Raymond J. Malloy, Complainant,v.Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 26, 2004
01A34040 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 26, 2004)

01A34040

07-26-2004

Raymond J. Malloy, Complainant, v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.


Raymond J. Malloy v. Social Security Administration

01A34040

July 26, 2004

.

Raymond J. Malloy,

Complainant,

v.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart,

Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A34040

Agency No. 00-0447-SSA

Hearing No. 310-A1-5197X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the Administrative Judge's

(AJ) decision<1> concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �

621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the AJ's decision.

The record reveals that complainant, an Administrative Law Judge

(hereinafter "ALJ") at the agency's Dallas (North) Office of Hearings

and Appeals facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on July 24, 2000,

alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the basis

of age (D.O.B. 05/06/28) when: (1) pursuant to a pattern and practice

of selecting and promoting younger, less experienced ALJs, agency

management did not appoint him to fill the position of Hearing Office

Chief Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "HOCALJ") at the agency's

Las Vegas, Nevada office (�facility�), appointing a younger individual to

that position instead; and (2) management denied his subsequent request

to be transferred to another ALJ assignment at that office, opting again

to appoint a younger individual to that position.

The record reveals that following a public announcement that the agency

would open an office in Las Vegas, Nevada, complainant applied for an

ALJ position at the facility on September 17, 1999. On October 15, 1999,

he also filed an application for appointment to the facility's HOCALJ

position. Following review of complainant's applications and background,

the agency notified him that other individuals had been selected to fill

both positions. Each of these individuals is substantially younger in

age than complainant.<2>

Believing he was the victim of discrimination, complainant sought

EEO counseling and filed the aforementioned formal complainant.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC AJ.

Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of

age discrimination, as the selectees for the HOCALJ and ALJ at the

facility were substantially younger than complainant and thus outside

his protected group. However, the AJ further found that the agency

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not selecting

complainant for either the HOCALJ or ALJ positions. In so finding, the

AJ noted the statements of agency management that he was not selected

for either position due to: (1) an unforeseen reduced workload in the

region the facility was located in (Region IX); (2) complainant's past

discipline for federal fund misuse; and (3) his peers' negative image

of him. The AJ then found that complainant failed to proffer evidence

which established that it was more likely than not that the agency's

articulated reasons were a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination.

In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found that the agency had justifiably

based its actions in not selecting complainant upon its articulated

reasons. The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred when she did not find

that 1) the agency's basis of its decision upon subjective criteria

was not discriminatory; 2) the agency improperly considered his past

discipline; 3) the agency improperly considered management's personal

impressions of him; and 4) the agency's alleged workload concerns were

not legitimate reasons for its actions.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by

an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Substantial evidence is defined as �such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.� Universal

Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)

(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory

intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a

de novo standard of review, regardless of whether a hearing was held.

In order to establish a prima facie case for age discrimination, a

complainant must show that the comparison employee is "substantially

younger" than he is. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,

519 U.S. 1040 (1996). Once the complainant has done so, the agency

bears the burden of rebutting the prima facie case by setting forth a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). If the agency establishes such a reason,

the complainant may prevail only by showing, through a preponderance of

the evidence, that the agency's articulated reason is pretextual, either

by persuading the court that the agency's action more likely than not

resulted from discriminatory motives or that the articulated reason is

unworthy of credence. United States Postal Service Board of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); May v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01853225 (June 11, 1987).

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record

and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies and laws. The Commission

initially concurs with the AJ's finding that complainant established a

prima facie case of age discrimination, as the selectees are substantially

younger than he is. We further concur with the AJ's finding that the

agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

In so finding, we note the AJ found that agency management credibly

testified that: (1) neither complainant nor any other ALJ from outside

of Region IX were considered for these positions due to an unexpected

shortage of work; (2) complainant failed to demonstrate to the agency

any hardship or other reason why he deserved preferential consideration

for these positions; (3) complainant's deportment impacted management

negatively; and (4) both positions' ultimate selectees were simply

stronger candidates than was complainant. We further concur with the

AJ's finding that complainant failed to present substantial evidence that

the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext for age discrimination.

In so finding, we note that at the time that the instant claim arose,

an 85 year old individual held a Region IX HOCALJ position, and the

agency appointed a 73 year old individual to serve as a Region IX ALJ.

Investigative File (IF) at 439-40. Additionally, we note management's

contention that all of its past HOCALJ appointees were older than 55

years of age. IF at 538-39. Lastly, we note management's assertion that

an ALJ's length of service to the agency is not in itself an essential

factor in determining whether he or she is worthy of a promotion or

transfer. IF at 581. As a result, we discern no basis to disturb

the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of the record,

including Complainant's contentions on appeal and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the AJ's decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 26, 2004

__________________

Date

1 We note that complainant filed his appeal with the Commission after

the agency did not issue a final agency decision more than forty (40)

days after the issuance of the Administrative Judge's (AJ) decision.

As a result, the Commission will review the AJ's decision.

2 The record reflects that the selectee for the HOCALJ position was 55

years old (D.O.B. 12/14/44), and the selectee for the ALJ position was

48 years old (D.O.B. 10/8/51), while complainant at the time of the

selections was roughly 71 years old.