Securitas Security Services USA

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Aug 30, 2019

16-CA-176006 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 30, 2019)

JD–68–19
Austin, TX
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA
and CASES 16-CA-176006
16-CA-183494
RYAN PATRICK MURPHY, an Individual
Robert Perez, Esq. and Maxie Gallardo, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Maurice Baskin, Esq. (Littler Mendelson, PC), of
Washington, DC, for the Respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DONNA N. DAWSON, Administrative Law Judge. On September 28, 2017, I issued a
decision in which I found that the General Counsel had established that some of the challenged
work rules violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.1 Securitas Security Services USA (Respondent)
and the General Counsel both filed exceptions to my decision. While those exceptions were
pending before the Board, the Board issued its decision in The Boeing Company, 365 NLRB
No. 154 (2017), reconsideration denied 366 NLRB No. 128 (2018). In that decision, the Board
modified the standards for determining whether an employer’s work rules interfere with
employees’ rights under the Act in violation of Section 8(a)(1). On November 16, 2018, the
Board issued an Order remanding to me certain of Respondent’s work rules contained in the
consolidated complaint issued on April 7, 2017, at paragraph 7 (no-recording and no-camera),
paragraph 9 (prohibited discussion of internal investigations), and paragraph 10 (no-gossip).2
On November 21, 2018, the Board issued a Corrected Order remanding those issues to me “for

1 The Charging Party, Ryan Patrick Murphy, filed charges on May 9 and September 16, 2016. The General
Counsel filed orders consolidating cases and amended consolidated complaints on November 30, 2016, and April
7, 2017. (GC Exh. 1(e) and 1(m).)
2 Previously, on July 6, 2017, I granted the parties’ joint motion to sever allegations and approve a partial
bilateral informal settlement agreement executed by the parties on June 29, 2017. Pursuant to that agreement and
subsequent order, complaint allegations at paragraph 6 (confidentiality), par. 8 (proprietary information), and the
portion of paragraph 7 alleging that Respondent maintained an unlawful social networking policy were remanded
to the Region to sever from the complaint, monitor the settlement and dismiss those allegations as appropriate and
in accord with the agreement.
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the purpose of reopening the record, if necessary, and the preparation of a supplemental decision
addressing the complaint allegations (including allegations regarding the Respondent’s
recording and camera policies) under Boeing and setting forth credibility resolutions, findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order.”
5
I offered the parties an opportunity to participate in a supplemental hearing or otherwise
re-open the record to present any additional evidence they believed was relevant to
reconsideration of the work rules under the Boeing standards. In response, both parties opposed
the reopening of the record, contending that the presentation of additional evidence was not
necessary, and stated their positions. In addition, the General Counsel included a motion to 10
sever certain of the complaint allegations pertaining to the no-recording, the no-photography,
and the no-gossip rules in the complaint at paragraphs 7 and 10. In doing so, the General
Counsel determined that those rules are lawful under Boeing. Of course, Respondent did not
object. On August 5, 2019, I issued an order granting the General Counsel’s request to sever
and remand to the Region for appropriate action. I also gave the parties an opportunity to file 15
supplemental briefs on or before August 19, 2019.
Based on the August 5 order, the only remaining allegation before me for
reconsideration is set forth at complaint paragraph 9 that: On or about May 5, 2016, Respondent
prohibited an employee from discussing internal investigations. 20
On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs and position statements filed by the parties, I make the following
findings of facts and conclusions of law.
25
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent owns and operates a corporation with an office and place of business in 30
Austin, Texas, where it provides security services to other companies. In conducting its
operations in 2015, Respondent performed services valued in excess of $50,000 in states other
than the State of Texas. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
35
A. Respondent’s Business
Respondent is the second largest security service provider in the country, with about
14,000 customers and 90,000 security guards/officers. It provides its customers with security
officers, as well as a variety of security services and products. In the Austin, Texas area, 40
Respondent provides security officers to two Samsung facilities—the Samsung Austin
Research Center (SARC/Research Center) and the Samsung Austin Semiconductor Plant.
Respondent employs about 110 employees at both locations, with branch manager Joe Shuler
(Shuler) over area operations. This case involves occurrences at the Research Center, where
JD–68–19
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Respondent employs about 10 security officers/guards, with 2 officers and a shift supervisor on
each shift.
B. Respondent Bans Employees from Discussing Internal Investigations
5
The Charging Party, Ryan Patrick Murphy (Murphy), worked as a security officer for
Respondent at its Research Center from August 2015 to August 2016.3 His duties included
conducting entry and exit control of personnel and items, monitoring the facility via closed
circuit television, providing customer service and responding to incidents. Murphy worked his
shift with two other officers—Amanda Marino (Marino),4 his direct shift supervisor, and David 10
Brown (Brown), security officer. As stated, Joe Shuler managed the facility. Tennille Gray
(Gray) was the human resources manager.5
On April 26, 2016, Murphy witnessed or was present during an incident that resulted in
his co-worker, Brown, filing a race discrimination complaint against a supervisor and the 15
company initiating an investigation. Murphy was the only other employee present during this
incident. (Tr. 27, 29-31, 122–123, 127.) On May 5, Branch Manager Shuler and Human
Resources Manager Gray interviewed Murphy regarding the April 26 incident.6 Management
did not inform Murphy that a discrimination complaint had been filed, but Murphy understood
the investigation to be about an argument that occurred on April 26. While questioning 20
Murphy, Shuler and Gray orally instructed him not to discuss the investigation or incident with
anyone. They also asked him to submit a written statement, which he emailed to Gray on May
6. (Tr. 31–32, 45.) Murphy attached to his email to Gray specific questions about the directive
not to discuss the investigation or incident. He asked the following:
25
First, are you barring me and any other officer who is assigned to SARC from
discussing this matter in perpetuity? Is it just while you are investigating it? Are
there specific individuals with whom this bar is attached or is it a blanket
prohibition among every security officer? Does the prohibition to talk just
include this incident or does it include other work related matters? What is the 30
intent of this prohibition? Does the prohibition only apply during work hours
and on site, or am I, and every other officer prohibited from speaking about this
incident amongst ourselves regardless of the setting? Lastly, what are the
possible ramifications that I or any other officer may face if we fail to adhere to
this prohibition? 35
If I don’t receive a response, I’ll assume that the prohibition to not talk about
this incident applies to myself and every officer assigned to SARC [Samsung

3 Murphy voluntarily resigned, effective in August 2016.
4 Marino’s last name is misspelled in the transcript.
5 Marino’s last name is misspelled in the transcript. This is the correct spelling.
times, Marino, Shuler and Gray have been supervisors and/or agents of Respondent within the meaning of Secs
2(11) and 2(13) of the Act.
6 Murphy recalled that on April 26, 2016, Shuler and a human resources representative, Pablo Gonzalez
arrived after the incident to begin an investigation or questioning. He was not questioned until May 5. (Tr. 30.)
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Austin Research Center] regardless of the timing or the setting. If this
prohibition was in fact [erroneous], it is my hope that I, along with every officer
on site [receives] education on this matter.
(Tr. 31–34; GC Exh. 2.) 5
On May 9, Murphy emailed Shuler (copied to Gray and Marino) at 7:10 a.m., indicating
that he did not receive a response to his May 6 email inquiry. (GC Exh. 2.)
Later that morning, at 8:42 a.m., Gray emailed Murphy thanking him for his statement, 10
and responding to his May 6 email inquiries as follows:
In regards to your questions, all are barred from talking during the time of the
investigation in any circumstance. After the investigation is concluded – if any
one starts conversing about it and those conversations become a distraction to 15
the workplace anyone involved in conversing could face disciplinary action in
accordance with the handbook.
(Id.) Gray sent a second email to Murphy on May 9 at 8:53 a.m., repeating her earlier response
to Murphy’s inquiry regarding the ban on and warning about anyone discussing the 20
investigation. (Id.) Thus, there is no doubt that this policy prohibiting discussion about the
investigation applied to “all” employees. At some point, Gray informed David McAllister
(McAllister), Respondent’s vice president of human resources, via email that they went out to
the facility to investigate “the hotline call we received.” She explained that they told “all
Officers” not to discuss the investigation with anyone and asked him for guidance on how to 25
respond to Murphy’s inquiry. In response, McAllister told her to advise Murphy that “we are
barring him from talking during the time of the investigation in any circumstances. After the
investigation is concluded – If he starts conversing about it and those conversations become a
distraction to the workplace then he could face disciplinary action in accordance with the
handbook.”7 (Jt. Exhs. 4(a) and 4(b).) 30
Murphy testified that he interpreted Gray’s prohibition on discussing the investigation
as prohibiting him from talking about “any work conditions at all” to any other employees. (Tr.
39, 42–43, 46–49, 55.) There is no evidence that Murphy or any other employee received
discipline or reprimand concerning this prohibition. 35
Michael Christopher Pope (Pope), Respondent’s deputy general counsel, the only
witness for Respondent, testified that he believed Respondent implemented its prohibition on
discussing the investigation because Brown had complained about employees gossiping about
his complaint. Respondent’s counsel asked Pope if he “[could] talk to us about the reasons for 40
the Company’s policy on having employees not discuss internal investigations?” In response,

7 Although Gray’s email to McAllister reflects that it was sent at 9:26 a.m., McAllister’s email response
indicates that he sent it at 8:36 a.m. on May 9. Thus, it appears that Gray probably sent her inquiry to McAllister
after Murphy’s May 9 request for clarification. (Jt. Exs. 4(a) and 4(b).)
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5
Pope testified that Respondent sought to “have witnesses come forward with unvarnished,
untainted, uninfluenced statements” to get to the truth and to ensure that the “Mr. Browns of
the world” come “forward to make a comment,” without “know[ing] that everybody is talking
behind their back.” (Tr. 122–124.)
5
In addition, Pope insisted that banning employees from discussing the internal
investigation complied with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s)
guidelines for investigating discrimination and harassment claims. (Tr. 109–111, 116, 122–
124; R. Exh. 4.) This testimony, regarding types of investigations that lend themselves to bans
on employees discussing them belies Pope’s earlier testimony that Respondent’s prohibition 10
was not a policy “which is kind of the Bible of the Company,” but “words out of that particular
manager’s mouth on that particular day.” (Tr. 139.)
II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
15
A. Legal Standards
The Board has long recognized the right of employees to communicate in the workplace,
which includes the right to discuss with each other hours, wages and other terms and conditions
of employment. Parexel Int’l., LLC, 356 NLRB 516, 518 (2011), citing Aroostook County 20
Regional Ophthalmology Center, 317 NLRB 218, 220 (1995), enfd. in part 81 F.3d 209 (D.C.
Cir. 1996). The Board has also determined that employee discussions about employer
investigations involving themselves or coworkers are “vital to employees’ ability to aid one
another in addressing employment terms and conditions with their employer.” Banner Estrella
Medical Center, 362 NLRB 1108, 1109 (2015), enfd. 851 F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2017), citing Fresh 25
& Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB 151, 155–156 (3014); see also SNE Enterprises, 347
NLRB 472, 472 fn.4 (2006), enfd. 257 Fed. Appx. 642 (4th Cir. 2007.)
In The Boeing Company, 365 NLRB No. 154 (2017), the Board announced standards
for determining whether an employer’s facially neutral rule interferes with its employees’ rights 30
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Board stated that unless the rule is of a type that
the Board has already designated as being uniformly lawful or unlawful, the lawfulness of the
rule, under Section 8(a)(1), will be evaluated using a balancing test. First, the Board will
determine whether the rule is one that the employees would “reasonably interpret[ ]” as
“potentially interfer[ing] with the exercise of NLRA rights.” If it is, the Board will evaluate 35
whether the “nature and extent of the potential impact on NLRA rights” outweighs any
“legitimate justifications associated with” the rule. Boeing, slip op. at 3–4 and 16. The
Respondent’s rule in this case regarding employee participation in internal investigations is
facially neutral and not among those types that the Board has, as of this time, designated as
uniformly lawful or unlawful. 40
The balancing test formulation set forth in the Boeing decision, while it modified the
analysis for many types of workplace rules, does not appear to have meaningfully altered the
balancing test that I have previously applied to Respondent’s confidentiality in investigation
restrictions. Nor does analysis under the Boeing test alter my conclusion that the restrictions 45
JD–68–19
6
unlawfully interfere with employees’ rights under the Act. In other words, I adhere to Board
precedent holding that an employer may prohibit employee discussion of an investigation only
when the employer’s need for confidentiality with respect to that specific investigation
outweighs employees’ rights under Section 7 of the Act. Thus, an employer is permitted to
lawfully impose such a restriction only on a case-by-case basis and by considering whether the 5
circumstances of an investigation create legitimate concerns of witness intimidation or
harassment, the destruction of evidence, or other misconduct tending to compromise the
integrity of the inquiry. See Banner Estrella, 362 NLRB at 1109–1110. Also see, Hyundai
America Shipping Agency, 357 NLRB at 874, enfd. in relevant part, 805 F.3d 309 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Caesar’s Palace, 336 NLRB 271, 272 fn. 6 (2001). Further, a confidentiality rule 10
applied post investigation cannot be justified as necessary “to protect the sanctity of an ongoing
investigation.” SNE Enterprises, 347 NLRB 472, 472 fn. 4 (2006), enfd. 257 Fed. Appx. 642
(4th Cir. 2007).
In Banner Estrella, the Board emphasized that “it is the employer’s burden to justify a 15
prohibition on employees discussing a particular ongoing investigation.” The Board also stated
that “the employer must proceed on a case-by-case basis;” must not “reflexively impose
confidentiality requirements in all cases or in all cases of a particular type; and must determine
“that confidentiality is necessary in a particular case…based on objectively reasonable grounds
for believing that the integrity of the investigation will be compromised without 20
confidentiality.” Banner Estrella, above at 1110. The Board affirmed the standard endorsed
in Hyundai that it is the employer’s “responsibility to first determine whether in any given
investigation witnesses need protection, evidence is in danger of being destroyed, testimony is
in danger of being fabricated, and there is a need to prevent a cover up.” Banner Estrella,
quoting Hyundai, above, slip op at 15. 25
In Hyundai, the Board also adopted the Judge’s rejection of the employer’s justification
that the rule was necessary to protect the victim, witnesses and the accused harasser; “to
preserve confidentiality consistent with the [EEOC] guidelines and state and federal courts;”
and “to avoid potential liability from accused harassers in defamation and other causes of 30
action;” Hyundai, above at 873–874.
In Caesars Palace, the Board recognized the confidentiality in investigations rule
intruded on employees’ Section 7 right to discuss with each other internal investigations and
determined the issue was “whether the interests of the Respondent’s employees in discussing 35
this aspect of their terms and conditions of employment outweighs the Respondent’s asserted
legitimate and substantial business justifications.” Id. at 272. However, when the Board in
Caesar’s Palace examined the facts and circumstances in that case, it found that the employer’s
need for confidentiality during a drug investigation was a “substantial business justification”
that outweighed interference with employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights. Id. In doing 40
so, the Board considered the specific allegations in the case (drug activity, “management
coverup and possible management retaliation,” and threats of violence) and Respondent’s intent
to “impose a confidentiality rule to ensure that witnesses were not put in danger, that evidence
was not destroyed, and that testimony was not fabricated.” Id. See also, Menorah Medical
Center, 362 NLRB 1746, 1767 (2015), enfd. in relevant part, 867 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 45
JD–68–19
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(the Board found the medical center’s confidentiality prohibition against discussing incidents
under investigation by the peer-review committee was unlawful where there was no evidence
or accusation of coercion, fabrication of testimony, or threats of physical harm.
B. Respondent Violated the Act Under the Board’s Balancing Test5
I find that Respondent failed to prove that its justification for its confidentiality rule
banning employees from discussing investigations outweighs the interests of employees in their
rights under the Act and is therefore unlawful. See, e.g., Hyundai America Shipping Agency,
Inc., above. Even if, under Boeing, a blanket prohibition on the sharing of information from 10
investigations could be rendered lawful by a sufficiently weighted justification, the result here
would be the same because the record does not establish any such justification. There was no
evidence here that Respondent had experienced actual or potential problems with witnesses
being harassed or intimidated, evidence being destroyed, false testimony or other false evidence
being created, or with anyone otherwise exploiting information from investigations to interfere 15
with those investigations. Pope, Respondent’s only witness, who did not interview the
employees or issue the directive and rule to Murphy and the other employees, testified that he
believed the rule was implemented because Brown complained that people were gossiping
about his discrimination case and to prevent harassment.8 However, in Gray’s written ban and
email to McAllister, she referenced that she had told “all” officers not to discuss the 20
investigation. Although Respondent complained in his post-remand response that I erroneously
dismissed Pope’s testimony as hearsay, that is simply not the case. Rather, I found that there
was no evidence, including Pope’s testimony, that the prohibition here was initially issued after
or in response to Brown’s complaint that others were gossiping about his case. It is true that
Gray told McAllister that she and presumably other of Respondent’s representatives went out 25
to investigate “the hotline call we received,” and that there is undisputed evidence that Brown
filed a discrimination complaint. However, as stated, there was no evidence that Brown
complained about being harassed, threatened, intimidated, or even ridiculed by anyone
regarding his allegation.9 Further, in her email to McAllister, Gray did not mention justification
for her instruction to all officers other than to infer that it was in relation to a “hotline call.” 30
In support of the complaint in this case, the General Counsel relied in part on the recently
overruled (by Boeing) analytical framework set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia,
343 NLRB 646 (2004), as well as the analysis set forth in Banner Estrella Medical Center, 362
NLRB 1108 (2015). In its opposition to reopening the record, the General Counsel maintains 35
its reliance on the current Board law set forth in Banner Estrella, which has not been overruled
by Boeing. Consequently, the General Counsel has correctly argued that even under the Boeing
standard, Respondent violated the Act by promulgating a rule prohibiting employees to talk
about a pending investigation.

8 Respondent did not call Shuler, Gray, or Gonzalez to testify regarding justification for the rule. Although
Pope testified that he was involved with updating handbook rules, there was no evidence that he participated in
the prohibition on employees discussing the investigation or underlying incident which involved Murphy and other
employees.
9 There was no evidence that Murphy was the one who allegedly discriminated against Brown. Rather, the
evidence indicates that Murphy was the witness to an alleged altercation between the supervisor and Brown.
JD–68–19
8
C. Respondent’s Defenses
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the record shows that its ban on employee
discussion of an on-going investigation as well as a completed one does not restrict an 5
individual employee’s exercise of Section 7 rights. Respondent asserts that the record
demonstrates that the prohibition at issue was made solely for the legitimate business reason of
protecting the rights of the employee complaining of discrimination in that instance. Gray’s
email to Murphy stated that “all are barred from talking during the time of the investigation in
any circumstances,” and that anyone creating a distraction to the workplace by talking about it 10
could face disciplinary action. On its face, one might interpret that Gray only referred to the
investigation at hand. However, I find after considering the email, along with all other evidence,
that employees might also reasonably interpret it to preclude such discussions in future
investigations. Gray did not tell Murphy that her directive would not apply to other situations
which would include other investigations. (GC Exh. 2; Jt. Ex. 4(a) and 4(b).)15
Further, Pope’s extensive testimony in response to Respondent’s counsel’s question
about “the reasons for the Company’s policy on having employees not discuss internal
investigations,” belies his prior testimony, and Respondent’s argument, that this rule against
speaking to others about a pending investigation was somehow an isolated incident. More 20
specifically, he explained how Respondent’s purpose for this policy was to seek to “have
witnesses come forward with unvarnished, untainted, uninfluenced statements” to get to the
truth; to comply with the “EEO” desire to see companies perform thoughtful, intelligent
investigations; and to ensure that the “Mr. Browns of the world” will not be discouraged from
“[coming] forward to make a comment if they know that everybody is talking behind their 25
back.” (Tr. 122–124.) This testimony clearly does not reflect a policy limited to the
investigation of Mr. Brown’s complaint. Consequently, I find that Respondent intended this
policy to apply to all internal investigations and especially those involving discrimination
complaints.
30
Respondent also argues that it must follow EEOC rules and guidelines in harassment
cases in order to maintain confidentiality by keeping records and other information confidential,
and by creating an environment where investigation participants can speak freely. However,
similar assertions regarding EEOC (and even some state) guidelines and expectations have been
rejected by the Board. See Hyundai, above at 873–874. Respondent distinguishes this case 35
from Banner Health System, above, slip op. at 2. However, Respondent did not sufficiently
justify its rule such that its need for the rule outweighed employees’ rights under the Act.
Further, I find that Respondent’s ban on employee discussions constituted an overly broad
confidentiality provision applied to future cases pending investigation, including investigations
of a particular type such as those involving discrimination complaints. The Board has cautioned 40
that an employer must not “reflexively impose confidentiality requirements in all cases or in all
cases of a particular type.” Banner Estrella, above at 1110. Moreover, the Board has rejected
an employer’s justification that the rule was necessary to protect the victim, witnesses and the
accused harasser; “to preserve confidentiality consistent with the [EEOC] guidelines and state
JD–68–19
9
and federal courts;” and “to avoid potential liability from accused harassers in defamation and
other causes of action;” Hyundai, above at 873–874.
This case is also distinguishable from Caesar’s Palace, above, where the Board decided
that the respondent’s policy was lawful because it involved drug activity, cover ups by 5
management, and evidence of possible witness tampering.
Therefore, I find that under either articulation of the Board’s balancing test, under
Banner Estrella or Boeing, Respondent’s prohibition on employee discussion of investigations
unlawfully restricts employees’ Section 7 rights. Accordingly, I find that this rule violates 10
Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
D. The General Counsel’s Plea to the Board
I must note, however, that in the same opposition statement in support of a violation, 15
the General Counsel advocated for the Board to overturn its long-held ruling in Banner Estrella.
The General Counsel contended that the standard set forth in Banner Estrella “could be viewed
as unworkable and that it may fail to give appropriate weight to the shared employee and
national interests furthered by the maintenance of confidentiality in the course of sensitive
workplace investigations.” (GC Mot.) The General Counsel further argued against Banner 20
Estrella’s “single-minded adherence to the notion that its expansive and questionable vision of
rights under the NLRA should trump the countervailing federal and national interests reflected
in the employment statutes administered by other agencies.” (Id.) Finally, the General Counsel
asks the Board to reject Banner Estrella’s central requirement that employers determine a need
for confidentiality on a case-by-case basis as impractical and dismissive of an employer’s 25
legitimate and substantial need to conduct confidential investigations. Without going into
further detail, since the administrative law judge must follow current Board law, I will leave
the General Counsel’s call for a reversal of Banner Estrella to the Board.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW30
By maintaining an unlawful rule prohibiting all employees in its Austin, Texas Samsung
Research Center from discussing with each other and anyone else internal investigations,
Respondent, Securitas Security Services USA, has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.35
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to 40
effectuate the policies of the Act. Respondent must rescind, in writing, the overbroad, unlawful
prohibition on employees discussing with each other and anyone else internal investigations,
and advise all current employees working in its Austin, Texas Samsung facilities in writing that
the unlawful prohibition has been rescinded.
45
JD–68–19
10
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended10
ORDER
5
The Respondent, Securitas Security Services USA, Austin, Texas, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
10
a. Maintaining an oral or written rule prohibiting all employees from
discussing with each other and anyone else internal investigations.
b. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.15
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
a. Within 14 days from this Order, rescind, in writing, the prohibition on 20
employees from discussing with anyone internal investigations and notify all employees
currently employed at its Austin, Texas facilities that this prohibition has been rescinded.
b. Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Austin, Texas
Samsung facilities in Austin, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies 25
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be
distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or 30
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the 35
notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since May 6, 2016.

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and
all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading
“Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”
JD–68–19
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c. Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional
Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 30, 20195
Donna N. Dawson10
Administrative Law Judge
4ge,A_w
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT promulgate or maintain an oral or written rule prohibiting all employees from
discussing with each other and anyone else internal investigations.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind in writing the prohibition on all employees discussing with each other or
anyone else internal investigations.
WE WILL notify all current employees at our Austin, Texas Samsung facilities that the
unlawful oral and written rule prohibiting all employees from discussing with each other and
anyone else internal investigations has been rescinded.
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National
Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation
and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights
under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the
Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
819 Taylor Street, Room 8A24, Fort Worth, TX 76102-6178
(817) 978-2921, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-176006 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING
AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE
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