Sexton Welding Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 23, 1952

100 N.L.R.B. 344 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
strike which burdens and obstructs commerce and thus effectuate the policies
of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist from in-
fringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. United Furniture Workers of America , CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All of Respondent 's production and maintenance employees , excluding all
supervisors ( as the term is defined in Section 2 (11) of the Act ) and all office
clerical employees , guards, and professional employees , constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9 (b) of the Act.
3. At all times since October 18, 1950 , the Union has been and now is the ex-
clusive representative of all the' employees in the aforesaid unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 ( a) of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing at all times since October 19, 1950, to bargain col-
lectively with United Furniture Workers of America, CIO , as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices with the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5)
and (1 ) of the Act.
5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the
individuals who are referred to under the preceding section entitled "The
Remedy," thereby discouraging membership in United Furniture Workers of
America, CIO , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and ( 1) of the Act.
6. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act , Respondent has engaged in and
is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
GEORGE SEXTON, AN INDIVIDUAL, D/B/A SEXTON WELDING COMPANY and
LOCAL No. 105, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERMAKERS,
IRON SHIP BUILDERS & HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL. Case No.
9-CA-513. July 03, 1952
Decision and Order
On June 10, 1952, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter-
mediate Report in this proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain.
affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
100 NLRB No. 57.
''' SEXTON WELDING COMPANY 345
The Board x has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.2
Order
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, George Sexton,
an individual, doing business as Sexton Welding Company, Ashland,
Kentucky, his agents, successors, and assigns shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local No. 105, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders & Helpers of
America, A. F. L., as the exclusive representative of his employees in
the following unit :
All employees of the Respondent at his Ashland, Kentucky, opera-
tions, excluding all office and clerical employees, and all guards, pro-
fessional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) Engaging in any like or related acts or conduct interfering
with the efforts of Local No. 105, International Brotherhood of Boiler-
makers, Iron Ship Builders & Helpers of America, A. F. L., to nego-
tiate for or represent the employees in the aforesaid unit as exclusive
bargaining agent.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with Local No. 105, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders & Helpers
of America, A. F. L., as the exclusive bargaining agent of all employ-
ees in the bargaining unit described above in paragraph 1 (a) herein,
with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, em-
body such understanding in a signed agreement.
i Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and
Members Murdock and Peterson].
9 The Respondent's exceptions relating to the eligibility of Henry Sexton and Charles
M Francis raise issues which the Board has already considered in the earlier representa-
tion proceeding (96 NLRB 454) The Respondent's remaining exception to the finding
of the Trial Examiner "that the Union's loss of majority after the election but before
certification or demand for bargaining made upon the employer did not affect its right
to such certification or to be recognized thereafter as the bargaining agent for the em-
ployees of respondent," is without merit for the reasons and the cases cited by the Trial
Examiner in the Intermediate Report. See also Cheney/ Caltifornia Lumber Company, 62
NLRB 1208, enfd. 154 F 2d 112 (C. A. 9) ; Anderson Manufacturing Company, 58 NLRB
1511.
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(b) Post at his plant at Ashland, Kentucky, copies of the notice
attached to the Intermediate Report herein, narked "Appendix A." 3
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for
the Ninth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent,
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and
maintained by him for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(c) File with the Regional Director for the Ninth Region within
ten (10) days from the date of this Order a report in writing setting
forth in detail the manner and form in which the Respondent has com-
plied with the foregoing Order.
s This notice, however, shall be, and it hereby is, amended by striking from the first
paragraph thereof the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" and substituting
in lieu thereof the words "A Decision and Order." In the event that this order is enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words
"Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A charge having been filed by Local No. 105, International Brotherhood of Boil-
ermakers, Iron Ship Builders & Helpers of America, A. F. L., herein called the
Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the
Regional Director for the Ninth Region• (Cincinnati, Ohio), issued his complaint
dated April 21, 1952, against George Sexton, an individual, doing business as'
Sexton Welding Company, and herein called the Respondent. The complaint
alleged in substance that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act, in that the
Respondent, on or about November 20, 1951, and thereafter, refused to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Respondent's employees within an appropriate bargaining unit, although a
majority of the employees in the appropriate unit in an election conducted under
the supervision of the Board's Regional Director selected, and the Board duly
certified, the Union as the exclusive representative of such employees for the
purposes of collective bargaining. The Respondent in his answer denied that the
Union now is or ever was the majority or lawfully authorized exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and alleged that the
Respondent failed to bargain with the Union for that reason.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on May 6, 1952. at Ashland, Kentucky,
before Arthur Leff, the undersigned Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief
Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the Respondent were represented at
the hearing by counsel. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded
all parties. At the conclusion of the hearing, a motion was granted to conform
the pleadings of the proof. Ruling was reserved on a motion of the Respondent
to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency of proof. That motion is disposed of in
SEXTON WELDING COMPANY 347
accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made below. Oppor-
tunity was afforded all parties to argue orally upon the record at the close of the
case, and to file briefs and proposed findings and conclusions. After the hearing,
a brief was received from the Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
George Sexton, an individual doing business as Sexton Welding Company, has
his office and only place of business at Ashland, Kentucky, where he is engaged
in the business of job welding and contract welding. During the year 1951, a
representative period, the Respondent furnished and sold to Armco Steel Cor-
poration at Ashland, Kentucky, goods and services valued in excess of $100,000.
During the same period, Armco Steel Corporation caused goods and products
valued in excess of $50,000 to be shipped directly from its Ashland, Kentucky,
plant, to points outside the State of Kentucky. At all times material herein the
Respondent in the course of his business operations purchased and had shipped
to him from points outside the State of Kentucky goods and materials of sub-
stantial value, and also sold from his Ashland plant for delivery to points out-
side the State of Kentucky goods of substantial value. The Respondent has also
made substantial sales to, and performed substantial services for, instrumentali-
ties of commerce, transit systems, and enterprises which are themselves engaged
in producing or handling goods destined for out-of-State shipment and in per-
forming out-of-State services in substantial amounts. The Respondent admits
he is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local No. 105, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders
& Helpers of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, is a
labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
On April 27, 1951, the Respondent and the Union executed, and on April 30,
1951, the Board's Regional Director for the Ninth Region approved, a stipulation
for certification upon consent election in Case No. 9-RC-1182. The parties
agreed in the stipulation, the Respondent concedes in this proceeding, and it is
found, that the appropriate collective bargaining unit is as follows :
All employees of the Employer [Respondent] at its Ashland, Kentucky,
operation, excluding all office and clerical employees, and all guards, pro-
fessional employees and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Pursuant to the stipulation, an election by secret ballot was conducted under
the supervision of the Regional Director on May 7, 1951. Upon the conclusion of
the election, a tally of ballots was furnished to and certified by the observers for
the Union and the Respondent. The tally showed that of approximately 16
eligible voters in the aforesaid appropriate unit, 15 voted, and of these, 6 voted
in favor of representation by the Union, 6 against, and 3 voted challenged ballots.
No objections to the conduct of the election were filed.
Since the challenged ballots were sufficient in number to affect the results of the
election, the Regional Director, pursuant to Section 102.61 (b) of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, caused an investigation to be made of the challenged
348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ballots and, on July 8, 1951, issued his report on challenged ballots. With
regard to the ballot of Henry Sexton , challenged by the Union's observer on the
ground that he was a close relative of the Respondent , the Regional Director
reported:
The investigation reveals that Henry Sexton is a nephew of the employer.
In the light of the Board's decision in Stantslaus Implement and Hardware
Company, 92 NLRB 897, wherein it was stated that although the Act does not
expressly provide for closely related relations of management to be excluded
from the bargaining unit, Section 9 (b) of the Act does impose upon the
Board the function of determining in each, case the appropriate unit for
collective bargaining and that a policy has been established by the Board
that nephews of management officials were to be excluded from the bargain-
ing unit, the undersigned therefore finds that the subject employee was not
an eligible voter in the election.
With regard to the ballot of Edgar Crisp, challenged by the Respondent on the
ground that he was no longer employed by the Respondent, the Regional Director
found in agreement with the Respondent that Crisp was not an eligible voter.
With regard to the ballot of Charles M. Francis, challenged by the Board agent
on the ground that his name did not appear on the list of eligible voters, the
Regional Director, after reviewing the facts disclosed by his investigation, upheld
the Union's position that Francis was an employee on sick leave at the time of
the election, as against the Respondent's position that Francis' employment had
been terminated prior to that time, and found that Francis on the date of the
election was an employee eligible to vote. The Regional Director recommended
in conclusion that the challenges to Sexton's and Crisp's ballots be sustained and
that the challenge to Francis' ballot be overruled and his ballot opened and
counted.
On or about July 21, 1951, the Respondent filed with the Board exceptions to
the Regional Director's report on challenged ballots insofar as- it related to
Sexton and Francis. There was no exception to the finding on Crisp. On July
31, 1951, the Board issued an order directing that a hearing be held for the
limited purpose of taking evidence on the eligibility of Francis to vote in the
election. Pursuant to the order, a hearing was held on August 21, 1951, at
Ashland, Kentucky, in Case No. 9-RC-1182. Following the hearing, the Board
issued a Supplemental Decision and Direction (96 NLRB 454). The Board
adopted the Regional Director's findings and recommendations concerning the
ballots of Sexton and Crisp And, on the basis of the entire record, including
the Regional Director's report, the Respondent's exceptions to it, and the evidence
adduced at the hearing ordered by it, the Board found as a fact, contrary to the
Respondent's contention, that "Francis' employment had never been terminated,
he was in effect an employee absent on sick-leave, and under the established
policy of the Board, was eligible to vote." The Board therefore adopted the
Regional Director's recommendation that the challenge Jo Francis' ballot be
overruled and that his ballot be opened and counted.
Thereafter, on October 8, 1951, the Regional Director issued a revised tally of
ballots, showing that of 13 valid votes counted, 7 voted for, and 6 against , repre-
sentation by the Union. On October 19, 1951, the Board certified that the Union
had been designated and selected by a majority of the employees in the aforesaid
appropriate unit as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining,
and that, pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, as amended, the Union was the
exclusive representative of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment.
SEXTON WELDING COMPANY 349
On or about November 20, 1951, the Union requested the Respondent to
bargain collectively with it as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's -
employees in the unit found appropriate above. The Respondent refused, assert-
ing then, as it does now, that the Union did not represent a legal majority
of the Respondent's employees and was not the lawfully authorized representa-
tive of said employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. -
Three points are urged by the Respondent in support of his position. Two
of them have already been considered by the Board in the representaticn pro-
ceeding, and ruled upon by it adversely to the Respondent's position. One is that
the Board had no authority, as a matter of law, to sustain, as it did, the challenge
to Sexton's ballot on the ground that Sexton was a near relative, a nephew
in this case, of the employer. The other is that the evidence adduced at the
hearing relating to Francis' challenge did not substantiate the Board's finding
that Francis possessed employee status at the time of the election. On the
second point, the Respondent offered no new evidence, but relied entirely on the
record earlier made. Since the question of law raised by the Respondent's first
point, and the question of fact raised by his second, have already been passed
upon by the Board, the determinations made by the Board regarding them
must be regarded by me as establishing the law of the case. Consequently, and
in accordance with the Board's previous determination, I find the Respondent's
contentions to be without merit.
The Respondent's third point is new. He contends that after the election but
before the Union's certification, the Union lost any majority it might have
had at the time of the election. To support this contention, and the Board's
alleged notice of it prior to the issuance of the certification, the Respondent
introduced into evidence a letter, dated July 3, 1951, written by his attorney to
the Board's attorney who was in charge of the representation case. The let-
ter referred to various changes in personnel that had occurred since the elec-
tion, including the employment of one new employee and the voluntary termina-
tion of three-Burchett, Gray, and Davis. Burchett had been the Union's ob-
server at the election, and it is now the Respondent's position that the letter,
although not expressing it, placed the Board on notice before the certification
date that the Union had lost one of its supporters, enough to destroy its ma-
jority. The Respondent supplemented this letter by oral testimony, not contra-
dicted, of Essie Sexton, wife of the Respondent and keeper of his employment
records. Mrs. Sexton, in addition to verifying the truth of the letter's statements
relating to personnel turnover, testified that when Burchett, Gray, and Davis quit
their employment, one of them told her that the Union had obtained jobs
for them elsewhere. From this the Respondent would have it inferred that not
only Burchett, but Gray and Davis as well, were union supporters, and that
their leaving meant a loss of three votes the Union had received at the election.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, the Respondent argues in substance
that, whatever the situation may have been on the date of the election, the
Union did not in fact command a majority on the date of certification and was
therefore ineligible for certification at that time. Because-the Respondent's
argument continues-the letter of July 3, 1951, put the Board under a duty of
inquiry to determine whether the Union had lost its majority, the Board may
not now rely on the certification to presume the Union's majority as of the
date of the Respondent's refusal to bargain.
It is doubtful whether the letter of July 3, 1951, can be considered sufficient
in form to have put the Board on notice prior to the issuance of the certification
that the Respondent was claiming a loss of majority in the period intervening
between the election date and the certification date; but even if it were so con-
strued it would make no difference. Once a majority has been established as a
350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
result of a Board-conducted election by secret ballot, that majority is presumed
to continue for a reasonable length of time, normally for at least a year, despite
personnel changes that may thereafter occur. It is not for the Board to speculate
how individual employees cast their secret ballots, or to infer from extrinsic
evidence, as the Respondent would have it done here, that certain employees
since terminated probably voted for the Union, that their replacements may have
felt differently toward the Union, and that employees who voted against the
union did not thereafter change their position The evidence upon which the
Respondent relies in this case is of no probative value in overriding the presump-
tion of majority status flowing from the results of a secret ballot election. Absent
unusual circumstances-not present in this case-the legal presumption is a con-
clusive one, that a union designated by a majority in an election continues to
maintain its majority status for at least a year. And it has often been held that
even a substantial turnover of employees within the year does not afford proof
of a loss of majority sufficient to rebut that presumption'
In this case, the Respondent does not quarrel with the principle, by now firmly
rooted in the law, that a certification must be honored for a reasonable time,
usually at least a year, despite some evidence of repudiation of the union or loss
of majority after the certification. But he contends the conclusive presumption
of majority status flowing from a certification does not reach the state of facts
present in this case, where the loss of majority is claimed to have occurred before
the certification, though after the election. The distinction which the Respondent
would draw is I think an untenable one. The date on which a certification is
issued has no special significance in itself. The certification is nothing more
than the formal instrument by which the Board certifies to a state of facts found
established by a valid employee election. It is the election and not the formal
fact-finding instrument that determines the majority status and gives rise to the
presumption of continuity. The same administrative and policy considerations
that justify in part the conclusive presumption given to certifications-the need
of endowing some measure of finality and permanence to an election choice once
made 2 -apply With equal if not greater force to the period intervening between
,the election and the certification Where ballots are challenged or objections to
an election filed, a period of time, often substantial, must necessarily elapse before
the objections or challenges can be processed, and it is to be expected that per-
sonal changes frequently will occur in the meantime. Any rule such as that
urged by the Respondent, that would require a reexamination of the election
results where such changes appear, would not only tend to destroy the element
of finality in elections, but would "make chaos out of the administration of the
statute and prevent the protection of the very rights which it aimed to secure."
N. L. R. B. v. Botany Worsted Mills, 133 F. 2d 876 (C. A. 3). Even if there had
been doubt on that point before, that doubt must be viewed as resolved by the
enactment of Section 9 (c) (3) of the amended Act which proscribes the holding
of more than one valid election in a bargaining unit during any 12-month period.
Had the Board found after consideration of the challenged ballots that the Union
lost the election, the Union could not have sought a redetermination of its status
i See, e. g., The Century Oxford Manufacturing Corporation, 47 NLRB 835, enfd. 140
F. 2d 541, cert. den. 323 U. S. 714 (60 percent labor turnover and attempted employee
repudiation of the union before refusal to bargain ) ; S. H. Kress & Company , 88 NLRB
292, enfd. 194 F. 2d 449 ( C. A. 6) (of 40 employees in the unit , only 7 had been on the
election payroll ) ; Worcester Woolen Mills Corporation, 74 NLRB 1071 , enfd 140 F 2d 13
(C. A. 1) (after the union had won an election by a vote of 32 to 27 , 12 employees left the
respondent ' s employ ) ; Aetna Fire Brick Company , 56 NLRB 849 (after the union had
won an election by a vote of 29 to 28, 16 new employees were hired).
2 See N. L. R. B . v. Appalachian Power Co., 140 F. 2d 217 ( C. A. 4) ; N. L. R. B. v.
Century Oxford Mfg. Corp., 140 F . 2d 541 ( C. A. 2).
SEXTON WELDING COMPANY 351
within the year on the basis of changed conditions occurring after the date of
the election and before the Board's final determination of the election issues. No
reason appears why less finality should be accorded the election results because
the Union won.
On the basis of the record as a whole, it is concluded and found that on
November 20, 1951, and at all times thereafter, the Union was, and now is,
by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the aforesaid unit for the purpose of collective bargaining with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment. It is further found that by refusing to bargain with the Union
as such exclusive bargaining representatives on November 20, 1951, and there-
after, the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. By such conduct,
the Respondent also interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
It is found that the activities of the Respondent, set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in
section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices, it will be recommended that he cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It
having been found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with
the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate
unit, it will be recommended that the Respondent upon request bargain collec-
tively with the Union.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
. 1.. Local ' No. 105, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship
Builders & Helpers of America, A. F.- L., is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. All of the Respondent's employees, at his Ashland, Kentucky, operation,
excluding all office and clerical employees, and all guards, professional em-
ployees and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of
the Act.
3. The Union was on and after the date of the refusal to bargain set out in
paragraph numbered 4, below, the exclusive representative of all employees
in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 0 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on November 20, 1951, and at all times thereafter, to bargain
collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all its employees
in the unit described in paragraph numbered 2, above, the Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (5) of the Act.
352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. By interfering with , restraining , and coercing his employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices , within the meaning of Section 8 (a)
(1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce , within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT engage in any acts in any manner interfering with the efforts
of LOCAL No. 105, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOrLRRM AICERS, IRON SHIP
BUILDERS & HELPERS OF AMERICA , A. F. L., to negotiate for or represent the
employees in the bargaining unit described below.
WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the above -named union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed below with respect to wages, rates of pay , hours of employment and
other conditions of employment , and If an understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement . The bargaining unit is :
All employees of the undersigned at his Ashland , Kentucky, operation,
excluding all office and clerical employees , and all guards , professional
employees , and supervisors as deflued in the National Labor Relations
Act.
GEORGE SEXTON d/b/a SEXTON WELDING COMPANY.
Dated ----------------------------------- By --------------------- -------
(Representatlve ), ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must
not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
THE KROGER Co. and LILLY MAY PARRETT. Case No. 13-CA-711.
July 24,1952
Decision and Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed on December 18, 1950, by Lilly May Par-
rett, herein called Parrett, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the General Counsel and the Board,
respectively, by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region
(Chicago, Illinois), issued his complaint on July 21, 1951, alleging
that The Kroger Co., Wabash, Indiana, had engaged in and was en-
100 NLRB No. 55.