CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

May 6, 2013

04-CA-085979 (N.L.R.B. May. 6, 2013)

JD–32–13
Wilmington, DE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC.
and Case 4–CA–085979
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 313
William Slack, Esq.
for the General Counsel.
Richard Muser, Esq.
for the Respondent.
Robert O’Brien, Esq.
for the Charging Party.
Martin W. Milz, Esq.
for Intervenor, United Association of
Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 74.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Robert A. Giannasi, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, on March 20, 2013. The complaint alleges that, during negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
insisting to impasse on a non-mandatory subject of bargaining. The contract provision at issue
involves two unions: Intervener, United Association of Plumbers & Pipefitters, Local 74
(hereafter Intervenor, Plumbers, or Local 74) 1 and the Charging Party Union (hereafter the
Union, Electrical Workers, or Local 313), the exclusive bargaining representative of
Respondent’s employees. Respondent insisted on contract language under which membership in
Plumbers would satisfy the union security clause’s requirement of membership in the Union.
Respondent’s answer denies the essential allegations in the complaint, contending that its

1 By order dated February 21, 2013, the Acting Regional Director of Region 4 granted the Plumbers’
motion to intervene.
JD–32–13
2
proposed contract language constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining, which it could
lawfully insist upon to impasse.2
After the trial, the parties, including Intervener, filed briefs, which I have read and
considered. Based on the entire record in this case, I make the following5
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
10
Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES15
The Facts
Background
20
Respondent provides maintenance services pursuant to a subcontract with JP Morgan’s
Critical Data Facilities located at two separate sites in Delaware, one in Wilmington and one in
Newark. The Union has represented the approximately 50 maintenance employees employed by
Respondent or its predecessors since April 2004. The employees provide day-to-day
maintenance on HVAC and electrical equipment at the two Delaware facilities. One-third of the 25
unit is composed of members of Intervener because the maintenance work requires not only the
skill of electricians, but also that of plumbers. Tr. 24-26.

2 The Acting General Counsel filed an unopposed motion to correct transcript. I agree with the
suggested corrections and grant the motion. The transcript is corrected as follows:
Page Line(s) Change To
9 8,11,18, 25 Mr. Milz Judge Giannasi
14 14 Mr. Milz Judge Giannasi
19 24 211 exclusive representative
20 8 211 exclusive representative
24 19, 24 Amcor Emcor
25 8 Amcor Emcor
41 12 Mr. Muser Mr. O'Brien
42 6 Mr. Muser Mr. O'Brien
42 6 Mr. Muser Mr. O'Brien
46 7 Mr. Muser Mr. O'Brien
50 15 Mr. Muser Mr. O'Brien
51 24 Mr. Muser Mr. O'Brien
53 10, 24 Mr. Muser Mr. Slack
61 19 Mr. Thurman Judge Giannasi
63 2 Mr. Muser Mr. O'Brien
63 4,15 Mr. Slack Mr. O'Brien
JD–32–13
3
In successive contracts since April 2004, Respondent’s predecessors, EMCOR Facilities
Services, Inc. and PM Realty Group LP (predecessors), recognized the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for the following unit of employees:
All employees working at CDC 1 and CDC 2 in the classifications of Journeyman5
Engineer, Engineer-Safety, Engineer Training, Assistant Chief Engineer, Chief
Engineer, and Apprentice Engineer, excluding supervisors, office help, and other workers
coming within the jurisdiction of other crafts, which are under contractual relationship
with the Company, and exclusions as provided by the National Labor Relations Act.3
10
Both the predecessors’ collective-bargaining agreements included a union security clause
requiring, as a condition of employment, that unit employees be members of the Union, after the
statutory grace period. That clause also included the following sentence: “For the purpose of
this provision, membership in good standing in Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union 74, which
shall also provide employees under this agreement, shall be considered as compliance with this 15
provision.” Section 7(1) of G.C. Exh. 2 and Int. Exh. 1. The agreements also provided that,
upon the signing of appropriate authorizations, Respondent would check off the required dues,
including those of Plumbers Local 74, and remit them periodically to the Union. In addition, the
agreements contained an agency shop clause providing that all employees “shall as a condition of
employment, pay to [the Union,] the employee’s exclusive collective bargaining representative[,] 20
an amount of money equal to that paid by other employees in the bargaining unit who are
members of the Union. . . .” Section 10(e) of the agreements.
According to Union Business Manager Douglas Drummond, sometime after he assumed
that position in 2005, he directed that dues deducted from the wages of the employees by the 25
employer and sent to the Union under the dues check-off clause would be divided as follows: All
dues of Union members went to the Union. The portion of the dues of Plumbers Local 74
members equal to the Union’s dues went to the Union; the remainder (Plumbers’ dues were
higher than the Union’s dues) went to Plumbers. That procedure is still followed. Drummond
apparently divided the dues in accordance with the agency shop clause mentioned above, and 30
because the Union was responsible for administering the agreement. The division of dues is the
subject of a separate lawsuit between the two unions. Tr. 50-53
Both predecessors’ bargaining agreements contained a hiring hall clause providing for the
Union’s referral of employees to the employer. The referral clause stated that, “in some 35
instances where certain special qualifications are required, the Union, shall, through a separate
understanding by and between it and Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union 74, refer applicants

3 The above language is from the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the most
recent predecessor employer, PM Realty Group LP, which ran from December 1, 2008, to November 30,
2011 (G.C. Exh. 2). That agreement identified the Union as the “sole and exclusive bargaining agent” for
the unit employees. An earlier agreement between the Union and predecessor employer EMCOR
Facilities Services Inc., which ran from April 1, 2004, to November 30, 2008, contained the same
language describing the unit, except for certain differences in the language following the word
“excluding,” in the above quoted unit description. The EMCOR agreement also included a statement that
the employer acknowledged that the unit employees had authorized the Union to act as their bargaining
representative, and that the employer recognized the Union as the “exclusive bargaining representative”
for the unit. (Int. Exh. 1).
JD–32–13
4
from Local 74 to fill such positions,” but that all employees “working under this agreement,
whether members of [Electrical Workers] Local 313 or [Plumbers] Local 74, shall have their
wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment governed by this agreement.” Int. Exh. 1
and G.C. Exh. 2. Both agreements also provided for the appointment of union stewards by the
Union and for a grievance-arbitration procedure, which included the involvement of the Union’s 5
shop steward and business representative.
In addition, both agreements contained appendices setting forth separate wage and fringe
benefits, depending on whether the employees belonged to the Union or Plumbers. For example,
separate amounts to were to be paid to industry-based joint employer-union trust funds that 10
provided fringe benefits to members of the Union or Plumbers, depending on the union to which
the employee belonged. But the predecessor employers made the fringe benefit payments
directly to the Union’s trust funds, which then divided the payments between the trust funds. The
trust funds had separate employer and union trustees, but were administered by the same
company under a reciprocal agreement between the trust funds. Tr. 48-49, 54-55.15
The Present Relationship
When Respondent took over the maintenance work in November 2009, it agreed with the
Union to continue the terms and conditions of the predecessor PM Realty contract, until a 20
successor agreement was negotiated. G.C. Exh. 3. The parties met about 10 times, from October
2011 to July 2012, to negotiate a successor collective bargaining agreement. Tr. 28-29. In those
negotiations, the Union proposed to remove the language quoted above from the union security
clause (Section 7(1)), providing that membership in Plumbers complied with the union security
clause’s requirement of membership in the Union. Respondent insisted on retention of that 25
language. Both parties held to their positions throughout the negotiations and reached impasse
on that issue. Tr. 14, 29-30.
In an exchange of emails, the parties agreed to all aspects of a collective bargaining
agreement, except for the union security reference to Plumbers membership amounting to 30
compliance with membership in the Union.4 The collective-bargaining agreement eventually
ratified by Union members included two side agreements. G.C. Exhs. 4-5, 6, 7, Tr. 35-36.
Included in the side agreements was a provision that Respondent was to make contributions to
the fringe benefit funds solely to the Union’s fund administrator, who would then allocate the
applicable contributions to the appropriate union members’ funds, pursuant to reciprocity 35
agreements among the funds. The second side agreement also included a paragraph providing
that all employees covered by the bargaining agreement would be governed by its terms
regardless of union affiliation. The last sentence of that paragraph stated that “present or future
employees who are members of Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 74 may retain such membership
in their home union and are not required to become members of Local 313.” G.C. Exh. 6.40
The relevant language governing the final resolution of the bargaining agreement and the
disputed issue, is as follows:

4 The agreement included all relevant provisions of the prior agreements, including those setting forth
separate pay scales and fringe benefit payments for employees, depending on their union membership. It
also included the agency shop clause in Section 10(e).
JD–32–13
5
The parties agree that this document represents the agreement between the parties. With
the sole exception that the Union believes that the employer’s insistence on the last
sentence of Section 7(1) and the second sentence of the second paragraph of the second
side letter constitutes an insistence on a permissive subject of bargaining and the union 5
intends to file an unfair labor practice charge based on that allegation. In the event the
NLRB dismisses the charge, the contract will continue as ratified. If the NLRB holds
that the employer’s insistence on this language is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act, then those two sentences will be removed from the
contract, which shall otherwise remain in effect. To be clear, the NLRB determination 10
must be a final determination—if the Regional Director dismisses the charge, the
determination will not be final until the Union’s time to appeal the Regional Director’s
decision has expired or the appeal has been denied. If the Regional Director decides to
issue a complaint, the determination will not be final until an ALJ has heard the case and
the NLRB has accepted the ALJ’s decision. G.C. Exh. 5.15
At some point after July 26, 2012, the parties formally signed a collective-bargaining
agreement in accordance with the understandings set forth above. G.C. Exh. 8, Tr. 36-37.
Thereafter, and to the present, the parties adhered to their positions regarding Plumbers Local 74
in the union security clause and the second side letter. Tr. 38.20
Respondent’s group engineering manager, Gregory Fernandez, who was a member of
Respondent’s negotiating team, testified about Respondent’s reason for insisting on its union
security clause position with regard to Plumbers Local 74 members. In response to a question
from his counsel as to Respondent’s “basis for wanting to retain the ability to have [Plumbers] 25
Local 74 members work in the bargaining unit,” Fernandez stated that “their skill sets are
required by the equipment we service and maintain at the facility.” Tr. 56. On cross-
examination, Fernandez explained that Respondent needed both electrical and plumbing
expertise at the Delaware facilities. Tr. 57.
30
Discussion and Analysis
Parties engaged in collective bargaining are required to bargain over so-called mandatory
subjects—that is, matters that “vitally affect” wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment. Bricklayers (Daniel J. Titulaer), 306 NLRB 229, 235 (1992), citing relevant 35
authorities. As to those subjects, the parties may hold to their positions without yielding, even to
the point of impasse. But they are not required to bargain, and may not insist to impasse, on so-
called permissive subjects, although the parties may bargain about those matters and include
them in an agreement if both sides consent. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
40
It is clear that union security generally is a mandatory subject because it involves whether
employees will have to pay union dues or fees as a condition of employment. Union security
clauses requiring membership (after 31 days) in a union that is the bargaining representative of
the employees are lawful under the first proviso to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The contractual
requirement of membership as a condition of employment is, however, “whittled down to its 45
financial core.” NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
JD–32–13
6
Although union security is generally a mandatory subject of bargaining, it is also clear
that not all aspects of union security are mandatory subjects. Rather, they may involve internal
union affairs that are governed by the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, which protects
“the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.” Thus, the amount of dues and whether an initiation fee is 5
required are not mandatory subjects, but rather matters to be determined between the union and
the employees, not between the union and the employer. Pleasantville Nursing Home, 335
NLRB 961, 963-964 (2001), enfd. in relevant part, 351 F.3d. 747 (6th Cir. 2003); and Service
Employees Local 535 (North Bay Center), 287 NLRB 1223, 1225-1227 (1988), enfd. 903 F.2d.
476 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1082 (1991).10
The issue in the instant case involves drawing a line between terms and conditions of
employment and internal union affairs. See North Bay Development Disabilities Services, Inc.,
d/b/a North Bay Regional Center v. NLRB, 905 F.2d. 476, 478-479 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied
498 U.S. 1082 (1991). I find that the situation here falls on the side of internal union affairs. 15
Therefore, Respondent was not entitled to insist to impasse that “membership in good standing in
the Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union 74 shall be considered compliance with” the union
security clause that required membership in the Union, which was the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees. Nor was Respondent entitled to insist on language in the side
agreement that excused members of Plumbers Local 74 from becoming members of the Union. 20
Those provisions were permissive, not mandatory subjects. Accordingly, by insisting on them to
impasse, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Respondent’s insistence that Plumbers’ membership be considered membership for the
purposes of the union security clause flies in the face of the statutory scheme that permits union 25
security clauses in the first place. The proviso to Section 8(a)(3) that permits unions and
employers to agree to a union security clause assumes that union membership as a condition of
employment applies only to the union that “is the representative of the employees as provided in
section 9(a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
made.” Thus, the union to which payment may be contractually required is the union that is the 30
exclusive bargaining representative and party to the contract. Recognition of that limitation
precludes any effort to include as a condition of employment membership in another union that
is not the exclusive bargaining representative.
Put another way, what makes union security a mandatory subject of bargaining is its 35
requirement that payment of dues and fees to the bargaining representative may be a condition of
employment. That requirement, in turn, is based on the fact that the bargaining agent administers
the bargaining agreement on behalf of all unit employees and is entitled to financial support for
that responsibility. As the Second Circuit has stated:
40
[T]he national labor laws provide for an exclusive bargaining agent to represent each
discrete employee bargaining unit. . . . To enable these agents to fulfill their statutory
responsibility to represent all the employees while collectively bargaining with the
employer, the statutes permit the levying of mandatory dues on all employees who will
JD–32–13
7
reap the benefits of the union’s representation of them in the contract negotiations with
the employer.5
Respondent’s insistence also runs afoul of the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act,
which protects “the right of a labor organization to prescribe it own rules with respect to the 5
acquisition or retention of membership therein.” Although an employer may insist on not having
a union security clause at all, once an employer has agreed to such a clause, it has no right to
insist upon how the exclusive bargaining agent determines union membership.
Respondent’s insisted-upon proposal would weaken the independence of the incumbent 10
bargaining agent, which, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, is an important factor illustrating that a
proposal could be a permissive subject of bargaining. See Retlaw Broadcasting Co. v. NLRB,
172 F.3d. 660, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). There is no doubt that the Union is the recognized exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees. It alone has bargained for the agreements covering
the unit employees and it alone has represented the employees in grievance matters. And it alone 15
bears the cost of administering the contract. While the Union has, in the past, accepted
Plumbers’ membership as compliance with the union security clause, it did so voluntarily. But,
as counsel for the Acting General Counsel points out (Br. 15), Respondent’s insistence that
membership in Plumbers be treated the same as membership in the Union would take that
determination out of the Union’s hands. And because union membership in this context amounts 20
to financial support, Respondent’s insistence could jeopardize the Union’s ability to administer
the contract. As the Acting General Counsel further points out, that insistence has the practical
effect of forcing the Union to negotiate with Respondent over “the amount it will devote to
representation of employees . . . which is surely an internal union matter.” North Bay
Development Disabilities Services, above, 905 F.2d at 479.25
Respondent counters (R. Br. 11) that a separate agency shop clause in the collective
bargaining agreement (Section 10(e)) already provides that the Union is entitled to dues and fees
to administer the contract. Respondent’s assertion in this respect demonstrates it is interested in
something beyond financial core support or membership in the Union, the extent of its legitimate 30
concern. Otherwise, the agency shop language, to which it does not object, would suffice. Thus,
Respondent seems interested only in membership qua membership, and it insists on having a say
in how the Union determines membership. But, since the General Motors decision makes clear
that any membership requirement in a union security clause is reduced to its financial core,
Respondent has no business injecting itself into union membership beyond that financial core 35
aspect of union security. Working conditions are implicated by union security because an
employee who fails to pay the financial core aspect of union security may be discharged under
the second proviso to Section 8(a)(3). Any other benefits or aspects of union membership do not
affect working conditions, are not part of the requirements of a union security clause, and thus
amount to a permissive, non-mandatory, subject of bargaining.40
The disputed union-security language does not vitally affect working conditions in any
other respect. Respondent’s assertion that it needs the skill sets of Plumbers’ members does not
equate to a requirement that those employees remain members of Plumbers as a condition of

5 Buckley v. Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093
(1974).
JD–32–13
8
employment. Plumbers’ members may retain their membership in Plumbers if they wish, along
with that in the Union, the exclusive bargaining agent. Respondent has no greater risk of loss of
the services of Plumbers’ members than it does of any other employee who fails to pay the dues
and fees required in a union security clause. The second proviso to Section 8(a)(3) permits such
a discharge, but it also protects employees from denial of membership in the Union on the same 5
terms and conditions generally available to other members.
Nor does Respondent have any other recognizable interest in protecting membership in
Plumbers. Indeed, there is no other perceptible loss of benefits to Plumbers’ members in
requiring them to adhere to the union security clause. Whatever their union membership, 10
Plumbers’ members retain their interest in the Plumbers’ fringe benefit plans, for which they
presumably have built prior credits. Their interest in those fringe benefit plans are protected by
the collective bargaining agreement negotiated on their behalf by the Union. And their interests
in those plans are unaffected by union membership since the plans are funded by employer
contributions, and not by union dues. Should the Union not fairly represent all members of the 15
unit as their exclusive bargaining representative, the proper recourse for the affected employees
would be to file a charge, under Section 8(b)(1)(A), that the Union has not fairly represented
them.
Finally, I reject Intervener’s contention that it is a joint bargaining agent with the Union 20
for the unit involved in this case. Although there are many references to Plumbers’ members in
the applicable bargaining agreements, past and present, and their wages and benefits are
separately listed, nothing in any of the bargaining agreements involving the unit in this case
refers to joint bargaining representation. To the contrary, the agreements identify the Union as
the exclusive bargaining representative, and only the Union has bargained for and administered 25
the agreements. Indeed, Respondent itself makes quite clear that it considers the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the unit. R. Br. 9. In these
circumstances, Intervener’s contention that it jointly represents the employees is without merit.6
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW30
1. By insisting to impasse that any agreement between it and the Union include
provisions that permits employees to comply with union security obligations through
membership in Plumbers Local 74 and that members of Plumbers Local 74 are not required to
become member of the Union, which is the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees, 35
Respondent has insisted to impasse on permissive subjects of bargaining and thus violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
2. The above violations are unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act.
40

6 Any attempt to prove otherwise by extrinsic evidence would run counter to the parol evidence rule,
as it would contradict the explicit provisions of successive bargaining agreements.
JD–32–13
9
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall
order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate
the policies of the Act.5
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended7
ORDER10
The Respondent, Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from15
(a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers Local 313 in the unit described below by insisting to impasse and as a condition of
reaching agreement on non-mandatory subjects, including our proposals to include in Section
7(1) of the agreement a provision to allow employees to satisfy their union security obligation by 20
membership in Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 74 and to include in a side letter to the agreement
a statement that members of Plumbers Local 74 are not required to become members of
Electrical Workers Local 313:
All employees working at CDC 1 and CDC 2 in the classifications of Journeyman 25
Engineer, Engineer-Safety, Engineer Training, Assistant Chief Engineer, Chief Engineer,
and Apprentice Engineer, excluding supervisors, office help, and other workers coming
within the jurisdiction of other crafts, which are under contractual relationship with the
Company, and exclusions as provided by the National Labor Relations Act.
30
(b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
35
(a) Upon request, bargain in good faith with International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers Local 313 in the unit described above, without insisting to impasse and as a condition
of reaching agreement on non-mandatory subjects of bargaining.
40

7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD–32–13
10
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facilities in Wilmington
and Newark, Delaware, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”8 Copies of the notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily 5
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these 10
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since July
24, 2012.
15
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., May 6, 2013 20
____________________
Robert A. Giannasi25
Administrative Law Judge

8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain in good faith with International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers Local 313 in the unit described below by insisting to impasse and as a condition of
reaching agreement on non-mandatory subjects, including our proposals to include in Section
7(1) of the agreement a provision to allow employees to satisfy their union security obligation by
membership in Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 74 and to include in a side letter to the agreement
a statement that members of Plumbers Local 74 are not required to become members of
Electrical Workers Local 313:
All employees working at CDC 1 and CDC 2 in the classifications of
Journeyman Engineer, Engineer-Safety, Engineer Training, Assistant
Chief Engineer, Chief Engineer, and Apprentice Engineer, excluding
supervisors, office help, and other workers coming within the jurisdiction
of other crafts, which are under contractual relationship with the Company, and
exclusions as provided by the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL on request, bargain in good faith with Electrical Workers Local 313 in the unit
described above, without insisting to impasse and as a condition of reaching agreement on non-
mandatory subjects of bargaining.
CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, INC
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce
the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether
employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge
or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office
set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, 7th Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER
MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE
OFFICER, (215) 597-5394