Cook Mail Services, Inc

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jan 16, 2004

16-CA-020974 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 16, 2004)

JD(ATL)—3—04
Austin, TX

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ATLANTA DIVISION OF JUDGES

COOK MAIL SERVICES, INC.

and CASES 16-CA-20974
16-CA-21643
American Postal Workers Union 16-CA-21755
Austin, Texas Area Local 299

Michael Rank, Esq., for the General
Counsel.
Jason Boulette, Esq., for the Respondent.
Anton Hajjar, Esq., Charging Party.

DECISION

Statement of the Case

LAWRENCE W. CULLEN, Administrative Law Judge: This case was
assigned to me on November 12, 2003 by Order of Associate Chief Judge, William N.
Cates, of the Atlanta Branch Office of the National Labor Relations Board (“the Board”)
Division of Judges, by Order Accepting Stipulated Record; Waiver of Hearing;
Assignment of Judge and Establishing Briefing Date. This Order was entered pursuant to
the Parties November 10, 2003 Motion to the Administrative Law Judge to Issue
Decision Based on the Stipulated Record and Stipulation of Facts in the above-styled
cases. As grounds for the Motion the Board General Counsel, Charging Party, American
Postal Workers Union Austin, Texas Area Local 299 (“the Charging Party” or “the
Union”), Respondent Cook Mail Services, Inc. (“the Respondent” or “the Company”),
asserted the operative facts as set forth in the proposed stipulation, with attachments, are
undisputed and asserted there are specific limited issues to be decided in this matter. The
Parties stipulated that no oral testimony is necessary or desired by any of the Parties and
expressly waived a hearing before an administrative law judge (“Judge”) and urged that
the matter be assigned directly to a judge for a decision on the matter. In the Order I was
directed to prepare a decision in this matter on the Stipulated Record, with attachments
and directed to serve on the Parties my decision in this matter. In the Order the Parties
were given until close of business December 19, 2003, to file briefs on this matter.

The Record Exhibits in this case are as follows:

1(a) Charge in Case 16-CA-20974 filed on March 5, 2001
1(b) Affidavit of Service of 2(a) dated March 5, 2001

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1(c) Charge in Case 16-CA-21643 filed on January 10, 2002
1(d) Affidavit of Service of 1(c) dated January 11, 2002
1(e) Charge in Case 16-CA-21755 filed on March 1, 2002
1(f) Affidavit of Service of 1(e) dated March 1, 2002
2 Fourth Order Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of
Hearing dated April 24, 2002.
3 Respondent Cook Mail Services, Inc.’s Fourth Amended Answer
4 Settlement Agreement executed by Respondent Vice President, Jim Cook
on June 24, 2003; executed by Charging Party Representative Rick Brown
on June 26, 2002
5 February 8, 2001, termination notice regarding Robert Mata.
6 October 5, 2000, written disciplinary warning issued to Stephen Malina.
7 October 6, 2000, written disciplinary warning issued to John Bryant.
8 July 31, 2001, written disciplinary warning issued to Rick Brown.

The parties resolved several allegations alleged in these cases through an informal
settlement agreement executed by the Respondent on June 24, 2002 and executed by the
Charging Party on June 26, 2002. The specific allegations set forth in the Fourth Order
Consolidating Cases, Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing dated April 24,
2002 that are reserved from the informal Board settlement agreement are paragraphs 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12 and 13 and paragraph 24 amended to read as follows:

By the conduct described above in paragraph 13 Respondent has
been failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees and has
committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 8(a)((5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act

The allegations identified in this paragraph that were not resolved by the informal
Board settlement agreement are set out in the following paragraphs. The parties have
requested that the judge make all findings of fact and law necessary to resolve the
following allegations. The central issue in this case is whether the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) by unilaterally
terminating employee Robert Mata and issuing written disciplinary warnings to
employees Stephen Malina, John W. Bryant and Rick Brown without affording the Union
notice prior to instituting the disciplinary actions.

The parties have stipulated and I find that at all times material herein, the
Respondent has been a Texas corporation with an office in Austin, Texas and has been
engaged in the business of transporting the United States Mail, that during the past twelve
months prior to the execution of the stipulation, Respondent in conducting its business
operations, derived revenues in excess of $50,000 directly from sources located outside
the State of Texas; and the Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.

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The parties have also stipulated and I find that at all times material herein, the
Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

The parties have also stipulated and I find that at all times material herein, the
following individuals have held the positions set forth opposite their respective names
and have been supervisors of Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) and agents of Respondent within the meaning
of Section 2(13) of the Act:

Jim Cook Owner/Vice President
Sharon Cook Owner/President
Kristen Muennink Office Manager/Officer
Patrick Jarrell Assistant Transportation Manager
(until 4/12/01, thereafter
Transportation Manager)
Claude Anderson Assistant Transportation Manager
(until 4/12/01, thereafter
Director of Operations)
Bret Brock Fleet Manager
It is also stipulated and I find that the Board found in 16-RC-10226 that the
following employees of Respondent, herein called the Unit, constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
INCLUDED: Full-time truck drivers, part-time truck drivers, and mechanics.
EXCLUDED: All casual employees, dispatchers, secretaries and supervisors as
defined by the Act.

On August 9, 2000, the Union was certified as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the Unit.

At the times material herein based on Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union was the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the Unit. Although the Union and
Respondent have negotiated, there is not presently nor has there ever been a collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and Respondent.

About February 8, 2001, Respondent terminated Robert Mata. The Company did
not notify the Union prior to terminating Mata. About February 9, 2001, the Union
demanded bargaining over the termination of Mata. That same day, the Union and
Respondent bargained over the decision to terminate Mata, with Mata present. At the
conclusion of the meeting, Respondent indicated that the decision to terminate Mata
would stand. About March 7, 2001, the Company and the Union discussed Mata’s
termination further, again with Mata present. About March 9, 2001, the Company
informed the Union that Mata’s termination would still stand.

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About October 5, 2000, Respondent issued a written disciplinary warning to
Stephen Malina. The Company did not notify the Union prior to issuing the warning to
Malina. The Union did not request bargaining over the warning issued to Malina.

About October 6, 2000, Respondent issued a written disciplinary warning to John
W. Bryant. The Company did not notify the Union prior to issuing the warning to
Bryant. The Union never requested bargaining over the warning issued to Bryant.

About July 31, 2001, Respondent issued a written disciplinary warning to Rick
Brown. The Company did not notify the Union prior to issuing the warning to Brown.
About October 12, 2001, the Union requested that the Company bargain over the warning
issued to Brown. About October 22, 2001, the Company agreed to bargain with the
Union over the discipline of Brown and asked the Union when and where it would like to
meet. The Union did not follow up on the Company’s offer to bargain over Brown’s
discipline because the Union believed it would be an exercise in futility to change the
Company’s mind after-the-fact.

Each employment action taken by Respondent as described above is a disciplinary
action. Respondent exercised discretion when it implemented each act of discipline. The
disciplinary actions were taken consistent with Respondent’s disciplinary practices as
they existed prior to August 9, 2000. There is no allegation that Respondent made
unilateral changes in its disciplinary practices or that its exercise of discretion was
motivated by antiunion animus. The only issue in dispute is whether the Company was
obliged to notify the Union in advance of and to give the Union an opportunity to bargain
in advance over the disciplinary actions.

After the Union was certified as the bargaining representative of the Unit, the
Union:

(a) Engaged in collective bargaining with Respondent regarding discipline
and termination of Unit employees during the parties’ collective
bargaining negotiations.

(b) Did not agree at any time that Respondent had the sole and exclusive right
to counsel, demote, suspend, discipline or discharge Unit employees.

About October 22, 2001, Respondent notified the Union that Respondent is not required
to bargain with the Union before Respondent makes disciplinary or termination decisions.
At the same time, Respondent offered to engage in after-the-fact bargaining over each of
the disciplinary actions at issue in this proceeding.

The parties request that the judge make all necessary findings of fact and
conclusions of law to determine whether Respondent, by the conduct described above,
has been failing and refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of its employees and has committed unfair labor

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practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.

The parties request that if the judge finds Respondent violated the Act, he should
order an appropriate remedy under the Act.

This stipulation is made without prejudice to any argument or contention which
any party may have as to the materiality or relevance of any facts set forth herein or
recorded in Record Exhibits one through eight inclusive.

Issue

The only issue in dispute is whether the Company was obliged to notify the Union
and give it an opportunity to bargain in advance over the disciplinary actions set out
above.

Positions of the Parties

The General Counsel asserts that the Board recently restated its long standing
doctrine that the employer must bargain with a union representing its employees before
the employer undertakes unilateral action involving mandatory subjects of bargaining
even where:

1. The union is recently certified or recognized; and
2. The employer is merely continuing to exercise the same kind of discretion
it exercised prior to the union’s certification, citing Eugene Iovine
Inc., 328 NLRB 294, 294-295, 297 (1999) enfd. mem., 242 F.3
366 (2nd Cir. 2001). This case involved the employer’s
discretionary reduction in employee work hours. The Board stated
that the discretionary reduction in employees’ hours is “precisely
the type of action over which an employer must bargain with a
newly certified union,” because, “there was ‘no reasonable
certainty’ to the timing and criteria for such a reduction.” 328
NLRB294 at 294, citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 746 (1962).
In Oneita Knitting Mills, 205 NLRB 500 (1973) the Board held
“that once employees choose to be represented by a union, their
employer may not unilaterally discontinue a discretionary merit
wage increase program. Further the employer may not continue
unilaterally to exercise its discretion in determining the amounts or
timing of the merit increases.” Washoe Medical Center, Inc., 337
NLRB. 202 at 202 (2001) citing Oneita Knitting Mills, 205 NLRB
500, 500 fn 1 (1973).

General Counsel notes that discharge and discipline are mandatory subjects of
bargaining citing Crestfield Convalescent Home, 287 NLRB 328, 328 (1987); Ryder
Distribution Resources, 302 NLRB 76, 76, 90 (1991); NK Parker Transport, Inc., 332

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NLRB 547 (2000); Venture Packaging, Inc., 294 NLRB 544, 556 and 557 (1989).
General Counsel notes also that “work rules that could be grounds for discipline are
mandatory subjects of bargaining,” and “their constituent penalties should not be
artificially severed” . . “for purposes of collective bargaining under the Act.” Praxair,
Inc., 317 NLRB 435, 436 (1995). General Counsel notes also that the employer’s duty to
bargain, before continuing to implement discretionary policies or implementing
discretionary policies or implementing changes related to mandatory subjects of
bargaining, is a duty to notify the union and provide a reasonable opportunity to bargain
prior to engaging in action, citing, Garret Flexible Products, Inc., 276 NLRB 704 (1985).

The General Counsel relies on Washoe Medical Center, supra, which he contends
affirmed that an employer has a duty to bargain before implementing discretionary
discipline. In Washoe the Board found the employer did not breach its duty to bargain
before implementing specific discipline against specific employees because “[t]he record
does not establish that the Union at any time sought to engage in such before-the-fact
bargaining.” General Counsel argues that the Board recognized the existence of the
employer’s duty to bargain before the planned imposition of specific discipline on
particular employees, but simply held that the record facts in Washoe did not constitute a
violation of the duty. The Board’s analytical approach in Washoe regarding the
employer’s duty to engage in pre-discipline bargaining does not relieve the employer of
its duty to give notice and an opportunity to bargain to the Union prior to implementing
discipline, but simply concludes that the union never sought pre-discipline bargaining at
any time. The Judge in Washoe relied on four facts to support the conclusion that the
union never sought pre-discipline bargaining at any time:

1. The union never requested bargaining over any of the employee discipline
and only sought to assist certain employees in protesting their discipline through
utilization of the internal company appeal process;

2. The union failed to request bargaining regarding the discipline after it had
actual notice of it;

3. The absence of record evidence that the employer would have refused to
bargain upon request; and

4. The union agreed to a management rights and discipline provision during
negotiations giving the employer the sole and exclusive right to counsel, demote,
suspend, discipline or discharge employees.

General Counsel urges that the Board found the employer had not breached its
duty to engage in pre-discipline bargaining because the union had not sought pre-
disciplinary bargaining at any time. The Board essentially found that the union had
waived its right to bargain with the employer before the employer implemented
discretionary discipline because the Union failed to seek bargaining regarding the
discipline at any time. The Union, in the instant case before me, did not waive its right to
bargain regarding the discipline of the Unit employees and did not agree to a

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management rights and discipline provision during negotiations giving the Respondent
the sole and exclusive right to counsel, demote, suspend, discipline or discharge
employees. The Union in the instant case sought pre-discipline bargaining with
Respondent during the parties initial collective bargaining negotiations and filed NLRB
charges as early as March 5, 2001, alleging the Respondent in that case violated the Act
by failing to bargain over the discipline. General Counsel further urges that it is
determinative in finding a violation that the Respondent, in this case, has expressly stated
it does not have a duty to bargain with the Union before making disciplinary or
termination decisions.

The Charging Party asserts that it has long been recognized that the appropriate
time for employers and unions to meet and confer with respect to proposed changes in
terms and conditions of employment is before the changes are implemented, citing May
Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 284-384 (1945). “The rule that requires an employer
to negotiate with the union before changing the working conditions in the bargaining unit
is intended to prevent the employer from undermining the union by taking steps which
suggest to the workers that it is powerless to protect them.” NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg.
Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1090 (7th Cir. 1987). “It is a settled rule that once a union has been
chosen as the employees’ representative, terminations or suspensions of employment are
not a management prerogative but are a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.”
Until the labor agreement sets out the procedures to be followed, an employer that wants
to [terminate or suspend] employees must bargain over the matter with the union.”
Advertisers Mfg. Co., at 1090. The Board stated in Eugene Iovine, 328 NLRB at 297 that
“unlimited discretion is not ‘a practice’ which has evolved into a term or condition of
employment.” Charging Party also cites Washoe Medical Center, supra, as having
applied its settled understanding that the imposition of discretionary discipline is subject
to bargaining even if the disciplinary action does not constitute a change in the
employer’s policies and procedures. In Washoe the union “waived any right to bargain. .
. by its failure to request bargaining about discipline of which it had actual notice.” 337
NLRB No. 32 P. 25, citing Washoe 11 at 337 NLRB No. 149 (2002).

The Respondent contends that the Act does not impose a duty to notify the Union
of an intent to discipline nor does it impose a duty to bargain in advance with the Union
over decision to discipline, citing The Trading Post, 224 NLRB 980, 983 (1976) where
the Board held:

[W]hen, on the basis of entirely discretionary considerations, it is
determined that an employee’s output has fallen below tolerable levels, the
employer is free, without the intervention of the Act, to terminate that
employee even though the various considerations supporting that decision
were not subject to prior notification and bargaining with the exclusive
statutory representative.

Respondent also cites Bath Iron Works Corp., 302 NLRB 898, 901 (1991) where the
Board held the employer had no obligation to bargain over implementation of discipline
where the standards and sanctions for discipline did not change and Wabash Transformer

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Corp., 215 NLRB 546 (1974) where the Board held the employer did not violate Section
8(a)(5) or (1) of the Act by discharging its employees for failing to meet efficiency
standards without negotiating with the union, even though the employer had never
previously discharged an employee for inefficiency. Respondent also contends that the
consistent nature of these holdings is in perfect accord with the Supreme Court’s decision
in NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251 (1975), which held that an employee has no
Section 7 right to the presence of his union representative at a meeting with his employer
held solely for the purpose of informing the employee of, and acting upon, a previously
made disciplinary decision. Baton Rouge Water Works Co., 246 NLRB 995, 997 (1979).

Respondent contends also that if any duty to bargain over the decision to
discipline exists, it exists only on demand by the Union and contends it is undisputed that
the Charging Party Union never requested bargaining as to the Malina warning or the
Bryant warning. Respondent also contends that the Charging Party did not request
bargaining as to the Mata termination or the Brown warning until after the fact.

Analysis

It is well settled that an employer is obligated to maintain the status quo during
initial bargaining with a newly certified union. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
196 NLRB 137, enfd. 476 F.2d 850 (1st Cir. 1973). An employer must first notify and
bargain with the collective bargaining representative of its employees before he effects a
change in a mandatory subject of bargaining. NLRB v. Katz, supra. Wages, hours, terms
and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of employment. In Q-1 Motor
Expresses, Inc., 323 NLRB 767 (1997) the Board held that Section 8(d) of the Act, which
defines the duty to bargain collectively imposed by Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, requires an
employer to meet and bargain in good faith with the employees’ collective bargaining
representative with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment which are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Employers are prohibited from
changing matters related to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment
without first affording their employees’ bargaining representative a reasonable and
meaningful opportunity to discuss changes. In Davis Electric Wallingford Corporation,
318 NLRB 375, (1995) the Board held that where the union was certified as collective
bargaining representative of the employer’s engineering unit employees about six weeks
prior to the employer’s mass layoff of those employees, the employer owed a duty to the
union to notify it beforehand and to accord it an opportunity to bargain given the effect
on the unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment and the fact that the layoffs
are mandatory subjects of bargaining. The employees’ failure to do so violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. In Tocco, Inc., 232 NLRB 480 (1997) the Employer’s
unilateral implementation of a drug testing policy for the bargaining unit was violative of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act since the Employer failed to notify and bargain with the
union as this was a mandatory subject of bargaining and the testing of employees resulted
in the discharge of unit employees. In East Coast Steel, Inc., 317 NLRB 842 (1995), the
Employer’s failure to bargain with the union over its decision to lay off employees for
economic reasons and the effects of the decision was violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.

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In the instant case it is clear that the discipline of an employee, whether it
involves discharge as in the case of Mata or a written warning as in the cases of the other
three employees, is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although it is undisputed that the
employer in the instant case followed its normal practice of imposing discipline without
providing prior notice to the Union, this did not permit the unilateral imposition of
discipline which occurred here. Prior to the certification of the Union, the Employer was
under no obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to bargain to the Union.
However once the Union was certified, the Employer had an obligation under the Act to
provide notice to the Union and afford it an opportunity to bargain prior to the imposition
of discipline on these employees. The Employer’s contention, that it merely followed its
established practice by unilaterally imposing discipline on the employees, ignores the
reality of the situation which is that the employer effected a change in Matas’ status as an
employee by terminating him and effected a change in the other employees’ status as
employees and their personnel records by the imposition of discipline upon them. This is
at odds with established Board and judicial precedent which holds that an employer must
maintain the status quo during initial bargaining with a newly certified union and that the
employer must first notify and bargain with the collective bargaining representative of its
employees before it effects a change in a mandatory subject of bargaining. In Our Lady
of Lourdes Health Center, 306 NLRB 337 (1992) the Board held that where a union is
newly recognized or certified as the employees’ collective bargaining representative, the
employer must maintain in effect the current terms and conditions of employment until
negotiations result in either agreement on any proposed changes or a bargaining impasse.
The Board further held in Our Lady of Lourdes Health Center, that where an employer
contends it is merely continuing the status quo, it is not a mere continuation of the status
quo when the employer has a significant degree of discretion and takes actions which
effect changes in employees’ terms and conditions of employment rather than
maintenance of the status quo. See Bryant and Stratton Business Institute, 321 NLRB
1007, 1017-1018 (1995) where the Board held in agreement with the Administrative Law
Judge that the employer in that case had violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by
unilaterally altering its established pattern and practice of granting discretionary wage
increases and imposed a freeze of wage increases under its monetary review policy.

I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by its
unilateral imposition of the disciplinary actions taken against the employees in this case
without affording the Union notice and an opportunity to bargain concerning the
disciplinary actions. I find that the cases cited by the General Counsel and Charging
Party and particularly the Board’s decision in the recent case of Washoe Medical Center,
supra, are supportive of the finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by its unilateral actions in disciplining the above named employees without
affording the Union with notice and an opportunity to bargain. Although the cases cited
by the Respondent appear supportive of its position, they are premised on findings that
the employers in those cases were following prescribed standards whereas in the instant
case before me there were no standards for the exercise of discipline. Rather the exercise
of discipline in this case was based on the discretion of the employer. I accordingly find
that Washoe is supportive of the findings that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)

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of the Act by the unilateral discharge and issuance of written warnings imposed by it in
this case.

Conclusions of Law

1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.

2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.

3. The Respondent had an obligation to notify the Union as the certified
collective bargaining agent of its unit employees and give it an opportunity to bargain
prior to the implementation of the disciplinary actions as set out above on behalf of the
unit employees affected thereby.

4. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to
notify the Union and give it an opportunity to bargain prior to the implementation of the
disciplinary actions.

5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.

The Remedy

Having found that the Respondent has engaged in violations of the Act, it will be
recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and post the appropriate notice.

On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue
the following recommended
1
:

ORDER

The Respondent, Cook Mail Services, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Discharging and issuing written warnings to its employees without
notifying the Union and affording it an opportunity to bargain prior to
the taking of any disciplinary actions against its unit employees.

1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.

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(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of
the Act:

Within 14 days after service by the Region, post copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by
the Regional Director for Region 16, after being signed by the
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately on receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time since October 2000.

Dated at Washington, D.C.

_______________________
Lawrence W. Cullen
Administrative Law Judge

2 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the
notice reading “POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD” shall read “POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD.”

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APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.

The following employees of Respondent Cook Mail Services, Inc. constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining:

Included: Full-time truck drivers, part-time truck drivers, and mechanics.
Excluded: All casual employees, dispatchers, secretaries and supervisors
as defined by the Act.

On August 9, 2000, American Postal Workers Union Austin, Texas Area Local 299 was
certified as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the Unit.

WE WILL NOT discharge you or issue you written warnings without first notifying the
American Postal Workers Union Austin, Texas Area Local 299, (the Union) and
affording it an opportunity to bargain concerning the above disciplinary actions.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.

COOK MAIL SERVICES, INC.
(Employer)

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to
enforce the National labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine
whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair
labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the

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Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any
agent with the Board’s Regional office set forth below. You may also obtain information
from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov

819 Taylor Street – Room 8A24, Fort Worth, TX 76102-6178
(817) 978-2921, Hours: 9:15 a.m. to 5:45 p.m.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY
ANYONE.

THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM
THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR
COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE
ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (817) 978-2925.