Ernest D. Worsham, Appellant,v.Andrew M. Cuomo, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 23, 1999
01965683 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 23, 1999)

01965683

02-23-1999

Ernest D. Worsham, Appellant, v. Andrew M. Cuomo, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Agency.


Ernest D. Worsham v. Department of Housing and Urban Development

01965683

February 23, 1999

Ernest D. Worsham, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01965683

v. ) Agency No. FW-91-30

) EEOC No. 310-92-5391X

Andrew M. Cuomo, )

Secretary, )

Department of Housing )

and Urban Development, )

Agency. )

___________________________________)

DECISION

Appellant timely appealed the agency's final decision that it had not

discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The Commission accepts

this appeal in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

Appellant filed a formal complaint of discrimination in which he

claimed discrimination on the bases of race (African-American) and

sex (male), when he was not selected for the position of Supervisory

Realty Specialist, (Chief, Property Disposition Branch), GM-1160-13,

under vacancy announcement No. 06-MSO-91-0004. The agency accepted

the complaint and conducted an investigation. At the conclusion of the

investigation, appellant requested a hearing before an Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission administrative judge (AJ). A hearing was conducted

on March 12, 1993.

On March 31, 1993, the AJ issued a recommended decision (RD) finding no

discrimination. The AJ concluded that although appellant had established

a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the agency had articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The Selecting

Official (SO) testified that he was looking for four things in a selectee:

(1) a supervisor who was credible and stressed equality among his

employees; (2) a manager who was assertive in management philosophy; (3)

a manager who actively supported the Secretary's number one priority, the

resident initiatives program; and (4) a person who displayed leadership

skills, and who could deal with people problems in a positive way.

Specifically, agency witnesses testified that in terms of qualifications,

appellant and the selectee (White female), were about equal. However,

in terms of managing employees, the SO found that the selectee was

more flexible, and appellant's style was rigid and authoritarian.

Furthermore, the SO testified that appellant was not as enthusiastic

about the resident initiative program, while the selectee showed more

enthusiasm for the program. The AJ also noted that the agency had

alleged that women were under represented in grades GS-13 and above.

In discussing pretext, the AJ noted that appellant believed the selectee

was preselected for the position because she had been placed into the

position in an acting role prior to the selection. However, the AJ

found that given the fact that appellant and the selectee were equal or

near equal in qualifications, the agency's use of subjective criteria

in its selection was not pretext for discrimination. In conclusion,

the AJ found that appellant had failed to show that the agency's

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its selection was a pretext

for discrimination.

On June 4, 1993, the agency issued a final decision adopting the AJ's

finding of no discrimination. On June 30, 1993, appellant filed

an appeal to the Office of Federal Operations (OFO). See Worsham

v. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, EEOC Appeal No. 01933564

(June 17, 1994). In that decision, the Commission noted that, despite

repeated requests, the agency had failed to provide the Commission with

a copy of the hearing transcript. Therefore, the Commission decided to

draw an adverse inference regarding the testimony of the parties where

credibility was in issue. In that decision, the Commission affirmed

the agency's final decision of no discrimination.

On July 20, 1994, appellant initiated a request to the Commission to

reconsider the Worsham decision. See Worsham v. Dept. of Housing and

Urban Development, EEOC Request No. 05940818 (March 7, 1996). In his

request, appellant argued that the agency failed to supply a copy of the

hearing transcript in an effort to conceal the SO's hearing testimony

wherein he admitted that the under representation of white women at the

GS-13 level played a part in his decision. In light of this allegation,

the Commission decided to reconsider the previous decision on its own

motion. See id. Therein, the Commission found that in light of the

agency's failure to provide an explanation for the missing transcript,

as well as appellant's allegations that the SO testified that he had

taken the under representation into consideration, the Commission found

that there may be evidence that the agency's articulated reason for

its nonselection was pretext for discrimination. Therefore, the final

decision was vacated and the agency was ordered to conduct a supplemental

investigation. As part of its investigation, the agency was ordered to

obtain the transcript, or, if it could not, it was to provide an affidavit

from the SO addressing appellant's contention that he testified on cross

examination as to his desire to correct the under representation of white

women at the GS-13 level. The agency was further ordered to provide an

affidavit explaining the reasons it failed to provide the Commission and

appellant with a copy of the hearing transcript. Finally, the agency

was ordered to issue a new final decision addressing the findings of

the supplemental investigation.

On May 31, 1996, the agency issued a second final agency decision

adopting the AJ's finding of no discrimination. In addition, it added

that with respect to the consideration given to the Affirmative Action

Plan, the agency found that it is permissible to consider such factors

when they are used to effectuate the purposes of Title VII. Furthermore,

it stated that the mere fact that the selection assisted the agency in

fulfilling its affirmative action goals, is not indicative of whether

it was the reason for its selection. See Maley v. Department of Health

and Human Services, 01842676 (1986).

It is from this final agency decision that appellant now appeals. In the

instant appeal, appellant argues that the agency admitted that race and

sex were motivating reasons behind the selection, and that subjective

factors were used as further basis for the decision.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, including

the hearing transcript which was ultimately sent to the Commission,

the Commission finds that the AJ's recommended decision sets forth

the relevant facts and properly analyzes the appropriate regulations,

policies and laws. The Commission has reviewed the parties' statements

on appeal and discerns no basis in which to disturb the AJ's finding

of no discrimination. We note that the record shows that appellant

and the selectee were both well qualified for the position, and the SO

testified that the decision was a difficult one. However, the record

also demonstrates that the bases for the selection included enthusiasm

for the resident initiative program, managerial style, and the ability

to deal with people problems involved when directing and coordinating

the work of a subordinate staff. While appellant may argue that

the agency's action was, to a certain degree, premised on subjective

criteria, we note that with respect to promotions to managerial level,

professional and specialized positions, the use of subjective criteria

is generally acceptable. Camillas v. U.S. Navy, 735 F.2d 338, 345

(9th Cir. 1984); Page v. U.S. Industries, 726 F.2d 1038 1053 (5th

Cir. 1984). Court and Commission precedent have consistently held that

where there are two equally desirable candidates competing for the same

position, the selecting official may exercise his/her prerogative in

choosing between the candidates and, absent discrimination, a trier

of fact should not substitute his judgment for the legitimate exercise

of managerial discretion. Bennett v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01893757 (April 20, 1990); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1048 (10th

Cir. 1981). Moreover, appellant has produced insufficient evidence,

either testimonial or documentary, to support the finding that his

qualifications for the position were so plainly superior to those of

the selectees as to warrant a finding of pretext.

The Commission finds insufficient evidence of discrimination in the

agency's acknowledgment that the decision to chose the selectee had the

additional benefit of being supportive of the its affirmative action

goals. The SO was able to articulate and support the other reasons for

his selection. Specifically, the selectee was more supportive of the

resident initiatives program and had a management style preferable to

that of appellant. The preponderance of the evidence does not support

appellant's contention that the agency's consideration of its affirmative

action goals played a deciding role in the selection. Indeed, the SO

specifically testified that such considerations were not the deciding

factors in his decision to chose the selectee. Accordingly, it is the

decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the

agency's finding of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

February 23, 1999

___________________ ____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations