RIM HOSPITALITY

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 15, 2016

21-CA-137250 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 15, 2016)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
RIM HOSPITALITY
and

Case 21—CA-137250
NELSON CHICO, an Individual
ERRATUM
The June 15, 2016 administrative law judge decision in the above case (JD(SF)-27-16) is
corrected as follows. On page 5, the sentence beginning on line 17 is corrected to read:
As for the fact that some employees have not signed the agreement over the past 4-5 years, this
does not establish that some of the former Crestline employees did not sign it in October 2011.
Dated, Washington, D.C., July 6, 2016
Jeffrey D. Wedekind
Administrative Law Judge
JD(SF)-27-16
Los Angeles, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES, SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
RIM HOSPITALITY
and

Case 21—CA-137250 -
NELSON CHICO, an Individual
Laura Haddad, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Douglas J. Melton, Esq. & Shane Cahill, Esq. (Long & Levit LLP),
for the Respondent.
Roy Suh, Esq. (Matern Law Group),
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
JEFFREY D. WEDEKIND, Administrative Law Judge. This is another case
involving a mandatory arbitration agreement. The Respondent is Rim Hospitality, a hotel
management company. The Charging Party is Nelson Chico, who worked as a dishwasher for
Respondent at the Doubletree Hotel by Hilton in downtown Los Angeles from October 2011,
when Respondent took over management of the hotel from his previous employer (Crestline),
until October 24, 2012, when he was terminated.
The subject agreement is a 2-page document entitled "Agreement for Binding
Arbitration." It consists of five paragraphs. The first paragraph states that the employee agrees
that all employment-related disputes will be subject to binding arbitration "[i]n consideration of'
being employed and paid compensation and benefits by the Company and the Company's
promise to arbitrate all employment-related disputes. The second and third paragraphs describe
how arbitrations will be conducted and paid for and the authority of the arbitrator. The fourth
paragraph states that the agreement does not prohibit the employee from pursuing administrative
claims with a state or federal agency. The fifth and final paragraph states that the employee
"acknowledge[s] and agree[s]" that he or she is executing the agreement "voluntarily and
without any duress or undue influence by the Company or anyone else 3,
Chico signed Respondent's foregoing mandatory arbitration agreement at an orientation
session for new hires on October 5, 2011. Nevertheless, on April 1, 2014, about 18 months after
his termination, he filed a class action complaint against Respondent in California Superior Court
alleging wage and other related violations of the California Labor Code, IWC Wage Orders, and
the California Business and Professions Code.
Respondent responded by (1) removing the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, Case No. 2:14-cv-05750-JFW-SS; and (2) filing a petition with the
JD(SF)-27-16
district court on July 31, 2014, to compel individual arbitration of Chico's claims pursuant to the
arbitration agreement. Although the agreement is silent regarding class or collective actions,
Respondent argued that it nevertheless prohibits such actions, citing the Supreme Court's
holding in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), that an

5 implicit agreement to authorize class arbitration may not be inferred from the contract's silence
on the matter. The district court (John F. Walter, J.) agreed and issued an order on October 7,
2014, compelling Chico to individually arbitrate his claims (Jt. Exh. 17).
In the meantime, on September 22, 2014, Chico filed the unfair labor practice (ULP)
10 charge in this proceeding. Following an investigation, on August 31, 2015, the Regional
Director issued a complaint on the charge.
Approximately 6 months later, on February 3, 2016, Chico and Respondent executed a
non-Board Settlement Agreement and General Release. Respondent agreed therein to pay Chico
15 $55,000 in return for releasing it from any and all of his claims, including those in his wage suit
and his ULP charge (Jt. Exh. 18). Shortly after, on February 10, the district court dismissed
Chico's suit (which had been stayed pending the outcome of arbitration) without prejudice due to
the parties' failure to file a timely joint status report (Jt. Exh. 19). A few days later, on February
12, Chico submitted a request to the Regional Director to withdraw his ULP charge against
20 Respondent in light of the recent settlement of his wage claims against Respondent. The
Regional Director, however, denied the request.'
A hearing on the complaint allegations was held a few months later, on April 26, 2016.
Thereafter, on June 3, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs.'
25
'See Sec. 102.9 of the Board's Rules (a charge may be withdrawn, prior to the hearing, only
with the consent of the Regional Director); and Independent Stave Co., 287 NLRB 740, 741
(1987) ("[I]t is well settled that 'the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices is exclusive,
and that its function is to be performed in the public interest and not in vindication of private
rights' and 'the Board alone is vested with lawful discretion to determine whether a proceeding,
when once instituted, may be abandoned.") (citations omitted). See also Flyte Tyme Worldwide,
362 NLRB No. 46 (2015), final decision and order issued 363 NLRB No. 107 (2016), where the
Board denied a motion to withdraw a similar charge after the judge's decision issued. Neither
the Charging Party nor the Respondent directly challenges the Regional Director's
determination. The Board's jurisdiction is likewise uncontested and established by the admitted
and/or stipulated facts.
2 Specific citations herein to the transcript, exhibits, and briefs are included where
appropriate to aid review, and are not necessarily exclusive or exhaustive. In making credibility
findings, all relevant and appropriate factors have been considered, including the demeanor and
interests of the witnesses; whether their testimony is corroborated or consistent with the
documentary evidence and/or the established or admitted facts; inherent probabilities; and
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record as a whole. See, e.g., Daikichi Corp.,
335 NLRB 622, 633 (2001), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003); and New Breed Leasing
Corp. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 522 U.S. 948 (1997).
2
JD(SF)-27-16
THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The General Counsel alleges that, by maintaining the mandatory arbitration agreement at
the hotel and petitioning the court to compel individual arbitration of Chico's employment-

5 related claims pursuant thereto, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act. Although the last paragraph of the agreement states that signing is "voluntary,"
the General Counsel contends that Respondent required Chico and other employees to sign it as a
condition of employment. Accordingly, the General Counsel contends that the agreement is
clearly unlawful under the Board's decisions in D.R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), and
10 Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), holding that an employer's maintenance and
enforcement of a mandatory individual arbitration policy or agreement is unlawful where it is a
condition of employment. Alternatively, the General Counsel contends that, even if the
agreement is not a condition of employment, it is still unlawful because it prospectively waives
the employees' right to engage in protected concerted activity. Finally, although the agreement
15 itself is silent regarding class or collective actions, the General Counsel contends that it is
nevertheless unlawful because it was applied to prohibit such actions.
Respondent denies that the arbitration agreement is a condition of employment, asserting
that it is entirely voluntary as stated in the agreement. Respondent further argues that,
notwithstanding the Board's decisions in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil, its maintenance and
20 enforcement of the agreement is lawful regardless of whether the agreement is voluntary or a
condition of employment. Finally, it also asserts various other reasons why the complaint
allegations should be dismissed.
I. Whether the Arbitration Agreement is a Condition of Employment
25 A preponderance of the evidence supports that General Counsel's contention that
Respondent's mandatory arbitration agreement was a condition of employment at the hotel at the
time Chico and other former Crestline employees signed it in October 2011. As indicated above,
it is undisputed that Respondent presented the agreement to them at an "orientation" meeting
where the Company's representatives described the Company's policies, procedures, and
30 benefits. It is also undisputed that the agreement was included in the "new hire packet" with
various other forms the representatives gave them to fill out or sign, including a W-4 and 1-9.
Finally, it is likewise undisputed that the Company's representatives did not tell Chico and the
others that they did not have to sign the arbitration agreement (Tr. 23,58-59). Cf. Network
Capital Funding Corp., 363 NLRB No. 106 (2016) (finding that employer's mandatory
35 arbitration agreement was a condition of employment where the employer's representative
distributed the agreement to new hires at an orientation session with other forms to sign and
submit; the representative did not indicate in any way that the employees could remain employed
without signing the agreement; the purpose of the orientation session was to instruct the new
hires on the company's required operating procedures; and the employees "would reasonably
40 have believed" in this context that signing the agreement was a condition of their employment).
See also Haynes Building Services, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 125 (2016) (finding that employer's
mandatory arbitration agreement was a condition of employment where the employer "created
3
JD(SF)-27-16
the reasonable impression," and the applicant's therefore "would reasonably understand," that
signing the agreement was a condition of employment).3
Further, the agreement does not clearly state that signing is not required as a condition of

5 employment. Although the last paragraph of the agreement states that signing is voluntary, the
word "voluntary" has more than one possible meaning or definition. See, e.g., Laborers Local
1184 (NVE Constructors), 296 NLRB 1325, 1329 (1989) (discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" in the legislative history of Sec. 8(f) of the Act), rev. denied 934 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir.
1991). See also U.S. ex rel. Fine v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 72 F.3d 740, 745-747 (9th Cir. 1995)
10 (Kozinski, J., concurring), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1233 (1996). Indeed, the Merriam-Webster
online dictionary currently lists seven definitions, "rang[ing] from the metaphysical to the
mechanical"'
(1) proceeding from the will or from one's own choice or consent;
(2) unconstrained by interference (self-determining);
15 (3) done by design or intention (intentional);
(4) of, relating to, subject to, or regulated by the will (voluntary behavior);
(5) having power of free choice;
(6) provided or supported by voluntary action; and
(7) acting or done of one's own free will without valuable consideration or legal
20 obligation.
This available range of possible definitions has not been lost on employers, particularly in
the context of mandatory arbitration agreements. See, for example, Waffle House, Inc., 363
NLRB No. 104 (2016), where the employer argued that its mandatory arbitration agreement was
3 Chico testified that the HR director for Crestline was present at Respondent's orientation
meeting and told him and the other Crestline employees that they had to fill out all the
paperwork or they would be let go (Tr. 22). See also Jt. Exh. 14B, an August 21, 2014
declaration he gave in the court case ("I believed that I was required to sign the document as a
condition of my employment with Rim because I was not told that it was optional. .I was told
to fill out all the paperwork in order to continue working for Rim.") However, Respondent's
Regional HR director at the time, Kari Schlagheck, denied that anyone told Chico or the others
that they had to sign all the papers in the packet. Although Schlagheck admitted that Crestline's
HR director was still on site at the time, she denied that he was present at Respondent's
orientation meetings. Schlagheck testified that she and another HR person (Charlene Proche)
conducted all of the "on-boarding" orientation meetings and that they never said the employees
had to sign all the papers including the arbitration agreement. (Tr. 50-56). Neither of these two
accounts of the meeting is more credible than the other; both are equally believable and equally
suspect considering all the usual factors (see fn. 2, above). Accordingly, the General Counsel
failed to establish that Chico and others were told that they had to sign all the forms, including
the arbitration agreement, at the October 5, 2011 orientation meeting. See generally Central
National Gotteman, 303 NLRB 143, 145 (1991); and Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB 591 (1954)
(finding that the General Counsel failed to carry the burden of proof where conflicting testimony
was equally credible).
US. ex rel. Griffith v. Conn, 2015 WL 779047, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2015) (describing
the seven similar definitions for the word "voluntary" in the 1976 edition of Webster's).
4
JD(SF)-27-16
voluntary, even though the agreement expressly stated that signing was a mandatory condition of
employment, because employees could decline employment and choose to work for a different
employer;5 and San Fernando Post-Acute Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 57 (2015), where the
employer acknowledged that its mandatory arbitration agreement was a condition of
5 employment, even though the agreement expressly stated that signing was voluntary. It follows
that the range of possible definitions would also not be lost on employees in this context, and
that, in the absence of any written or oral guidance otherwise, at least some would therefore
reasonably interpret the word "voluntary" in the same mechanical manner, i.e. to simply mean
that they were physically free not to sign and to look for a job elsewhere.
10
Respondent's posthearing brief (p. 5) argues that Chico "did understand the meaning of
the word 'voluntary'," citing his testimony on cross-examination that he did so (Tr. 36). It also
cites the stipulated fact that 25 of 367 employees (7 percent) have not signed the agreement since
October 2011. However, counsel never asked Chico precisely what he understood the word
15 "voluntary" to mean. Further, Chico credibly testified that he did not even read the last
paragraph of the agreement at the time; rather, he only read the first half of the first paragraph
(Tr. 40). As for the fact that some employees have not signed the agreement over the past 4-5
years, this does not establish that some of the former Crestline employees did not sign it in
October 2011. Nor does it establish that none of the employees interpreted the word "voluntary"
20 in the mechanical manner described above. In any event, the reasonableness test is an objective
one; thus, the actual subjective manner in which Chico and others interpreted the agreement in
October 2011 is not relevant or determinative. See also AWG Ambassador, LLC, 363 NLRB No.
137 (2016) (affirming judge's finding that employer's mandatory arbitration agreement, which
stated that it was a condition of employment, was in fact a condition of employment,
25 notwithstanding the employer's contention that multiple employees had refused to sign it and
were not disciplined for doing so).
The General Counsel, however, has failed to establish that Respondent continued to
maintain the agreement at the hotel as a condition of employment for new employees who were
30 hired after the October 2011 takeover/transition from Crestline was completed. Jeannette
Garcia, Respondent's HR manager at the hotel since March 2012, testified that all new
employees since that time have been told which forms in the packet are or are not required to be
signed, and that they do not have to sign the arbitration agreement (Tr. 80,83). The General
Counsel presented no witnesses or other evidence to rebut this testimony. Nor does the General
35 Counsel's posthearing brief offer any basis to discredit Garcia's uncontroverted testimony.
II. Whether the Agreement is Unlawful Regardless
of Whether it is a Condition of Employment
40 As indicated above, the Board's decisions in D.R. Horton and Murphy Oil only outlawed
mandatory individual arbitration agreements that are required as a condition of employment.
However, the Board subsequently extended the ban to optional agreements in On Assignment
Staffing Services, 362 NLRB No. 189, slip op. at 1 (2015), holding that such an agreement "is
5 See slip op. at 2 n. 3. See also the dissenting opinion, slip op. at 3 n. 1 (agreeing with the
employer's argument).
5
JD(SF)-27-16
still unlawful because it requires employees to prospectively waive their Section 7 right to
engage in concerted activity."
Respondent argues that the Board's decision in On Assignment Staffing Services is

5 distinguishable because the mandatory arbitration agreement there automatically took effect 10
days after it was received by the employees unless they followed an "opt-out" procedure within
that time as specified in the agreement. However, as indicated by the General Counsel, the
Board has made clear in subsequent cases that the same analysis applies where the employees
have the option whether to sign the agreement in the first place, i.e. whether to "opt in" rather
10 than "opt out." See, e.g., Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45 (2015) (rejecting employer's
argument that its proposed revised arbitration agreement was lawful because it expressly stated
that signing the agreement was optional).
Thus, Respondent's agreement is unlawful even though the evidence fails to establish
15 that it has been maintained as a condition of employment since the October 2011
takeover/transition from Crestline was completed.6
III. Whether the Agreement is Unlawful Even Though
it is Silent Regarding Class or Collective Actions
20
The Board has held in a number of cases that the maintenance of a mandatory arbitration
agreement is unlawful, even if it is silent regarding class or collective claims, if the employer has
applied the agreement to preclude employees from pursuing employment-related claims on a
class or collective basis in any forum. See, e.g., Haynes Bldg Services, LLC, 363 NLRB No.
25 125 (2016); Fuji Food Products, 363 NLRB No. 118 (2016); and Employer's Resource, 363
NLRB No. 59 (2015), citing Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004) (a
workplace rule that does not explicitly restrict protected activity may be found unlawful if
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit such activity, the rule was
promulgated in response to protected activity, or the rule has been applied to restrict such
30 activity). Here, as in those cases, it is undisputed that Respondent applied its mandatory
arbitration agreement in this manner; specifically, by citing it to the district court as support for
compelling individual arbitration of Chico's wage claims. Accordingly, Respondent's
maintenance of the agreement violated the Act even though the agreement did not expressly
prohibit such class or collective actions.'
35
6 Respondent also argues that the Board's decisions in D.R. Horton, Murphy Oil, and On
Assignment Staffing are wrong. However, administrative law judges must follow Board
precedent unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342
NLRB 378 n. 1 (2004). Accordingly, Respondent's arguments regarding the merits of the
Board's decisions are properly addressed to and by the Board and the reviewing courts.
Consistent with the complaint (par. 4 (b)), the General Counsel's posthearing brief also
argues that Respondent's maintenance of the mandatory arbitration agreement is unlawful
because employees would reasonably construe it to prohibit class or collective claims. It is
unnecessary to reach this allegation or argument given the finding above that Respondent's
maintenance of the agreement is unlawful because it has been applied to prohibit such claims.
6
JD(SF)-27-16
IV, Whether Respondent Unlawfully Enforced
the Agreement in Chico's Wage Suit
The Board in Murphy Oil held that enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement in the

5 above manner to compel individual arbitration of an employee's claims is itself a violation of the
Act. It has reaffirmed this holding in numerous other cases since, including in circumstances
similar to those here. See Adrianas Insurance Services, Inc., 364 NLRB No. 17, slip op. at 1 n. 4
(2016); and Fuji Food Products, above, slip op. at 1 n. 2, and cases cited there (rejecting the
argument, reasserted by Respondent here, that finding such a violation unconstitutionally
10 interferes with an employer's right to petition a court). Accordingly, Respondent's July 31, 2014
petition to compel individual arbitration of Chico's wage claims pursuant to the unlawful
arbitration agreement was also unlawful.
V, Whether the Allegations Should be Dismissed for Other Reasons
15
As indicated above, Respondent also asserts various other reasons why the complaint
allegations should be dismissed. Specifically, Respondent argues that Chico's class action suit
did not constitute protected concerted activity under the Act; that Chico lacked standing to file
the ULP charge; that Chico did not file the ULP charge within the 6- month limitations period
20 after he signed the arbitration agreement; and that the complaint is barred under the doctrine of
res judicata.
None have merit. The Board has repeatedly held that the filing of an employment-related
class or collective action by an individual constitutes concerted activity under the Act; that
25 former employees are protected by the Act and may file ULP charges over their former
employer's post-termination maintenance and enforcement of an individual arbitration policy;
and that a violation may be found where, as here, an unlawful provision has been maintained
and/or enforced within 6 months of the charge, regardless of when the provision became
effective or was first acknowledged by or enforced against the employee. See, e.g., Cowabunga,
30 Inc., 363 NLRB No. 133, slip op. at 2 (2016); Flyte Tyme Worldwide, 363 NLRB No. 107, slip
op. at 1 n. 4 (2016); Fuji Food Products, slip op. at 1 nn. 1, 7; and Employer's Resource, slip op
at 1 nn. 2, 6, 7, and cases cited there.
The Board has also repeatedly held that court decisions in related or collateral private
35 litigation such as Chico's wage suit against Respondent are not binding on the Board under the
doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel as it was not a party to that litigation. See
Bloomingdales, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 172, slip op. at 4 n. 8 (2016), citing Field Bridge
Associates, 306 NLRB 322 (1992), enfd. sub nom. Service Employees Local 32B-32J v. NLRB,
982 F.2d 845, 850 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 509 U.S. 904 (1993) ("The Board adheres to the general
40 rule that if the Government was not a party to the prior private litigation, it is not barred from
litigating an issue involving enforcement of Federal law which the private plaintiff has litigated
unsuccessfully."). See also UnitedHealth Group, Inc., 363 NLRB No. 134, slip op. at 9 (2016).8
8 NLRB v. Heyman, 541 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976), the primary case relied on by Respondent
in support of its res judicata argument, is arguably distinguishable. See Roadway Express, 355
NLRB 197, 201 (2010) (distinguishing Heyman on the ground that the Board's unfair labor
practice findings there depended entirely on the existence of a contract, and the courts' prior
7
JD(SF)-27-16
•
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act by:
5
1. Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement at the hotel that, as applied, compels
employees to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums, whether
arbitral or judicial; and
10 2. Seeking to enforce the foregoing mandatory arbitration agreement against Chico in his
employment-related court suit from July 31, 2014 to February 3, 2016.
REMEDY
15 Consistent with D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, Respondent will be required to rescind or
revise the Agreement for Binding Arbitration, and to notify Chico and other current and former
hotel employees who signed or were subject to the agreement that they have done so.
As requested by the General Counsel, Respondent will also be required to reimburse
20 Chico for all reasonable expenses and legal fees, with interest, incurred in opposing its petition to
enforce the mandatory arbitration agreement to preclude Chico's class claims, to the extent the
February 3, 2016 non-Board settlement between Respondent and Chico did not fully reimburse
him for such amounts. Interest shall be computed and compounded daily as set forth in New
Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), and Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).9
25
Finally, Respondent will be required to post a notice to employees, in both English and
Spanish, at the hotel. Respondent will be required to distribute the notice electronically as well,
including by email, if it customarily communicates with employees by such means. See I Picini
Flooring, 356 NLRB 11, 14 (2010). Alternatively, in the event Respondent has gone out of
findings on that issue represented "a minimal intrusion into the Board's jurisdiction" as "no broad
policy question" was implicated in that determination), enfd. per curiam 427 Fed. Appx. 838, 840
(11th Cir. 2011). In any event, as noted above, administrative law judges must follow Board
precedent.
9 See Flyte Tyme Worldwide, 362 NLRB No. 46 (2015), final decision and order issued 363
NLRB No. 107 (2016), where the Board ordered this reimbursement remedy even though the
non-Board settlement purportedly covered attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, taxes, and
interest. See also Sidhal Industries, LLP, 356 NLRB 422 n. 2 (2010). The General Counsel also
requests that the order include the standard requirement that Respondent notify the court that it
has revised or rescinded the mandatory arbitration agreement, and that it no longer opposes
Chico's class claims on the basis that they are barred by the agreement. However, as indicated
above, the court case was dismissed following the parties' settlement of all the claims. Thus,
there is no case involving the parties currently before the court, and no reason to believe there
will be in the future. Cf. Flyte Tyme Worldwide, above (deleting this notification remedy from
the judge's order in similar circumstances).
8
JD(SF)-27-16
business or ceased providing services at the hotel, it will be required to mail the notice. See, e.g.,
SBM Management Services, 362 NLRB No. 144, slip op. at 1 n. 3 (2015).b0
ORDER"
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) orders that the Respondent, Rim
Hospitality, Los Angeles, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining and/or enforcing a mandatory arbitration agreement in a manner that
requires employees to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial.
15 (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
20 (a) Rescind the Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of its forms, or revise it in all of
its forms to make clear to employees that it does not waive their right to maintain employment-
related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
(b) Notify all current and former employees at the Doubletree Hotel by Hilton in
25 downtown Los Angeles who were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the mandatory
arbitration agreement in any form that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide
them a copy of the revised agreement.
(c) Reimburse Nelson Chico for any reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses
30 that he may have incurred in opposing the Respondent's petition to the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California to compel individual arbitration of his claims in Case No. 2:14-cv-
05750-JFW-SS, to the extent the subsequent settlement between Respondent and Chico did not
fully reimburse him for such amounts.
35 (d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix" in both English and Spanish at the hotel.' Copies of the notice, on forms provided
°Garcia testified at the April 26 hearing that Respondent expected to cease managing the
hotel, the only remaining property it still manages, by the end of May (Tr. 78).
" If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notices reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
5
10
9
JD(SF)-27-16
by the Region, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative(s), shall be
posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
5 site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or ceased doing
business at the hotel,- the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
10 notice to all current employees and former employees employed by it at that facility at any time
since March 23, 2014.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for
Region 21 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
15
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 15, 2016
20
Jeffrey D. Wedekind
Administrative Law Judge
10
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain and/or enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement in a manner that
requires employees to waive the right to maintain class or collective actions for employment-
related claims in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL rescind the Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of its forms, or revise it in all of
its forms to make clear to employees that it does not waive their right to maintain employment-
related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees at the Doubletree Hotel by Hilton in
downtown Los Angeles who were required to sign or otherwise become bound to the mandatory
arbitration agreement in any form that it has been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide
them a copy of the revised agreement.
WE WILL reimburse Nelson Chico for any reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses
that he may have incurred in opposing our petition to the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California to compel individual arbitration of his claims in Case No. 2:14-cv-05750-
JFW-SS, to the extent the subsequent settlement between us and Chico did not fully reimburse
him for such amounts.
RIM HOSPITALITY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge
or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board's Regional Office
set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board's website: www.nlrb.gov.
888 South Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017-5449
(213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge's decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-137250 or
by using the QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE
DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY
OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE
WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE'S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (213) 894-5184.