Raymond Interior Systems

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Nov 10, 2008

21-CA-037649 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 10, 2008)

JD(SF)–47–08
Orange and San Diego, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS
and Case 21-CA-37649
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 36,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES, AFL-CIO
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS
AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 1506
and Case 21-CB-14259
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 36,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES, AFL-CIO
and
SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF
CARPENTERS, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF
CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA
(Party in Interest)
Patrick J. Cullen, Esq., of Los Angeles, California,
on behalf of the General Counsel.
Ellen Greenstone, Esq. and Richa Amar, Esq.,
for Rothner, Segall, & Greenstone, of
Pasadena, California, on behalf of the Charging Party.
James A. Bowles, Esq. and Richard S. Zuniga, Esq. (on brief),
for Hill, Farrer & Burrill LLP, of Los Angeles, California,
on behalf of Respondent Raymond Interior Systems
Kathleen M. Jorgenson, Esq. for Decarlo, Connor & Shanley,
of Los Angeles, California, on behalf of Respondent
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
Local Union No. 1506
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DECISION
BURTON LITVACK: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
Statement of the Case
The original and the first amended unfair labor practice charge in Case 21-CA-37649
were filed by Southern California Painters and Allied Trades District Council No. 36,
International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL-CIO, herein called the Painters Union, on
February 8 and April 30, 2007, respectively. The original unfair labor practice charge and the
first amended unfair labor practice charge in Case 21-CB-14259 were filed by the Painters
Union on February 8 and April 30, 2007, respectively. After investigating the above-described
unfair labor practice charges, on January 30, 2008, the Regional Director of Region 21 of the
National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, issued an order consolidating cases
and a consolidated complaint, alleging that Respondent Raymond Interior Systems, herein
called Respondent Raymond, engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, herein called the
Act, and that Respondent United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local
Union No. 1506, herein called Respondent Carpenters, engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. Respondent Raymond and
Respondent Carpenters each filed an answer, essentially denying the commission of any of the
alleged unfair labor practices. Pursuant to a notice of hearing, on April 28 through 30 and May
1, 2008, in Los Angeles, California, a trial on the merits of the above unfair labor practice
allegations was held before the above-named administrative law judge. At the hearing, each of
the parties was afforded the opportunity to examine and to cross-examine witnesses, to offer
into the record any relevant documentary evidence, to argue legal positions orally, and to file
post-hearing briefs. The latter documents were filed by counsel for the General Counsel,
counsel for the Painters, counsel for Respondent Raymond, and counsel for Respondent
Carpenters, and each brief has been carefully considered. Accordingly, based upon the entire
record herein, including the post-hearing briefs and my observation of the testimonial demeanor
of the several witnesses, I make the following:
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
At all times material herein, Respondent Raymond, a California corporation with its
principal place of business located in the Orange, California, herein called the Orange facility,
and another place of business in San Diego, California, herein called its San Diego facility, has
been engaged in the building and construction industry as a contractor performing drywall,
lathing, and plastering work. During the calendar year 2006, a representative period, in
conducting its business affairs, Respondent Raymond purchased and received at its State of
California jobsites goods, valued in excess of $50,000, directly from suppliers located outside
the State of California. At all times material herein, Respondent Raymond has been an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. Labor Organizations
At all material times herein, the Painters Union has been a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
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At all material times herein, Respondent Carpenters has been a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. The Issues
The consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and
conduct violative of Section 8(a) (1) and (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, on or about
October 2, 2006, by granting recognition to and, since then, maintaining and enforcing an
existing collective-bargaining agreement with the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters
and its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the exclusive representative
of its drywall finishing employees at a time when Respondent Carpenters did not represent an
uncoerced majority of the above bargaining unit employees nor was the lawfully recognized
exclusive collective- bargaining representative of said employees; by maintaining and enforcing
a union- security clause in said collective-bargaining agreement thereby encouraging its drywall
finishing employees to join Respondent Carpenters; by warning its drywall finishing employees
that they had to join or sign up with the Carpenters that day or they could no longer work for
Respondent Raymond and by telling said employees they had to sign with the Carpenters that
day if they wanted to work for Respondent Raymond the following day thereby rendering
assistance and support to Respondent Carpenters and not adhering to the terms of the
contractual union-security provision; and by rendering assistance and support to Respondent
Carpenters by entering into a recognition agreement, acknowledging Respondent Carpenters as
the representative of all its employees under an existing collective-bargaining agreement at a
time when Respondent Carpenters did not represent an uncoerced majority of Respondent
Raymond’s drywall finishing employees.
The consolidated complaint also alleges that Respondent Carpenters engaged in
conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, on or about October 2,
2006, by obtaining recognition from Respondent Raymond and maintaining and enforcing its
existing collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent Raymond as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees at a time
when it neither represented an uncoerced majority of said employees nor was recognized as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of them; by maintaining and enforcing a union
security provision in the above collective-bargaining agreement thereby causing Respondent
Raymond to encourage its drywall finishing employees to become members of Respondent
Carpenters; by telling employees they had to sign up with the Carpenters that day or they could
no longer work for Respondent Raymond; and by receiving assistance and support from
Respondent Raymond when the latter entered into a recognition agreement, acknowledging
Respondent Carpenters as the exclusive representative of all of its employees under an existing
collective-bargaining agreement at a time when Respondent Carpenters did not represent an
uncoerced majority of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees. The consolidated
complaint further alleges that Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act on or about October 2, 2006 by failing to inform Respondent
Raymond’s drywall finishing employees of the following information prior to obtaining completed
membership applications from them and thereby obligating the said employees to pay dues and
fees to the labor organization--that they had the right to be or remain a nonmember, that they
have a right as a nonmember to object to paying for nonrepresentational activities and to obtain
a reduction in fees for such nonrepresentational activities, that they have the right to be given
sufficient information to enable them to intelligently decide whether to object, and that they
have the right as a nonmember to be apprised of any internal union procedures for filing
objections.
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In their respective answers to the consolidated complaint, Respondent Raymond and
Respondent Carpenters both denied the above-described unfair labor practice allegations.
Further, both deny that a unit limited to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees
constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining and argue that, upon the
expiration of Respondent Raymond’s collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union
on September 30, 2006, by operation of law and the provisions of the existing collective-
bargaining agreement between Respondent Raymond and the Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, effective
from July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2010, Respondent Carpenters was the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the employees covered by said agreement, including Respondent
Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
Alternatively, they argue that the parties’ existing collective-bargaining agreement was a lawful
pre-hire agreement, privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, covering Respondent Raymond’s
drywall finishing employees and their work. In this regard, during the hearing, Respondent
Raymond and Respondent Carpenters alleged that a confidential settlement agreement, dated
September 12, 2006, between the parties also constituted a pre-hire collective-bargaining
agreement, privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, covering Respondent Raymond’s drywall
finishing employees and their work. Next, each asserts that, on October 2, 2006, Respondent
Raymond lawfully advised its drywall finishing employees that the existing Carpenters collective-
bargaining agreement was operative covering them and their work and that they would have to
join Respondent Carpenters pursuant to said agreement. Finally the Respondents contend that
they entered into a recognition agreement on October 2, 2006, which agreement lawfully
recognized Respondent Carpenters as the Section 9(a) of the Act majority representative of
Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees.
IV. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Facts
Respondent Raymond is a specialty wall and ceiling contractor in the building and
construction industry, performing drywall, metal stud framing, drywall finishing, lathe, plastering,
and specialty finishing work, in several states, including California and Nevada, whose work
generally encompasses new and existing commercial projects, such as retail, educational,
healthcare, and institutional structures, and some high density residential projects. Respondent
Raymond performs work in each of the 11 southern California counties, and as of October 2006,
employed 579 construction employees working out of its Orange and San Diego facilities, with
224 framing and drywall hanging employees and 55 drywall finishing employees employed at
the Orange facility and 127 framing and drywall hanging employees and 55 drywall finishing
employees employed at its San Diego facility. At least since the early 1960’s, Respondent
Raymond has been an employer-member of the Western Wall and Ceiling Contractors
Association, Inc. (WWCCA), a multi-employer association composed of companies performing
work in the building and construction industry similar to that of Respondent Raymond, and the
latter’s former president and current CEO, Travis Winsor,1 is currently a member of the
executive board of the WWCCA and has served in each of the association’s officer positions
including president. The record reveals that the WWCCA is structurally divided into several
“conferences,” each of which negotiates, executes, and enforces collective-bargaining
agreements with a particular labor organization on behalf of the WWCCA employer-members,
who belong to the conference. In this regard, since, at least, the1960’s and through September
2006, Respondent Raymond had been an employer-member of the respective WWCCA

1 Prior to employment with Respondent Raymond, Winsor practiced law.
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conferences, which have negotiated successive collective-bargaining agreements with the
Painters Union (the California Finishers Conference), the Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters (the
Drywall/Finishers Conference), the Plasterers Union, and the Plaster Tenders Union.
The most recent of the successive collective-bargaining agreements between the
WWCA California Drywall Finishers Conference and the Painters Union, to which Respondent
Raymond was signatory through its membership in the said WWCCA conference, was the
Southern California Drywall Finishers Joint Agreement, effective from October 1, 2003 through
September 30, 2006. Said agreement covered the employer-members’, including Respondent
Raymond’s, drywall finishing employees, who performed the work of covering up screws and
joints in drywall after the drywall sheets have been hung and smoothing out the walls and
preparing the material for painting. There is no dispute that the successive Painters Union
collective-bargaining agreements were entered into by the parties pursuant to the provisions of
Section 8(f) of the Act.
The most recent collective-bargaining agreements between the WWCCA
Drywall/Finishers Conference and the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of
its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, to which Respondent Raymond was
signatory through its membership in the said WWCCA conference, are the July 1, 2002 through
June 30, 2006 and the July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2010 Southern California Drywall/Lathing
Master Agreements. Said collective-bargaining agreements contain the following identical
language:
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION AGREEMENT
***
(a) On behalf of each Contractor signatory hereto, the Association, having
received from the Union a demand or request for recognition as the majority
representative of the unit employees covered by this collective bargaining
agreement; and having been presented or having been offered to be presented
with, by the Union, proof that the Union has the support of, or has received
authorization to represent, a majority of the unit employees covered by this
collective bargaining agreement; hereby expressly and unconditionally
acknowledges and grants, on behalf of each of its members in their individual
capacities, recognition to the Union as the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the unit employees covered by this collective
bargaining agreement, pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, and agrees not to make any claim questioning or challenging
the representative status of the Union.
Until 1988, the successive Carpenters Union master agreements basically covered the work of
the employer-members’, including Respondent Raymond’s, framing and drywall hanging
employees, whose work includes metal stud framing, drywall hanging, and lathing work. Then,
in the above year, the parties negotiated a master agreement, which extended the bargaining
unit description and work coverage of the agreement to include those employees who
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performed drywall finishing work.2 Subsequently, in 1992, as a result of the concerns of
WWCCA employer-members, including Respondent Raymond, who were signatory to both the
Painters Union collective-bargaining agreements and the Carpenters Union master agreements,
regarding conflicting enforcement of the overlapping work jurisdictions of their agreements by
the Painters Union and by the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, the Drywall/Finishers
Conference and the latter negotiated and inserted the following language in that year’s and their
successive master agreements:
The Union understands and recognizes that the WWCCA and its members are
signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with the Painters . . . covering
drywall work . . . . The Parties agree that [the coverage of the work of drywall
finishing employees] shall apply only to those signatory employers who are not
already signatory to a collective bargaining agreement with the Painters . . .
covering the drywall finishing . . . work . . . and who choose to assign that work to
the Painters . . . . The Union agrees not to invoke or enforce [the coverage of
this agreement] or to create any jurisdictional dispute concerning [the above]
work against any signatory employer that is also signatory to an agreement with
the Painters . . . covering the drywall finishing . . . work and who chooses to
assign that work to the Painters . . . . as long as such contract remains in effect.
Winsor understood the foregoing language to mean that Respondent Carpenters would not
claim jurisdiction over the work of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees while it
was signatory to a collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union.
The genesis of the instant dispute was Respondent Raymond’s decision in May 2006 to
terminate its collective-bargaining relationship with the Painters Union. In this regard, according
to Travis Winsor, as he wanted to align his company with a labor organization which would
provide better work acquisition and preservation strategies and higher wages and better health
insurance and pension plans for the drywall finishing employees and would assure the “stability
of our existing workforce” and place Respondent Raymond in a better position to recruit skilled
workers, he decided it was in the best interests of Respondent Raymond to terminate its
existing collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union. Thus, on May 24, he sent the
following letter to the Painters Union and a copy to the WWCCA California Finishers
Conference. In pertinent part, said letter stated:
Raymond Interior Systems . . . is signatory to the Southern California Finishers
Joint Agreement. We hereby give you and your labor organization notice that it
is the Company’s intention to terminate the above-mentioned agreement and any
addenda or other agreement with your union on its expiration date,
September 30, 2006.
By copy of this letter, the Company is resigning from the [WWCCA]
California Finishers Conference and withdrawing any bargaining authority from
that organization. The Company is no longer a part of any multi-employer group,

2 In practice, there remained a distinction between the work performed by Respondent’s
drywall finishing employees and those performing framing and drywall hanging. Thus, each of
Respondent Raymond’s former drywall finishing employees, who testified at the hearing,
testified without contradiction that he or she never performed framing or drywall hanging work
and that the employees, who performed drywall hanging work, never performed drywall finishing
work.
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and will not be bound by any agreement reached between the union and such a
group. . . .
Thereafter, Winsor, who understood that Respondent Raymond was bound to the terms
and conditions of employment, embodied in the existing Painters Union contract until
September 30, 2006, testified, the fact that Respondent Raymond intended to terminate its
bargaining relationship with the Painters Union soon became “well known” throughout the
industry, and “. . . we were aware that the Carpenters had expressed their intentions to enforce
[the] provisions of [their existing master agreement]” so as to assert bargaining representative
status for drywall finishing employees. Specifically, according to him, between May 24 and
September 12, 2006, two representatives of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters,
Mike McCarron, the executive secretary, and Gordon Hubel, the contract administrator, “. . .
expressed their intentions to fully enforce all provisions of their contract upon the expiration of
the Painters Union contract . . . which could apply to our existing [drywall finishing employees]
or another potential outcome would be to require us to receive employees to perform this work
dispatched from the Carpenters’ hall.” On this point, Gordon Hubel testified that, during
bargaining over the Carpenters Union 2002-2006 master agreement, he and Winsor engaged in
a conversation regarding the above-quoted so-called Painters contract exception language in
the collective-bargaining agreement and that he told Winsor, if a signatory contractor, which
performed drywall finishing work, terminated its contract with the Painters Unioin, “. . . we
believed [our] contract kicked in immediately, that there wasn’t any transition period . . . .” He
told Winsor that the Carpenters Union would “griev” it if a signatory contractor failed or refused
to give the drywall finishing work to the Carpenters Union. Likewise, Winsor believed that, upon
expiration of the Painters Union contract, Respondent Raymond could not unilaterally
implement its own terms and conditions of employment for its drywall finishing employees rather
than adopting those of the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement without facing a
lawsuit or grievance by the Carpenters Union
Apparently, in order to obviate a potential contractual grievance, representatives of the
Regional Council of Carpenters and Respondent Raymond held discussions over a period of
several weeks during the summer of 2006. While Hubel placed the conversations in the context
of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters pursuit of its demand that, upon expiration of
its collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union, Respondent Raymond
acknowledge that its drywall finishing employees and their work were covered by the existing
Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement, Travis Winsor placed the negotiations in a
different context. According to him, the negotiations, which the parties intended to keep
confidential,3 concerned a dispute over how to provide wages and benefits to Respondent
Raymond’s drywall finishers without any disruptions or other eligibility, vesting, and coverage
issues resulting from differences between the provisions of the Painters Union and Carpenters
Union collective-bargaining agreements. While such may have been Respondent Raymond’s
concern, Winsor admitted that McCarron continually expressed the Carpenters Union’s intention
“to fully enforce all provisions of their contract upon expiration of the Painters’ [collective-
bargaining agreement]” and specifically threatened to file a grievance against Respondent
Raymond if the latter did not comply. Further, when asked if any document exists providing for

3 Gordon Hubel stated that “[I]t’s usually the employer who wants to keep [such talks]
confidential so other employees don’t know about the resolution.” In this regard, it is obvious
that the instant discussions were kept confidential from Respondent Raymond’s drywall
finishers in order to avert the possibility of a work stoppage. While initially denying being
concerned about a strike, Winsor admitted “I was worried that the Painters Union would call a
strike against Raymond projects.”
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the exact vesting and eligibility terms worked out with the Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters, Winsor averred, “I believe those provisions are contained in the various trust fund
documents;” however, neither Respondent Raymond nor Respondent Carpenters offered any
corroboration for his assertion.
In any event, the result of the aforementioned conversations was a September 12, 2006
document, between the parties, entitled CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. Said
document states in part:
WHEREAS, disputes and grievances have arisen between the parties about
proper assignment of drywall finishing and other work to the proper trade, craft,
and group of employees, and the parties desire to settle said disputes through a
confidential settlement agreement
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual promises and
agreements set forth, the parties agree as follows:
1. Raymond agrees to sign the Southern California Drywall/Lathing
Memorandum Agreement 2006-2010.
2. At the expiration of Raymond’s agreement with Painters District Council No.
36 on September 30, 2006, Raymond agrees that to the fullest extent permitted
by law it will apply the Southern California Drywall/Lathing Agreement to its
drywall finishing work and employees.4
In addition, pursuant to paragraph 3 of the document, the Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters agreed to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Respondent Raymond for any
contractual grievance and/or lawsuit filed by the Painters Union or any related trust fund. While,
at the hearing, Hubel maintained that the confidential settlement agreement was a collective-
bargaining agreement5 as it established terms and conditions of employment and referred to the
Carpenters Union’s memorandum agreement, which binds a signatory contractor to the existing

4 The Memorandum Agreement, referred to in paragraph 1, is a short form collective-
bargaining agreement, is usually executed by a new employer in the industry, and binds the
signatory contractor to abide by the terms and conditions of employment of the existing
Carpenters Union master agreement except as specifically excluded by the terms of the
memorandum agreement. As with the master agreement, the memorandum agreement
purports to be Section 9(a) collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, in the seventh paragraph,”
the contractor and the Carpenters Union expressly acknowledge that on the contractor’s current
jobsite work, the Carpenters Union has the support of a majority of the employees performing
the work covered by this agreement. The Union has demanded and the contractor has
recognized the Carpenters Union as the majority representative of its employees performing
work covered by this Agreement.” Further, the parties to the memorandum agreement agree
that “this memorandum agreement will be effective when signed and will remain in full force and
effect for the term of the [existing master agreement]. . . . “ Finally, Gordon Hubel explained that
the memorandum agreement differs from the existing master agreement in that, pursuant to
paragraph 6, the former does not contain the above-quoted Painters Union exclusion language
and admitted that Respondent Raymond has never executed a copy of the memorandum
agreement.
Winsor asserted that the preamble language in the confidential settlement agreement
recites his concerns regarding the continuity of wages and health and pension benefits for
Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees.
5 Hubel conceded that the parties never discussed the confidential settlement agreement in
terms of creating a Section 8(f) bargaining relationship.
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Carpenters Union master agreement,6 he conceded that the document itself does not contain a
bargaining unit description7 or an expiration date, and, on this point, Winsor admitted that,
during the discussions “we never used the term bargaining unit.”
Respondent Raymond’s collective-bargaining agreement with the Painters Union,
covering its drywall finishing employees, expired by its terms on September 30, 2006, and,
presumably, as early as the next day, Respondent Raymond began complying with the terms of
the above-described September 12, 2006 confidential settlement agreement and its existing
Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement8 with Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, and
extended recognition to the latter as the bargaining representative of the above employees. In a
position statement to Region 21, dated December 18, 2006, Respondent Raymond’s attorney
stated that the 2006-2010 Carpenters Union master agreement “. . . is a full-fledged Section
9(a) agreement, unlike the former agreement with the Painters, which was a Section 8(f) pre-
hire agreement” and that “. . . pursuant to its Section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement with
the Carpenters, which . . . covered drywall finishing work, Raymond complied with the
requirements of that agreement and assigned the drywall finishing work to Carpenters.” In
these regards, according to Gordon Hubel, if Respondent Raymond had refused to assign the
drywall finishing work to Respondent Carpenters, “. . . we would have argued the overall unit
was a 9(a) unit.” Continuing, he added, “I mean we were prepared to argue that there was one
overall Section 9(a) unit.”9 Winsor and Carpenters Union representatives realized that the
demise of the Painters Union’s bargaining representative status, the transferring of such status
to Respondent Carpenters, and the necessity for signing forms for continued health insurance
and pension coverage would have to be explained to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing

6 During cross-examination, Hubel insisted that the confidential settlement agreement
somehow bound Respondent Raymond to both the memorandum agreement and to the 2006-
2010 Carpenters Union master agreement.
7 Hubel, who practiced as an attorney in the field of labor relations, argued that the
bargaining unit description is contained in the memorandum agreement and the existing master
agreement. While the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement seemingly does refer to
drywall taping and finishing and successive master agreements since 1988 have covered such
work, the parties stipulated that Respondent Raymond’s bargaining relationship with the
Painters Union has existed since, at least, 1966, covering such work for 20 years prior to the
Carpenters Union’s claim upon the work and the employees performing the work. Hubel, in fact,
conceded that Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishers constituted a historically separate
bargaining unit from those employees represented by the Carpenters Union.
8 Article IV, Section 1 of this agreement provides in part:
Every . . . person performing work covered by this Agreement shall be required, as a
condition of continued employment, to apply for and become a member of and to
maintain membership in good standing in the appropriate Local Union of the Union
which has territorial jurisdiction of the area in which such person completes his
eighth (8th) day of employment. Such application shall be made within eight (8) days
after the beginning of such employment for any contractor in the State of California
and employment for any or all contractors shall be accumulated for purposes of
determining the running of the eight (8) day period.
9 According to Hubel, Respondent Carpenters recognized that it would be difficult convincing
the Board that there was one appropriate unit herein, an overall carpenters unit, and “that’s why
we went and got cards.” He also averred that Respondent Carpenters would have argued
alternative theories-- that the drywall finishers might be considered to constitute a separate
bargaining unit, “and were prepared alternatively to accept the 8(f) contract.”
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employees, and, during their discussions regarding the confidential settlement agreement,
Winsor and McCarron also developed plans for meeting with those employees to explain the
foregoing subjects.
Such meetings were for scheduled for Monday October 2, 2006 at Respondent
Raymond’s Orange facility in the morning and at its San Diego facility in the afternoon;
according to Winsor, “the purpose . . . was to explain the decisions and the actions we had
taken, why we had done so, and to let the employees know of the new wage packages and
benefits.”10 The instant consolidated complaint allegations concern the meeting at the Orange
facility, which was scheduled for 7:00 a.m., and there is no dispute about the sequence of
events. Thus, on the night before (Sunday evening), Hector Zorrero, Respondent Raymond’s
general superintendent, and, at least, one other company official made telephone calls to all of
the company’s drywall finishing employees, directing them to be at the Orange facility’s yard11
at approximately six o’clock in the morning for a meeting. As each employee arrived in his or
her car or truck the next morning, he or she was met by three company officials, who were
standing by the outer gate and checking names on a sheet of paper. Upon his or her name
being checked on the list, the employee was permitted to enter the parking area and to park his
or her vehicle.12 At the gate entrance into the yard, a company office worker also checked each
employee’s name on a list of names. Then, at 7:00, the doors to the facility were opened and
the 85 to 90 drywall finishing employees were ushered into the center warehouse section, in
which tables and chairs were arranged and the employees were served breakfast. After an
hour, the employees were instructed to enter the training room, which is 37 feet wide and 60
feet in length and which was arranged with rows of chairs, a stage, on which were tables and a
podium, in the front of the room, and two drop-down projection screens on either side of the
room. Spanish speaking employees were told to enter first and directed to seats on which head
phones, necessary for English to Spanish translation, had been placed.13 Travis Winsor and
Hector Zorrero attended the meeting for Respondent Raymond, and McCarron, Hubel, Ron
Schoen, the administrator of the Carpenters Union trust funds, Marty Dahlquist, and other
representatives attended on behalf of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters and of
Respondent Carpenters.14 The initial speaker at the meeting was Winsor, who spoke for
several minutes utilizing PowerPoint slides and a document, which was distributed to the
employees. Said document, Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit No. 1, reads, in part, as follows:

10 Later, in his December 18, 2006 position letter, Respondent Raymond’s attorney argued
that “ . . . the [October 2 meeting] was privileged by the fact that [the existing Carpenters Union
2006-2010 master agreement] covered the work and Raymond already recognized Carpenters
as the Section 9(a) representative of its drywall employees (both hangers and finishers).”
11 Apparently, the Orange facility’s yard area is enclosed by an outer fence, with a sliding
gate permitting entry into a parking area, and the parking area is separated from the yard by an
inner fence, with an entry gate. The Orange facility building is divided into three areas—a gym
and storage room, a center warehouse and a training center.
12 The obvious purpose was to keep non-employees, especially Painters Union officials out
of the facility that morning. One such official, Jim Dunleavy, had been informed of the meeting
by a drywall finishing employee. He arrived at the Orange facility yard entrance on Monday
morning, found the entrance gate closed, and was told by Zorrero that he could not enter the
facility that day.
13 A representative of the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, David Cordero,
performed the translation.
14 The Carpenters representatives wore shirts or jackets on which the Carpenters Union
logo was imprinted.
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Raymond has terminated its collective bargaining agreement with Painters
and Allied Trades District Council No. 36, effective September 30, 2006.
This was a difficult decision which has come after much thought and analysis.
This decision was made in the best interests of the employees and company.
While Raymond has terminated the [above] agreement, Raymond continues to
be a union company.

Pursuant to Raymond’s agreement with the Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters, if the company is not bound to an agreement with the Painters
covering the drywall finishing work, this work is covered under the Carpenters
Southern California Drywall/Lathing Master Agreement. Raymond is bound by its
labor agreement with the Carpenters and will apply this agreement to employees
performing drywall finishing work in Southern California from October 1, 2006
forward.
The Carpenters agreement provides higher wages and better benefits for the
employees. Higher wages, better benefits and the support of the Carpenters will
improve the working conditions for everyone.
Drywall finishing employees who were not previously members of the
Carpenters must join the Carpenters Union under the union security provision of
the Carpenters labor agreement. In addition, the Carpenters have agreed to
special provisions regarding pension and health and welfare benefits which are
only available to Raymond drywall finishing employees. . . .
When Winsor finished, he introduced Marty Dahlquist of the Carpenters Union, and, utilizing
another PowerPoint presentation, the latter compared and contrasted the wage packages
contained in the existing Painters Union and Carpenters Union collective-bargaining
agreements. After Dahlquist, Ron Schoen spoke, in detail, about the Carpenters Union health
and pension plans and explained the trust funds’ vesting arrangement with Respondent
Raymond for the latter’s drywall finishing employees. When Schoen concluded his remarks,
Hector Zorrero spoke to the employees for a few moments, and, when he finished, employees
were permitted to ask questions to which Winsor, Zorrero, and the Carpenters Union
representatives responded.15 Upon the conclusion of the question and answer portion, the
employees were instructed to go back into the warehouse area.16 There, two tables were set
up. Clerical employees of Respondent Carpenters were at one table, and they distributed
copies of General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3, a three page document consisting of identical white,
yellow, and pink pages17 The document itself is in four parts, two being English and Spanish
versions of Respondent Carpenters’ application for membership form, the third a document
entitled Supplemental Dues and CLIC Authorization, and the fourth being an English language
Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters authorization for representation form. When

15 While unclear at exactly what point, Respondent’s Exhibit No. 2, a form entitled
Resignation from Painters Union, and an attached sample resignation letter, was distributed to
the employees during the meeting.
16 The record reveals that many employees lingered in the meeting room, speaking among
themselves about what they had just been told. Apparently, Winsor, Zorrero, and Carpenters
Union representatives spoke to individuals and groups regarding signing with Respondent
Carpenters.
17 Presumably, by writing on the top or white copy, the writer’s words appeared on the
bottom yellow and pink copies.
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Respondent Raymond employees completed and returned the entire document to the
Respondent Carpenters representatives, the employees were given copies of the Carpenters
Union magazine entitled Carpenter.18 At the other table were representatives of the Carpenters
Union trust funds, who were distributing trust fund forms to the employees. Finally, at the
conclusion of the meeting, rather than going into the warehouse area, many employees either
lingered in the back of the training room or left the building and congregated in the yard. In both
places, groups of employees discussed amongst themselves what they had heard and their
options and were approached by representatives of Respondent Carpenters, who answered
questions.
What is in dispute herein are alleged comments during the meeting to the assembled
drywall finishing employees by Respondent Raymond’s Winsor and Zorrero and by
representatives of Respondent Carpenters regarding becoming members of the latter. In this
regard, Richard Myers, who had been employed by Respondent Raymond for approximately 28
years and was the drywall finishing foreman in October 2006, testified that he sat in the rear of
the training room and that, at the outset of the meeting, Travis Winsor moved to the podium and
said “. . . that he’d been thinking about it for a while and that he’d . . . decided to sign . . . with
just the Carpenters and mot the Painters.” Also, “. . . he told us [that] if we did not sign with the
Carpenters . . . we wouldn’t have a job.” Next, Dahlquist and Schoen of the Carpenters Union
spoke. While not naming either official, Myers recalled that the first speaker told the drywall
finishing employees he was “proud” that the company had “signed” with his union and the other
“. . . spoke about the financial benefits, medical, what have you.” Then, according to Myers,
employees were permitted to ask questions, and several, including him, did so. He asked
whether his pension would be affected by switching union representation,19 and another
employee asked whether they would continue to perform taping work, or would they begin
hanging drywall. To the latter, the response was “they would just be tapers.” Myers recalled
that most of the questions pertained to the employees’ continued employment, and Winsor
“repeated” several times that “. . . if you didn’t sign, you didn’t have a job . . . we were told we
weren’t fired, we just couldn’t have a job.” Then, Myers testified, at the conclusion of the
meeting, as employees were standing and speaking to each other, Carpenters Union

18 The copy of the magazine, which was distributed on October 2, was dated January-
March 2006. On page 47 of this magazine, after four pages of obituary notices, the next to the
last page, printed in English and in a print size smaller than that used throughout the rest of the
magazine, is a document entitled Procedures for Objecting Non-members to File with the Union
Objections to the Expenditure of Dues for Purposes Not Germane to Collective Bargaining.
There is no dispute that, during the meeting the Carpenters Union representatives failed to
verbally inform the attending employees that each had a right not to join the Carpenters Union
and continue working for Respondent Raymond, that each had the right to object to paying the
portion of dues that went to non-representational expenditures, or that there was an internal
Union procedure for employees to challenge the amount they would have to pay in dues.
Finally, in these regards, close scrutiny of the Carpenters Union PowerPoint discloses that,
while the obligation to pay dues is discussed in detail, there was nothing shown to the
employees regarding the rights of nonmembers or regarding objecting to paying for union
activities not germane to the labor organization’s obligation as bargaining agent.
19 During direct examination, Myers averred that he actually asked two questions but could
specifically recall only one; however, during cross-examination, he was able to recall his second
question, which concerned the Carpenters Union’s “voting practices,” and he was informed “. . .
that they didn’t vote en mass, they had delegates for their voting . . . .”
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representatives began handing out “the paperwork”20 and the “pamphlets”21 for joining the
Carpenters Union. When the forms were offered to him by a representative, “. . . I told him I
didn’t want one.” For the next 20 to 30 minutes, Myers observed Carpenters Union agents
speaking to employees and offering papers for their signatures. At one point, he recalled,
Travis Winsor approached and asked if he was going to sign the membership document, and
Myers said, no. Winsor responded the he would like Myers to do so and stay working for
Respondent Raymond. Myers replied that would not happen because it wasn’t about the
money, it was about integrity.
During cross-examination, Myers denied that his memory of the events of that day was
hazy and testified that, as the meeting progressed, he became “upset” because of the way the
transition from the Painters Union to the Carpenters Union had been “pulled off” and that he
recalled Winsor utilizing a PowerPoint display but could not recall if the latter spoke from it.
Further, while recalling Winsor saying that, from then on, the employees would be performing
their work under the Carpenters Union contract and Carpenters finishers would be doing drywall
finishing work, Myers could not recall whether Winsor said “if we didn’t sign with the Carpenters,
we wouldn’t have a job” before or after he introduced the Carpenters Union representatives but
“. . . I know that it was brought up during questioning afterwards.” Then, asked to repeat what
Winsor said in his opening remarks, Myers said he was unable to recall “everything” but
“[Winsor] just got up and said he’d been mulling it over some time, that he . . . wasn’t going to
sign with the Painters, he was going to sign with the Carpenters . . . and . . . then he introduced
[the Carpenters representatives] and I wasn’t paying that close of attention.” While he was not
sure exactly when Winsor uttered the comment regarding employees having to join the
Carpenters in order to keep their jobs, Myers recalled that Winsor specifically said “you’re not
fired” and recalled that Winsor made the statement in response to an employee’s question-- “. . .
do we have to join the Carpenters?” Finally, while denying that he quit his job with Respondent
Raymond,22 Myers admitted he accepted a job with another contractor the next day. 23
Janet Pineda, who had been working for Respondent Raymond as a drywall finishing
employee for two years, testified that she sat towards the back of the training room during the
meeting that Travis Winsor spoke first, thanking everyone for coming and saying there were
some speakers from the Carpenters Union after him. Pineda neither could recall anything else
Winsor said nor could she recall anything the Carpenters Union representatives said except that
one spoke about “. . . financial issues, wages, benefits from the Carpenters Union.”24 According
to Pineda, after the Carpenters Union representatives finished, employees asked questions. “I
asked a couple of questions . . . . I asked if switching over . . . as a Carpenter taper was going to
make us look bad because Carpenter tapers are known to do bad work . . . . Their [response]
was no, it wouldn’t make us look bad.” Then, she commented that it would be nice for them to
have more time to contemplate working as members of the Carpenters Union; to this, Winsor

20 During cross-examination, Myers denied that this was inside the room in which the
employees had been served breakfast.
21 During cross-examination, Myers said, by packet, he meant a document consisting of
several sheets of paper.
22 Myers maintained that he could not continue working for Respondent Raymond as Winsor
said he would no longer have a job if he didn’t sign with Respondent Carpenters.
23 According to Myers, upon driving his vehicle out from Respondent‘s facility, he
encountered Painters Union representatives, who were waiting outside the gate. They told him
he could begin working for another contractor KHS&S, and he accepted their offer.
24 She did remember the Carpenters Union representatives speaking from slides, which
were projected upon the two screens.
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responded, saying “. . . we had plenty of time to think about it throughout the day.” Next,
another employee spoke, saying he had recently worked as a member of the Carpenters Union
“. . . but there wasn’t a lot of work with [that union], so that was one of the reasons why he
switched to the Painters Union. So he thought that switching to the Carpenters Union wasn’t a
very good idea because lack of work. Pineda could not recall a response to this remark and
could recall just one other question and response. An employee asked a question “. . . if we
didn’t sign up with the Carpenters were we going to be able to work the following day.” Winsor
responded, saying “. . . no, we could not work the following day if we didn’t sign up with the
Carpenters.” Pineda next testified that, after the question and answer period, for approximately
40 minutes, employees were permitted to discuss what they had heard amongst themselves. At
one point, according to her, “a representative from the Carpenters approached me and told me
that he wanted to convince me to sign . . . because it looked like I was the hardest person to
convince. . . . I just laughed.”25 After speaking to other employees and attempting to dissuade
them from joining the Carpenters Union, Pineda walked through the warehouse area26 and
outside into the yard where she encountered more employees many of whom had executed the
membership forms for Respondent Carpenters.
During cross-examination, Pineda27 testified that she could not recall Winsor either
speaking from slides, speaking about Respondent Raymond’s values, or saying he had signed
a Carpenters Union collective-bargaining agreement. However, “he did mention something
about the contract expiring from the Painters,” and she did recall him saying from that point
forward, all drywall finishing work would done under the Carpenters Union contract and
employees performing drywall finishing work would receive Carpenters Union benefits “if we
signed with the Carpenters Union.” Immediately after so testifying, Pineda changed her
testimony, stating that, while Winsor spoke about employees signing with the Carpenters Union,
he did not say this until “towards the end” of the meeting when “. . . he encouraged us to sign
over with the Carpenters Union when we were asking questions . . . . that was toward the end of
the meeting, not in the introduction.” On this point, she remembered Winsor saying “. . .
I encourage you guys to think it over and to sign . . . with the Carpenters Union.” Also, during
cross-examination, Pineda recalled that most of the meeting concerned the description of the
Carpenters Union’s fringe benefits, but she could not recall Winsor saying it was important for
employees to sign up for benefits in order to be immediately covered by the Carpenters Union
health plan.28 Pineda conceded that her recollection of the meeting was not good and that,
while the question regarding what would happen if they didn’t sign up today with the Carpenters
Union was asked just once, she could not recall whether she or another person asked the
question. She did, however, reiterate Winsor responding “. . . no, we cannot work the following

25 Gordon Hubel testified that he was the Carpenters Union representative who spoke to
Pineda. “I specifically sought her out and said that you [look] like you’re going to be a hard
person to convince because she’d asked several pointed questions. . . . she expressed he
loyalty to the Painters Union and I said I understand that but . . . there’s a lot of opportunities
here, you should keep an open mind . . . .”
26 In this room, there were tables set up with Carpenters Union representatives at the tables.
On the tables, “there were papers, I believe. Applications. There were papers on the tables. . .
. some employees were asking questions . . . to the representatives and some of them were
signing in and getting some information, paperwork.” Pineda was unable to identify General
Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3 as the “paperwork.”
27 Pineda admitted that she is currently being paid by the Painters Union for teaching “CPR
First Aid” at the Painters Union Apprenticeship school.
28 She did remember a PowerPoint presentation about the Carpenters Union’s benefits and
wages.
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day if we did not sign over with the Carpenters Union.”29 Finally, with regard to her direct
examination testimony that Winsor said the employees had plenty of time until the end of the
day to think about their decision, after reiterating the foregoing, Pineda admitted she was not
quoting the former and averred that “. . . he did mention that we had plenty of time to think about
it.”30
Ruben Mejia Alvarez, who worked for Respondent Raymond as a drywall finisher from
August through November 2006, testified that, after he and the other employees finished eating
breakfast, they were ushered into a larger room in which the meeting was to occur. Travis
Winsor and Hector Zorrero were present on behalf of Respondent Raymond, and four or five
Carpenters Union officials were also present. Winsor spoke first, and he said that the company
was changing from the Painters Union to the Carpenters Union “. . . because they want better
future for us” and “. . . because they going to gent paid more money with the Carpenters and so
more benefits and more future for us.” Next, Zorrero spoke, and he echoed Winsor, saying the
Carpenters Union represented a “better future for us and they need us.” Then, each of the
Carpenters Union representatives “spoke some,” with “. . . some of them [speaking] for
everyone and others . . . speaking individually.” He recalled one speaker telling the employees
that it was “better” working for the Carpenters and, in particular, “that it was better to sign with
them because they had better benefits, better pay, and . . . their retirement was better.” Further,
Alvarez testified that Zorrero and a Carpenters Union representative each said “that in order to
continue working with Raymond Company we had to sign up with them.31 According to this
witness, after the speakers finished, the employees were permitted to ask questions. Alvarez
asked if they would give the employees some time to think about what they had just been told
about having to sign with the Carpenters Union;32 Hector Zorrero responded, in English, “No. . .
. that it was either today or that there wasn’t any time to think about it, that it was at that
moment.”33 Another employee asked what was going to happen to their Painters Union pension
plan money, and a Carpenters Union representative answered this question. When the
questioning ended, Alvarez testified, “a raffle was made” and the Carpenters Union
representatives distributed paperwork in the form of “a sheet like [General Counsel’s Exhibit No.
3] that I signed in order to be able to continue working.”34
During cross-examination, Alvarez could not recall Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1 being
distributed during the meeting but could recall that there was information projected onto screens

29 Pineda conceded that these may not have been Winsor’s exact words. Further, in her
pretrial affidavit, she stated that she and other employees questioned Winsor about being
terminated if they did not sign with the Carpenters Union. His quoted response in Pineda’s
affidavit is virtually identical to her testimony during the trial.
30 In her pretrial affidavit, Pineda quotes Winsor as merely saying that the employees had
plenty of time to decide and that they should think about it.
31 Zorrero made his comment in English, and the Carpenters Union representative spoke
Spanish.
32 Alvarez recalled that a “majority” of the employees were making this same request. He
and the others shouted together, and Zorrero gave just one answer-- “There’s no time to think
about it. Either sign for us today or you cannot work tomorrow for us.”
33 According to Alvarez, he understands spoken English but reads very little in that
language.
34 Alvarez testified that, after the meeting, “nobody wanted to sign” to join the Carpenters
Union; however, all the drywall finishing foremen were called into a meeting. When they
returned, all said they had signed with the Carpenters Union and, from then on, it’ll depend upon
whether you sign. They added, they all signed and would continue working.
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in English, “but I don’t remember what that was, but it was representing the Carpenters.” With
regard to what Zorrero said, he recalled that Zorrero said “very little” speaking from the podium.
On stage, “. . . he said almost the same thing [Winsor said], that they had already signed with
the Carpenters . . . and they want a better future for us and they . . . will pay us more money to
go with [the Carpenters Union].” As to the statement “that we needed to sign with them if we
wanted to continue working,” Zorrero said this while “. . . amongst the people35 trying to
convince them . . . to sign” with the Carpenters Union. Finally, Alvarez confirmed that a large
portion of the meeting was devoted to an explanation of the Carpenters benefits plans.
Specifically with regard to health insurance, the employees were told “they were going to give it
to us automatically just for being members of the Carpenters Union even though we didn’t have
the number of hours.” He could not recall whether someone said it was important to sign that
day in order to receive health insurance coverage starting that day.
Jose Ramos was hired by Respondent Raymond as a drywall finishing employee in
March 2006 and ceased working for Respondent at the conclusion of the meeting on October 2.
According to him, upon being instructed to enter the training room for the meeting that day, he
recognized Winsor for Respondent Raymond and observed between six and eight Carpenters
Union representatives also in the room. Winsor spoke first, and Ramos listened to the Spanish
translation. The former “. . . thanked us for being present and he told us that the company was
big due to the workers and that the company didn’t have a contract any more with the Painters
Union, that they had signed already with the Carpenters Union . . . that he wanted us to also
sign with the Carpenters and that soon a representative from the Carpenters would be talking to
us.” Then, according to Ramos, two or three Carpenters Union representatives spoke to the
employees, and “. . . one of them explained to us what the Carpenters Union was about, the
benefits we could obtain through them and on a screen they showed us all of the entitlements
and the benefits one could obtain through the Carpenters. Also, they explained we would not
be losing any benefits by joining the Carpenters.” Winsor then solicited questions, and one
person, whose name Ramos did not know, “. . . asked what would happen if we didn’t sign with
the [Carpenters Union],” and both Winsor and a Carpenters Union representative responded.
Winsor said “. . . that they could continue working but that they needed to sign with the
Carpenters,”36 and the Carpenters Union representative’s response in English was the same-- “.
. . that they could continue working but they had to sign up with the Carpenters Union.” At this
point, Alvarez’s brother David spoke, saying he had once been a member of the Carpenters
Union and “. . . that what they promise, they wouldn’t fulfill . . . .’ A Carpenters Union
representative denied what David Ramos asserted and said everything was “fine” with his labor
organization. Then, someone again asked if they didn’t sign, could they continue working, and
Winsor this time replied “. . . that if they didn’t sign, there wouldn’t be any work.”37 At this point,
according to the witness, “they started distributing these papers like applications for affiliation to
the Carpenters Union” inside the meeting room.38 Ramos identified the document, which he

35 “[Zorrero] was walking all over the room there.”
36 As to what Winsor said, Ramos testified that he listened to the Spanish translation of
Winsor’s words.
37 During direct examination by the attorney for the Painters Union, Ramos reiterated what
Winsor said to the employees. Thus, asked whether Winsor ever said “when” the employees
had to sign with the Carpenters Union, the witness replied, “First he said that they could
continue working and sign later but then someone asked again and he said that if we didn’t sign
on that day, we weren’t working any more.”
38 According to Ramos, Winsor remained in the meeting room while General Counsel’s
Exhibit No. 3 was being distributed.
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received, as General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3,39 and said, as he had no intention of signing, he
folded the bottom portion of the document and walked outside into the yard area where other
drywall finishing employees were talking amongst themselves. Finally, asked whether he
reported for work the next day, Tuesday, Ramos replied, “No. . . . Because of what they told us
since we didn’t sign. . . . That if we didn’t sign we weren’t working any more.”
During cross-examination, Ramos denied that any literature, bearing a company
letterhead, was distributed to the employees, and he denied being given a copy of Respondent
Raymond’s Exhibit No. 1. Asked if anyone said that employees who were not previously
members of the Carpenters Union would have to join that labor organization, while not recalling
who spoke, Ramos replied, “Yes, they did say that. We had to become part of the Carpenters
Union.” He added that the latter’s representatives “. . . only said that they wanted us to sign”
and that one said it was important that they sign up for the Carpenters benefits. However, he
could not recall anyone saying it was important for the employees to do so that same day. As to
Winsor’s statement that employees had to sign with the Carpenters Union in order to continue
working, a Carpenters Union representative made the same statement. Asked precisely what
Winsor said through the translator, Ramos replied, “The only thing I remember precisely is . . .
when he was asked what happen[s] if somebody would refuse to sign, he said . . . if you don’t
sign now this day, there’s no more work.” Further, Ramos, who stated he was sitting towards
the rear of the room, did not recall whether, when he was given a copy of the Carpenters Union
membership document, Winsor remained in the front of the room “. . . since by then many
people had gotten up to leave. I don’t remember if he was still there or not.” Finally, during
cross-examination by counsel for Respondent Carpenters, while stating that no one said they
would be fired, Ramos reiterated that he did not report for work on the day after the meeting
based upon what Winsor said “. . . that if we didn’t sign that day we wouldn’t be working.” While
conceding that his brother David told him that, based upon Winsor’s comment, he could no
longer work for Respondent Raymond, Ramos stated that, rather than his brother telling him he
could no longer work for Respondent Raymond, he made his own decision in that regard.
Travis Winsor specifically denied all of the alleged unlawful statements attributed to him
by the above four witnesses including if the employees did not sign with the Carpenters, they
would not have a job; if they didn’t sign with the Carpenters, they couldn’t work the following
day; and if employees did not sign today, there won’t be any work for the company. During his
direct examination, he stated he was the first speaker, and, while he spoke, he referred to
PowerPoint slides, which he projected onto the two viewing screens. First, he welcomed the
drywall finishers to the meeting, acknowledged that some of them had not any occasion to be at
the Orange facility prior to this meeting, and stressed the importance of what they would be told
during the meeting. Then, Winsor spoke about the “values” and “ideas” at the core of
Respondent Raymond’s organization including the company’s relationship with the unions,
which act as the bargaining representatives of its employees, and his “decisions” relative to the
existing collective-bargaining agreements. Further, he spoke about the circumstances which
preceded the meeting and their impact upon the drywall finishing employees and said that, while
the company would remain a union shop and would not operate on a non-union basis, as of
September 30, “. . . Raymond’s contract with the [Painters Union] had expired and . . . we were
no longer signatory . . . with [the] union, that, as a result, all our drywall finishing work needed to
be done through the Carpenters agreement; and that, as a result, Raymond was able to
negotiate on behalf of all of its employees . . . with the Carpenters . . . .” He added that,
accordingly, every aspect of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment would be

39 Ramos was unable to identify the person, who gave him the document, as a Carpenters
Union representative.
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improved-- specifically, higher wages and better and increased benefits. On the latter point,
Winsor assured the employees that, because they were immediately covered under the existing
Carpenters Union collective-bargaining agreement, their health insurance coverage would not
lapse nor would there be any loss of vested benefits but that the benefits of one group of
employees would be at risk-- those who had less than five years employment with Respondent
Raymond and were not vested in their pension plan benefits, and “. . . I admonished [the latter
group] . . . if they were committed to the trade and remained with the Carpenters for a short
period of time they would easily make back and exceed the value in their pension plan . . . .”
With regard to Respondent’s Exhibit No. 1, Winsor denied that he discussed its contents with
any specificity, “but the topic and information contained in the document were verbally relayed
during my presentation.”
Asked, by the attorney for Respondent Raymond, whether he referred to the union-
security provisions in the existing Carpenters Union’s master agreement, Winsor stated that
what he said was in response to an employee’s question, which came after the Carpenters
Union representatives’ presentations, and “I don’t recall the exact words but questions to the
effect of are we being fired? Are we going to have a job? And I reaffirmed multiple times that I
wanted everybody in the room to continue to work with Raymond, that nobody was being fired,
that we had put a situation in place where it was better benefits wages for all employees and
encouraged them to take that option and continue to work for Raymond but no one was being
fired and everyone had a job.” According to Winsor, given his audience, he did not mention the
words “union security clause” as the term was “not well understood” by them, but he stressed
that no worker would be fired, that they all would continue in their jobs, but that “. . . I would like
you to make a decision that’s in your best interests . . . .” Asked if any employees asked if they
had to make a decision that day, Winsor replied “people did ask whether or not they had to
make a decision that day” about “whether or not they needed to enroll for the benefits afforded
by the Carpenters.” Moments later, after being asked by me whether the employees were
specific as to about what they needed to make a decision, Winsor changed his testimony,
averring “I can’t speak as to what they were specific about” and stating “I was asked whether or
not they needed to make a decision today.” To this, he replied, “No. They could take the time to
consider it” but he wanted the employees to protect themselves from the possibility of “any fines
or penalties” imposed by the Painters Union. Asked by me what subject he and his employees
were talking about, Winsor replied that the Carpenters Union representatives were standing
next to him, and “they were asking for the employees to enroll in the various [health insurance
and pension plan packages].” Winsor maintained that he was referring to a “stack of
paperwork,” and, while “. . . I did not review or examine any of the documents being handed out
by the Carpenters,” the papers appeared, to him, to be “pension and health and welfare
benefits” documents. He denied he was referring to membership forms-- “I did not see that.”
Winsor denied that his PowerPoint presentation had anything to do with membership and
asserted that the “entire essence of the meeting” concerned the Carpenters Union benefits
plans. However, he added that “. . . there were questions about our obligations under the
Carpenters agreement and after affirming that we want all of these employees to continue
working for Raymond, it was pointed out that it was their decision. It was voluntary, however, if
they chose not to go back to work, then Raymond would be obligated under the existing
contract to put employees out there from the Carpenters’ hall . . . .” He added that, while there
were questions about union membership, such were in reference to whether or not employees
could hold card in both the Painters Union and the Carpenters Union, and “. . . I said . . . they
need to enroll for the Carpenters’ benefits because . . . that is the way Raymond is providing the
benefits.” Then, according to Winsor, came the general questions about whether they had to
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decide today to which he replied, “No. You do not need to decide today.”40 Finally, during his
direct examination, Winsor admitted that, at the conclusion of the meeting, he did approach
Richard Myers, and . . . I acknowledged his demeanor and asked him if there’s any questions
that I could answer for him. . . . I believe he made statements that I’m not signing and something
about the fact he didn’t like the way the meeting was held. Winsor denied asking if Myers had
signed with the Carpenters.
During cross-examination, Winsor stated that the drywall finishing employees were paid
for attending the October 2 meeting pursuant to the terms of the existing Carpenters Union
master agreement. With regard to Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit No. 1, he maintained that “I
did not discuss this specific memorandum with [the employees],” but “the information contained
in it was provided verbally through my PowerPoint presentation.” Asked by counsel for the
General Counsel whether there was anything in the document which he did not discuss that
day with the employees, Winsor replied, “No.” Asked by counsel for the Painters Union if he
told employees they did not have to become members of the Carpenters Union, Winsor replied,
“I told them that they had time to make up their minds . . . ,” but he admitted not telling them
they had seven days in which to do so.41 Under further questioning by counsel for the Painters
Union, Winsor admitted that he did reference the union security provision of the existing
Carpenters Union master agreement but denied explaining what it meant. Likewise, he
acknowledged referring to the first sentence of the penultimate paragraph of Respondent
Raymond’s Exhibit No. 1; however, “I did not discuss it during my presentation.” Specifically, he
denied conveying any information regarding the contractual union-security provision during his
presentation. When asked what provisions of Respondent Raymond’s Exhibit No. 1 he did
discuss in detail, Winsor said he conveyed that the company had terminated its collective-
bargaining agreement with the Painters Union, that such was a “difficult” decision but one made
“in the best interests of the employees and the company, that the company continued to be a
union contractor, that, pursuant to Respondent Raymond’s existing agreement with the
Carpenters Union, all drywall finishing work was covered under the terms of said agreement,
that said collective-bargaining agreement provides for higher wages and better benefits, and
that “drywall finishing employees who were not presently members of the Carpenters must join
the Carpenters Union under the union security provision of the [CBA]. I conveyed that we would
be obligated to dispatch employees [from] the Carpenters hall according to our agreement.”
Once again, asked if he, therefore, conveyed all the information in Respondent Raymond’s
Exhibit No. 1 as written except for the first sentence of the penultimate paragraph, Winsor
responded “I did not use the term union security provision. The employees would not know
necessarily.” As to whether he mentioned the remainder of the sentence, “I conveyed what is
stated there.”
Hector Zorrero testified that he spoke “at the very end” of the meeting, initially thanking
the employees for attending and for politely listening to Winsor and the Carpenters Union
representatives. He said both Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters are “class
acts;” that he “. . . couldn’t stand up here before them without assurance from [the company]
that no one would suffer any type of loss in pay or benefits . . . . that, effective today all of their
contributions were going to be paid into the Carpenters’ plan and [he] encouraged them to
[examine all of the information which they would receive from the Carpenters].” Zorrero “. . .

40 Winsor said he emphasized this as “I wanted to reinforce the ‘what’s-in-it-for-me’
consideration as I anticipated everyone in that room was sitting there and thinking . . . .”
41 Winsor believed he did tell someone he had eight days in which to decide but “I don’t
recall” who and said he did so “usually in conjunction with this decision in order to help them
understand what their rights are.”
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concluded by saying tomorrow Raymond is still obligated to man our jobs and if no one in this
room shows up on our jobsites that they’re no longer signatory with the Painters and I would
have to man . . . our drywall finishers through the Carpenters.” With regard to the question and
answer session, Zorrero denied telling the employees that, in order to continue working for
Respondent Raymond, they had to sign up with the Carpenters Union or that they had to sign at
that moment or that day or they couldn’t work for Respondent Raymond. However, while
essentially corroborating Winsor’s denials, Zorrero contradicted Winsor, denying any employee
asked whether employees had to make a decision that day concerning anything. Further, while
denying that Winsor warned about employees having to sign up for anything, he did believe
that, during the meeting, a Carpenters Union representative spoke about the importance of
employees signing up for benefits-- “. . .I think it was that they had to sign up . . . if they wanted
the benefits they would have to sign that day . . . so they’d be paid into the Carpenters.” Finally,
Zorrero denied that, at any point during the meeting, he or any other manager met in private
with the foremen of the drywall finishers and stated that the meeting ended with the drywall
finishers going into the warehouse area,42 which was set up with Carpenters’ fringe benefits
information on tables-- employees either went into that area or “. . . just went outside and hung
outside for a little of the time.”
Pedro Loera, a special representative for the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters,
testified that he attended the October 2 meeting at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility in
order to answer questions posed by any of the Spanish-speaking drywall finishers, who were
employed by Respondent Raymond. According to Loera, “I was on my own speaking to [the
employees]” in the warehouse area and outside in the yard area after the employees left the
meeting room. While also recalling the documents were on a table, he remembered that “some”
of those to whom he spoke were filling out the membership application forms but was unable to
remember if said documents were distributed by other Carpenters Union representatives. Loera
denied telling any employee, to whom he spoke, he or she needed to make an immediate
decision regarding joining the Carpenters Union or telling any employee he or she needed to
join the Carpenters Union that day in order to continue working for Respondent Raymond.
Gordon Hubel testified that he was involved in the October 2 meeting “only to the extent
that they had the Carpenters Union magazine, which contained the so-called Beck notice, at the
union’s table.”43 With regard to the meeting itself, Hubel recalled that Winsor spoke first,
utilizing a PowerPoint presentation. Asked if Winsor warned that, if employees did not sign with
the Carpenters, they wouldn’t have a job or they couldn’t work the following day, Hubel replied,
“No. To the contrary, he said specifically that no one was being fired.” Asked if Winsor was
asked for more time to consider switching to the Carpenters Union, Hubel contradicted Winsor
and responded that there was a question about having to decide that day, and Winsor replied “.
. . no, you don’t have to make a decision today but you should sign up for benefits today.”
According to Hubel, during his remarks to the employees, McCarron did talk about “. . . our
partnership with Raymond and he hoped that all of the people would join the Carpenters Union,”
but this was the only comment made about joining the union during the “whole” presentation.44
As to Hector Zorrero, Hubel denied that the former said employees had to decide that day or at
that moment about joining the Carpenters Union, and “the only thing he said was that we have
to man our jobs tomorrow and, if you employees . . . choose to leave Raymond, we’ll have to

42 Zorrero said this was the room in which employees were supposed to execute any forms
43 One table was for Respondent Carpenters and the other table was utilized by
representatives of the Carpenters Union trust funds.
44 Hubel denied hearing any representative of the Carpenters Union tell employees they
needed to join that day or they could no longer work for Raymond.
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call the Carpenters Union to man the jobs.” When the meeting ended, Hubel testified,
employees congregated into small groups inside the warehouse area and outside, and three
employees approached him and “. . . specifically asked me do we have to join the Carpenters
today, and . . . I told them no. I said the Carpenters agreement does have a union security-
clause within eight days you’d have to join, but you don’t have to decide today.” Hubel denied
telling the employees that the Carpenters Union would not enforce the union security clause and
did not know whether the latter would, in fact, enforce the clause. Finally, Hubel testified that
employees were completing all of the paperwork “in different areas” of the facility but that “there
was nothing being distributed by the Carpenters Union anywhere except in the warehouse at
this table.”45
Melinda Carlton, an office administrative assistant for Respondent Carpenters, testified
that she attended the October 2 meeting in order “to have the employees fill out the
membership applications to join Respondent Carpenters.” According to her, tables were set up
along the wall adjacent to the gym and storage areas, and, “after the presentation, [the
employees] were sent to the table where we had the membership applications for them to fill
out.” She sat at the table along with another clerical, Margaret Armenta, who was able to speak
Spanish. Besides the membership application forms, General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3, at the
table were pencils, stickers, envelopes, and a stack of “the Carpenters magazine.”46 According
to Carlton, “once they brought us back the membership application, we handed them the
magazine,47 stickers . . . and the envelope,” which was to be used for “their dues payment.”
According to Carlton, Armenta dealt with more than half of the employees, who came to
Respondent Carpenters table, speaking Spanish. Because there were so many employees
coming to her table, the Carpenters Union agents, who were at the meeting, spoke to some of
them. However, Carlton denied seeing these representatives giving out membership forms
during the meeting and knew this was not possible as “. . . Margaret and myself were the only
ones that had the membership applications. They had to come to us to get them. After
employees signed, “I was in charge of collecting all of the applications along with the
apprenticeship paperwork and taking them back to the office . . . . We had a list that we checked
off when they brought us back the application.”48 When asked if her testimony was if returned
signed and returned unsigned application forms were added together, the total equaled the

45 The individual, who translated from English to Spanish for the listening employees, was
David Cordero. For this, he did both contemporaneous and subsequent translation. He denied
anything being said about having to join the Carpenters Union that day. Testifying that there
was a question and answer session after the formal presentations, Cordero was unable to recall
anything “specific;” however, “I don’t recall anybody asking a question about joining the Union
that time.” He added that such did not seem to be a major concern; rather, most of the
employees’ questions concerned benefits and insurance. While, according to Cordero, there
were questions “about being part of the Carpenters per se,” employees were told there was a
“form” which they needed to fill out. However, he denied employees were told they had to sign
anything that day or there would be no work. Specifically, he denied Winsor uttered such a
remark.
46 Upon publication on a quarterly basis, the magazine is mailed to every Carpenters Union
member.
47 The magazine is given to all new members as “. . . we are letting them know that they will
be receiving this in the mail. . . .” Carlton admitted not being instructed to direct anyone’s
attention to the Beck statement, contained in the magazine on page 47.
48 Carlton maintained that there was “a set amount of applications,” and she received back
the same number she handed out. All were returned, even the forms, which had not been filled
out.
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exact number she and Armenta distributed that day, Carlton replied, “I did not count them at the
end . . . . we had a set number of forms. I did not have an extra stack that someone could have
taken from because I only had a certain amount to hand out.” She conceded it was possible
employees, to whom she handed forms, failed to return them. During cross-examination,
Carlton confirmed that she would not give out a magazine unless an employee returned signed
paperwork.
Finally, there is no dispute that, later on October 2 at Respondent Raymond’s San Diego
facility, on behalf of the latter, Travis Winsor executed a document, entitled Recognition
Agreement, recognizing the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated
local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the majority representative, pursuant to
Section 9(a) of the Act, of all full-time and regular part-time employees performing work covered
by the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters Drywall/Lathing Memorandum Agreement.49
In this regard, Gordon Hubel testified that, during the time he was at Respondent Raymond’s
Orange facility on October 2, he was aware that the Carpenters Union agents were soliciting the
company’s drywall finishing employees to execute the authorization cards, which are part of
General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3, and that Winsor was not informed of these activities. Also in
this regard, Winsor testified that, later in the day at approximately 5:00p.m. at the close of the
meeting at the company’s San Diego facility, McCarron and his attorney, Dan Shanley,
approached and McCarron “. . . informed me that they had received representation from the
majority of our employees of their decision to have the Carpenters be their representative and
that he was prepared to present evidence of that decision at which time I was shown a stack of
papers,” the authorization cards which had been attached to General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3.
According to Winsor, he had no idea that Carpenters Union agents had been soliciting the
cards, and, after looking through the documents, he acknowledged McCarron’s representation
that the signatures were authentic and executed the recognition agreement. On this point, in his
December 18, 2006 position statement to Region 21, Respondent Raymond’s attorney wrote,
“Carpenters later presented signed authorization cards to Raymond and on the basis of those
cards, Raymond signed an additional voluntary recognition agreement . . . recognizing that
union as the exclusive representative of Raymond’s drywall finishing and drywall hanging
employees.”50
B. Legal Analysis
The twin centerpieces of the instant consolidated complaint concern Respondent
Raymond’s attempts to recognize Respondent Carpenters as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its drywall finishing employees initially by virtue of the language of the
Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement and subsequently by virtue of a purported
majority showing by Respondent Carpenters and Respondent Carpenters acceptance of said
recognition attempts. At the outset, I shall consider whether, on or about October 1, 2006,
Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) and
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, by extending recognition to the Southwest Regional Council
of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, of
its drywall finishing employees and maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006-2010

49 Notwithstanding the wording of the document, as stated above, there is no record
evidence that Respondent Raymond ever actually entered into the Carpenters Union’s so-called
Memorandum Agreement.
50 Hubel testified that the only authorization cards, which were solicited that day, were
signed by Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees.
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master agreement as covering said employees and whether Respondent Carpenters engaged
in acts and conduct, violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, by obtaining
such recognition from Respondent Raymond and maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters
Union 2006-2010 master agreement as covering Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing
employees. In these regards, there is no dispute that, by virtue of their September 12, 2006
confidential settlement agreement, on or about October 1, immediately upon expiration of its
collective-bargaining agreement, privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, with the Painters Union,51
Respondent Raymond and the Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, on behalf of its
affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, commenced covering the former’s
drywall finishing employees under the existing Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement,
which recognizes the Carpenters Union as the Section 9(a) majority representative of the
bargaining unit employees and to which Respondent Raymond is a party. Thus, counsel for
Respondent Raymond in his December 18, 2006 position statement to the Board, admitted that,
as the parties’ existing master agreement covered drywall finishing work, “on October 2 . . .
pursuant to its Section 9(a) collective bargaining agreement with the Carpenters . . . Raymond
complied with the requirements of that agreement and assigned the drywall finishing work to
Carpenters,” with the latter acting “. . . as the Section 9(a) representative of its drywall
employees (both hangers and finishers).” Likewise, at the hearing, Gordon Hubel conceded
that, as of October 1, the “overall unit” of Respondent Raymond’s drywall employees included
both drywall hangers and drywall finishers. Counsel for the General Counsel, joined by counsel
for the Painters Union, argues that, in these circumstances, Respondent Raymond and
Respondent Carpenters clearly considered the former’s drywall finishing employees as having
been accreted into the contractual wall-to-wall Carpenters’ Section 9(a) bargaining unit and that
as Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees had been historically excluded from the
bargaining unit, represented by the Carpenters Union, and as, demonstrated by the drywall
finishing employees’ long bargaining history as an independent bargaining unit, the only
appropriate unit herein is, therefore, not a wall-to-wall bargaining unit, accretion herein was
unlawful; for, by their actions, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters deprived the
former’s drywall finishing employees of their statutory right to select the bargaining
representative of their choice.
I agree that the concessions by Respondent Raymond’s attorney and by Hubel, who
practiced as an attorney in the field of labor law, seemingly describe an accretion. Pursuant to
applicable Board law, accretion is the “. . . incorporation of employees into an already existing
larger unit when such a community of interests exists among the entire group that the additional
employees have no separate unit identity. Thus, they are properly governed by the larger
group’s choice of bargaining representative.” Reliable Trailer & Body, 295 NLRB 1013 (1989),
quoting NLRB v. Security Columbian Banknote Co., 541 F.2d 135, 140 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Essentially, the act of accretion is designed to preserve industrial stability by allowing
adjustments to bargaining units without requiring representation elections whenever new jobs
are created or incorporated into the workforce. Brooklyn Hospital Center, 309 NLRB 1163,
1182 (1992). However, the Board has traditionally followed a “restrictive policy” in determining
accretions to existing units as “. . . employees accreted to such units are not accorded a self-

51 Section 8(f) of the Act permits labor organizations and employers in the building and
construction industry to enter into collective-bargaining agreements without the former being
established as the majority representative of the employees in the covered bargaining unit.
Unlike a bargaining relationship within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, a Section 8(f)
relationship may be terminated by either the labor organization or the employer at the expiration
of a collective-bargaining agreement. John Decklewa & Sons, 265 NLRB 1375, 1386-87
(1987), enfd. 843 F.2d 770 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert denied 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
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determination election, and the Board seeks to insure the employees’ right to determine their
own bargaining representative.” Passavant Retirement & Health Center, 313 NLRB 1216, 1218
(1994). Therefore, “. . . previously unrepresented employees may not be lawfully accreted to an
existing bargaining unit where “. . . the group sought to be accreted . . . . has been in existence
and historically excluded” from the larger unit and “. . . where the employee group sought to be
[accreted] . . . is so composed that it may separately constitute an appropriate bargaining unit.”
Teamsters Local 89 (United Parcel Service), 346 NLRB 484 at 484 (2006); Passavant
Retirement & Health Center, supra. In such circumstances, whenever the parties to an existing
collective-bargaining agreement attempt to include previously unrepresented employees within
the existing contractual bargaining unit without an “expression of the desire of the majority of
said employees to be so represented,” a violation of the Act must be found. Teamsters Local
89, supra. Further, “it is the fact of historical exclusion that is determinative and not whether the
union has acquiesced in that exclusion or whether the excluded group has some common job-
related characteristic distinct from unit employees. United Parcel Service, 303 NLRB 326, 327
(1991). In the cited cases involving unlawful accretion, by granting recognition to a labor
organization as the representative of the previously unrepresented employees, the offending
employer violates Sections 8(a)(1) and (2) and 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, and, by accepting
exclusive recognition as the representative of the previously unrepresented employees, the
offending labor organization violates Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act. Finally, unlawful
accretion only exists in the context of a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship, and, as a finding of
majority status is immaterial, such does not apply in the context of a Section 8(f) contract. IBEC
Housing Corp., 245 NLRB 1282 at 128 (1979).
In agreement with counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Painters Union, I
find that the General Counsel has established that Respondent Raymond and Respondent
Carpenters acted unlawfully. At the outset, the language of the Carpenters Union 2006-2010
master agreement clearly meets the requirements prerequisite for a Section 9(a) bargaining
relationship between the contracting parties as set forth by the Board in Staunton Fuel &
Material, 335 NLRB 717 (2001).52 Thus, the voluntary recognition agreement provision of the
Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement recites the Carpenters Union’s demand for
recognition, upon each contracting employer, including Respondent Raymond, as the majority
representative of the bargaining unit employees; the Carpenters Union’s show of, or offer to
show, proof of its majority support amongst the employees covered by the collective-bargaining
agreement; and each contracting employer’s, including Respondent Raymond, grant of
recognition to the Carpenters Union as “the sole and exclusive” bargaining representative of its
bargaining unit employee within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. Id. at 720. Moreover,
the provision of the September 12 confidential settlement agreement, wherein Respondent
Raymond agreed that, at the expiration of the Painters Union collective-bargaining agreement, it
would apply the existing Carpenters Union master agreement to its drywall finishing employees

52 Therein, the Board decided how a labor organization, whose status as a bargaining
representative is privileged by Section 8(f) of the Act, may acquire, through agreement with the
employer, the status of a majority bargaining representative within the meaning of Section 9(a)
of the Act. It stated that “a recognition agreement or contract provision will be independently
sufficient to establish a Section 9(a) representation status where the language unequivocally
indicates that (1) the union requested recognition as the majority or 9(a) representative of the
unit employees; (2) the employer recognized the union as the majority or 9(a) representative;
and (3) the employer’s recognition was based upon the union’s having shown, or having offered
to show, evidence of its majority support.” Id. at 719-720.
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“to the fullest extent permitted by law”53 and the admissions of Respondent Raymond’s attorney
and of Gordon Hubel are demonstrative of the parties’ intent to establish a Section 9(a)
bargaining relationship, encompassing a unit of Respondent Raymond’s drywall framing and
drywall finishing employees, immediately upon expiration of Respondent Raymond’s collective-
bargaining agreement with the Painters Union. Indeed, such must be the case as, given the
legal training of the principals of each contracting party, they most certainly would have been
aware of the possibility of a representation petition, filed by the Painters Union, and the resultant
legal consequences and that only a collective-bargaining agreement with a Section 9(a)
representative would bar such a petition. Decklewa, supra, at 1387. In these circumstances,
absent the filing of a representation petition and subsequent certification, I believe that the only
method by which Respondent Raymond and Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters, on
behalf of its affiliated local Unions, including Respondent Carpenters, could have assured the
latter’s majority representative status for Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, a
historically separate appropriate unit,54 was through the process of accretion, and that,
therefore, it is manifestly certain that the parties meant to accrete Respondent Raymond’s
existing drywall finishing employees bargaining unit to the existing Carpenters Union master
agreement’s bargaining unit, which ostensibly covers employees, who perform drywall finishing
work. However, since, at least the 1960’s, given the drywall finishing employees’ status as an
historical separate appropriate bargaining unit, clearly, a wall-to-wall unit, comprised of drywall
framers and drywall finishers, is not the only appropriate unit herein, and the record evidence
establishes that Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters had historically excluded
the former’s drywall finishing employees from their master agreement bargaining unit.55
Accordingly, I think that the parties attempted accretion of Respondent Raymond’s drywall
finishing employees to the existing Carpenters Union master agreement bargaining unit was
unlawful, and it follows that Respondent Raymond’s recognition of Respondent Carpenters as
the majority representative of the former’s drywall finishing employees and Respondent
Carpenters’ acceptance of such recognition must have been violative of the Act. Teamsters
Local 89, supra; Brooklyn Hospital Center, supra.
Contrary to the General Counsel, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters
contend that the former’s extension of recognition to the latter on or about October 1, 2006 was
lawful. Initially, counsel for Respondent Raymond argue that, even if the parties meant to
accrete the drywall finishing employees to the overall Carpenters Union bargaining unit, said act
was not unlawful. Citing Central Soya Co., 281 NLRB 1308 (1986), counsel assert that “. . . the

53 In my view, in the context of the earlier warning from Hubel to Winsor with regard to
coverage of the drywall finishing employees at the expiration of the Painters Union collective-
bargaining agreement, the quoted language can only refer to a Section 9(a) relationship, and
any ambiguity, in this regard, must be resolved against each Respondent.
54 While in their answers, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters deny that a
bargaining unit limited to the former’s drywall finishing employees constitutes an appropriate unit
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, neither offered any evidence to establish that said
historical unit was no longer appropriate. Each, of course, had the burden of proof in this
regard. Paramus Ford, 351 NLRB No. 53 (2007). In these circumstances, I reject the
Respondents’ contention and find that a unit of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing
employees constituted a historically separate and appropriate unit within the meaning of Section
9(a) of the Act.
55 In this regard, I note that drywall finishing employees have only recently been included in
the Carpenters Union master agreement’s bargaining unit and, even after said employees were
included, they had been specifically excluded whenever a contracting employer, such as
Respondent Raymond, had an existing bargaining relationship with the Painters Union.
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Board will find an accretion where the employees in the represented group outnumber the
employees in the unrepresented group.” However, unlike the situation herein, Central Soya
involved an employer, whose employees were represented by a union, purchasing another
company, whose bargaining unit employees were unrepresented, and then consolidating the
two business operations at the location of the latter enterprise with no substantial change in
operations. The crucial factor herein, one not present in the cited decision, is the parties’
“historical exclusion” of drywall finishing employees from Respondent Raymond’s carpenters
bargaining unit, and, as pointed out above, said factor is, of course, paramount in alleged
unlawful accretion situations. United Parcel Service, supra, at 327.
The crux of Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’ defense is that, as of
October 1, 2006, Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees were covered by a pre-
existing Section 8(f) collective-bargaining agreement, between the parties-- either the existing
Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement and/or the parties’ September 12 confidential
settlement agreement.56 With regard to coverage under the former agreement, relying upon
Western Pipeline, Inc., 328 NLRB 925, 927 (1999) and Decklewa, supra, at 1385, n. 41, counsel
for Respondent Raymond and counsel for the Carpenters argue that “the drywall finishing
employees were a separate bargaining unit and, in the construction industry, the Board
presumes that a bargaining relationship is a non-majority Section 8(f) relationship.”57
Recognizing that this presumption is only valid absent evidence to the contrary and noting the
existence of language in the master agreement, which satisfies the Staunton Fuel test for the
existence of a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship, counsel for Respondent Raymond
nevertheless argue such does not mean that the contracting parties intended such a bargaining
relationship with respect to the “separate unit” of drywall finishing employees and assert “an
analysis of the parties’ intent limited solely to the [Staunton Fuel language] would be
inappropriate and in error.” In this regard, citing Madison Industries, Inc., 349 NLRB No. 114
(2007), counsel argue that “whether the parties intended a Section 9(a) relationship vis-à-vis the
drywall finishing employees requires an examination of the parties’ entire agreement.”
However, counsels’ assertion that the parties were concerned with a separate unit consisting of
Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees is belied by the record evidence, and their
reliance upon the cited decision is misplaced. Thus, the Carpenters Union representative Hubel
told Travis Winsor during bargaining for the 2002-2006 master agreement that the language,
excluding drywall finishers from the contract bargaining unit, became void immediately upon a
signatory contractor terminating his bargaining relationship with the Painters Union. Also,
Respondent Raymond’s attorney admitted that, as of October 2, 2006, “. . . Raymond already

56 Counsel for Respondent Carpenters argues that the General Counsel’s consolidated
complaint allegations with regard to the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement are
time-barred by Section 10(b) of the Act inasmuch as they were filed more than six months after
the execution of said document. Counsel’s contentions seem to be based upon her perception
of the consolidated complaint as attacking the validity of the Section 9(a) character of the
agreement. Contrary to counsel, the General Counsel neither argues nor seeks a finding that
the master agreement is not what it appears to be-- a collective-bargaining agreement within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. Rather, it appears that, notwithstanding the recognition
language of the master agreement, the General Counsel is only attacking the validity of
Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’ attempt to bring the former’s drywall
finishing employees within the coverage of the master agreement. Accordingly, I reject
counsel’s contention that the above consolidated complaint allegations are time-barred by
Section 10(b) of the Act.
57 Said presumption is a rebuttable one with the Board challenging “. . . the party asserting a
Section 9(a) relationship to prove it.” Decklewa, supra.
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recognized Carpenters as the Section 9(a) representative of its drywall employees (both
hangers and finishers),” and Hubel confirmed that his labor organization likewise intended to
assert such status in one overall Carpenters unit. Further, unlike the Carpenters Union 2006-
2010 master agreement, which specifies recognition of the labor organization as the exclusive
bargaining representative pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act,58 the contractual recognition
clause, at issue in Madison Industries, failed to specify that the employer recognized the union
pursuant to Section 9(a) of the Act, and it was this lack of such specificity that caused the Board
to examine the entire agreement in order to ascertain the intent of the parties— a task
unnecessary herein. Moreover, to the extent such may be necessary, as noted above, extrinsic
evidence reveals that the parties herein meant to establish a Section 9(a) bargaining
relationship covering one overall carpenters bargaining unit.
Nevertheless, continuing to expound upon their illusory separate bargaining unit
contention and coverage for said unit pursuant to Section 8(f) of the Act, counsel for
Respondent Raymond and counsel for Respondent Carpenters argue that, inasmuch as the
Board, in Decklewa, supra, rejected the so-called merger doctrine, under which an employer’s
separate bargaining unit was deemed to have become merged into a multi-employer bargaining
association’s Section 9(a) bargaining unit, such “. . . can only mean that coverage of the
separate unit of Raymond’s drywall finishing employees did not merge those employees into the
larger Carpenters’ represented framing and hanging bargaining unit . . . .” Therefore, they
argue that Respondent Carpenter’s representation of the drywall finishing employees bargaining
unit must have been on a Section 8(f) basis and that the Board’s decision in Comtel Systems
Technology, Inc., 305 NLRB 287 (1991) is dispositive on this point. In the cited decision, a
representation matter, the question presented by the Board was “. . . whether, in the
construction industry, [a Section 9(a) collective-bargaining agreement] will bar an election in a
unit consisting of the employees of an individual employer-member of a multi-employer
association if it is not established that a majority of the employees in the classifications covered
by the agreement had expressed a desire for union representation at the time recognition was
extended by the multi-employer association.” Id at 288. Therein, a construction industry
electrical contractor was a member of the multi-employer association but failed to signify its
assent to be bound by the association’s collective-bargaining agreement with the involved labor
organization until after the former had extended recognition to the latter as the majority Section
9(a) bargaining representative of the employees in the multi-employer bargaining unit and after
the ratification of a collective-bargaining agreement between the parties. Further, at no point
prior to receiving recognition as the Section 9(a) bargaining representative did the labor
organization establish that it represented a majority of the employer’s employees, who were
working in the bargaining unit job classifications. In these circumstances, the Board held, the
employer’s relationship with the labor organization was a Section 8(f) relationship and if a labor
organization desires to achieve status as a Section 9(a) bargaining representative of employees
in a multi-employer association, “. . . it must have the manifest support of a majority of the
employees of any individual employer whose employees it seeks to merge into the unit under a
Section 9(a) agreement.” Id at 291. From the foregoing, counsel for Respondent Raymond and
counsel for Respondent Carpenters extrapolate that, when Respondent Raymond’s collective-
bargaining agreement with the Painters Union expired, until Respondent Carpenters established
its majority status as the representative of Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees,
the parties’ existing 2006-2010 master agreement covered said employees on a Section 8(f)
basis.

58 Such wording is “independently sufficient” to establish Section 9(a) status. Staunton Fuel,
supra, at 720.
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Pursuant to Comtel, when a building and construction industry employer joins a multi-
employer bargaining association after a labor organization has been recognized as the Section
9(a) bargaining representative of the employees in the multi-employer bargaining unit but prior
to having achieved majority status amongst the new employer’s bargaining unit employees, a
Section 8(f) bargaining relationship exists between the employer and the labor organization until
such time as the latter establishes its majority status amongst the employer’s bargaining unit
employees. Contrary to counsel for each Respondent, I do not believe that Comtel has any
broader meaning, and neither counsel has cited any contrary Board case authority. Indeed, the
instant matter is factually distinguishable from Comtel. Thus, unlike in the cited decision,
Respondent Raymond is not seeking to join a multi-employer association, Respondent
Raymond and Respondent Carpenters have an extant Section 9(a) bargaining relationship
memorialized in successive collective-bargaining agreements, including the existing Carpenters
Union 2006-2010 master agreement, and Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees
represent an historically separate bargaining unit. In my view, the contentions of counsel for
Respondent Raymond and counsel for Respondent Carpenters appear to distort Comtel to
mean that, in the building and construction industry, the same collective-bargaining agreement
may establish a Section 8(f) bargaining relationship for one bargaining unit and a Section 9(a)
bargaining relationship for another bargaining unit. While, apparently under Comtel, in a multi-
employer context, a collective-bargaining agreement may be considered to be a Section 8(f)
privileged agreement until the labor organization establishes its Section 9(a) representative
status in the bargaining unit job classifications, it appears axiomatic that the single employer’s
bargaining unit job classifications must be the same as those of the multi-employer bargaining
unit. Further, there exists no language in Comtel, suggesting that the agreement may also
constitute a Section 8(f) agreement, covering a completely separate bargaining unit, and neither
counsel for Respondent Raymond nor counsel for Respondent Carpenters has cited any case
authority for a contrary view of the law. Perhaps recognizing this, counsel for Respondent
Carpenters argues that requiring the parties to have drafted a separate collective-bargaining
agreement, setting forth the identical terms and conditions of employment but describing the
bargaining unit and governing provision of the Act differently, would have elevated form over
substance and would not have effectuated the intent of the parties. While in a different context,
one not involving a historically separate bargaining unit, I might view counsel’s argument in a
more favorable light, given the admission of Respondent Raymond’s attorney that the parties
intended to establish a Section 9(a) relationship covering the drywall finishing employees, I
agree with counsel for the General Counsel that giving credence to Respondents’ belated
defense would allow them to escape the consequences of a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship
after they have been permitted to enjoy the benefits of said status. Moreover, contrary to
counsel for Respondent Carpenters, I do not believe ensuring industrial stability trumps the
drywall finishing employees’ Section 7 right to choose their own bargaining representative.
Finally, counsel for Respondent Carpenters argues the fact that her client solicited authorization
cards from Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees and then entered into a
separate recognition agreement with the latter demonstrates that the parties had intended a
Section 8(f) bargaining relationship immediately following Respondent Raymond’s termination of
its contract with the Painters Union. However, said contention is rendered utterly nugatory by
Gordon Hubel’s admission that Respondent Carpenters solicited authorization cards herein
solely to buttress its legal argument that, upon expiration of Respondent Raymond’s contract
with the Painters Union, a valid Section 9(a) bargaining unit existed, encompassing all of the
former’s drywall employees, including the finishers.
Turning to the second aspect of Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’
defense, counsel for each asserts that, assuming the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master
agreement was not a valid Section 8(f) pre-hire agreement, to the extent that a separate
collective-bargaining agreement, between the parties, was necessary to create a Section 8(f)
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bargaining relationship, the parties considered their September 12, 2006 confidential settlement
agreement to have been such a collective-bargaining agreement, covering Respondent
Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, since it incorporated the terms and conditions of
employment set forth in the above master agreement. At the outset, contrary to counsel, I have
previously concluded that, by the phrase “to the fullest extent permitted by law,” the parties
clearly signified their intent to establish a Section 9(a) bargaining relationship covering the
drywall finishing employees, and the collective-bargaining agreements, to which Respondent
Raymond agreed to bind itself, are Section 9(a) agreements. Next, I do not accept that the
September 12 document may be viewed as constituting a collective-bargaining agreement.
Initially, I note that, while not dispositive, rather than bearing any title commensurate with
collective-bargaining agreement, the document is entitled Confidential Settlement Agreement.
Further, nothing in the document’s preamble suggests the parties intended to create a
collective-bargaining agreement or even meant to establish terms and conditions of
employment; rather, the language therein describes their intent to settle disputes and
grievances, which had arisen between them. Next, while in Madelaine Chocolate Novelties,
Inc., 333 NLRB 1312 at 1312 (2001), the Board concluded, in a “contract-bar” context, that to
be considered a collective-bargaining agreement, a document “. . . must contain substantial
terms and conditions of employment deemed sufficient to stabilize the bargaining relationship,”
there is no record evidence herein that the parties intended their settlement agreement to
constitute a collective-bargaining agreement,59 the term bargaining unit is not mentioned, and
the document bears no expiration date. Moreover, the document apparently binds Respondent
to two separate and different collective-bargaining agreements-- the Carpenters Union
memorandum agreement, which Respondent Raymond agreed to execute, and the existing
Carpenters Union master agreement, which Respondent Raymond agreed to abide by upon
expiration of its existing Painters Agreement. Also, in the second numbered paragraph, the
reference to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees is tenebrous-- did the parties
refer to said employees as a separate bargaining unit or as, I believe, included in the overall
carpenters-represented unit of the existing master agreement? Finally, as counsel for the
Painters Union persuasively argues, if, as argued, the parties did enter into a collective-
bargaining agreement via the confidential settlement agreement, such would have been an
unlawful act. Thus, pursuant to Decklewa, supra, a collective-bargaining agreement, privileged
by Section 8(f) of the Act, is enforceable under Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act during its term,
and a labor organization, which enters into such a contract with an employer, enjoys a limited
Section 9(a) status during the duration of the said agreement. Gem Management Co., 339
NLRB 489, 501 (2003). Further, an employer engages in acts and conduct, violative of Section
8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act, if, during the term of such an agreement, it unlawfully offers
assistance to another labor organization in contravention of its existing bargaining relationship.
Id. Specifically, in Oil Field Maintenance Co., Inc., 142 NLRB 1384, 1386 (1963), the Board
held that contracting with a labor organization while bound to maintain recognition of another
during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement “falls outside the purpose and protection of
Section 8(f).” Herein, there is no dispute that Respondent Raymond’s collective-bargaining
agreement with the Painters Union was not due to expire until September 30, 2006.
Accordingly, if as argued, by entering into their September 12, 2006 confidential settlement
agreement Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters actually entered into a Section
8(f) pre-hire collective-bargaining agreement, such would have constituted an unfair labor

59 Counsel for Respondent Raymond cite to the Board’s decision in Carthage Sheet Metal
Co., 286 NLRB 1249 for the proposition that an employer may be held bound to a Section 8(f)
agreement pursuant to the terms of a settlement agreement. However, from the record therein,
although unclear, it does not appear that the settlement agreement and purported Section 8(f)
agreement were the same document.
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practice, and the putative collective-bargaining agreement would have been unlawful as would
have been Respondent Raymond’s recognition of Respondent Carpenters as the bargaining
representative of its drywall finishing employees and the latter’s acceptance of such recognition.
In the above circumstances, I reject Respondent Raymond’s and Respondent
Carpenters’ defenses that either their existing 2006-2010 master agreement or their
September 12, 2006 confidential settlement agreement was a valid Section 8(f) of the Act
privileged collective-bargaining agreement covering Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing
employees. Therefore, I find that, on or about October 1, 2006, in the context of a Section 9(a)
bargaining relationship, Respondent Raymond unlawfully recognized Respondent Carpenters
as the majority representative of its drywall finishing employees and Respondent Carpenters
unlawfully accepted such recognition, and Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters
unlawfully enforced and applied their existing 2006-2010 master agreement as to the former’s
drywall finishing employees, who constituted a historically separate appropriate unit, by
accreting said employees to the existing carpenters bargaining unit. By their actions, each
Respondent deprived Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees of their statutory
right to select their own bargaining representative. Accordingly, Respondent Raymond engaged
in acts and conduct violative of Section8(a)(1) and (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act and
Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and
8(b)(2) of the Act. Teamsters Local 89, supra; Brooklyn Hospital Center, supra.
The consolidated complaint next alleges that Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act and that Respondent Carpenters engaged
in acts and conduct violative of Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by subjecting the
former’s drywall finishing employees to the union security provision of the Carpenters Union
2006-2010 master agreement. I have found that, upon expiration of its collective-bargaining
agreement with the Painters Union, pursuant to the terms of their September 12 confidential
settlement agreement, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters unlawfully extended
the coverage of their existing master agreement to include representation of the former’s drywall
finishing employees. Said collective-bargaining agreement contains a common building and
construction industry union-security provision, requiring membership in the labor organization
after an employee’s eighth day of employment. The Board has long held that, in such
circumstances, by entering into, maintaining, and enforcing a collective-bargaining agreement,
which includes a union-security clause, an employer and a labor organization engage in conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act, respectively,
and, therefore, I find such violations in the instant matter. Duane Reade, Inc., 338 NLRB 943,
944 (2003); Polyclinic Medical Group, 315 NLRB 1257 (1995).
Next, I consider Respondent Raymond’s recognition of Respondent Carpenters as the
exclusive representative of its drywall finishing employees, by virtue of the latter’s purported
majority showing, late in the afternoon on October 2, 2006. In this regard, the consolidated
complaint alleges that, at the time, Respondent Carpenters did not represent an uncoerced
majority of said employees and that, therefore, Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and
conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by extending
such recognition and Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Sections
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the Act by accepting such recognition. Concerning these allegations,
there is no dispute, and I find, that, on the above date, subsequent to the formal presentations
to the drywall finishing employees by representatives of Respondent Raymond and the
Carpenters Union during the meeting at the Orange facility, Respondent Carpenters distributed
a form (General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3), which included a membership application and a
representation authorization, to the said employees for completion and execution; that
Respondent Carpenters collected signed copies of these forms; that, later at approximately
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5:00 p.m. at Respondent Raymond’s San Diego facility, agents of the Carpenters Union,
demanded recognition by Respondent Raymond as the majority representative of the
employees in the bargaining unit set forth in the Carpenters Union memorandum agreement
and, as evidence of its majority status, permitted Travis Winsor to examine the authorization
forms, which Respondent Carpenters had obtained earlier during the day, and that, after
examining the authorization forms, Winsor entered into a recognition agreement, by which
Respondent Raymond recognized Respondent Carpenters as the majority representative, within
the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, of the latter’s drywall framing and finishing employees.
Urging that Respondent Raymond’s recognition of Respondent Carpenters as the above
employees’ majority bargaining representative and that Respondent Carpenters acceptance of
such recognition be found unlawful, counsel for the General Counsel argues that such was
tainted by statements made during the employee meeting earlier that day by agents of
Respondent Raymond. Thus, he asserts that, by warning its employees that they must
immediately join Respondent Carpenters if they wished to continue working for the company,
Respondent Raymond unlawfully assisted Respondent Carpenters by conditioning continued
employment on immediate membership in a union, thereby denying employees their statutory
grace period. Acme Tile & Terrazzo Co., 318 NLRB 425, 427-28 (1995).60
In his post-hearing brief, in arguing that Respondent Raymond unlawfully coerced its
drywall finishing employees and unlawfully assisted Respondent Carpenters,61 counsel for the
General Counsel relies solely upon statements attributed to Travis Winsor and Hector Zorrero.62
As such is directly at issue, I must, at the outset, assess the credibility of the several witnesses,
and, in this regard, the most trustworthy was Jose Ramos. In my view, his demeanor, while
testifying, was that of a veracious witness, one who, unlike others, clearly exhibited his
comprehension of the meaning, gravity, and consequences of the oath, to which he swore prior
to testifying. That Ramos forthrightly recounted Travis Winsor’s alleged threat to the listening
drywall finishers and that he understood Winsor as being utterly serious seem unmistakably
clear given his indelible decision, based upon what Winsor said and reached without the
immediate prospect of another job, not to report for work the next day.63 Although enigmatical,
given the candid testimonial demeanor of each and their corroboration by the candid Ramos,

60 In Acme Tile, what the Board found unlawful were employer statements to employees,
conditioning continued employment upon “immediate membership” in the assisted labor
organization. Id. Thus, in my view, to be considered unlawful herein, statements, attributed to
agents of Respondent Raymond, must clearly condition continued employment with it upon
employees becoming members of Respondent Carpenters prior to the conclusion of the
statutory eight day grace period, as set forth in the master agreement’s union-security clause.
Apparently recognizing this, the General Counsel has alleged as unlawful only statements made
at the October 2 by agents of Respondent Raymond that employees had to sign with the
Carpenters that day in order to continue working for it.
61 The consolidated complaint also alleges that similar statements were made by unnamed
Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters representatives. However, the record evidence
attributes no such statements to any Carpenters Union representative. Rather, according to
witnesses Alvarez and Ramos, Carpenters Union officials, at most, told the listening employees
that, in order to continue working, they would have to sign with the Carpenters Union, a
statement not inconsistent with the union-security clause and not requiring immediate action.
Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of paragraph 19(a) of the consolidated complaint.
62 Counsel for the Painters Union argues that I should also find that the totality of
Raymond’s statements and conduct during the meeting constitutes unlawful assistance. Such
is not an allegation of the consolidated complaint, and I shall make no finding in this regard.
63 Acme Tile, supra at 428.
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I likewise believe that Janet Pineda64 and Ruben Mejia Alvarez65 were honest witnesses,
testifying to the best of their respective recollections.66 Moreover, with regard to each of the
above witnesses, I note that neither had any pecuniary, employment, or other interest in the
outcome of this matter.
In contrast, while portions of his testimony, regarding what he told the listening
employees on October 2, were uncontroverted and probably truthful, Travis Winsor, whose
demeanor, on the whole while testifying, was hardly that of a guileless witness, appeared to be
testifying particularly disingenuously concerning his colloquy with the employees as to the
subject about which they had to reach a decision that day. On this, he was contradictory,
stating, at one point, he was referring to benefit enrollment forms and, later, stating he was
referring to Painters Union membership withdrawal forms so that the employees could protect
themselves against the possibility of fines or penalties imposed by that labor organization.
Further, I found both his testimony, as to the underlying purpose for the September 12, 2006
confidential settlement agreement, and his testimony, pertaining to what he said regarding the
master agreement’s union-security clause during the October 2 employee meeting at the
Orange facility, adroitly labored and vague. Accordingly, I do not credit his specific denials of
the unlawful threats attributed to him by the above witnesses. Next, Hector Zorrero failed to
impress me as exhibiting any candor, and, particularly as compared to Alvarez, I found the latter
to have been a more compelling and frank witness. Moreover, I note that Zorrero and Winsor
were contradictory as to whether, during the question and answer session, employees
questioned Winsor regarding having to reach a decision that day about any subject. In these
circumstances, I do not credit his specific denials of unlawful statements, which were attributed
to him or to Winsor. Finally, with regard to the respective testimony of Gordon Hubel, David
Cordero, and Pedro Loera and their denials of statements attributed to Winsor and Zorrero, I
note such testimony tracked the specific denials of Winsor and Zorrero. However, inasmuch as
neither Winsor nor Zorrero convinced me as to the candor of said denials,67 I shall place no
reliance upon the putative corroborating testimony of Hubel, Cordero, or Loera.
In the foregoing circumstances, I find that, at the October 2 morning employee meeting
at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility, during the question and answer session, which
followed the formal presentations of Travis Winsor on behalf of Respondent Raymond and
Marty Dahlquist and Ron Schoen on behalf of the Carpenters Union, an employee asked, if
employees did not sign with the Carpenters, could they continue working, Travis Winsor replied

64 I recognize that Pineda admitted that her memory of the October 2 meeting was “not
good;” however, Respondent Raymond’s attorney’s attempted impeachment of her only served
to corroborate her testimony with regard to Winsor’s threat that employees could not work the
following day if they did not sign with the Carpenters.
65 I recognize that Alvarez testified regarding an asserted meeting to which all of
Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing foremen were called and that there was no
corroboration for such a meeting. However, whether said meeting did or did not occur does not
detract from my belief that Alvarez was basically an honest witness.
66 While Richard Myers also impressed me as testifying truthfully, I note that he recalled
Winsor as repeatedly warning the listening employees that, if they did not sign with the
Carpenters, they would not have a job. As I stated above, said comment was not inconsistent
with the language of the master agreement’s union-security clause and did not demand that the
employees act prior to the end of the statutory grace period. Accordingly, I shall not rely upon
his testimony herein.
67 I note that Hubel contradicted Winsor as to whether any employee asked if the employees
had to decide that day about becoming a member of Respondent Carpenters.
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that, if they did not sign, there would be no more work, and that, if you don’t sign, you will not
have a job but that no one would be fired. Then, one or more employees asked if they had to
reach a decision that day about signing with the Carpenters Union, and Winsor responded, “. . .
that if we didn’t sign on that day, we weren’t working any more.” I further find that, at the
conclusion of the question and answer session, while Hector Zorrero stayed with the employees
in the training room and answered their questions, several employees shouted to Zorrero,
asking if the company would give them some time to decide about signing with the Carpenters
Union. He replied, “There’s no time to think about it. Either sign . . . today or you cannot work
tomorrow for us.” Given the circumstances, Winsor’s and Zorrero’s warnings obviously were
heard by numerous employees and are virtually identical to those which the Board found
unlawful in Acme Tile, supra.
In defense, counsel for Respondent Raymond point out that neither Winsor nor Zorrero
solicited nor directed the drywall finishing employees to execute authorization for representation
forms and that the warnings, which are attributed to each, concern the signing of Respondent
Carpenters’ application for membership forms. Therefore, they argue, the alleged violations of
the Act may taint the latter forms but not the former, which formed the basis for the request for
recognition later that day. On this point, counsel for Respondent Carpenters argues that the
desire to be represented and the desire to be a member of a labor organization constitute
separate and distinct issues and that “. . . any alleged comments urging the employees to
become members of the Carpenters Union that day should not negate the employees stated
desire to have Carpenters Union represent them for the purposes of negotiating terms and
conditions of employment . . . .” In support, counsel cites the Board’s decision, Highlands
Regional Medical Center, 347 NLRB 1404 (2006), in which the Board considered an employer’s
reliance upon a petition, assertedly signed by half of its bargaining unit employees, for
withdrawing recognition from a labor organization. Noting that shortly after signing and dating
the petition, an employee joined the union and began paying dues, the Board stated “. . . where
an employee who has signed a decertification petition then voluntarily joins the union and
begins paying dues, the employer may no longer count the employee as opposing union
representation.” Id. at 1407 at n. 16. Contrary to both attorneys, I understand the Board as
equating membership in a labor organization with supporting representation by the said labor
organization, and, therefore, I believe that becoming a member of a labor organization signifies
one’s desire to be represented by it for the purpose of collective bargaining. Accordingly, the
inevitable result of Winsor’s and Zorrero’s coercive warnings upon the listening drywall finishing
employees, most of whom, I believe, desired to retain their jobs with Respondent Raymond,
was a tropism to execute Respondent Carpenters’ membership forms immediately after the
October 2 morning meeting, and it follows that said threats undoubtedly had the equally
coercive effect upon said employees, who also executed authorization cards on behalf of
Respondent Carpenters. In this regard, I note that General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3 contains
both Respondent Carpenters’ application for membership and authorization for representation
forms and believe that employees, who were instructed to complete the membership
application, undoubtedly completed and executed every form on the large document without
regard to the differences between them. In the foregoing circumstances, Respondent
Raymond’s and Respondent Carpenters’ defense is without merit, and I find that, in violation of
Section 8 (a)(1) and (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, by the above warnings of Travis
Winsor and Hector Zorrero, Respondent Raymond unlawfully coerced its employees into
executing authorization cards on behalf of Respondent Carpenters and, thereby, rendered
unlawful assistance to the latter. Acme Tile, supra.
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act when it extends recognition to a
labor organization that does not represent an uncoerced majority of its bargaining unit
employees, and the labor organization violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by accepting such
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unlawful assistance from the employer. International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 731 (1961). In this regard, the General Counsel need not show, “with mathematical
precision,” that the labor organization lacks the support of an uncoerced majority of the
bargaining unit employees. Dairyland USA Corp., 347 NLRB 310, 311 (2006); SMI of
Worcester, 271 NLRB 1508, 1520 (1984). Rather, the General Counsel must show only that a
“pattern” of employer assistance exists. Dairyland USA, supra; Famous Castings Corp.301
NLRB 404, 408 (1991). Such misconduct includes an employer’s direction to its employees to
sign cards. Famous Castings, supra at 407. Herein, I have concluded that the signed
authorization cards, which Respondent Carpenters collected subsequent to the October 2
morning meeting at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility and relied upon in demanding
recognition as the uncoerced majority representative of Respondent Raymond’s drywall
finishing employees later that day, were tainted by the warnings uttered by Respondent
Raymond’s Winsor and Zorrero. Also, in my view, said acts and conduct demonstrate a pattern
of unlawful assistance to Respondent Carpenters sufficient to taint the latter’s asserted showing,
by authorization cards, of majority support. Accordingly, as there exists insufficient record
evidence to establish that Respondent Carpenters represented an uncoerced majority of
Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees at the time Respondent Raymond granted
such recognition, the latter engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of
the Act. Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, supra.68 Similarly, by accepting recognition from
Respondent Raymond as the majority representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees
at a time when it did not represent an uncoerced majority of said employees, Respondent
Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Dairyland
USA, supra at 312.69
Finally, I consider the consolidated complaint allegations that, during the October 2
meeting at Respondent Raymond’s Orange facility, Respondent Carpenters failed to properly
inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees of their General Motors70 and
Beck71 rights in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Briefly stated, in General Motors,
supra, the Supreme Court held that, whenever a labor organization’s collective-bargaining
agreement with an employer contains a union-security clause, whereby continued employment
is conditioned upon membership in the former, the labor organization must inform bargaining
unit employees they have a right to be or remain nonmembers and that the term “union
membership” may be “whittled down to its financial core” so that nonmembers are only required
to pay an amount equivalent to union initiation fees and dues. Id. at 742. In Beck, supra, the
Court held that Section 8(a)(3) of the Act does not permit a collective-bargaining representative,
over the objections of dues-paying nonmember employees, to expend funds, which are
collected pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on activities which are not germane to
collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment. While the Court
believed that nonmember employees, who enjoyed the benefits of representation by a labor
organization, should bear their fair share of the costs incurred by the bargaining representative

68 While the October 2 recognition agreement seemingly bound Respondent Raymond to
the Carpenters Union memorandum agreement, the latter only becomes effective upon an
employer’s signature, and the record evidence is that Respondent Raymond never entered into
said agreement. Accordingly, the union-security clause of said agreement never became
binding upon Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, and, therefore, I can not find
that the latter engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
69 For the reasons set forth in n. 68, I can not find that Respondent engaged in conduct
violative of Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
70 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963)
71 Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988)
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for such representation, it also concluded that “. . . the expenditure of dues and fees on activities
outside the [labor organization’s] role as collective-bargaining representative violate[s its] duty of
fair representation to nonmember employees who objected to such expenditures.” Id. at 752-
54; California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224 (1995). Therefore, in California Saw, the
Board interpreted Beck and formulated the following rules
[B]efore a union seeks to obligate an employee to pay fees and dues under a
union-security clause, the union should inform the employee that he has the
right to be or remain a nonmember and that nonmembers have the right (1) to
object to paying for union activities not germane to the union’s duties as
bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in fees for such activities; (2) to be
given sufficient information to enable the employee to intelligently decide whether
to object; and (3) to be appraised of any internal union procedures for filing
objections.
In the view of the Board, a “close connection” exists between these rights of nonmember
employees and the right, under General Motors, to be and remain a nonmember subject only to
the duty to pay union initiation fees and periodic dues, and, “simply stated, an employee cannot
exercise Beck rights without exercising the General Motors right.” Paperworkers Local 1033
(Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 NLRB 349 at 349. Therefore, in order to fully inform
nonmember bargaining unit employees of their Beck rights, a labor organization must also
inform said employees of their right, pursuant to General Motors, to be or remain nonmembers,
and, “basic obligations of fairness” require the labor organization to notify all bargaining unit
employees of their rights under Beck and General Motors at the time it initially seeks to subject
them to the obligations of a contractual union-security clause. Id. at 349-50; California Saw,
supra, at 233 and 235 at n. 57. Finally, the Board views a labor organization’s failure to properly
give employees the General Motors and Beck notices as a breach of its fair duty of
representation in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., supra.
Herein, the record evidence is that, during the October 2 meeting at Respondent
Raymond’s Orange facility, Travis Winsor, speaking on behalf of Respondent Raymond placed
the its drywall finishing employees, none of whom was a member of Respondent Carpenters at
the time, on notice that the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement’s union-security
clause would be applicable to them, and the Carpenters Union officials, who followed him,
spoke about the employees’ obligation to pay monthly union dues. The uncontroverted record
evidence is, and I find, that no Carpenters Union official ever informed the employees that they
did not have to become members of Respondent Carpenters; that they had the right to object to
that portion of their dues going to nonrepresentational expenses; or that there was an internal
union procedure for challenging the amount of their monthly dues payment. In this context, the
Carpenters Union then distributed General Counsel’s Exhibit No. 3, which contained the
membership application forms and a supplemental dues check off form for Respondent
Carpenters, to the drywall finishing employees. Further, the record also establishes that, while
Respondent Carpenters employee, Melinda Carlton, distributed copies of the quarterly
Carpenters Union magazine, which contained a Beck notice, to bargaining unit employees, she
did so only after employees returned completed and executed copies of the membership
applications and supplemental dues check off forms. In these circumstances, I find that, prior to
enforcing its contractual union-security clause and obligating them to pay monthly dues,
Respondent Carpenters failed to inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees,
none of whom were members of said labor organization, that they were not obligated to join
Respondent Carpenters subject only to the duty to pay union initiation fees and periodic dues
and that, as nonmembers, they had the rights to object to paying for union activities not
germane to the union’s duty as bargaining representative and to obtain a reduction in fees for
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such activities, to be given sufficient information to enable them to object; and to be appraised
of any internal union procedure for filing objections. Based upon the foregoing, there can be no
doubt that Respondent Carpenters failed to meet the requirements of California Saw, supra, and
Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., supra.
In defense, counsel for Respondent Carpenters asserts that her client never actually
sought to obligate nonmembers working for Respondent to pay dues or fees and that, in such
circumstances, the instant matter is distinguishable from California Saw. However, contrary to
counsel, as in the cited decision,72 Carpenters Union employees distributed membership
applications and supplemental dues check off forms for Respondent Carpenters to Respondent
Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, none of whom were members of Respondent
Carpenters, moments after they were informed the existing Carpenters Union master agreement
and its union-security provision would be applicable to them and they would be required to pay
union dues. I find that, in these circumstances, presentation of the two forms to these
nonmembers effectively caused them to believe that membership in Respondent Carpenters,
including the obligation to pay full dues, was required at that time.73 California Saw, supra at
235. That this is, indeed, true, is seen from the fact that, along with a copy of the Carpenters
magazine, Melinda Carlton handed each employee an envelope for the payment of dues.
Accordingly, in the foregoing circumstances, as Respondent Carpenters failed to give the
required General Motors and Beck notices to Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing
employees prior to giving them membership applications and supplemental dues check off
forms, Respondent Carpenters breached its duty of fair representation, owed to Respondent
Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, in violation of Section 8(b)(!)(A) of the Act.74
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent Raymond is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Painters Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. Respondent Carpenters is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
4. By, on or about October 1, 2006, recognizing Southwest Regional Council of
Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the
Section 9(a) majority bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees and
maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement, to which it and

72 In California Saw, the Board was concerned with newly hired employees. Here, while
obviously not new hires, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters were treating the
former’s drywall finishing employees in the same manner for purposes of covering them under a
new and different collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, the distinction is without a difference.
73 Herein, of course, the record evidence is that Respondent Raymond’s officials, Winsor
and Zorrero, warned the employees that such was, indeed, required that day.
Whether Respondent Carpenters thereafter sought to enforce its union-security provision is
irrelevant.
74 In these circumstances, as Respondent Carpenters failed to give the required notices
prior to obtaining signed membership applications, I need not and do not reach the issue of the
sufficiency of the Beck notice, which is printed in Respondent Carpenters quarterly magazine.
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Respondent Carpenters are parties and which contains a union-security provision, as covering
its drywall finishing employees, Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct violative of
Section 8(a)(1) and (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act..
5. By, on or about October 1, 2006, accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond
as the Section 9(a) majority bargaining representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees
and maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement, to which
Respondent Raymond and it are parties and which contains a union-security provision, as
covering Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, Respondent Carpenters engaged
in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
6. By, on or about October 2, 2006, warning its drywall finishing employees that, if they
fail to sign with Respondent Carpenters that day, there will be no more work for them,
Respondent Raymond conditioned employment upon immediate membership in Respondent
Carpenters and rendered assistance to said labor organization in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
7. By, on or about October 2, 2006, extending recognition to Southwest Regional
Council of Carpenters on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters,
as the Section 9(a) majority bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees at a
time when Respondent Carpenters did not represent an uncoerced majority of its drywall
finishing employees, Respondent Raymond engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section
8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
8. By, on or about October 2, 2006, accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond
as the Section 9(a) majority bargaining representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees
at a time when it did not represent an uncoerced majority of said employees, Respondent
Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
9. By, on or about October 2, 2006, failing to inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall
finishing employees, whom it sought to obligate to pay dues and fees under a union-security
provision, of their rights under General Motors, supra, to be and remain nonmembers and of the
rights of nonmembers under Beck, supra, to object to paying for union activities not germane to
its duties as bargaining agent and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such activities,
Respondent Carpenters engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
10. By their activities, in violation of the Act, Respondent Raymond and Respondent
Carpenters engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. Unless specified above, Respondent Raymond and Respondent Carpenters
engaged in no other unfair labor practices.
Remedy
I have found that, by its acts and conduct, Respondent Raymond engaged in serious
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) (2) and Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act and that, by its and conduct, Respondent Carpenters engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. Therefore, I shall
recommend that each be ordered to cease and desist from said acts and conduct and to take
certain affirmative actions designed to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act. Initially,
with regard to Respondent Raymond, I shall recommend that it be required to withdraw
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recognition from Respondent Carpenters as the collective-bargaining representative of its
drywall finishing employees until said labor organization has been has been certified by the
Board as their exclusive collective- bargaining representative. In accord with standard Board
practice in similar circumstances,75 I shall further recommend that, jointly and severally with
Respondent Carpenters, Respondent Raymond be required to reimburse all its past and
present drywall finishing employees, who joined Respondent Carpenters on or after October 2,
2006,76 for any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they
may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters
Union 2006-2010 master agreement, together with interest as prescribed in New Horizons for
the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). In addition, while nothing in the ORDER herein should
be construed as permitting Respondent Raymond to withdraw or eliminate any benefit,
including, but not limited to, pension plans and medical, dental, prescription drug, optical,
hospitalization, and/or life insurance, which it may have implemented pursuant to the above
collective-bargaining agreement for its drywall finishing employees, to the extent that such
insurance and pension coverage was by or through a Carpenters Union plan, I shall recommend
that it be required to provide an equivalent substitute.77 As to Respondent Carpenters, in
accord with standard practice,78 I shall recommend that it be required, jointly and severally with
Respondent Raymond, to reimburse all of the latter’s past and present drywall finishing
employees, who joined it on or after October 2, 2006, for any initiation fees, periodic dues,
assessments, or other moneys, which they may have paid or which may have been withheld
from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement, with interest as
set forth above. Finally, I shall recommend that each Respondent post an appropriate notice,
setting forth its obligations.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended.79
ORDER
A. The Respondent, Raymond Interior Systems, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Recognizing and bargaining with Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters on
behalf of its affiliated local unions, including Respondent Carpenters, as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees until Respondent Carpenters has
been certified as their exclusive collective-bargaining representative by the Board;

75 Duane Reade, Inc., supra, at 945.
76 While there is record evidence that some employees signed membership applications for
Respondent Carpenters subsequent to October 2, there is no evidence that any received the
necessary General Motors and Beck notices before doing so.
77 Brooklyn Hospital Center, supra, at 1163; Mego Corp., 254 NLRB 300 (1981).
78 Duane Reade, Inc., supra, at 946.
79 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
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(b) Maintaining, enforcing, or giving effect to the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master
agreement, including the union-security clause, so as to cover its drywall finishing employees,
or any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless or until Respondent Carpenters has
been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of said
employees; provided that nothing in this Order shall authorize, allow, or require the withdrawal
or elimination of any wage increase or other benefits (pension or insurance plans) that it may
have been established pursuant to said agreement;
(c) Assisting Respondent Carpenters by warning its drywall finishing employees that,
if they did not sign with Respondent Carpenters that day, there would be no more work for them;
(d) Recognizing Respondent Carpenters as the Section 9(a) of Act exclusive
bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees when it does not represent an
uncoerced majority of said employees;
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Withdraw recognition from Respondent Carpenters as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its drywall finishing employees unless and until it has been certified by the
Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of said employees;
(b) Jointly and severally with Respondent Carpenters, reimburse its past and present
drywall finishing employees, who joined Respondent Carpenters on or after October 2, 2006, for
any initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid
or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006-201110
master agreement, together with interest as set forth above;
(c) To the extent that coverage was provided under Carpenters Union plans, provide
alternate benefits coverage equivalent to the coverage that its drywall finishing employees
possessed under the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement including pension
coverage and medical, hospitalization, prescription drug, dental, optical, life, and other
insurance benefits and ensure that there be no lapse in coverage;
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of money to be reimbursed under the terms
of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Orange facility and
worksites in Southern California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A.”80 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by

80 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words
in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
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Respondent Raymond’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent Raymond
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent Raymond to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
Respondent Raymond has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, Respondent Raymond shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the
notice to all current employees and former drywall finishing employees employed by
Respondent Raymond at any time since October 2, 2006.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
B. The Respondent, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
Local Union 1506, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Receiving assistance and accepting recognition from Respondent Raymond as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the latter’s drywall finishing employees unless and
until it has been certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
said employees;
(b) Maintaining and enforcing the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 master agreement,
including the union-security clause so as to cover Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing
employees, and any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless and until it has been
certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of said employees;
(c) Failing to inform Respondent Raymond’s drywall finishing employees, whom it
sought to obligate to pay dues and fees under a union-security provision, of their rights, under
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and remain nonmembers of
Respondent Carpenters and of the rights of nonmembers, under Communications Workers v.
Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object to paying for union activities not germane to the labor
organization’s duties as collective-bargaining representative and to obtain a reduction in dues
and fees for such activities;
(d) Seeking and obtaining Section 9(a) recognition from Respondent Raymond as the
majority representative of its drywall finishing employees when it does not represent an
uncoerced majority of said employees;
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Jointly and severally with Respondent Raymond, reimburse all of the latter’s past
and present drywall finishing employees, who joined Respondent Carpenters on or after
October 2, 2006, for initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which
they may have paid or which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters
Union 2006-2010 master agreement;
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(b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in
electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of money to be reimbursed under the terms of
this Order;
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its union office in Los Angeles,
California, copies of the attached Notice to Members, marked “Appendix B.”81 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by
Respondent Carpenter’s authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent Carpenters
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent Carpenters to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
Respondent Carpenters has ceased its representational activities or has become defunct,
Southern California Regional Council of Carpenters shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense,
a copy of the notice to all current employees and former drywall finishing employees, employed
by Respondent Raymond at any time since October 2, 2006;
(d) Forward to the Regional Director of Region 21 signed copies of the attached
notice, marked “Appendix B,” for posting by Respondent Raymond at its Orange facility and
worksites in Southern California for 60 consecutive days in places where notices to employees
are customarily posted;
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C., November 10, 2008.
____________________
Burton Litvack
Administrative Law Judge

81 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words
in the notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD”
shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”
JD(SF)-47-08
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT recognize and bargain with Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters
(SWRCC) on behalf of its affiliated local unions, including United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America. Local Union 1506 (Carpenters 1506), as the exclusive bargaining
representative of our drywall finishing employees until Carpenters 1506 has been certified as
their exclusive representative by the NLRB.
WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or give effect to our Carpenters Union 2006-2010 Master
Agreement, including the union-security clause, as covering our drywall finishing employees, or
any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless or until Carpenters 1506 has been
certified by the NLRB as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of said employees,
provided that nothing herein shall authorize, allow, or require us to withdraw or eliminate any
wage increases or other benefits that we established pursuant to said agreement.
WE WILL NOT assist Carpenters 1506 by warning our drywall finishing employees that, if they
did not sign with Carpenters 1506 today, there would be no work for them.
WE WILL NOT recognize Carpenters 1506 as the Section 9(a) exclusive bargaining
representative of our drywall finishing employees when it does not represent an uncoerced
majority of said employees.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL withdraw recognition from Carpenters 1506 as the exclusive bargaining
representative of our drywall finishing employees unless and until it has been certified by the
NLRB as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the said employees.
WE WILL, jointly and severally with Carpenters 1506, reimburse our past and present drywall
finishing employees, who joined Carpenters 1506 on or after October 2, 2006,for any initiation
fees, periodic dues, assessments, or any other moneys, which they may have paid or which
may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to our Carpenters Union 2006-2010 Master
Agreement, together with interest.
JD(SF)-47-08
WE WILL, to the extent that coverage was provided under Carpenters Union plans, provide
alternate benefits coverage equivalent to the coverage that our drywall finishing employees
possessed under our Carpenters Union 2006-2010 Master Agreement including pension
coverage and medical, hospitalization, prescription drug, dental, optical, life, and other
insurance benefits and ensure that there will be no lapse in coverage.
Raymond Interior Systems
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
888 South Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles CA 90017-5449
(213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE
ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (213) 894-5229.
JD(SF)-47-08
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board had found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
WE WILL NOT accept assistance or recognition from Raymond Interior Systems as the
exclusive bargaining representative of its drywall finishing employees unless and until we has
been certified by the NLRB as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of said
employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce the Carpenters Union 2006-2010 Master Agreement,
including the union-security clause, as covering Raymond Interior Systems’ drywall finishing
employees, and any extensions, renewal, or modifications thereof unless and until we have
been certified by the NLRB as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of said
employees.
WE WILL NOT fail to inform Raymond Interior Systems’ drywall finishing employees, whom we
sought to obligate to pay dues and fees under a union-security provision, of their rights under
the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), to be and
remain nonmembers of this labor organization and of the rights of nonmembers under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), to object
to paying for union activities not germane to our duties as collective-bargaining representative
and to obtain a reduction in dues and fees for such activities.
WE WILL NOT seek and obtain Section 9(a) recognition from Raymond Interior Systems as the
majority representative of its drywall finishing employees when we do not represent an
uncoerced majority of said employees.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, jointly and severally with Raymond Interior Systems, reimburse all of the latter’s
drywall finishing employees, who joined this labor organization on or after October 2, 2006, for
initiation fees, periodic dues, assessments, or other moneys, which they may have paid or
which may have been withheld from their pay pursuant to the Carpenters Union 2006-2010
Master Agreement
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Local Union 1506
(Labor Organization)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
JD(SF)-47-08
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
888 South Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles CA 90017-5449
(213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE
ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (213) 894-5229.
JD(SF)-47-08
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
RAYMOND INTERIOR SYSTEMS
and Case 21-CA-37649
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 36,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES, AFL-CIO
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS
AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION 1506
and Case 21-CB-14259
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES DISTRICT COUNCIL NO. 36,
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF PAINTERS AND
ALLIED TRADES, AFL-CIO
and
SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF
CARPENTERS, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF
CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA
(Party in Interest)
Table of Contents
Statement of the Case ...................................................................................................... 2
Findings of Fact ................................................................................................................ 2
I. Jurisdiction.............................................................................................................. 2
II. Labor Organizations............................................................................................... 2
III. The Issues ............................................................................................................ 3
IV. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices ...................................................................... 4
A. The Facts ....................................................................................................... 4
B. Legal Analysis ................................................................................................ 22
Conclusions of Law........................................................................................................... 36
Remedy ............................................................................................................................ 37
ORDER ............................................................................................................................ 38
APPENDIX A.................................................................................................................... 42
APPENDIX B.................................................................................................................... 44