RheaDawn Phelps, Complainant,v.Hansford T. Johnson, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 20, 2003
01A23398_r (E.E.O.C. May. 20, 2003)

01A23398_r

05-20-2003

RheaDawn Phelps, Complainant, v. Hansford T. Johnson, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


RheaDawn Phelps v. Department of the Navy

01A23398

May 20, 2003

.

RheaDawn Phelps,

Complainant,

v.

Hansford T. Johnson,

Acting Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A23398

Agency No. 02-65923-001

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal from a final agency decision dated May

8, 2002, concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, the agency employed

complainant as a GS-12 Information Systems Security Manager at its Naval

Aviation Depot, Cherry Point, North Carolina facility. Complainant sought

EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on October 9,

2001, claiming sexual harassment by a co-worker, as evidenced by the

following incidents:

(1) In March 2001, while temporarily re-located to a work trailer, a

named co-worker (CW), intentionally touched complainant's breast with

his elbow, laughing immediately thereafter, and complainant objected

to this touching;

In April 2001, while still located in the trailer work space, CW grabbed

complainant's breast, and complainant told him never to do it again;

During this same time period, also in the work trailer, CW made several

obscene remarks to complainant, which she found offensive; and

In August 2001, two months after being re-located from the trailer to

another office, CW came to complainant's office and commented on her

change of hair color, attempting to solicit a concurring comment from

another worker, causing complainant to feel demeaned.

In her formal complaint, complainant further contends that after she was

re-located from the trailer, in June 2001, she reported CW's conduct to

their mutual first line supervisor (S1). Complainant avers that she did

not report the conduct sooner because she feared reprisal as long as she

still worked with CW in the trailer. Complainant contends that S1 did not

appear to be interested in her report of CW's conduct, and failed to take

any action. Complainant also contends that, to compound matters, S1 then

gave CW a performance award larger than the one she gave to complainant.

Because of S1's purported indifference and inaction, in early August

2001, complainant contacted the human resources office and reported the

sexual harassment that purportedly occurred in the trailer. Additionally,

in mid-August, complainant also contacted a second line supervisor (S2),

who professed to have no knowledge of the trailer incidents, but acted to

address the matter by immediately contacting the human resources office,

whereupon he learned that the matter was already under investigation.

A day or so later, incident 4 occurred, and complainant reported this

incident to S2 as well. The record reflects that S2 interviewed a

witness, who failed to confirm complainant's version of events, and

the record does not reflect that S2 took any further action regarding

incident 4.

At the conclusion of the investigation of complainant's EEO complaint,

in March 2002, the agency informed complainant of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive

a final decision by the agency. Complainant requested that the agency

issue a final decision.

In its final decision, the agency found that complainant failed to

submit sufficient evidence to show that the incidents she identifies

were sufficiently severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of

her employment. In reaching this conclusion, the agency noted that

CW denied all of the �trailer incidents� (incidents 1, 2, and 3 above)

alleged by complainant, and that he indicated that complainant herself

engaged in explicit personal conversations, and that she never objected to

CW about his language or content of his conversations. The agency also

found that CW averred that he did not intend the hair color remark as

demeaning, noting that he would have apologized for making such a remark.

Additionally, the agency determined that an internal investigation of

the trailer incidents, which was prompted by complainant's report to

the human resources office, failed to uncover sufficient evidence of the

alleged sexual touching, although noting that the investigator felt that

CW engaged in some degree of unacceptable behavior that upset complainant.

As a result, the agency found that CW received a Letter of Caution,

directing him to refrain from using language that could be interpreted

as sexual or offensive, prohibiting his contact with complainant, and

requiring him to undergo certain sexual harassment training. The agency

also indicated that S1 received a Letter of Counseling for failing to

report the sexual harassment in June 2001. Based on these findings,

the agency concluded that complainant failed to prove, by a preponderance

of the evidence, that she was subjected to sexual harassment.

As an initial matter, we note that because this is an appeal from

an agency final decision issued without a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge, we apply a de novo standard of review. See 29

C.F.R. 1614.405(a).

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a violation of Title

VII may be predicated on either of two types of sexual harassment: (a)

harassment that results in the employer taking a tangible employment

action against the employee; and (b) harassment that, while not resulting

in the taking of a tangible employment action, nevertheless creates a

hostile work environment. See Burlington Industries., Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998).

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment due to

sexual harassment, a complainant must show that:

(1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class;

(2) she was subjected to unwelcome conduct related to her gender,

including sexual advances, requests for favors, or other verbal or

physical conduct of a sexual nature;

(3) the harassment complained of was based on sex;

(4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering

with her work performance and/or creating an intimidating, hostile,

or offensive work environment; and

(5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.

See McCleod v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal No. 01963810

(Aug. 5, 1999)

Moreover, the harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective

viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances.

See Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994).

In applying these legal standards to this case, we find that, on one

hand, the evidence of record consists of complainant's allegations,

as described in the enumerated incidents set forth above, and witness

statements attesting to CW's reputation for engaging in sexually

inappropriate conduct around women. On the other hand, the evidence

of record contains CW's denials, and witness statement attesting to

CW's reputation for gentlemanly conduct. In particular, one witness,

who also worked in the trailer with complainant and CW, attested that he

never observed CW conduct himself in an inappropriate manner, physically

or verbally, in complainant's presence, but could not say the same

for complainant. However, complainant contends that this witness is a

long-time friend of CW's, and that his testimony has limited credibility.

The record also contains the report of the agency's informal investigation

which found only enough evidence to raise a suspicion that CW engaged

in some sort of unacceptable behavior.

Incidents 1 and 2

With respect to the touching incidents, as reflected in incidents 1

and 2, we find that there are no witnesses, and complainant presents no

tangible evidence that her claims are true. We find that complainant

fails to demonstrate that these incidents occurred as claimed, and so

fails to satisfy any of the elements of the prima facie case set forth

above regarding these incidents.

Incident 4

Regarding incident 4, we find that CW admits that this incident

occurred, he disputes that his comments were sexually inappropriate or

otherwise demeaning to complainant.<1> We also find that a witness to

incident 4 (the co-worker who CW attempted to solicit a comment), who

appears to be impartial and credible, provided affidavit testimony that

this was a fairly innocuous exchange, devoid of sexual innuendo.<2> While

complainant contends that she felt demeaned by CW's comment about her

change in hair color, we conclude that the record fails to support that

a �reasonable person,� in complainant's situation would have found his

comments to be sexually offensive. Even when viewed within the context

of her entire claim of sexual harassment, we find that complainant here

fails to satisfy prongs 2 and 3, and so fails to establish a prima facie

case of sexual harassment regarding incident 4.

Incident 3

Regarding CW's purportedly sexually offensive verbal conduct, as

reflected in incident 3, we again find that there are no witnesses to

support this claim. Moreover, we note the affidavit evidence generally

describing CW's reputation for sexually harassing conduct is contradictory

and inconsistent. Additionally, while we find that the witness who worked

in the trailer along side CW and complainant could best describe whether

or not the atmosphere was tinged with sexual harassment, we agree with

complainant that his credibility is at least somewhat diminished given

his long-time friendship with CW.

Notwithstanding this inconclusive affidavit evidence, however, given

that the report of the agency's informal investigation reflects that

CW probably engaged in some sort of inappropriate conduct, short of the

touching, as well as the evidence that CW was officially reprimanded for

this conduct with a Letter of Caution, we find that complainant presents

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that incident 3 occurred as claimed.<3>

Therefore, we find that as to incident 3, complainant established prongs

1, 2, and 3, of a prima facie case of sexual harassment due to a hostile

work environment. See McCleod, supra.

Next, in addressing whether complainant satisfies prong 4 of the prima

facie case analysis with respect to incident 3, we note that harassment

is actionable only if the harassment to which the complainant has been

subjected was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of the complainant's employment. See Cobb v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13, 1997).

Here, despite careful review of the record, we find no evidence to suggest

that the sexual harassment claimed by complainant adversely interfered

with her ability to do her work, or her overall work conditions.

In responding to this question in her affidavit, complainant vaguely

indicates that she felt �depressed� and could not tell her husband for

a long time because she felt �filthy.� In this regard, we note that

while the comments alleged to be uttered by CW are clearly vulgar, and

apparently occurred on at least an occasional basis, possibly more,

the conduct was nonetheless confined to a two to three month period,

and the statements, while offensive, were not of a threatening or

intimidating nature.<4>

Moreover, we find that complainant claims that she became upset after

she reported sexual harassment to S1 in June 2001, because instead of

S1 investigating the situation and reprimanding CW, she instead gave

him a larger performance award than complainant received. While we

note that complainant avers that incident 4 marked the point at which

she could endure no more, we

also note that complainant admits that there were no acts of sexual

harassment by CW toward her from June 2001, until incident 4 occurred

in mid-August 2001. We also note that the human relations office had

begun its investigation of complainant's report of sexual harassment

immediately prior to incident 4. Additionally, although complainant

contends that she became so stressed she could no longer come to work,

we find that she presents no evidence to corroborate her claimed stress

level. We note that complainant claims that she is under a physician's

care for stress, but she presents no documentary evidence to confirm

this, or to otherwise describe the nature and extent of her emotional

suffering as it relates to the claimed sexual harassment.

Therefore, we find that incident 3, even when considered within the

entire context of complainant's sexual harassment claim, had neither the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with her work performance

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment,

such that complainant fails to establish a prima facie case of sexual

harassment regarding this incident.

Therefore, after careful review of the record, and considering

complainant's entire sexual harassment claim, we find that complainant

fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of sexual harassment due to a

hostile work environment.<5>

Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, including arguments

and evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the

agency's final decision.<6>

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 20, 2003

__________________

Date

1CW attests that complainant dramatically changed her hair color from

brunette to blonde, and that he commented that he thought the brunette

color was preferable, engaging a co-worker to voice his opinion, which

he declined to do.

2Two other witnesses identified by complainant did not observe enough

of this exchange to be able to offer pertinent testimony.

3In describing incident 3, complainant sets forth the following in

her formal complaint: �At the time of these incidences (referring to

incidents 1 and 2), [CW] made several comments of a sexual nature that

were unwelcome. He stated on several occasions that he would like to

�f�k� [a named] co-worker. He stated he would like to perform oral sex

on [a named co-worker] by commenting that he would like to �have her

for lunch.' On other another occasion as I was leaving work for the day,

[CW] told me to be a good wife and �go home and f--k your husband.'�

4As opposed to the �several� comments alleged in her formal complaint,

complainant, in her affidavits, instead avers that the comments by

CW were made �daily.� However, we find that complainant provides no

corroboration whatsoever for either statement.

5Because we find that complainant fails to demonstrate a prima facie case

of sexual harassment due to a hostile work environment, we do not reach

the issue of whether the agency successfully asserted an affirmative

defense to avoid liability. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues

of Sexual Harassment, N-915-050, No. 137 (March 19, 1990);

6In her formal complaint, complainant also avers that the agency denied

her request for leave as reprisal for reporting the sexual harassment.

This matter was not raised during EEO counseling, and it was not addressed

during the investigation or in the agency's final decision. Therefore,

if she has not already done so, we advise complainant that should she

wish to pursue this matter, she should contact an EEO Counselor thereon.