Ex Parte VAN DER MERWE et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 17, 2016

12646492 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
12/646,492 12/23/2009 Jacobus VAN DER MERWE
83719 7590 08/17/2016
AT & T Legal Department - FKM
AT & T LEGAL DEPARTMENT,
ATTN: PATENT DOCKETING ROOM 2A-207
BEDMINSTER, NJ 07921
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2009-0120 (40147/14901) 1212
EXAMINER
RUBIN, BLAKE J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2457
MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE
08/17/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JACOBUS VAN DER MERWE, XU CHEN, and
ZHUOQING MA0 1
Appeal2015-005096
Application 12/646,492
Technology Center 2400
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection of
claims 1-10 and 12-19. Claim 11 is cancelled. We have jurisdiction over
this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.2
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is AT&T Intellectual
Property I, LP. See Appeal Brief 2.
2 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) Appellants' Specification filed
Dec. 23, 2009 ("Spec."); (2) the Final Office Action ("Final Act.") mailed
Sep. 2, 2014; (3) the Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.") filed Dec. 2, 2014; (4) the
Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") mailed Feb. 9, 2015; and the Reply Brief
("Reply Br.") filed Apr. 9, 2015.
Appeal2015-005096
Application 12/646,492
BACKGROUND
According to Appellants, the application relates to a system and
method for creating a library of active documents. Spec. i-fl3. The active
documents form a building block for automation of network operations. Id.
at i-f l 0. Claim 1 is reproduced below with disputed limitation emphasized:
1. A system comprising:
a memory storing a set of instructions; and
a processor executing the set of instructions to perform
operations comprising:
receiving a process for accomplishing a network
administration task, the process including a plurality of events
including configuration changing events and condition
checking events, the receiving comprising logging steps of a
user interaction with a network element during a user
performance of the network administration task;
receiving parameters related to the task;
including the parameters in the process; and
executing the process.
REFERENCES
The art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal:
McKinnon, III et al.
("McKinnon")
Fables et al. ("Fables")
US 2002/0003806 Al
US 7,127,701 B2
REJECTION
Jan. 10,2002
Oct. 24, 2006
Claims 1-10 and 12-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Fables and McKinnon. Final Act. 2.
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Application 12/646,492
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
issues raised by the Appellants. We have not considered other possible
issues that have not been raised by Appellants and which are, therefore, not
before us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2012).
ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Fables and
McKinnon teaches or suggests "the receiving comprising logging steps of a
user interaction with a network element during a user performance of the
network administration task," as recited in claim 1?
DISCUSSION
After review of Appellants' arguments and the Examiner's findings
and reasoning, we determine that Appellants have not identified error in the
Examiner's rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we affirm the rejection for
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office Action and the Answer.
See Final Act. 3, 10-11; Ans. 10-11. We adopt the Examiner's findings and
conclusion and add the following for emphasis and completeness.
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds McKinnon's Administrator
106 acts as a "user" while interacting with GUI & Report Generating Engine
94. Final Act. 11; Ans. 10-11 (citing McKinnon i-fi-199 and 100).
Specifically, the Examiner finds that Administrator 106 of McKinnon
performs a network administration task by configuring or setting up
Network Access Manager 86 and "the storage of such setup and
configuration [information in Database Manager 90] would constitute the
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Application 12/646,492
logging of a user interaction with a network element." Ans. 10-11 (citing
McKinnon i-f 100).
Appellants contend "[i]t is clear ... that the Administrator in
McKinnon merely arranges the network access manager to preferred settings
in order to access the reports generated by the network access manager. It is
these settings that are received by the Database Manager." Reply Br. 3
(citing McKinnon i-f 100).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument. The Examiner
correctly finds that McKinnon's Administrator 106 configures Network
Access Manager 86 and that the storing of the configuration and setup
information suggests "logging steps of a user interaction," as claimed, where
the Administrator is interpreted as the user. Ans. 10-11 (citing McKinnon
i-fi-1 99 and 100).
Appellants further contend the Examiner has erroneously construed
Database Manager 90; s storing of configuration and setup information
determined by Administrator 106 in McKinnon to teach the claimed
"logging." Appeal Br. 3. We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments.
Appellants first proffer, based on Appellants' Specification, a
definition of "logging," which "entails keeping a record of a variety of
interactions that the user has with a network element, such as configuration
changing events, condition checking events, etc." Ans. 3 (citing Spec. i-f20).
Appellants, however, fail to establish that this definition is the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with Appellants' Specification. See In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2004). Under
a broadest reasonable interpretation, the words of the claim must be given
their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent with the
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Application 12/646,492
specification. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Chef America,
Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The plain
meaning of a term means the ordinary and customary meaning given to the
term by those of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In re
Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The
presumption that a term is given its ordinary and customary meaning may be
rebutted by Appellants clearly setting forth a different definition of the term
in the specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Here, Appellants fail to demonstrate that "logging" has been explicitly
defined in this particular way in Appellants' Specification.
Appellants next contend "the term 'logging', has a specific definition
in the art" and proffer a second definition. Appeal Br. 3--4 (citing PC
Magazine, see http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/46257 /).
Appellants, however, fail to establish that this definition is the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with Appellants; Specification as
understood by one of ordinary skill, at the time of the invention.
Accordingly, we determine that the Examiner's interpretation of the
term "logging" is not inconsistent with Appellants' Specification and is
therefore, not shown to be erroneous. In light of this interpretation, we agree
with the Examiner's finding that the claimed "logging," given a reasonable
interpretation in light of the Specification, encompasses storing of the
configuration and setup information as discussed in McKinnon.
We therefore sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
independent claims 10 and 18, which Appellants argue are patentable for
similarly unpersuasive reasons. Appeal Br. 6.
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Application 12/646,492
Appellants do not make any other substantive argument regarding the
rejection of dependent claims 2-9, 12-17, and 19. Appeal Br. 7. Therefore,
we likewise sustain the rejections of these dependent claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-10 and 12-19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fables and McKinnon is affirmed3.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
3 If Appellants should choose to reopen prosecution, the Examiner is advised
to ascertain whether independent claims 1, 10, and 18 meet the requirements
of 35 U.S.C. § 112(pre-AIA), first paragraph. As an example, the Examiner
should ascertain whether the limitation "step" satisfies the written
description requirement, by reasonably conveying to skilled artisans that the
patentee possessed the claimed invention as of the filing date of application.
See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (en bane).
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