Central Soya Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 21, 1986

281 N.L.R.B. 1308 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Central Soya Company, Inc. and American Federa-
tion of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO. Case 17-CA-
10007
21 October 1986
DECISION AND ORDER
By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
JOHANSEN, BABSON , AND STEPHENS
On 7 August 1981 Administrative Law Judge
Russell L. Stevens issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief, and the Charging Party filed an answering
brief.
The Board has considered the decision and the
-record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge' s rulings, findings," and
conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order
as modified.2
The judge found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing
recognition from the Union as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of its employees at the S.
Washington Street facility, and by refusing to
apply the existing collective-bargaining agreement
at that facility. The judge also found that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refus-
ing to bargain with the Union on request concern-
ing the effects of the relocation to the S. Washing-
ton Street facility. We agree with the judge's con-
clusion regarding both alleged violations.
Since about 1968, the Respondent owned and op-
erated a feed mill on First Street in Abilene,
Kansas, where it employed 15 employees. The Re-
spondent also owned and operated an elevator fa-
cility on Elm Street, where it employed two em-
ployees. Those 17 employees were represented by
the Union in a single unit covered by successive
collective-bargaining agreements , the most recent
of which was effective 1 July 1979 through 1 July
1982.
In July 1980 the Respondent purchased O. A.
Cooper Company, a competitor, and thereby ac-
quired a feed mill on S .' Washington Street, which
employed 13 employees who were not represented
by any labor organization . Both feed mills pro-
duced the same product-formula feed for live-
stock-using the same manufacturing processes, but
i The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge 's credibility find-
ings. The Board 's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge 's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect . Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd . 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
Y The recommended Order is modified to conform more closely to the
violations found.
the new facility was larger, had more modern
equipment, and had a greater production capacity.
In mid-September 1980 the Union's International
representative, Roe, asked the Respondent's per-
sonnel services manager, Ronnaletta, about rumors
concerning the purchase of the S. Washington
Street facility and requested that the Respondent
hold a meeting with the unit employees. The Re-
spondent held such a meeting on 9 October3 and
informed employees that the First Street facility
would be closed and that all employees would be
transferred to S. Washington Street with no reduc-
tion in pay or benefits. Meanwhile, by letter dated
7 October, the Union requested the Respondent to
meet to discuss the effects of the acquisition on unit
employees. The Union also stated its position that
the collective-bargaining agreement was binding on
the Respondent even if all the operations were
transferred to S. Washington Street. The Respond-
ent agreed to a meeting on 22 October.
On 21 October the Respondent told the unit em-
ployees that it planned to operate the S. Washing-
ton Street facility on a nonunion basis. On 22 Octo-
ber the Respondent told the Union that all employ-
ees would be given the opportunity to transfer and
that the Union would not be recognized at the S.
Washington Street facility after the transfer. Inter-
national Representative Roe stated that he dis-
agreed with the Respondent's position and would
speak to his attorney. The Respondent reiterated its
position in writing on 29 October. There were no
further communications between the parties.
On 3 November the Respondent transferred 13
employees, as well as some equipment and trucks,
from the First Street mill to the S. Washington
Street mill. Two employees were on sick leave at
the time, and they transferred to S. Washington
Street on their return to work in January and April
1981, respectively. The two employees who
worked at the Elm Street elevator facility contin-
ued to work there until the Respondent sold that
facility in April 1981 and transferred the two em-
ployees to S. Washington Street. The First Street
employees received no training at the new mill,
where they performed the same duties' under the
same supervision as they had before. The Respond-
ent's same customers were served at the old and
new mills, although the new mill had more custom-
ers.
The judge stated that his initial inquiry was
whether the S. Washington Street facility "was a
new and different one, or whether it was one for
relocation of an older facility" because, if the facili-
ty was new and different, the Respondent may not
s All dates are in 1980 unless otherwise indicated.
281 NLRB No. 173
CENTRAL SOYA CO. 1309
have had a duty to bargain with the Union there.
Applying the factors used by the Board in Cooper
Thermometer Co.,4 the judge found that, as in
Cooper, the new facility here was the old facility
relocated based on similarities in the product, man-
ufacturing process , and organization and nature of
the work force. Although noting that the new
work force was larger in size , the judge found that
the new work force was comprised "substantially"
of the transferred employees , as in Westwood Import
Co.5
The judge's next inquiry was into the majority
status of the Union at the S . Washington Street fa-
cility . Relying on his finding of relocation, the
judge found that the collective-bargaining agree-
ment followed the transferred employees to the
new mill . Further, relying on the presumption that
new employees support a union in the same pro-
portion as employees covered by an existing agree-
ment, and noting that the Respondent provided no
evidence to rebut that presumption here , the judge
found that the Union enjoyed majority status at S.
Washington Street . He therefore concluded that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
withdrawing recognition from the Union and refus-
ing to apply the collective -bargaining agreement at
S. Washington Street , as alleged.
Regarding the alleged effects-bargaining viola-
tion , the judge found that at no time following the
Union 's 7 October request to bargain did the Re-
spondent offer to bargain about the effects of the
relocation; rather , the Respondent merely an-
nounced a decision already made . The judge there-
fore concluded that the Respondent also violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to bargain over
the effects of the relocation to S. Washington
Street.
Although we would characterize the Respond-
ent's move to S. Washington Street as a consolida-
tion as well as a relocation , 6 we agree with the
judge 's finding that the S . Washington Street facili-
ty was not "a new and different one" for which the
Respondent had no duty to bargain with the
Union . In this regard , we particularly rely on the
judge's finding that there was no substantial change
in operations following the relocation/consolida-
tion .7 We also rely on the fact that the employees
4 160 NLRB 1902 (1966), enfd . in part and enf denied in part 376 F 2d
684 (2d Cir. 1967)
8 251 NLRB 1213 (1980), enfd . 681 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1982). The
Board recently cited Westwood Import with approval in Harte & Co., 278
NLRB 947 (1986).
6 The instant case therefore is distinguishable from Harte & Co, above,
and Westwood Import, above , which are exclusively relocation cases.
T Contrary to our dissenting colleague , the organization and nature of
the work force did not change simply by virtue of a mere expansion of
the unit.
transferred from the First Sreet facility-including
the two employees who were on sick leave at the
time of the move and who transferred on their
return from leave-constituted a majority of the
combined work force at S. Washington Street.8
Our dissenting colleague would find that the ac-
cretion doctrine is inapplicable in the circumstances
of this case mainly because the two groups of em-
ployees were of "approximately the same size" and
the unrepresented S. Washington Street employees
existed as a "historically separate work force." The
dissent relies on, inter alia , Renaissance Center Part-
nership, 239 NLRB 1247 (1979), and Vincent Price
Laboratories, 220 NLRB 1387 (1975). In our view,
the dissent 's reliance on those cases is misplaced.
Unlike the employees in this case , the two
groups of employees in Vincent Price performed
different operations , with different types of special-
ized equipment , in well defined and separate work
areas, and were separately supervised . Moreover,
there was no integration of work functions, nor
was there any interchange of employees between
the two groups. Thus, although the Board ac-
knowledged that the number of employeds the
union sought to add to the certified unit approxi-
mately equaled the number - which that unit con-
tained, the Board relied on its finding that , after the
move, the two groups were "presently functioning
as they originated , as two separate corporations."9
Further, unlike in Renaissance Center, above, the
employees sought to be accreted here do not nu-
merically overshadow the existing bargaining
unit.10 Moreover, the Board has never held that an
accretion cannot be found when the two groups of
employees are of approximately equal size . In fact,
the Board has effectively found valid accretions in
cases involving approximately equal size groups
even when the represented employees barely con-
stituted a majority of the combined work force.
See, e .g., Western-Davis Co." and South Coast Ter-
minals.12 See also Public Service Co. of New Hamp-
8 In this regard , we reject outright our colleague 's assertion that we
have created a new presumption extending recognition to the newly cre-
ated unit whenever a group of represented employees is merged with a
group of unrepresented employees. Rather , we find, solely on the facts of
this case , that the Union was entitled to continued recognition based on
the lack of substantial change in operations as well as the maintenance of
majority status by the Union.
8 220 NLRB at 1388.
10 In Renaissance Center, above , the unrepresented employees outnum-
bered the represented employees 67 to 59. While some factors favored an
accretion , the Board noted that it is "cautious " when the accreted group
numerically overshadows the existing unit.
11 236 NLRB 1224 (1978 ) (two employers merged and 14 union-repre-
sented employees were transferred to warehouse where 14 unrepresented
employees were retained , including 3 who would not be in the unit)
is 221 NLRB 197 (1975) (employer opened new plant and transferred
6 employees , who constituted majority of 11 employees at new plant).
1310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
shire . 13 Thus, the dissent 's reliance on the approxi-
mately equal size of the consolidated groups
glosses over the key fact of majority status and
constitutes an unexplained departure from Board
law.
The Chairman additionally relies on the so-called
balancing test set forth in the dissenting opinion in
Gibbs & COX, 14 which accords more weight to as-
suring employee choice than to fostering estab-
lished bargaining relationships . Following the ma-
jority opinion in Gibbs & Cox, which seeks to bal-
ance the two aims, we find that the balance should
be struck here in favor of the long-term bargaining
relationship covering the First Street employees,
who constitute a clear majority of the combined
work force at S. Washington Street . It is critical
that no other labor organization represented the
employees who already worked at S. Washington
Street . In these circumstances , the Respondent
should not be allowed to capitalize on the reloca-
tion to S. Washington Street to justify terminating
its long-term bargaining relationship with the ma-
jority representative . 15 As the previously unrepre-
sented employees share such an overwhelming
community of interest with the previously repre-
sented employees, we are constrained to find a
valid accretion that perpetuated the Respondent's
obligation to bargain with the Union at S. Wash-
ington Street.
Finally , we disagree with the dissent 's finding
that the Respondent provided the Union an oppor-
tunity to bargain about the effects of the move. As
found by the judge , the Respondent did not offer
to bargain , but rather announced a decision already
made with its effects already determined-i.e., that
the First Street employees would be given an op-
portunity to transfer to S. Washington Street, but
that S . Washington Street would operate nonunion.
In these circumstances , with the Respondent pre-
senting the move and the effects thereof as a fait
accompli , we cannot find that the Union had an
obligation to present counterproposals or again re-
quest bargaining as the dissent suggests . Rather, the
Respondent 's announcement "precluded such a re-
quest and clearly indicated that any attempt at bar-
gaining would have been futile ." 16 Accordingly,
we find that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by depriving the Union of the op-
13 190 NLRB 350 (1971) (employer combined five unrepresented em-
ployees with five union-represented employees)
14 280 NLRB 953 (1986)
15 Contrary to our colleague 's unsupported assertion , we do not imply
any unlawful motive to the Respondent's relocation/consolidation of fa-
cilities.
16 National Car Rental System, 252 NLRB 159, 163 (1980), enfd. in rel-
evant part 672 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir 1983).
portunity to engage in meaningful bargaining over
the effects of the move.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge as modified below and orders that the Re-
spondent, Central Soya Company, Inc., Abilene,
Kansas, its officers , agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Order as modi-
fied.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b).
"(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the
Union relative to the effects on employees of the
Respondent 's relocation/consolidation of its facility
on First Street with is facility on S. Washington
Street in Abilene, Kansas."
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
"(b) On request , bargain with the Union relative
to the effects on employees of the Respondent's
relocation/consolidation of its facilities on First
Street with its facility on S. Washington Street in
Abilene, Kansas."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge.
CHAIRMAN DOTSON, dissenting.
Contrary to the administrative law judge and my
colleagues , I find that the Respondent has not un-
lawfully refused to recognize the Union as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of the Respond-
ent's work force at its newly consolidated feed mill
operation at its recently acquired Washington
Street facility , and that the Respondent did not
refuse to bargain with the Union about the effects
of its consolidation of its First Street and Washing-
ton Street feed mill operations.
For about 12 years, the Respondent owned and
operated a feed mill on First Street and an elevator
facility on Elm Street in Abilene , Kansas, where it
recognized the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of its employees. The most recent
collective-bargaining agreement was effective 1
July 1979 to 1 July 1982. In mid-July 1980, the Re-
spondent became the owner of a newer and more
modern feed mill on Washington Street in Abilene.
The Washington Street facility had been operation-
al since 1975. Effective 3 November 1980 the Re-
spondent closed its First Street feed mill, and 13
bargaining unit employees were transferred from
the closed facility to the Washington Street facili-
ty.1 At the time of the transfer there were 13 em-
' Two additional employees who were on authorized sick leave were
transferred after their return to work on 25 January and 22 April 1981,
respectively . On I May 1981 the Respondent closed its elevator facility
Continued
CENTRAL SOYA CO.
ployees already working at Washington Street.
These employees historically had not been repre-
sented by any labor organization . Prior to the
transfer the Respondent informed the Union that it
would not be recognized as the representative of
the combined work force at Washington Street, al-
though the Respondent stated there would be no
loss of jobs or reduction in wages or benefits.
My colleagues and the judge find that there was
no substantial change in operations at Washington
Street following the consolidation of the First
Street and Washington Street operations , and that
the represented former First Street employees out-
numbered the unrepresented incumbent Washing-
ton Street employees-15 to 13. Based on these
findings , my colleagues affirm the judge 's conclu-
sion that the Respondent unlawfully refused to rec-
ognize the Union and apply the First Street collec-
tive-bargaining agreement at the consolidated
Washington Street facility. I disagree.
The majority has created a presumption that
when a represented group is merged with an un-
represented group , representation will extend to
the newly created unit. This is contrary to the neu-
trality mandated by the Act concerning questions
of representation. As the Supreme Court has stated:
The Act is wholly neutral when it comes to
that basic choice. By § 7 of the Act employees
have the right not only to "form, join, or
assist" unions but also the right "to refrain
from any or all of such activities."
NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270, 278 (1973).
Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be
said that the imposition of a bargaining agent on
this unit of employees even rises to the level of an
educated guess as to their wishes.
At the time of the consolidation of operations,
the Washington Street facility had a preexisting
separate work force of 13 employees to which 15
employees from First Street were added. The two
groups have been totally intergrated , and the sepa-
rate and distinct identity of neither group has been
maintained .2 Therefore, "the organization and
nature of the work force" has not, as the judge
found , remained unchanged . On the contrary, the
move materially affected the alleged bargaining
unit , as its size has virtually doubled and the em-
ployees from First Street who transferred to Wash-
and transferred two more employees to the Washington Street facility.
Inasmuch as the record indicates that at the time of the transfer and con-
solidation in November 1980, the Respondent had not decided what it
would do with the elevator facility , I do not consider these latter two
employees to be part of the consolidated Washington Street unit for pur-
poses of my analysis.
8 See Renaissance Center Partnership , 239 NLRB 1247 (1979). Compare
Republic Engraving & Designing Co, 236 NLRB 1150 (1978)
1311
ington Street are no longer an identifiable group
with interests distinct and dissimilar from those of
the Washington Street employees.
My colleagues in effect ' treat the unrepresented
Washington Street employees as an accretion to
the newly arrived represented unit from First
Street . I find the accretion doctrine to be inapplica-
ble in the instant circumstances . Ordinarily , the ac-
cretion doctrine applies to "new employees who
have common interests with members of an existing
bargaining unit and who would have been included in
the certified unit or are covered by a current collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. "$ That is not the situa-
tion here . For 5 years prior to the instant events,
the Washington Street employees comprised a sep-
arate , distinct, and historically unrepresented work
force that operated the facility to which the repre-
sented employees ultimately were transferred.
Moreover, an accretion normally is only found
where a relatively small related operation is includ-
ed or added to the coverage of a collective-bar-
gaining unit involving a larger group of employ-
ees.4 Again, that is not the situation here, as the
Washington Street group is almost exactly the
same size as the First Street unit . 5 Applications of
the accretion doctrine is improper when the accret-
ed group substantially equals the existing certified
or recognized unit , because the employees in the
accreted group are deprived of their statutory right
to express their desires concerning representation. 6
That right is fundamental and is not given its
proper significance in the result reached by my col-
leagues . Their holding resolves the status of the
a Renaissance Center Partnership, 239 NLRB at 1247 (emphasis added).
4 Hudson Berlind Corp., 203 NLRB 421 , 422 (1973)
8 Although the represented employees outnumber the unrepresented
employees by 15 to 13 , I believe the critical issue here is not whether the
Union possessed a bare majority at the Washington Street facility, but
rather, as discussed infra , where the unrepresented employees should be
deprived of their statutory right of free choice in circumstances where
they constitute approximately one-half the unit.
8 See Renaissance Center Partnership , supra See also Vincent Price Lab-
oratories, 220 NLRB 1387, 1388 ( 1975), in which the Board, in finding no
accretion , relied , inter alia, on the fact the number of employees sought
"approximately equals" the number represented . Vincent Price involved
eight represented and seven unrepresented employees . Thus, as here, rep-
resented employees only slightly outnumbered unrepresented employees.
My colleagues assert that these two cases are inapposite because in Ren-
aissance Center the unrepresented employees sought to be accreted out-
numbered the represented employees, and in Vincent Price the employees
sought to be accreted , in addition to being approximately equal in
number to the represented employees , also were more operationally dis-
tinct from the represented employees than the Washington Street em-
ployees were from the First Street employees in the instant case . My reli-
ance on these two cases is unshaken by my colleagues ' arguments, be-
cause I view these cases as standing for the fundamental principle for
which I have cited them accretion is improper where the group to be
accreted is approximately the same size as the represented group , because
the result of such an accretion would be that a substantial portion of the
overall unit would have been denied their statutory right to express their
desires about representation To the extent that cases cited by my col-
leagues support a contrary principle , I would find them to be incorrectly
decided , and would overrule them
1312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Washington Street employees without providing
them an opportunity to express their desires con-
cerning representation.
In accretion cases, the Board must balance the
right of employees to express their desire concern-
ing representation against the policy favoring conti-
nuity in collective -bargaining relationships .? As the
Board stated in Towne Ford Sales, "The Board has
followed a restrictive policy in finding accretion
because it forecloses the employees ' basic right to
select their bargaining representative ."e In Martin
Marietta Chemicals, the Board held that "[w]hen an
employer merges two groups of employees who
have been historically represented by different
unions, a question concerning representation arises,
and the Board will not impose a union by applying
its accretion policy where neither group of em-
ployees is sufficiently predominant to remove the
question concerning overall representation ."9 Inas-
much as Section 7 of the Act expressly protects the
employees' right to refrain from as well as the right
to engage in union activities , I see no reason for
applying a different standard to consolidation cases
in which one employee group was previously rep-
resented and the other was not. In this case, the
Washington Street employees had comprised a sep-
arate, distinct, and historically unrepresented work
force for approximately 5 years prior to the Re-
spondent's consolidation of the Washington Street
and First Street facilities. Following the consolida-
tion, approximately one-half of the total 28-employ-
ee work force at the consolidated Washington
Street plant was comprised of historically unrepre-
sented Washington Street employees . In these cir-
cumstances , I find that neither the represented
former First Street employees nor the unrepresent-
ed Washington Street employees are "sufficiently
predominant."10
Nevertheless, my colleagues erroneously apply
the accretion doctrine expansively and accrete this
group of historically unrepresented employees to
an approximately equal size group of represented
employees . In the circumstances of this case, where
the two groups of employees are approximately the
same size and the unrepresented group existed as a
historically separate work force at the premises to
which the represented employees were transferred,
I find ordinary principles of accretion inapplicable
and would not impose a bargaining representative
on the newly consolidated operation . I would
therefore strike the balance in favor of employee
7 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 140 NLRB 1011, 1023 ( 1963).
s 270 NLRB 311 (1984), affd . 759 F .2d 1477 (9th Cir . 1985).
270 NLRB 821, 822 (1984)
10 See Boston Gas Co., 221 NLRB 628 ( 1975), Massachusetts Electric
Co., 248 NLRB 155 (1980)
free choice, observing that "when the relevant con-
siderations are not free from doubt , it would seem
more satisfactory to resolve such close questions
through the election process.""
Recently, in Gibbs & Cox, 12 former Member
Dennis and I dissented from the plurality 's applica-
tion of the so-called "merger doctrine" 13 in a way
that effectively deprived the employees in the rela-
tively very small geographically separated appro-
priate bargaining unit in that case from ever chang-
ing or rejecting their bargaining representative.
Member Dennis and I described the majority's
result (joined in by Member Stephens) in Gibbs &
Cox as an unjustified serious impediment to the em-
ployees' full exercise of their right under the Act
to refrain from collective representation. For the
same reason, I disapprove of the result reached by
my colleagues in the instant case . Once again, they
have failed to strike the correct balance between
the general, albeit implicit, statutory policy of stabil-
ity in bargaining relationships and the express statu-
tory right of employees, set forth in Section 7 of
the Act, to refrain from collective bargaining. As
we said in our dissent in Gibbs & Cox, the purpose
of the Act is frustrated , not enhanced, when gener-
al considerations of labor policy are exalted over
specific expressions of statutory rights.14
Accordingly, I find the judge's conclusion that
the Washington Street employees are an accretion
to the former First Street unit improperly disen-
franchises the Washington Street employees. I fur-
ther find a bargaining unit limited to the former
First Street employees is no longer appropriate be-
cause of the consolidation of operations, which de-
stroyed the separate identity of the represented
work force. In these circumstances, I would not re-
quire the Respondent to recognize the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the com-
bined group of employees or apply the collective-
11 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1971).
Neither the Respondent nor the Union filed a representation petition, but
chose instead to litigate the issue.
12 280 NLRB 953 (1986)
' a In Member Stephens' view , Gibbs & Cox did not involve application
of the "merger doctrine."
14 280 NLRB 953, 958 In this context , my colleagues assert that the
Respondent "should not be allowed to capitalize " on the relocation of
the First Street facility to Washington Street "to justify terminating its
long-term bargaining relationships with the majority representative."
First , here my colleagues imply an unlawful motive to the Respondent's
consolidation of facilities that was not alleged by the General Counsel
and which was expressly rejected by the judge whose decision my col-
leagues adopt . But more importantly, my colleagues demonstrate in this
regard their flawed assessment of the competing interests in this case.
Thus, in their determination to see that this Respondent does not-from
their perspective-take advantage of the situation , they ignore , or at least
denigrate , the statutory right of the historically unrepresented Washing-
ton Street employees to choose for themselves whether they wish now to
be represented by the instant Union , by another union, or by no union at
all
CENTRAL SOYA CO. 1313
bargaining agreement to them , and I would not
find the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by its refusal to do So. 15
ib See generally General Electric Co., 170 NLRB 1272 (1968).
I also disagree with the judge 's conclusion that the Respondent violat-
ed Sec . 8(aX5) and ( 1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union
concerning the effects on employees of the move and consolidation The
Union was aware of the proposed move . By letter of 7 October 1980 the
Union requested bargaining , and the Respondent replied 10 days later
stating its willingness to discuss the matter . At a meeting held between
union and company representatives on 22 October 1980, the Respondent
explained that all employees at the closed facility would be given an op-
portunity to transfer , there would be no reduction in benefits and wages,
and the Union would not be recognized at the Washington Street facility.
The Union reiterated its position that the contract should be binding at
the new facility . The Union also requested a written statement of the Re-
spondent 's position , which was provided a week later . There is no evi-
dence that the Union made any counterproposals or thereafter even com-
municated with the Respondent with respect to a desire to discuss the
matter further In these circumstances , I find the Respondent provided
the Union with the opportunity to bargain about the effects to move and
has not violated Sec. 8 (a)(5) and (1).
Washington Street facility in Abilene, Kansas, pur-
suant to the collective -bargaining agreement be-
tween us and the Union which was in effect at the
First Street facility at the time of the
relocation/consolidation of the First Street mill
with the S. Washington Street facility.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union
relative to the effects on employees of the
relocation/consolidation of our facility on First
Street with the facility on S. Washington Street.
CENTRAL SOYA COMPANY, INC.
Constance N. Traylor, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Phillip Y. Carter, Esq., and Douglas A. Darch, Esq. (Sey-
forth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson), of Chicago, Il-
linois, for the Respondent.
Richard Helfand, Esq. (Panethiere & Helfand), of Kansas
City, Missouri, for the Charging Party.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found
that we violated the National Labor Relations Act
and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
respect to rates of pay , wages, hours of employ-
ment , and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment with American Federation of Grain Millers,
AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of our employees in the following unit:
All employees engaged in the operating activi-
ties the Employer at its Abilene , Kansas oper-
ations but excluding office or laboratory em-
ployees, superintendents, warehousemen fore-
men, watchmen and elevator foremen or inci-
dental labor not directly involved in the eleva-
tor or mill operations.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with
the Union relative to the effects on employees of
our relocation/consolidation of the facility on First
Street with our facility on S. Washington Street.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with , restrain , or coerce you in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL continue to recognize and, or request,
bargain collectively with the Union as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the employees in
the appropriate unit , including those at our S.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RUSSELL L. STEVENS, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried in Abilene, Kansas, on June 25 , 1981.1
The complaint, issued December 11, is based on a charge
filed October 31 by American Federation of Grain Mil-
lers, AFL-CIO (Union). The complaint alleges that Cen-
tral Soya Company, Inc.2 (Respondent) violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(Act).
All parties were given full opportunity to participate,
to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses , to argue orally , and to file briefs. Briefs,
which have been carefully considered , were filed on
behalf of the General Counsel and Respondent.
On the entire record , and from my observation of the
witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent , a corporation, is engaged in the manufac-
ture and distribution of domestic feed grains at various
facilities located throughout the United States, including
two facilities located in Abilene, Kansas. In the course
and conduct of its business operations within the State of
Kansas, the Respondent annually purchases goods and
services valued in excess of $50,000 directly from sources
located outside the State of Kansas , and sells goods and
services valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers
located outside the State of Kansas.
I find that the Respondent is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and
(7) of the Act.
i All dates hereinafter are within 1980 , unless stated to be otherwise.
2 The name of Respondent was amended at trial to correct the error in
the complaint, wherein the name was shown as Central Soya.
1314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
American Federation of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO is,
and at all times relevant herein has been, a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background3
From about 1968 through October 31, 1980, Respond-
ent owned and operated a feed mill at 412 W. First
Street, Abilene, Kansas, and from about 1968 through
about April 29, 1981 , owned and operated an elevator fa-
cility at 109 S. Elm Street, Abilene, Kansas.
About July 18, 1980, Respondent became the owner of
the O. A. Cooper Company, which operated a number
of feed mills and other facilities in the Midwest, includ-
ing a facility at 1000 S. Washington Street, Abilene,
Kansas.
About November 1, 1980, Respondent discontinued its
First Street feed mill operation and began operating the
S. Washington Street facility.
From about 1968 through October 31, 1980, Respond-
ent recognized the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of its production and maintenance employ-
ees and truckdrivers employed at the First Street feed
mill.
From about 1968 through about April 29, 1981, Re-
spondent recognized the Union as the collective -bargain-
ing representative of its employees employed at the Elm
Street elevator facility. Recognition of the Union by Re-
spondent has been embodied in a series of collective-bar-
gaining agreements , the most recent of which had an ef-
fective date of July 1, 1979, to July 1, 1982. The agree-
ments cover employees at both the First Street facility
and Elm Street elevator in the following unit:
All employees engaged in the operating activities of
Respondent at its Abilene, Kansas operations but
EXCLUDING office or laboratory employees, su-
perintendents , warehouse foremen, watchmen and
elevator foremen or incidental labor not directly in-
volved in the elevator or mill operations.
Effective November 3, 1980, 13 of 17 bargaining unit
employees were transferred from the First Street feed
mill to the S. Washington Street facility. Those employ-
ees were : Danny Hern , Randy Hern, Charles Holloway,
Frank Hubnik, Walter Sims, John Stewart, Louis
Thompson, Robert Emig, Gilbert Houlton, Fred Adam,
James Boileau, Roland Koepsel , and Rex Willis . Two ad-
ditional bargaining unit employees , John McVan and
Bennie Frazier, were on authorized sick leave at the time
of the transfer on November 3, 1980, and thereafter were
transferred to the S. Washington Street facility on their
return from sick leave, on January 25, 1981, and April
22, 1981 , respectively . Two additional bargaining unit
employees, Mark Barnett and Macario Gil, continued to
3 This background summary is based on stipulations of counsel, and on
credited testimony and evidence that is not in dispute
work at the Elm Street elevator facility until about April
29, 1981. About April 29, 1981, Respondent sold the ele-
vator facility located on Elm Street. About May 1, 1981,
employees Barnett and Gil were transferred to the S.
Washington Street facility.
At the time of the transfer of the 13 employees from
the First Street mill to the S. Washington Street mill, 13
employees of Respondent were engaged in production
and maintenance work and truckdriving activities at the
S. Washington Street mill . None of the 13 employees at
the S . Washington Street mill was represented by a
union or covered by any collective -bargaining agree-
ment. Those employees were : Thomas Barlow, Kenneth
Knerr, Michael Kraft, Steven Kraft, Edward Lacey,
Timothy Meece, Michael Morton, Scott Shuman, Mi-
chael Vaughn, Dan Chindamo, Ray Power, Jonathan
Sellin , and Jay Stoddard.
In mid-June 1980, a meeting of all employees then on
duty was held at the First Street mill by Kenneth Hobbs,
then Respondent 's plant manager .4 Hobbs notified the
employees that Respondent had acquired a controlling
interest in O. A. Cooper, and that the transaction at that
time was being reviewed by governmental agencies.
Approximately September 16, Howard Roe , an Inter-
national representative of the Union , called John Ronna-
letta, personnel services manager for the domestic feed
division of Respondent, on the telephone and said he had
received a telephone call from the union steward at Abi-
lene, wherein the steward said rumors were circulating
concerning the sale of a Cooper feed mill, and asked
what the effect was going to be on the employees. Roe
asked Ronnaletta to seek with his company a meeting
with employees and explain to them what their status
then was, and would be in the future . Ronnaletta said he
knew an acquisition had taken place, but that he did not
know what the status was between the two facilities.
Ronnaletta also said he believed the company still was in
the planning stage for the mill, and the Respondent may
not be able at that time to tell the employees what their
status was. Ronnaletta called Hobbs on the telephone,
and told him about the call from Roe. Hobbs then called
his superior, Gregory Gray, who was operations manag-
er for the domestic feed division of Respondent. The two
of them decided that they should meet with the employ-
ees and give them some information to allay their con-
cern . About October 9 a meeting of employees was held,
and Hobbs explained that Respondent had acquired O.
A. Cooper Company . He said the old operation on First
Street would be closed , that all employees would be
transferred to the new facility, and that all existing em-
ployees would have a job with no reduction in pay or
benefits . At the meeting, John Stewart, the union stew-
ard, asked Hobbs what training employees would be
given at the new location , and Hobbs replied that neces-
sary training would be given.
On October 7 Roe wrote a letter to Hobbs, received
by Hobbs on October 10, reading as follows:
4 Hobbs' employment with Respondent ended June 1, 1981
CENTRAL SOYA CO. 1315
October 7, 1980
Mr. Ken Hobbs, Plant Manager
Central Soya
412 West First Street
Abliene, [sic] Kansas 67410
Dear Mr. Hobbs:
The purpose of this letter is to request that your
Company meet with the Union committee to discuss
the Company 's recent acquisition of the Cooper fa-
cility and the effect it will on our bargaining unit.
This request is based on Article V, Sections 1 and 2
or the current labor agreement.
The Union believes our contract with you is
binding even if a portion or all of the operation is
transfered [sic] from the present facility to the
Cooper facility.
The Union stands ready to meet with you at the
earliest possible date . This is an absolute must as it
is wrong for either party to keep our members and
your employees in suspense not knowing what the
future holds as far as their employment is con-
cerned.
Please advise me as to your availability for the
requested meeting.
Sincerely,
/s/ Howard W. Roe
Howard W. Roe
International Representative
HR/gl
copy: N. Stewart
C. Jeffery
L. R. Jackson
Certified Mail
Return Receipt Requested
Soon after receiving the letter, Roe called Hobbs on the
telephone and said the union steward had notified him
that the employees were much less concerned after
Hobbs met with them.
On October 17 Hobbs replied to Roe's letter of Octo-
ber 7:
Please be advised that the employees are not
being kept in suspense as far as their employment is
concerned . We have told our employees that there
will be no loss of jobs, nor reduction of wages or
benefits as a result of the acquisition.
If the above time and date is not convenient for
you, please advise me. I will contact you regarding
a meeting place.
Sincerely,
/s/ Ken Hobbs
Ken Hobbs,
Plant Manager
KH/jr
cc: Mr. J. Seiler
On October 21 a meeting was held by Hobbs with the
employees . Also in attendance were Gray and James
Seiler, personnel services manager for Respondent. Gray
explained the "merger ' in detail , and stated that Re-
spondent planned to operate the new facility on S. Wash-
ington Street as nonunion because the existing employees
at that location were nonunion , and Respondent felt it
was not fair to impose a union on them without their
first having expressed their desire relative to a union.
Gray then discussed wages and benefits to be in effect at
the new location , all of which were equal to, or some-
what better than , those at the old location.
Pursuant to Hobbs' letter of October 17, a meeting
was held on October 22, attended by Hobbs, Roe, and
Seiler . Stewart did not attend because he was on vaca-
tion . Seiler stated that all employees at the First Street
location were going to be given the opportunity to trans-
fer to the S. Washington Street facility, that there would
be no reduction in benefits and wages , and that the
Union would not be recognized at the S. Washington
Street facility after the transfer was made . Seiler stated
that final plans for the Elm Street elevator had not been
completed. Roe stated that the Union 's position remained
the same as stated in Roe's letter of October 7. Roe
asked for a written statement of Respndent's position,
and Hobbs later wrote, on October 29:5
October 29, 1980
Certified Mail
Return Receipt RequestedCertified Mail
Returned Receipt Requested
October 17, 1980
Mr. Howard W. Roe
International Representative
1100 Admiral Blvd.
Room 202
Kansas City, MO 64106
Dear Mr. Roe:
As you requested in your letter of October 7,
1980, the Company is willing to meet with the
Union Committee to discuss our recent acquisition
of the Cooper facility. I would suggest that we plan
to meet on Wednesday, October 22, 1980 at 5:00
p.m.
Mr. Howard Roe
International Representative
American Federation of Grain Millers
1100 Admiral Boulevard
Room 202
Kansas City, MO 64106
Dear Mr. Roe:
As you requested, this is to confirm the Compa-
ny's position relative to the November 3, 1980
merger of the Central Soya work force into the O.
5 Seiler credibly testified that , at the meeting of October 22, Roe stated
that he disagreed with Respondent's position , but that he would talk with
his attorney about the matter Seiler and Hobbs testified that they re-
ceived no further information from Roe
1316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Cooper facility which we discussed in our meet-
ing of October 22, 1980 . It is the Company 's posi-
tion that it would be inappropriate for us to force
the Collective Bargaining Agreement on the non-
union Cooper facility . Therefore , we intend to oper-
ate the Cooper plant as non-union.
As we indicated to you in the October 22 meet-
ing, the reason for merging with the Cooper facility
is for business reasons to operate out of a much
more modern feed manufacturing facility.
Sincerely,
/s/ Ken Hobbs
Ken Hobbs,
Plant Manager
KH/jr
cc: Mr . J. Seiler
On November 3, when employees were transferred to
the S . Washington Street facility , Hobbs met with them,
and stated that he could represent the employees without
the Union.
A. Alleged Refusal to Recognize the Union
An initial inquiry is whether the facility to which em-
ployees were transferred from the First Street location
was a new and different one, or whether it was one for
relocation of an older facility , i.e., one which performed
the same function but in a different place . For, as the
National Labor Relations Board has stated in many
cases, if the facility is a new and different one, there may
not be a duty to bargain with a union that represented
employees at a location , which an employer vacated in
order to commence production elsewhere.6
No single case , or line of cases, enunciates mandatory
requirements for finding a new facility , as opposed to re-
location of an existing facility . As the Board stated in
California Footwear Co:7 "each case of this type must
therefore be decided on the basis of its own facts."
Cooper Thermometers is helpful in discussing facts
deemed by the Board to be important in case such as the
one herein . In Cooper, a move to a new plant was dictat-
ed by economic necessity .s The Board affirmed the hear-
ing examiner, who analyzed the factors involved in order
to determine whether a refusal to bargain at the new
plant was justified , and who found an 8(a)(5) violation.
Similarities found at the old and new plants were: the
same products were produced; the same basic machinery
was used ; foremen and company officials were the same;
° See, e.g, American Can Co., 218 NLRB 102 (1976), affd. 533 F 2d
180 (2d Cir. 1976), Fraser & Johnston Co., 189 NLRB 142 (1971), affd. in
part 469 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1972); General Electric Co., 170 NLRB 1272
(1968).
7 114 NLRB 765, 769 (1955), enfd. as modified in other respects 246
F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
° Cooper Thermometer Co., 160 NLRB 1902 (1966).
° There is no basis in the record for finding that the move from Re-
spondent's First Street location was occasioned by any factor other than
an economic one The General Counsel did not allege in the complaint,
nor is it found , that Respondent decided to make the move in order to
divest itself of the necessity to bargain with the Union at the S . Washing-
ton Street facility The Charging Party argues to the contrary, but that
argument is not supported by the record.
number of employees was similar ; and the two facilities
were only 25 miles apart . Dissimilarities were: there was
some reorganization and consolidation ; a quality control
department was created ; the new work flow was more
efficient . The new plant was found to be a relocation,
rather than a new facility . Here, Respondent argues that
the S . Washington Street facility is a new and different
one because (a) the equipment at the S. Washington
Street facility is significantly different from that at the
First Street facility ; (b) the work of employees at the
two facilities was significantly different . Respondent's ar-
gument is not persuasive, in view of the record, and
having in mind the guidelines of Cooper Thermometer,
supra . Those guidelines are not controlling, as indicated
by the Board in California Footwear, supra, but they do
provide an aid for analysis . Looking to the factors used
in Cooper Thermometer, (a) Stewart and Robert Emig,
who has worked for Respondent as a maintenance man
for approximately 11-1/2 years credibly testified that the
same product, i.e., formula feed for livestock, was pro-
duced both at the S. Washington Street and the First
Street facilities . That testimony was not denied by Re-
spondent . (b) Some new machinery was installed at the
S. Washington Street facility, 10 and some of the oper-
ations were computerized. Some equipment at the new
facility is more modern than that at the old facility, and
some machinery , such as pellet dies and dusters, was
interchangeable between the two facilities . Stewart credi-
bly testified , without denial or contradiction by Respond-
ent, that the manufacturing process at the two facilties,
the old and new, was the same. Emig credibly testified
that the delivery equipment (trucks) used at the First
Street facility were moved to and used by , the S. Wash-
ington Street facility . Emig credibly testified that his
duties at the new mill are the same as they were at the
old mill, i.e., repair and upkeep of machinery , and gener-
al maintenance , although an outside technician is neces-
sary for repair of computer equipment and the automatic
batching equipment , neither of which was in use at the
First Street facility. Emig credibly testified that he re-
ceived no training for his duties at the new facility. The
new facility is larger, more modern, and has a greater
production capacity than the old facility ; the buildings at
the First Street location were quite old . (c) S. Washing-
ton Street employees totaled approximately one-half the
entire complement of the two combined facilities , but the
basic functions of the new facility were the same as those
of the First Street mill. Stewart and Emig credibly testi-
fied that their supervisors were the same persons, at both
the new and the old facilities, and that the duties of em-
ployees at the old plant remained the same after moving
to the new plant. (d) Whereas in Cooper Thermometer the
new and old facilities were approximately 25 miles apart,
Respondent's two facilities involved herein were quite
close together, in the same small town. Finally, the same
customers served by Respondent 's old facility also were
served by the S . Washington Street mill. It is noted,
10 Included were new pellet mills (same function in the new as in the
old facilities), and a new conveyor system.
CENTRAL SOYA CO. 1317
however, that the new mill had more customers than the
old one , and used a new label for its product.
It is clear that the S . Washington Street facility is
larger , more modern , and more efficient than the First
Sreet facility. However, it is equally clear that the new
facility is the old facility relocated , with the addition of
some features that make it larger , more modern, and
more efficient . The product, the manufacturing process,
the organization , and nature of the work force remain
almost unchanged . The size of the work force at the new
facility is larger than that of the old one, but the two
work forces approximately were of equal size . Certainly,
the percentage of the total force at the S . Washington
Street site was comprised "substantially" of employees
transferred from First Street."
The remaining question on this issue is that of majority
status of the Union at the S. Washington Street facility.
Respondent argues that the Union did not, and could
not, show such status, but that argument is without
merit. Since the S. Washington Street facility was a relo-
cation of the First Street facility, the bargaining agree-
ment covering the latter mill followed the employees,
and the mill , when they moved.12 At the time of the re-
location , and consolidation of the two facilities, the bar-
gaining agreement covering the First Street facility was
effective. Whether the work force of First Street em-
ployees was larger than that of the S. Washington em-
ployees is irrelevant . It is presumed that new employees
support the Union in the same proportion as the employ-
ees covered by the bargaining agreement . 13 Respondent
introduced no testimony or evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption . It is found, therefore, that the Union enjoyed
the same majority status at S. Washington Street that it
had at First Street . Respondent 's withdrawal of recogni-
tion of the Union as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of employees at the S. Washington Street facility,
and its refusal to apply the existing bargaining agreement
to that facility, constitute a violation of the Act, as al-
leged in the complaint.14
B. Alleged Refusal to Bargain
The complaint alleges that Respondent refused to bar-
gain with the Union concerning Respondent 's proposed
relocation.
Respondent argues that the Union never requested that
Respondent bargain with it concerning the effects on em-
ployees of the proposed move,' s and that, in any event,
Respondent did meet with the Union, and gave it an op-
portunity to bargain , which the Union did not seize. The
record does not support that argument.
Respondent had decided approximately October 1 that
the First Street facility would be closed, and the employ-
ees transferred to S. Washington Street. That decision
11 Westwood Import Co., 251 NLRB 1213 (1980); Mass. Machine &
Stamping, 231 NLRB 801 (1977).
12 Railing Corp, 203 NLRB 355 (1973 ); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
195 NLRB 767 (1972).
13 Cain 's Generator Co, 237 NLRB 1198 (1978); S. Prawer & Co., 232
NLRB 495 (1977)
14 Mass. Machine & Stamping, supra; Rittling Corp ., supra.
15 A finding concerning bargaining about the decision to relocate is
not necessary, and is not made.
first was announced to Respondent 's employees on Octo-
ber 9 . The Union had received no notification of that de-
cision prior to October 9, yet on October 7 Roe had
asked Hobbs, by letter, to "meet with the Union commit-
tee to discuss the Company 's recent acquisition of the
Cooper facility and the effect it will have on our bar-
gaining unit ." On October 17 Hobbs agreed , by letter, to
meet with the Union on October 22. On October 21,
Gray told Respondent 's employees that the move would
be made , and that the S. Washington Street facility
would be nonunion . Orally on October 22, and by letter
dated October 29, Respondent advised the Union that
Respondent intended to operate the S . Washington Street
mill as a nonunion facility. At no time after the Union's
request did Respondent offer to bargain with the Union
concerning the effects of the move-Respondent simply
told the employees , on October 21, and the Union, on
October 22, that the move would be made, and that the
new facility would be nonunion . That was not bargain-
ing-it was no more than the announcement of a deci-
sion already made and , clearly, the decision was irrevo-
cable . Under such circumstances , Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, by refusing to bargain
with the Union as requested , concerning the effects of
the relocation.16
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with their operations de-
scribed in section I , above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and tend to lead to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I recommend that it be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom , and take certain af-
firmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
I recommend that Respondent be ordered to continue
to recognize the Union as the bargaining representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit, including those
at its facility on S. Washington Street in Abilene, Kansas,
and apply retroactively , and maintain in effect , the col-
lective-bargaining agreement with the Union that was in
force at the First Street facility, unless the parties mutu-
ally agree to do otherwise . It is also recommended that
Respondent bargain with the Union concerning the ef-
fects of the relocation of the First Street facility to the S.
Washington Street facility. Nothing in this recommenda-
tion is to be construed as permitting Respondent to de-
prive employees of any benefits they may have received
as a result of its refusal to apply the contract terms to
the employees at the S. Washington Street facility.
16 Ohio Brake & Clutch Corp, 244 NLRB 35 (1979)
1318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record , I issue the following recommend-
ed"
ORDER
The Respondent , Central Soya Co., Abilene, Kansas,
its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with respect to
rates of pay , wages, hours of employment , and other
terms and conditions of employment , with American
Federation of Grain Millers , AFL-CIO as the exclusive
bargaining representative of its employees in the follow-
ing unit:
All employees engaged in the operating activities of
Respondent at its Abilene , Kansas operations but
excluding office or laboratory employees , superin-
tendents, warehouse foremen , watchmen and eleva-
tor foremen or incidental labor not directly in-
volved in the elevator or mill operations.
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union
relative to the effects on employees of Respondent 's relo-
cation of its facility on First Street to its facility on S.
Washington Street , in Abilene , Kansas.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining , or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Continue to recognize and, on request , bargain col-
lectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of the employees in the appropriate unit, in-
cluding those at the S . Washington Street facility in Abi-
lene, Kansas , pursuant to the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between the parties which was in effect at the First
Street facility at the time of the relocation of the First
Street mill to the S . Washington Street facility, in the
manner described in the remedy section of the this deci-
sion.
(b) On request , bargain with the Union relative to the
effects on employees of Respondent 's relocation of its fa-
cility on first Street to its facility on S. Washington
Street , in Abilene, Kansas.
(c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records , timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records nec-
essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this Order.
(d) Post at its Abilene, Kansas facility copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix ." 18 Copies of the
notice , on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 17 , after being signed by the Respondent's au-
thorized representative , shall be posted by the Respond-
ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order what steps the Re-
spondent has taken to comply.
14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations , the findings , conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec . 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
18 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board " shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
*U.S. G.P .O. 1989-241-524:00001