after they ratified the contract in April 2014. However, the Company did not
start health insurance deductions during the period of April 13 to August 9, 2014. It is not 35
disputed that the Company was entitled to reimbursement for the unpaid health insurance costs.72
The only question is how it could legally accomplish the recoupment.
On September 3, Riess notified Dagle of the Company’s plan to recoup the outstanding
health insurance costs through equal deductions from employees’ the next three paychecks, 40
starting September 12, and asked if Dagle had “any questions or concerns.” Dagle responded on
September 5, asserting that the “recoupment decision is in violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and Stericycle’s obligations under federal law.” On September 9, Dagle demanded
that any “recoupment schedule must be negotiated with the Union.”

72 Dagle argued to Reiss at one point that the Company waived its right to recoup the unpaid costs,
but the Union provided no precedent to support that proposition.
JD–110–16
21
The Company’s notification of the first recoupment after it was too late to bargain over
the action presented the Union with a fait accompli and, thus, did not afford it with a reasonable
opportunity for bargaining. Intersystems Design Corp., 278 NLRB 759 (1986), Ciba-Geigy
Pharmaceuticals Division, supra 264 NLRB at 1017. See also Laro Maintenance Corp., 333 5
NLRB 958, 959 (2001); S & I Transportation, Inc., supra, 311 NLRB at 1388 fn. 1, 1390.
The next issue is whether the Company’s action in reducing employee wages for the next
three pay periods constituted a significant and material change. Berkshire Nursing Home, 345
NLRB 220, 220 (2005) (citing Crittendon Hospital, 342 NLRB 686, 686 (2004)). As noted by 10
the General Counsel, the contract required the Company to deduct health costs following
ratification, but did not specify how and when the Company could recoup health insurance costs
if the Company failed to start deducting the costs in a timely manner.
The Company’s payroll processing problems lasted over 4 months before it took action to 15
correct the situation by recouping the amounts owed in three paychecks. Eagle Transport Corp.,
338 NLRB 489, 490 (2002), where the Board deemed an employer’s unilateral recoupment
lawful after it miscalculated certain employee’s wage rates, promptly corrected the error after
discovering it and limited it to one paycheck, suggests different results depending on how many
recoupments are in issue. In Alexander Linn Hospital Association, 288 NLRB 103 (1988), ’enfd. 20
sub nom. NLRB v. Wallkill Valley General Hosp., 866 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1989), however, the
Board determined the propriety of the employer’s unilateral action based on the amounts at issue.
In that case, the employer failed to deduct union dues on behalf of a 13 employees over a period
of time, but continued to remit the dues to the union. The amounts owed by employees ranged
from $1.60 to $38.60 and upon, discovering the mistake, the employer decided to recoup the 25
amounts over one or two pay periods depending on whether the amount owed was more or less
than $10. The judge concurred with the judge’s determination that, under the circumstances, the
amounts unilaterally recouped were insubstantial and, thus, did not constitute a material,
substantial, or significant change in a condition of employment. Id. at 118.
30
Applying the principles in Eagle Transport and Alexander Linn, the Company’s
unilateral action in processing the first recoupment were relatively insignificant and did not
constitute a material and substantial change. The 1978 Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey data
cited by the Company indicates that the amounts unilaterally deducted in Alexander Linn,
approximately 2 hours of pay, line up with those at issue in this case.7335
In contrast, the Company’s second and third recoupments of health insurance costs,
however, constituted a more significant amount of employees’ wages. The issue then is whether
the Company provided the Union with sufficient advance notice to facilitate meaningful
negotiations over the second and third recoupments.40
After essentially telling Dagle that the first recoupment scheduled for September 12 was

73 See Industry Wage Survey: Hospitals and Nursing Homes, September 1978, U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, November 1980, Bulletin 2069, at 6, indicating average
wage rates for general duty nurses in 1978 was between $5.85 per hour and $8.30 per hour.
JD–110–16
22
a fait accompli, Reiss offered to bargain over the future second and third recoupment pay
periods. Dagle refused, conditioning bargaining on the Company’s restoring the status quo by
reversing its decision to implement the first recoupment. Having given a reasonable amount of
time to bargain over the second and third recoupments, which had not yet been processed, the
Union waived the opportunity to bargain over those changes. Ciba-Geigy Pharmaceuticals 5
Division, supra at 1017 (1982); Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 300 NLRB 561, 563 (1990);
Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 289 NLRB 1441, 1442 (1988).
Under the circumstances, the Company was entitled to recoup the 1 percent health
insurance cost from Southampton unit employees. The Company did not afford the Union a 10
reasonable opportunity to bargain over the first recoupment, but the amounts involved were
insignificant and did not constitute a change. While the second and third recoupments did
constitute more significant amount of wages, the Union waived its opportunity to bargain over
those changes. This allegation is dismissed.
15
B. The Employee Handbook
1. Distribution of the Employee Handbook
The General Counsel alleges that the Company’s February 2015 distribution of a U.S. 20
company-wide employee handbook to Morgantown employees containing provisions
inconsistent with the CBA unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment of unit
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). The Company contends that it did not
unilaterally change employees’ terms and conditions of employment by distributing an employee
handbook to Morgantown employees.25
An employer violates Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by changing wages, hours or other terms
and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees without giving the employees’
bargaining representative notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain about the changes.
NLRB v. Katz, supra; United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, 347 NLRB 603, 607 (2006). The 30
Board has specifically found work rules to be mandatory subjects of bargaining: work rules
involving the imposition of discipline: United Cerebral Palsy of New York City, supra.
The Morgantown facility employee handbook contained numerous policies inconsistent
with CBA provisions relating to overtime, attendance, work schedules, paid time-off, paid 35
holidays, personal time-off, work rules, disciplinary policy, use of bulletin board, recoupment,
drug testing, grievance procedure, employee probationary period, employee status and vehicle
collision reporting. Page 1 of the handbook, however, contained an acknowledgment that its
policies might be superseded by certain provisions in the CBA. Additionally, there is no
evidence that the Company ever enforced the employee handbook in a manner that contravened 40
any provisions in the CBA.
Notwithstanding the employee handbook’s disclaimer regarding the CBA and the lack of
evidence of its enforcement, the fact remains that the document contained numerous Company
policies and practices that affected numerous mandatory subjects of bargaining. That being the 45
case, the Company was obligated to notify the Union and afford it a reasonable opportunity to
bargain over the handbook provisions before distributing it to unit employees. A notation in the
JD–110–16
23
handbook vaguely apprising unit employees that in “some cases these policies may be impacting
by collective bargaining agreements” did not provide them with clear guidance as to the
applicable policies affecting certain terms and conditions of employment.
Under the circumstances, the Company’s February 2015 unilateral implementation of an 5
employee handbook at the Morgantown facility constituted material and significant changes to
unit employees terms and conditions of employment in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
2. The Company’s rules and policies10
The complaint also alleges that the Company’s 2015 employee handbook and policy
manuals contain several rules or policies that unlawfully interfere with unit employees’ Section 7
rights.
15
The maintenance of a rule that would reasonably have a chilling effect on employees’
Section 7 activity violates Section 7. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998), enfd.
203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In determining whether an employer’s rules or policies restrict or
chill employee’s rights to engage in protected activity, one must consider if: “(1) employees
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was 20
promulgated in response to union activity; (3) or the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise
of Section 7 rights.” Lutheran Heritage Village – Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004).
Where a rule or policy explicitly restricts Section 7 activity or can be reasonably read to restrict
such activity, the Board is required to evaluate the employer’s asserted business justification
“[t]o strike a proper balance between the employees’ rights and the Respondent’s business 25
justification.” Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271, 272 (2001). The Board must accommodate the
respective rights of the parties “with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other.” NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
(a) Use of Personal Electronic Devices30
The Company’s policy manual and employee handbook contain virtually identical polices
relating to the use of personal electronics in the workplace. The General Counsel contends that
the policies unlawfully restrict employees’ cell phones and other personal electronic devices.
The Company contends that the policies, on their face, do not purport to address Section 7 35
activity. Nor is there any evidence that the policies were adopted in response to, or ever applied
to restrict, Section 7 activity. Finally, the Company asserts that the policies are narrowly tailored
to provide a safe working environment for employees.
An employer has a legitimate interest in ensuring the safety of its operations, but rules 40
regulating the use of electronic devices must be narrowly tailored to address such concern.
Whole Foods Market, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 87, slip op. at 4 (2015); T-Mobile USA, Inc., 363
NLRB No. 171, slip op. at 4 (2016); Rio All-Suites Hotel & Casino, 362 NLRB No. 190 (2015).
The policy manual and employee handbook restrict the use of personal mobile phones or 45
other electronic devices to break time, requires that they be kept in lockers during worktime, and
prohibits them from entering work areas with their cell phones and other electronic devices. The
JD–110–16
24
General Counsel contends that the policy unlawfully inhibits protected activity because the
requirement that cell phones be kept in an employee’s locker except during break times is
tantamount to prohibiting employees from entering work areas with personal electronic devices
during nonwork time. It is also noted that these rules do not make any exceptions so employees
would reasonably interpret it to even prohibit them from accessing their cell phone to take5
pictures of safety violations while on nonworking time.
The General Counsel’s argument fails for several reasons. First, the Section 7 type of
activity referred to by the General Counsel—the taking of photographs through a cell phone or
other electronic device—is not explicitly mentioned in the rule. Of course, mobile phone 10
technology has evolved to the point where many users, but not all, possess a picture taking
feature on their phones and other electronic devices. However, the Company has a separate rule
in place, discussed below, specifically regulating the taking of photographs or videos in working
areas. In that context, a reasonable interpretation of the rule is that it prohibits employees from
engaging in telephone conversations and using other electronic devices in work areas. As noted 15
by the Company, many devices have music and reading features. Gone unmentioned are devices
with game features. In a facility where employees handle regulated medical waste, one can
appreciate the virtues in a prohibition against telephone conversations, listening to music,
reading or playing games in work areas.
20
Secondly, the record established a workplace environment at the Morgantown facility
that necessitates the use of protective clothing covering employees’ entire bodies, including
hands, when they are in work areas because they handle regulated medical waste. Given the
hazardous conditions involved, it is hard to imagine how an employee could use a mobile phone
or electronic device in a work area without exposing it to the hazardous elements. The General 25
Counsel focuses on the distinction between using and merely carrying a mobile phone or other
electronic device, but that is a distinction without meaning. There is no practical point in being
able to carry something to a location if one is not safely able to use it there.
The Company’s maintenance of its policy manual rule regarding the use of personal 30
electronics in the workplace policy and employee handbook policy regarding the use of personal
electronics do not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity, are narrowly tailored to restrict the use of
mobile phones and electronic devices in the Company’s hazardous work areas, and any impact
on Section 7 activity is outweighed by the Company’s substantial business justification for the
rules. The allegations at paragraphs 6(a)(i) and 6(c) of the complaint are dismissed.35
(b) Personal Conduct Policy
The complaint alleges that the Company’s personal conduct policy violates Section
8(a)(1) because the policy is vague and can be reasonably construed as prohibiting Section 7 40
activity. The Company contends that the policy does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity
and was not adopted in response to, or applied to, such activity.
Although Section 7 activity may sometimes harm the reputation of an employer, the
Board and courts have never held that employees have a right to maliciously or intentionally45
harm their employer’s business or reputation. NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 1229 (Jefferson
Standard), 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953); Valley Hospital Medical Center, Inc., 351 NLRB 1250,
JD–110–16
25
1252–1253 (2007), enfd. sub nom. Nevada Service Employees Union v. NLRB, 358 Fed Appx.
783 (9th Cir. 2009); Stanley Furniture Co., 271 NLRB 702, 703–704 (1984). Nevertheless,
employer rules aimed at criticism by employees must contain clear language stating that they are
aimed only at unprotected activity. See e.g. Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip op. at
3 (2014). Otherwise, the failure to make that distinction would cause employees to refrain from 5
engaging in protected activities. See Lafayette Park Hotel, supra at 828.
The policy provision at issue prohibits employee conduct “that maliciously harms or
intends to harm the business reputation” of the Company. The example stated cites “behavior
that is damaging to Stericycle’s reputation.” The provision makes no exception, however, for 10
statements that would be protected by the Act, which would protect false or negative statements
relating to Section 7 rights. See Costco Wholesale Corp. 358 NLRB 1100 supra at 1100–1102
(2012). The statement is sufficiently vague and is accompanied by a threat of discipline or
termination, causing employees to reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1). Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, supra. The fact that the policy 15
is buried amongst 16 other rules relating to unprotected conduct is immaterial. As far as the
typical employee is concerned, if the rule is there, it can be applied to him/her. Accordingly, the
Company’s personal conduct policy was vague, overbroad and in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
(c) Conflict of Interest Policy20
The complaint alleges that the Morgantown facility’s conflict of interest policy against
activities that “adversely reflect upon the integrity of the company” is unlawfully overbroad.
The Company contends that this language must be read in context and not in isolation, neither
involves nor can be reasonably construed as involving protected activity, but rather, activities 25
which would reflect adversely upon the integrity of the Company.
Section 7 of the Act protects employees’ right to engage in concerted activity, even if that
activity conflicts with the employer’s interest. Examples include protests in front of the
company, organizing a boycott of the employer and soliciting union support on nonwork time. 30
The Board has concluded that an employer cannot prohibit employees from engaging in conduct
that could conflict with its interests where those interests could include union interests. The
Sheraton Anchorage, 362 NLRB No. 123 (2015). If an employer’s conflict-of-interest rule
would reasonably be read to prohibit such activities, the rule will be found unlawful. See HTH
Corp., 356 NLRB 1397, 1398, 1421 (2011), enfd. 693 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). Rules that are 35
clearly limited to legitimate business interests, on the other hand, are not unlawful.
The Company’s conflict of interest policy prohibits employee activity that “constitutes a
conflict of interest or adversely reflects upon the integrity of the Company or its management”
including “activity in which a team member obtains financial gain due to his/her association with 40
the Company” or “activity, which by its nature, detracts from the ability of the team member to
fulfill his/her obligation to the Company.” The Company’s policy against activities that
“adversely reflect upon the integrity of the company” is overbroad. The policy does not set forth
examples nor does it clarify a legitimate business interest so that employees will not understand
it to prohibit protected activity. Moreover, the statement is vague and is accompanied by a threat 45
of discipline, causing employees to reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1). Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, supra, 343 NLRB at 647.
JD–110–16
26
Accordingly, the Company’s maintenance of the conflict of interest policy is impermissibly
overbroad in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(d) Harassment Complaints
5
The complaint alleges that the Company’s retaliation policy in the Morgantown
employee handbook, explicitly prohibiting employees from disclosing “complaints and the terms
of their resolution,” is unlawfully overbroad. The Company maintains that the policy’s
confidentiality language does not expressly restrict Section 7 rights and there is no evidence that
it was adopted in response to protected activity or has been applied to Section 7 activity.10
It is well settled that Section 7 of the Act grants employees the right to discuss wages and
other terms and conditions of employment with other employees, and the Board has repeatedly
found confidentiality rules unlawful if employees would reasonably construe the rules to prohibit
protected discussions. See, e.g., Battle’s Transportation, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 17, slip op. at 1-2 15
(2015); Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB No. 8, slip op. at 2 (2014); Cintas
Corp., 344 NLRB 943, 943 (2005), enfd. 482 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 2007). It is likewise well
settled that employees have a Section 7 right to discuss their conditions of employment with
third parties, such as union representatives, Board agents, and the public in general, and the
Board has invalidated rules prohibiting such third-party communication. See, e.g., DirecTV U.S. 20
DirecTV Holdings, LLC, 359 NLRB 545, 547 (2013), reaffirmed and incorporated by reference,
362 NLRB No. 48 (2015); Hyundai America Shipping, 357 NLRB 860, 872 (2011), enfd. in part
805 F.3d 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Kinder-Care Learning Centers, Inc., 299 NLRB 1171, 1171–
1172 (1990).
25
There is no question that the policy has a lawful purpose—to protect employees from all
forms of harassment, and to provide a process by which they can address the problem with the
employer, have the problem investigated, appropriate remedial action taken, and appropriate
protective measures established. Nor is it disputed that the Company has a substantial and
compelling business interest adopting rules banning any form of harassment in the workplace, 30
and that the inclusion of a confidentiality provision is an integral part of such a policy. Hyundai
America Shipping Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, supra.
The pertinent question, however, is whether employees would reasonably read the
policy’s confidentiality provision as restricting their Section 7 rights in certain situations. As 35
noted by the General Counsel, it is not clear from the handbook that the policy is limited to
sexual harassment complaints and resolutions. The Company lists a variety of types of
harassment, but that list is in another section of the handbook, between its affirmative action
policy and its prohibition on the use or possession of firearms and dangerous weapons on
company property. 40
Employees who submit a complaint or participate in a complaint do not have to agree to
keep the complaint, report or investigation confidential. Fresenius USA Mfg., Inc., 362 NLRB
No. 130, slip op at 2 (2015). Here, the Company’s rule encompasses parties beyond the its
representatives, requiring “all parties involved” to keep complaints and the terms of their 45
resolution confidential. An employee could reasonably construe the restriction as prohibiting
communications with Board agents or other governmental agencies about complaints related to
JD–110–16
27
the workplace or Section 7 activities. Kinder-Care Learning Centers, supra, 299 NLRB at 1172;
DirecTV U.S. DirecTV Holdings, LLC, supra, 359 NLRB at 547.
The Company also argues that the policy merely articulates its pledge to employees, is
not a rule of conduct does not mention a penalty. Those considerations ignore the fact that the 5
portion of the harassment policy at issue, requiring that employees “will keep complaints and the
terms of their resolution confidential to the fullest extent practicable,” can be reasonably
interpreted as a rule of conduct preventing employees from engaging in Section 7 protected
communications. Moreover, clarifying that employees’ obligation to maintain confidentiality is
not ironclad and only “to the fullest extent practicable,” serves to create further uncertainty in the10
minds of employees as to whether they might incur adverse consequences if they violate that
provision. Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union 915, CWA, 915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d
Cir. 1990) (upholding the right of employer to discharge employees who violated confidentiality
provisions of harassment policy).
15
Accordingly, the Company’s retaliation policy relating to the confidentiality of
harassment complaints is overboard in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
(e) Electronic Communications Policy
20
The General Counsel alleges that a portion of the Company’s electronic communication
policy unlawfully restricts employees’ usage of the Company’s email system in violation of
Section 8(a)(1). The Company contends that the language as issue does not explicitly restrict
Section 7 activity, has not been applied to restrict Section 7 activity, and cannot be reasonably
construed to restrict Section 7 activity.25
In Purple Communications, 361 NLRB No. 126 slip op. at 14 (2014), the Board
explained the rights available to employees in using an employer’s email system:
[W]e will presume that employees who have rightful access to their employer’s email 30
system in the course of their work have a right to use the email system to engage in
Section 7-protected communications on nonworking time. An employer may rebut the
presumption by demonstrating that special circumstances necessary to maintain
production or discipline justify restricting its employees’ rights.
35
The Company’s electronic communications policy language at issue states that a
substantial portion of its business is conducted by telephone and over the internet and, in order to
“maintain the efficiency of these systems, nonbusiness usage must be restricted. Phone and data
lines must be kept open for business purposes. Accordingly, personal telephone calls and emails
should be infrequent and brief, and limited to urgent family matters.”40
The General Counsel does not argue that the restrictions on the use of the Company’s
telephone system is unlawful, just the limits on the use of its email system. In contrast with
telephone use, where the use of a telephone line might make that mode of communication
unavailable for others, the use of email would not interfere with simultaneous use of the system 45
by other employees.
JD–110–16
28
The Company’s limits on the use of its email system to “urgent family matters” can be
reasonably construed to preclude employees from using the system, even on break time, to
engage in protected activities relating to their terms and conditions of employment. As written,
the policy poses a clear restriction upon employees Section 7 rights and the Company has not
shown the special circumstances needed to justify its restriction on the nonbusiness use of its 5
email system, even on break time. Nor does the fact that the policy permits such use to an extent
that is “infrequent and brief” any less restrictive on the ability of a unit to engage in protected
activity.
In contrast to Purple Communications, however, the record here lacks any evidence that 10
unit employees at the Morgantown facility had access to the Company’s email system. In Purple
Communications, the employees at issue were assigned company email accounts and routinely
used company computers during the course of their work. That is hardly the case here, where the
only work activity described in the record relates to the handling of medical waste. The record is
replete with email communications between company supervisors and managers, and between 15
the Company and the Union. There is not a hint that unit employees even had access to the
Company’s email system at any time, whether during work or on break time. The allegations at
paragraph 6(a)(v) of the complaint are dismissed.
(f) Camera and Video Use Policy20
The General Counsel contends that the Company’s camera and video use policy
unlawfully prohibits employees from taking pictures, or video or audio recordings with personal
or company-issued mobile phones, cameras, camcorders or other devices of any company
property, operation, or equipment without the permission of their supervisor/manager. The 25
Company contends that the restrictions were narrowly drawn in order to protect its legitimate
business interests, specifically, protecting its physical equipment, property, proprietary
information and processes.
Employees have a Section 7 right to photograph and make recordings in furtherance of 30
their protected concerted activity, including the right to use personal devices to take such
pictures and recordings. See Hawaii Tribune-Herald, 356 NLRB 661 (2011), enfd. sub. nom.
Stephens Media, LLC v. NLRB, 677 F.3d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012); White Oak Manor, 353 NLRB
795 (2009), incorporated by reference, 355 NLRB 1280 (2010), enfd. mem. 452 F.App’x 374
(4th Cir. 2011). Rules placing a total ban on such photography or recordings, or banning the use 35
or possession of personal cameras or recording devices are unlawfully overbroad where they
would reasonably be read to prohibit the taking of pictures or recordings on nonwork time. See
e.g., T-Mobile USA, Inc., supra, at 4–5 (prohibition against recording unlawfully overbroad
where rule failed to distinguish between recordings protected by Section 7 and included within
its scope, recordings created during nonwork time and in nonwork areas); Whole Foods Market, 40
Inc., supra at 4 (employer’s broad and unqualified language prohibiting work-place recordings
would reasonably be read by employees as prohibiting Section 7 activity); Rio All-Suites Hotel &
Casino, supra at 4 (photography and audio or video recording in the workplace are protected by
Section 7 if employees are acting in concert for their mutual aid and protection and no overriding
employer interest is present).45
JD–110–16
29
There is no evidence that the policy was adopted in response or applied to protected
activity. It is also undisputed that the Company has a legitimate proprietary interest in its
equipment and processes. The Company’s contention, however, that the policy does not
unqualifiedly prohibit all picture taking or recording on its property, including pictures of
“people” or recording “conversations,” is incorrect.5
A reasonable interpretation of the policy conveys the sense that the policy totally
prohibits the use of cameras, video and audio recording devices on company property. The
policy is not limited in scope, but rather, broadly prohibits the use of such devices at any time on
company property without permission from a supervisor or manager. The language of the policy 10
does not make any exceptions so employees would reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit
employees from such Section 7 activity as taking pictures of safety violations. Nor does it
differentiate between work time and work areas, and nonwork time and nonwork areas.
The Company did not present evidence of an overriding proprietary interest in such a 15
broad ban on camera and recording devices. Nor did it present sufficient evidence to show why it
could not make an exception in the policy for Section 7 activity. Accordingly, the camera and
video policy is unlawfully over broad and insufficiently tailored to protect the the Company’s
legitimate business interests. As currently written, the policy violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
20
C. The Union’s Information Requests
The complaint alleges that the Company failed and refused to provide relevant
information to the Union. The Company denied the allegations, insisting that the
information requested was irrelevant, already provided or confidential.25
An employer has a duty, upon request, to furnish the union with information that is
potentially relevant and useful to its role as unit employees’ bargaining representative. Detroit
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314–315 (1979). Certain types of information pertaining to
wages, hours, benefits, and working conditions of employees are considered, “so intrinsic to the 30
core of the employer-employee relationship (as to be) considered presumptively relevant.”
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 NLRB 424 (1993). Where information is considered presumptively
relevant, no specific showing of relevance is required, and the employer has the burden of
proving lack of relevance. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 293 NLRB 693 (1989); Ohio Power Co.,
216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975); Grand Rapids Press, 331 NLRB 296 (2000); Contract Carriers 35
Corp., 339 NLRB 851, 858 (2003). A liberal discovery type standard is applied, and the union is
not required to prove that the requested data will be dispositive of the issue before the parties.
ATC/Vancom of Nevada Ltd., 326 NLRB 1432, 1434 (1998). An employer can avoid production
only if it either proves the information is not relevant or demonstrates some reason why it cannot
be provided. Ormet Aluminum Mill Products Corporation, 335 NLRB 788, 801 (2001); A-Plus 40
Roofing, 295 NLRB 967, 970 (1989), enfd. 39 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir. 1994).
1. Information Relating to the Recoupment of Health Care Costs
The Company denied the Union’s requests for internal communications regarding 45
the Company’s decision and actions to recoup outstanding health care premium over
three pay periods and its bargaining notes regarding the negotiation of Article 22.3 on the
JD–110–16
30
grounds of relevance, confidentiality and privilege.
Information relating to the Company’s failure to process payroll deductions for health
care costs for over 4 months is relevant because the Union was entitled to ascertain the
legitimacy of the Company’s explanation for the delay. One could reasonably envision a unit 5
employee asking Dagle for a more detailed explanation as to why a larger deduction was taken
out of his/her paycheck and demanding that Dagle file a grievance. In deciding whether to file a
grievance, however, Dagle was entitled to more than just the information on employee’s
paychecks. See Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB at 991.
10
Similarly, the Union’s request for bargaining notes was relevant to a potential grievance
because they might have reflected discussions between the parties regarding the future
implementation of Article 22.3. The mentioning or awareness of potential delays, or the absence
of such information, during bargaining, was certainly relevant to the parties’ positions on the
grievance that the Union was pondering. 15
The Company’s vague assertions of privilege and confidentiality also fail.
Confidentiality claims, in certain situations, may justify a refusal to provide information. Mission
Foods, 345 NLRB 788, 791–792 (2005). Justification, however, is determined by balancing the
union’s need for the information against any “legitimate and substantial confidentiality interests 20
established by the employer.” Detroit Edison v. NLRB, supra 440 U.S. at 315, 318–320. Blanket
claims of confidentiality are insufficient. Pennsylvania Power Co., 301 NLRB 1104, 1105
(1991). In the event that the confidentiality interests are shown to outweigh the Union’s need for
the information, the party must still seek an accommodation to provide the information while
protecting its confidentiality interests. Mission Foods, supra 345 NLRB at 791–792; Tritac 25
Corp., 286 NLRB 522, 522 (1987). Here, however, the Company’s simply rejected the Union’s
requests for information relating to the decisions, planning and implementation of Article 22.3
and did not seek an accommodation of the interests it sought to protect from disclosure. United
States Testing Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 14, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
30
Under the circumstances, by failing to provide information requested by the Union on
September 11 and 26, relating to the recoupment of outstanding employee health insurance costs,
the Company failed to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2. Information Requests Relating To 401(k) Contributions35
The Union requested information on September 5 relating to the arbitration of its
grievance that the Company failed to remit on a pretax basis certain monies intended for
employees’ 401(k) or stock purchase plans. The items sought included biweekly earnings
statements from the period April 13 through September 6, and thereafter on an ongoing basis, 40
internal communications and meeting notes to the Company’s implementation of these
investment plans, and bargaining notes and proposals exchanged and agreements reached
regarding Article 23.3.
45
JD–110–16
31
(a) Earnings Statements for April 13 to September 6, 2014 Pay Periods
The Company timely responded to the September 5 request for the April through
September by providing employees’ earnings information, including 401(k) and stock
purchase plan deductions, in an Excel spreadsheet. Dagle was unable to decipher the 5
information contained on the spreadsheet, but never contacted Fox nor anyone else with
the Company for assistance. Instead, he requested the information again 11 months later
in an August 2015 subpoena in preparation for the September 2015 arbitration over
Article 23.3. Under the circumstances, the Company cannot be saddled with the Union’s
failure to request clarification or better information than the earnings records supplied. 10
The charge that the Company unlawfully failed to provide the Union with earnings
statements for the period of April 13 to September 6 is dismissed.
(b) Earnings Statements since September 7, 2014
15
On September 22, the Company objected to the Union’s September 5 request for
the biweekly earnings statements since September 7 on an “ongoing basis.” The
Company objected to the production of such information on an indefinite basis and as
unclear. It did, however, seek to reach an accommodation, asking the Union to “identify
any specific time periods and how each is related to the Union’s investigation of this 20
grievance or any particular grievance and the company will re-evaluate the
reasonableness of the request.”
The Union did not respond. Instead, on August 18, 2015, nearly 11 months later,
it requested the same information again by subpoena in preparation for the September 25
2015 arbitration. On September 8, 2015, pursuant to union subpoena in preparation for
the arbitration, the Company provided the Union with computer access to unit
employees’ earnings statements for the entire period from September 7, 2014 through
September 4, 2015, which the Union was able to view, but not print. The Union did not
request assistance from the Company in printing the statements. Notwithstanding the 30
Company’s eventual acquiescence to the “ongoing” request for the earnings statements in
September 2014, the issue remains whether the delay in providing the information
constituted an 8(a)(5) violation.
I agree with the Company’s contention that the process of printing out the requested 35
earnings statements on an ongoing basis since September 7, 2014, would have been a
monumental task since it would entail approximately 1,500 earnings statements taking a payroll
clerk about 100 hours to produce. At the time of the request on September 22, however, there
was only one earnings statement period that would have accrued since September 7. While the
production of earnings statements for one pay period on or since September 7 was justified, the 40
request for continuous production of such information was overly burdensome under the
circumstances.
The Union was entitled to earnings statements in relating to its grievance and the
arbitration of same. However, it is unclear why it would need the information on an 45
ongoing basis and there is no provision in the CBA imposing such an obligation on the
Company. The historical earnings information generated prior to the September 2015
JD–110–16
32
arbitration was certainly relevant to the arbitration, but the need for the information indefinitely
is unclear. The Company requested further explanation for such a request and offered to reach
an accommodation. The Union passed on the offer. Accordingly, the charge that the Company’s
unlawfully delayed in providing the Union with earnings statements on an ongoing basis since
September 7 is dismissed.5
(c) Internal Communications, Meeting Notes and Bargaining Documents
The Company refused the Union’s requests on September 5 and 18, to provide internal
communications, meeting notes and bargaining documents relating to Article 23.3 on the 10
grounds of relevance, confidentiality, privilege and impermissible pre-arbitral discovery.
The relevance of these information requests to the Union’s grievance is the same as it
was with the request for similar documentation relating to Article 22.3. The Union’s requests
were relevant in order to ascertain the Company’s position and comments during bargaining 15
regarding its implementation of Article 23.3.
Once again, the Company’s vague assertions of privilege and confidentiality also fail.
Mission Foods, supra. The union’s need for the information in connection with its grievance
prevailed over the Company’s interests in shielding from disclosure its potential legal theories20
for arbitration. See Acme Industrial, 385 U.S. 432, 438–439 (1967). The Company asserts that
this information request amounted to an impermissible demand for pre-arbitral discovery. See
California Nurses Association, 326 NLRB 1362 (1998). Moreover, the Company argues that it
essentially complied with this request by furnishing the information a few weeks after the Union
counsel subpoenaed it and 6 days before the arbitration.25
The request was indeed made after the Union filed for arbitration of the grievance, but it
also encompassed information that it needed to evaluate its grievance going forward. Fleming
Cos., 332 NLRB 1086, 1094 (2000). At the very least, it was incumbent on the Company to
suggest an accommodation by redacting any records encompassing information not related to 30
Article 23.3, legal strategy or other information directly related to the arbitration. Borgess
Medical Center, 342 NLRB 1105, 1106 (2004).
The Union’s demand for copies of all collective-bargaining proposals and agreements
relating to the 401(k) plan, however, were not justified. In the absence of an explanation by the 35
Union that it was not still in possession of proposals exchanged and proposals reached by the
parties, it should have specified what it possessed or did not possess. While the information was
certainly relevant, the Company was not required to regenerate information the Union already
possessed. See Manitowoc Ice, Inc., 344 NLRB 1222, 1238 (2005). Accordingly, this allegation
is dismissed.40
Under the circumstances, the Company’s failure to provide internal communications and
meeting and bargaining notes requested by the Union on September 5 and 18, 2014, relating to
the Company’s implementation of Article 23.3 violated of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
45
3. The Ebola PowerPoint Presentation
JD–110–16
33
The complaint alleged that the Company unlawfully refused the Union’s requests on
November 13 and 18, and December 1 for a copy of an Ebola PowerPoint presentation shown to
unit employees. The Company denied the requests for a copy, but offered to have the Union
view review the presentation. The Union declined the offer, insisting that it needed a copy to
provide its experts for review.5
The PowerPoint presentation was informational in nature and seemingly an activity not
covered by the CBA. However, an information request pertaining to mandatory employee
training is presumptively relevant as it is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Hospital of Bartow,
Inc., 361 NLRB No. 34, slip op at 2 (2014). On the other hand, production of the information is 10
sufficient if “made available in a manner not so burdensome or time-consuming as to impede the
process of bargaining.” Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 NLRB 592, 593 (1949).
Ebola and other highly infectious types of waste, which are specially packaged and
labeled, are not handled by unit employees at the Morgantown facility. However, the 15
Company’s PowerPoint mandatory presentation on how to recognize and handle Ebola waste
obviously sought to prepare employees for a worst case scenario if they ever encountered the
deadly material. In that context, the potential danger from Ebola had some connection to
employee’s terms and conditions of employment in handling regulated medical waste. To
suggest otherwise—that employees are not exposed and it is unrelated to their work—ignores the 20
Company’s safety reasons for conducting the training.
Although access to the PowerPoint was relevant to the Union’s interests in employee
training, the Company limited access to a viewing by Dagle in lieu of a copy. The Union refused
the offer, insisting that it needed a copy of the presentation in order to have it reviewed by 25
experts in infectious diseases. Given the extremely complex and sensitive nature of the
information involved, coupled with the Union’s assurances of confidentiality, the Company’s
offer to view the presentation only was unreasonable under the circumstances. See Cincinnati
Steel Castings Co., 86 NLRB 592, 593 (1949); American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 250
NLRB 47 (1980), ’enfd. sub nom. CWA, Local 1051 v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 923 (1st Cir. 1981).30
Under the circumstances, the Company’s refusal to provide the Union with a copy of
Ebola training provided to unit employees, as requested by the Union on November 13 and 18,
and December 1, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
35
4. The December 2014 Employee Handbook
The complaint alleges the Company ignored the Union’s request on December 1 for a
copy of the employee handbook then in effect. On November 25, Fox vaguely referred to the
existence of employee handbooks governing employee conduct. On December 1, Dagle 40
requested a copy of that employee handbook. Fox ignored Dagle’s request, although she
eventually provided him on March 2, 2015 with a copy of the recently issued 2015 version of the
handbook.
45
The employee handbook in effect on December 1 was presumptively relevant to the
Union’s obligations under the CBA as it undoubtedly contained employees’ terms and conditions
JD–110–16
34
of employment. While Fox eventually provided the Union with the newly issued employee
handbook on March 2, 2015, she never provided a copy of the version in effect on December 1.
The failure to provide a copy of that handbook impeded the Union’s ability to effectively
represent the interests of unit employees at the Morgantown facility in violation of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.5
5. Vehicle Backing Program
The complaint alleges that the Company unlawfully delayed from November 24 until
March 2, 2015, in providing the Union with a copy of its vehicle backing program. On 10
November 24, the Union’s requested a copy of the Company’s vehicle backing program. The
request was triggered by the discipline of employee James Clay for violating the vehicle backing
program after he was involved in a vehicular accident.
15
During their meeting regarding Clay’s discipline, Shoennagle provided with documents
in response to the November 24 request. However, the documents did not include a copy of the
vehicle backing program. Dagle reminded Shoennagle of this when they met again on November
28. At that time, Schoennagle said he would look into it. Two months passed until late January
2015, when Dagle inquired again. Schoennagle responded that the program was proprietary and 20
would not be provided. On January 30, 2015, the Union filed a charge alleging the Company’s
unlawful refusal to provide a copy of the program. On March 2, 2015, the Company
reconsidered and provided a copy of a PowerPoint presentation and website link where the
Union could purchase a copy of the video.
25
The Company’s 3-month delay in providing information about its vehicle backing
program was unreasonable. The information reflected the basis for Clay’s discipline and was
relevant to the Union’s obligation to determine whether there was an adequate justification for
the discipline. The Company’s delay in providing the information, however, prevented the
Union from effectively representing Clay’s interests when he was disciplined. Good Life 30
Beverage Co., 312 NLRB 1060, 1062 fn. 9 (1993); Postal Service, 308 NLRB 547, 547 fn. 1
(1992).
6. The Soubra Grievance
35
The complaint alleges that the Company unlawfully refused to provide information
requested by the Union on December 11 relating to a grievance over the Company’s response to
an altercation between Supervisor Ron Lobb and unit employee Ryan Soubra. The Company
provided the Union with video tapes of the incident and permitted it to view the disciplinary
action issued to Lobb. However, the Company denied the request for the remaining items on the 40
grounds that they were not presumptively relevant and there was no justification for production:
witness information; all documents, reports, notes and emails relating to the ensuing
investigation; and any such documents of similar incidents between Lobb and other employees.
The Union replied that the documentation was necessary to enable it to evaluate whether Lobb’s
discipline was “sufficient to deter future misconduct against bargaining unit members.”45
Had the information related to the discipline of a unit employee, the information
JD–110–16
35
requested would have been relevant and subject to disclosure. The requested information,
however, was not presumptively relevant as it concerned investigative, disciplinary and
personnel records of a supervisor, not a bargaining unit employee. See F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert
Co., 316 NLRB 1312, 1313 (1995). Accordingly, the Union was required to demonstrate a
special need for the information under the circumstances. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 5
301, 314–315 (1979).
The Union has a legitimate interest in protecting unit employees from misconduct by
persons outside the bargaining unit. However, its need, as established in this record, for the
outstanding information outweighed by the fact that it encompasses the disciplinary and 10
personnel information of a nonunit supervisor. Those are matters over which the Union does not
have a right to bargain. The Company provided Dagle with video tapes of the incident,
permitted him to read the disciplinary action issued to Lobb, and provided the names of the two
witnesses to the statement, including the written statement of one of them. Moreover, having
read the disciplinary action, the Union was aware of the discipline issued to Lobb, but did not 15
articulate it in the record.
Under the circumstances, the Company’s refusal to provide the additional information
requested in the Union’s letter of December 11 was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
This allegation is dismissed.20
7. Code of Conduct and Harassment Training
The complaint alleges that the Company refused the Union’s request on December 30 for
a copy the Code of Conduct and Harassment Training video shown to unit employees. The 25
Company refused to provide a copy of the video because it was “proprietary” but offered to let
Dagle view it. Dagle declined the offer.
Employee training information is presumptively relevant. Hospital of Bartow, Inc.,supra.
The Company now concedes that the training video was a relevant request by the Union. 30
However, relying on Cincinnati Steel Castings Co., 86 NLRB 592, 593 (1949), it contends that it
was under no obligation to furnish the requested “information in the exact form” requested by
the Union.
The Company’s refusal to provide the Union with a copy of the training video shown to 35
unit employees was unreasonable under the circumstances. Permitting the Union to merely view
the video is not the same as producing the video. The training video contained information
conveyed to employees that related to their terms and conditions of employment. As such, the
Union would have an interest referring to it during future bargaining or grievance matters.
40
Moreover, the Company provides no precedent to support its contention that a training
video created by it and shown to employees for training purposes may be shielded from
disclosure to its bargaining partner on the grounds that it is “proprietary.” At the very least, the
Company could have insisted on a nondisclosure agreement from the Union.
45
Under the circumstances, the Company’s refusal to provide the code of conduct and
harassment training video requested by the Union on December 30 violated Section 8(a)(5) and
JD–110–16
36
(1) of the Act.
8. The TMX Survey
In response to the Union’s July 15, 2015 request for copies of documents relating TMX 5
meetings with Morgantown employees, the Company provided a redacted copy of a PowerPoint
presentation of an employee survey. The dispute is over the omitted portions, which consisted of
slides containing “comparative data” with the Company’s other facilities.
Since the information sought related to facilities and employees not represented by the 10
Union, the burden was on the Union to assert a special need. The Union contends that the
information shown to Morgantown employees compared their satisfaction with their terms and
conditions of employment with those of employees at the Company’s other facilities. However,
there is no showing that the information contained in surveys of employees at other Company
facilities not represented by the Union had any bearing on the actual terms and conditions of the 15
Morgantown facility’s unit employees. This allegation is dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Stericycle, Inc. is an employer engaged in commerce within the 20
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Teamsters Local 628 (the Union) is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
25
3. At all times since September 1, 2006, the Union has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the following unit of employees at its Southampton facility (the
Southampton unit), which unit is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
30
All full-time and regular part-time drivers, driver techs, in house techs, helpers,
dockworkers and long haul drivers of the Company at its Southampton, Pennsylvania
location; but excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
35
4. At all times since September 1, 2011, the Union has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the following unit of employees at its Morgantown facility (the
Morgantown unit), which unit is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
40
All full-time and regular part-time regulated medical waste (RMW) plant workers, sharps
plan workers, RMW Shift Supervisors, Sharps Shift Supervisors/quality control
representatives, drivers, dispatchers, yard jockey, maintenance mechanics, Maintenance
Supervisor and painters employed by Respondent at its Morgantown, Pennsylvania
facility; but excluding all office employees, confidential employees, guards and 45
supervisors as defined in the Act.
JD–110–16
37
5. The Respondent failed to provide the Union with an opportunity to bargain in good
faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by making unilateral changes to
Morgantown facility employees’ terms and conditions of employment by implementing an
employee handbook in February 2015.
5
6. The Respondent failed to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing the Union’s requests on September 11 and 26, 2014, for a copy of
information concerning the Respondent’s recoupment of employee healthcare deductions from
Southampton unit employees.
10
7. The Respondent failed to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing the Union’s request on September 5 and 18, 2014, for a copy of the
Respondent’s internal communications, meeting notes and bargaining documents relating to the
Union’s grievance over the 401(k) provision in the Southampton unit employees’ collective-
bargaining agreement.15
8. The Respondent failed to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing the Union’s request on November 13 and 18, and December 1, 2014 for a
copy of the Respondent’s EBOLA training provided to Morgantown unit employees.
20
9. The Respondent failed to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing or failing to provide the Union with a copy of the Morgantown employee
handbook then in effect and requested by the Union on December 1, 2014.
10. The Respondent failed to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) 25
of the Act by unreasonably delaying in providing the Union with information it requested on
November 24, 2014 about the Vehicle Backing Program.
11. The Respondent failed to bargain in good faith in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by refusing to provide the Union with a copy of the Code of Conduct and Harassment 30
Training video shown to Morgantown unit employee.
12. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a personal
conduct work rule at page 30 of the Team Member Handbook which could be understood to
prohibit employees from engaging in activities protected under Section 7 of the Act and states, in 35
pertinent part, that “[c]onduct that maliciously harms or intends to harm the business reputation
of Stericycle will not be tolerated. You are expected to conduct yourself and behave in a manner
conducive to efficient operations. Failure to conduct yourself in an appropriate manner can lead
to corrective action up to and including termination . . . Engaging in behavior that is harmful to
Stericycle’s reputation.”40
13. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a conflict of
interest work rule at page 33 of the Team Member Handbook which could be understood to
prohibit employees from engaging in activities protected under Section 7 of the Act and states, in
pertinent part, that “Stericycle will not retain a team member who directly or indirectly engages 45
in the following: . . . An activity that constitutes a conflict of interest or adversely reflects upon
the integrity of the Company or its management.”
JD–110–16
38
14. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a retaliation work
rule at page 10 of the Team Member Handbook which could be understood to prohibit
employees from engaging in activities protected under Section 7 of the Act and states, in
pertinent part, that “[a]ll parties involved in the investigation will keep complaints and the terms 5
of their resolution confidential to the fullest extent practicable.”
15. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining a camera and
video use policy in the Respondent’s policy manual since January 1, 2012, which could be
understood to prohibit employees from engaging in activities protected under Section 7 of the 10
Act.
16. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
15
17. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set forth above.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall 20
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act. Moreover, as one or more of the challenged policies have been
determined to be overly broad and violate Section 8(a)(1), a nationwide posting by the Company
is appropriate since the record establishes that the unlawful rules or policies are maintained or in
effect at all of the Company’s facilities within the United States. See Mastec Advance25
Technologies, 357 NLRB 103 (2011), ’enfd. sub nom. DIRECTV v. NLRB, F.3d (D.C. Cir.
2016); Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 809, 812 (2005).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended7430
ORDER
The Respondent, Stericycle, Inc., Morgantown and Southampton, Pennsylvania, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall35
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the Teamsters Local 628 (the Union) as the
exclusive representative of employees in the following appropriate unit at the Respondent’s 40
Southampton facility:

74 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
-
JD–110–16
39
All full-time and regular part-time drivers, driver techs, in house techs, helpers,
dockworkers and long haul drivers of the Company at its Southampton, Pennsylvania
location; but excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
5
(b) Refusing to bargain in good faith with the Teamsters Local 628 (the Union) as the
exclusive representative of employees in the following appropriate unit at the Respondent’s
Morgantown facility:
All full-time and regular part-time regulated medical waste (RMW) plant workers, sharps 10
plan workers, RMW Shift Supervisors, Sharps Shift Supervisors/quality control
representatives, drivers, dispatchers, yard jockey, maintenance mechanics, Maintenance
Supervisor and painters employed by Respondent at its Morgantown, Pennsylvania
facility; but excluding all office employees, confidential employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.15
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union by distributing a Team Member
Handbook to bargaining unit employees that unilaterally changes their terms and conditions of
employment.
20
(d) Unreasonably delaying in providing the Union with information that is relevant and
necessary to its role as unit employees’ bargaining representative.
(e) Refusing to provide the Union with requested information that is relevant and
necessary to its role as unit employees’ bargaining representative. 25
(f) Maintaining a personal conduct rule in the Team Member Handbook that prohibits
unit employees from engaging in conduct that maliciously harms or intends to harm the
Respondent’s business reputation, expects employees to conduct themselves and behave in a
manner conducive to efficient operations, threatens employees with corrective action including 30
termination for failing to conduct themselves in an appropriate manner or engaging in behavior
that is harmful to the Respondent’s reputation.
(g) Maintaining a work rule in the Team Member Handbook prohibiting conflicts of
interest that threatens adverse action if an employee directly or indirectly engages in an activity 35
that adversely reflects upon the integrity of the Company or its management.
(h) Maintaining a retaliation work rule that requires unit employees involved in
harassment investigations to keep harassment complaints and the terms of their resolution
confidential to the fullest extent practicable. 40
(i) Maintaining a camera and video use policy in Respondent’s policy manual which
could be construed as prohibiting employees from using personal cameras or video equipment in
break areas during break time.
45
(j) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
JD–110–16
40
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the entire Team Member Handbook provided to Morgantown bargaining unit
employees that unilaterally changed their terms and conditions of employment. 5
(b) Before implementing any changes in wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment of Southampton and Morgantown unit employees, notify and on request, bargain
with the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative.
10
(c) Provide the Union with the vehicle backing program information it requested on
November 24, 2014.
(d) Provide the Union with information it requested on September 5 and 18, 2014,
regarding the Respondent’s internal communications, meeting notes and bargaining documents 15
relating to the Union’s grievance over the 401(k) provision in the Southampton unit employees’
collective-bargaining agreement.
(e) Provide the Union with the information it requested on November 13 and 18, and
December 1, 2014, regarding the Respondent’s EBOLA training provided to Morgantown unit 20
employees.
(f) Provide the Union with the information it requested on December 1, 2014, regarding
the Morgantown facility employee handbook then in effect.
25
(g) Provide the Union with the information it requested on December 30, 2014,
regarding Code of Conduct and Harassment Training provided to employees.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Morgantown and
Southampton, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A and at all of its 30
facilities within the United States and its territories, copies of Appendix B.”75 Copies of the
notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be 35
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these 40
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to

75 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
JD–110–16
41
all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
September 5, 2014.
(i) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that 5
the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of
the Act not specifically found.
10
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 10, 2016
______________________________
Michael A. Rosas15
Administrative Law Judge
isa:/ica
APPENDIX A
(POSTINGS AT SOUTHAMPTON AND MORGANTOWN FACILITIES)
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice at our Southampton and Morgantown facilities.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with Teamsters Union Local 628 (the Union) as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative for those of you in the following appropriate unit
(“the Southampton Unit”):
All full-time and regular part-time drivers, driver techs, in house techs, helpers,
dockworkers and long haul drivers of Respondent at its Southampton, Pennsylvania
location, excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with Teamsters Union Local 628 (the Union) as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative for those of you in the following unit (the
Morgantown Unit):
All full-time and regular part-time regulated medical waste (RMW) plant workers, sharps
plant workers, RMW Shift Supervisors, Sharps Shift Supervisors/quality control
representatives, drivers, dispatchers, yard jockey, maintenance mechanics, Maintenance
Supervisor and painters employed by Respondent at its Morgantown, Pennsylvania
facility; but excluding all office employees, confidential employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union by distributing a Team Member
Handbook to our bargaining unit employees that unilaterally changed your terms and conditions
of employment.
WE WILL NOT unreasonably delay in providing the Union with information that is relevant and
necessary to its role as your bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide the Union with requested information that is relevant and
necessary to its role as your bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind the entire Team Member Handbook provided to Morgantown bargaining unit
employees that unilaterally changed their terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive bargaining
representative of our Southampton unit employees and our Morgantown unit employees.
WE HAVE provided the Union with a copy of the vehicle backing program it requested on
November 24, 2014.
WE HAVE provided the Union with a copy of the information that it requested in its letters dated
September 5 and 18, 2014, including internal communications, meeting notes and bargaining
documents relating to its grievance over the 401(k) provision in the Southampton unit.
WE WILL provide the Union with a copy of information concerning Respondent’s recoupment of
employee healthcare deductions in the Southampton unit that it requested in its letters dated
September 11 and 26, 2014.
WE WILL provide the Union with a copy of the Ebola presentation for the Morgantown unit that it
requested through in e-mails, dated November 13 and 18, 2014, and December 1, 2014.
WE WILL provide the Union with a copy of the employee handbook that it requested in its email
dated December 1, 2014.
WE WILL provide the Union with a copy of the Code of Conduct and Harassment Training that
shown to Morgantown unit employees and requested in an email dated December 30, 2014.
Stericycle, Inc.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal Agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret–ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a
charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to an agent with the Board’s Regional
Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, 7th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-137660
or by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING
AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE
ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (215) 597-5354
APPENDIX B
(NATIONWIDE NOTICE)
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice at all of our facilities in the United States.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT do anything to prevent you from exercising the above rights.
WE WILL NOT maintain the following work rules in our Camera and Video Use Policy which
could be understood to prohibit you from engaging in activities protected under Section 7 of the
Act:
3.1 Team members are prohibited from taking pictures with a personal or company-
issued camera or cell phone camera of any Stericycle property, operation, or equipment
without the permission of their supervisor/manager.
4.1 Team members are prohibited from taking video or audio recordings with a personal
or company camera, camcorder, or other device of any Stericycle property, operation, or
equipment without the permission of their supervisor/manager.
WE WILL NOT maintain the following “Personal Conduct” work rule at page 30 in our Team
Member Handbook which could be understood to prohibit you from engaging in activities
protected under Section 7 of the Act:
In order to protect everyone’s rights and safety, it is the Company’s policy to implement
certain rules and regulations regarding your behavior as a team member. Conduct that
maliciously harms or intends to harm the business reputation of Stericycle will not be
tolerated. You are expected to conduct yourself and behave in a manner conducive to
efficient operations. Failure to conduct yourself in an appropriate manner can lead to
corrective action up to and including termination. . . .
Engaging in behavior that is harmful to Stericycle’s reputation.
WE WILL NOT maintain the following Conflict of Interest work rule at page 33 in our Team
Member Handbook which could be understood to prohibit you from engaging in activities
protected under Section 7 of the Act:
Stericycle will not retain a team member who directly or indirectly engages in the
following: . . . An activity that constitutes a conflict of interest or adversely reflects upon
the integrity of the Company of its management.
WE WILL NOT maintain the following “Retaliation” work rule at page 10 in our Team Member
Handbook which could be understood to prohibit you from engaging in activities protected under
Section 7 of the Act:
All parties involved in the investigation will keep complaints and the terms of their
resolution confidential to the fullest extent practicable.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with your rights under Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL modify our Camera and Video Use Policy, and our “Personal Conduct,” “Conflict of
Interest” and “Retaliation” work rules contained in our Team Member Handbook so those
policies and work rules will not abridge your Section 7 rights or activities, and WE WILL advise
you in writing that the rules have been amended.
WE WILL furnish all employees at our facilities nationwide with (1) inserts for the current
employee handbook that advise that the unlawful rules have been rescinded, or (2) the language
of lawful rules on adhesive backing that will cover or correct the unlawful rules, or (3) publish
and distribute revised handbooks that do not contain the unlawful rules.
Stericycle, Inc.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal Agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret–ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor
practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to
file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to an agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, 7th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-137660 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING
AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE
ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (215) 597-5354