§

Ex Parte VAN DER MERWE et al

12646492 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 17, 2016)
Ex Parte VAN DER MERWE et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.

    598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 604 times   78 Legal Analyses
    Holding that our written description requirement requires that a specification “reasonably convey to those skilled in the art” that the inventor “actually invented” and “had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date [of the invention]”

  2. Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.

    358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 209 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claim language that required heating "dough to a temperature in the range of about 400° F. to 850° F." meant exactly what the ordinary meaning suggested even though all agreed that heating dough itself — rather than the oven — to that temperature would burn the dough to a crisp and leave it as inedible as a "charcoal briquet"

  3. In re Am. Academy of Science Tech Ctr.

    367 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004)   Cited 88 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that descriptions of deficiencies of using mainframe computers set out in the "Background of the Invention" portion of the specification did not exclude mainframes from the definition of "'user computer'" where the "specification as a whole" did not express a clear disavowal of that subject matter

  4. In re Suitco Surface

    603 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 36 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Suitco, we disagreed with the Board's broadest reasonable construction of the term "finishing the top surface of the floor," because the Board's construction "allow[ed] the finishing material to fall anywhere above the surface being finished regardless of whether it actually ‘finishes’ the surface."

  5. In re Morris

    127 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 49 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in reviewing a claim construction decided under the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ standard, we determine whether the interpretation is within the range of reasonableness

  6. In re Zletz

    893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 42 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that claims failing this test during prosecution must be rejected under § 112, ¶ 2

  7. Section 112 - Specification

    35 U.S.C. § 112   Cited 7,362 times   1046 Legal Analyses
    Requiring patent applications to include a "specification" that provides, among other information, a written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and using it

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)