CASINO PAUMA

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 25, 2014

21-CA-103026 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 25, 2014)

UNITED STATES OF AME
BEFORE THE NATIONAL
DIVISION OF JUDGES
CASINO PAUMA
and

UNITE HERE INTERNATIONAL UNION
Robert MacKay, Esq.,
for the General Counsel.
Scott A. Wilson, Esq.,
for the Respondent Casino
Kristin L. Martin, Esq. (Davis, Cowell & Bowe, LLP)
for the Charging Party Union
JEFFREY D. WEDEKIND
unrepresented employees of Casino Pauma
housekeeper, slot machine technician
HERE button on their uniforms
The Casino responded by distributing
personnel handbook prohibited
uniforms” other than their ID badge
also verbally threatened to suspend
they did not remove it, and actually
button (lead engineer Victor Huerta)
Finally, the Casino instructed its
employees to ensure that they did not wear any pins or stickers on their uniforms or
the future.

1 Cheryl Williams, Esq. (Williams & Cochrane, LLP), made a limited appearance on behalf
of the Pauma Band of Mission Indians solely to object to
Pauma Valley, CA
RICA
LABOR RELATIONS BOAR
, SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
Cases 21-CA-103026
21-CA-114433
.
,
.1
DECISION
, Administrative Law Judge. In April 2013,
—including two food servers and a kitchen worker,
, and lead engineer—began wearing a small
in support of the Union’s organizing campaign
a memo to all employees reminding them
wearing “any badges, emblems, buttons or pins on their
, and that they could be disciplined for doing so
or terminate the employees who wore the union button
sent an email to one employee who was seen wearing the
warning that he could be suspended if he ever did so again
managers, supervisors, and other agents to “visually
the subpoenas served on
JD(SF)–30–14
D
various
white UNITE
(shown below).
that the
. The Casino
if
.
inspect”
ID badges in
the tribe.
JD(SF)–30–14
2
UNITE HERE timely filed unfair labor practice charges against the Casino, and the
General Counsel subsequently issued the instant complaint. The complaint alleges that all of the
Casino’s foregoing actions violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
which prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of their right to form, join, or assist labor organizations.25
The Casino denies that it violated the NLRA as alleged. It contends that the statute does
not even apply to the facility, as it is undisputedly owned and operated by the Pauma Band of
Mission Indians and is located on the tribal reservation.3 Alternatively, it contends that, even if
the statute does apply, there was no violation under Board and circuit court precedent as the 10
Casino’s policy disallowing union buttons is nondiscriminatory and necessary to protect its
public image.
Following several pretrial conferences, a hearing on the foregoing issues was held on
February 10–12 in Temecula, California. The parties thereafter filed posthearing briefs on April 15
25. Having fully considered the briefs and the entire record, for the reasons set forth below, I
find that the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute and that the Casino violated the Act as
alleged.4
I. JURISDICTION20
The Board has repeatedly asserted jurisdiction over casinos notwithstanding that they are
owned and operated by tribal governments and located on reservation lands. See San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 1055 (2004), reaffd. 345 NLRB 1047 (2005), enfd. 475 F.3d
1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Government, 359 NLRB No. 25
84 (2013), pet. for rev filed No. 13–1464 (6th Cir. April 15, 2013) ; Soaring Eagle Casino &
Resort, 359 NLRB No. 92 (2013), pet. for rev filed No. 13–1569 (6th Cir. May 3, 2013); and

2 The charges were filed on April 16 and September 30, 2013, and the consolidated complaint
issued on November 22, 2013. The complaint was subsequently amended at the outset of the
hearing in certain minor respects (Tr. 15–16), and again on the third day of hearing to
specifically allege that the Casino’s handbook rule is unlawfully overbroad on its face to the
extent it prohibits union buttons (Tr. 324–325).
3 The tribe is also sometimes referred to in the record as the Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission
Indians, or the Pauma Band of Luiseno Indians. However, all parties agreed to refer to the tribe
as the Pauma Band of Mission Indians (Jt. Exh. 1; Tr. 259).
4 Specific citations to the transcript, exhibits, and briefs are included where appropriate to aid
review, and are not necessarily exclusive or exhaustive. In making credibility findings, all
relevant and appropriate factors have been considered, including the demeanor and interests of
the witnesses; whether their testimony is corroborated or consistent with the documentary
evidence and/or the established or admitted facts; inherent probabilities; and reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from the record as a whole. See, e.g., Daikichi Corp., 335
NLRB 622, 633 (2001), enfd. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003); and New Breed Leasing
Corp. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 522 U.S. 948 (1997). Where
appropriate, language and translation difficulties have also been taken into account, as well as the
effects of age and time on memory, particularly of details such as dates that would have no
importance to the witnesses themselves.
JD(SF)–30–14
3
Chickasaw Nation Casino, 359 NLRB No. 163 (2013), pet. for rev filed No. 13–9578 (10th Cir.
July 23, 2013).5
There is no basis in the record to distinguish these prior cases. The Casino is likewise a
commercial gaming and entertainment enterprise, with gross revenue of over 50 million in 5
2013,6 and the vast majority of its employees and customers are not members of the Pauma Band
or any other Native American tribe. Indeed, of the Casino’s 450–500 employees, only 5 are
members of the Pauma Band. And the Casino draws over 10 times more customers every day on
average (2900) than the Tribe’s total membership (236).
10
Further, there is no evidence that applying the NLRA would abrogate any treaty rights.
In fact, there is no treaty whatsoever between the U.S. Government and the Pauma Band (Jt.
Exh. 1; Tr. 33–35). Moreover, the Casino repeatedly assured its employees, in writing, both
before and during the relevant events here, that they were “protected” by federal law and the
NLRA. The Casino even gave employees the address and telephone number of the Board’s 15
regional office in San Diego to learn about their “rights” (CP Exhs. 6–9). 7
Nevertheless, the Casino now argues that the Board should decline jurisdiction, citing the
Pauma Band’s history of severe poverty and total dependence on the Casino’s revenue to fund
the tribe’s governmental operations. As factual support for this history, the Casino’s posthearing 20
brief references and attaches various nonrecord documents (34 in all), including federal and state
government reports, newspaper articles, an American Gaming Association report, the Pauma
Band’s own website and correspondence, and a Wikipedia page. The Casino asserts that
these documents are publicly available on the internet and that the facts therein are appropriate
for judicial notice under FRE 201 (Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts).8 25

5 See also NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 1002 (9th Cir.
2003) (affirming district court order enforcing Board subpoena against respondent tribal
organization, as jurisdiction was not plainly lacking).
6 The Casino declined to stipulate to the exact amount of its annual revenues. However, there
is no dispute, and the record establishes, that the casino’s gross revenues and interstate
transactions satisfy the Board’s commerce standards for asserting jurisdiction. See GC Exh.
1(m), and Tr. 22–28.
7 There is no contention that the Casino is equitably estopped, by its prior assurances to
employees, from now challenging the Board’s exercise of statutory or discretionary jurisdiction
to address and remedy the alleged unfair labor practices. However, pursuant to FRE 801(d)(2),
the Casino’s prior statements admitting jurisdiction, which were offered by the Union and
received into evidence without objection (Tr. 255), may properly be considered in evaluating the
Casino’s contrary arguments here. See 2 McCormick on Evidence Sec. 256 (7th ed., database
updated March 2013), and cases cited there, including Russell v. UPS, Inc., 666 F.2d 1188, 1190
(8th Cir. 1981) (prior statements or admissions of a party may properly be received and
considered under FRE 801(d)(2) even if in the form of an opinion or a conclusion of law).
8 The Casino does not contend that the facts in the attached documents may properly be
noticed as legislative or “background” facts, which are not subject to the requirements of FRE
201. See Advisory Committee’s Note to FRE 201(a), and Graham, 21B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid.
Sec. 5103.2 (2d ed. database updated April 2014).
JD(SF)–30–14
4
Such judicial notice might well be appropriate with respect to the truth of statements
contained in the cited federal and state government reports, to the extent they are not subject to
reasonable dispute as required by FRE 201 and fall within the hearsay exception for public
records under FRE 803(8) or are corroborated. See, e.g., San Manuel, 341 NLRB at 1055 fn. 3
(taking administrative notice, based in part on reliable government sources, that the casino there 5
was located on the reservation). However, as indicated by the General Counsel and the Union,
judicial notice is clearly not appropriate with respect to the uncorroborated hearsay statements
contained in the cited newspaper articles, American Gaming Association report, and Wikipedia
page, absent a showing or basis to conclude that the statements properly fall within an exception
to the hearsay rule and/or are free from reasonable dispute, i.e. that the stated facts are generally 10
known or their accuracy can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned. See Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
578 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied 131 S.Ct. 3055 (2011); and McCrary v.
Elations Co., 2014 WL 1779243 at *1 fn. 3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (unpub.). See also Rivas v.
Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 520 fn. 4 (2d Cir. 2012); and American Prairie Construction Co. v. 15
Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 797 (8th Cir. 2009), and cases cited there.
Given the Pauma Band’s ownership and operation of the Casino, judicial notice is also
inappropriate with respect to reasonably disputable statements from the tribe’s website and
correspondence supporting the Casino’s position. Cf. Passa v. City of Columbus, 123 Fed. 20
Appx. 694, 698 (6th Cir. 2005) (judge improperly took notice of city attorney’s website to
establish the truth of an adjudicative fact supporting the city’s position given that the city
attorney was a part of the city).9
In any event, it is ultimately unnecessary to decide whether it is appropriate to take 25
FRE 201 judicial notice of any or all of the 34 documents for the truth of one or more of the
statements therein. Even if such notice were taken over the objections of the General Counsel
and the Union as requested by the Casino, the prior Board decisions would still be factually
indistinguishable. See San Manuel (tribe had no resources for many years prior to the casino);
and Soaring Eagle (casino revenues constituted 90 percent of tribal income), above. See also 30
Chickasaw Nation, 359 NLRB No. 163 at fn. 4; and Little River Band, 359 NLRB No. 84 at fn. 5
(tribe’s reliance on casino revenues to fund its governmental operations and programs does not
make the casino’s operations governmental as well).10
The Casino also argues that the Board’s prior decisions are simply wrong, citing the 35
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024

9 As noted by the General Counsel and the Union, judicial notice of such documents is also
inappropriate here, at least to the extent they address how the Casino’s revenues are distributed,
given Attorney Wilson’s statements at the hearing, during discussions about unresolved
subpoena compliance issues, that the Casino would not be putting on any such evidence because
it is irrelevant. See Tr. 21–29, 36, 256–258. However, I would reach the same conclusion
regardless.
10 It is therefore likewise unnecessary to rule on the General Counsel’s and the Union’s
motions to strike Attorney Wilson’s declaration and attached exhibits, which the Casino
submitted with and cited in its posthearing brief in support of its request for judicial notice.
JD(SF)–30–14
5
(May 27, 2014).11 However, as the Casino acknowledges, the Court in Bay Mills reaffirmed its
earlier precedents (which the dissenting Justices would have overruled) addressing tribal
sovereign immunity from lawsuits by states. The Board was well aware of those precedents and
distinguished them. See, e.g., San Manuel, 341 NLRB at 1063 fn. 22 (distinguishing the Court’s
prior opinion in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 5
Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), one of the principal precedents the Court cited and followed in
Bay Mills).12
Accordingly, consistent with San Manuel et al., I find that the NLRA applies and that the
Board has jurisdiction over the dispute. See generally Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342 NLRB 378 fn. 10
1 (2004).
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
It is well established that employees have a right under the NLRA to wear union insignia,15
particularly during an organizing campaign, and that a rule prohibiting them from doing so is
unlawful unless the employer can show special circumstances justifying the restriction. Republic
Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Pay ‘n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.
1981); and Pioneer Hotel, Inc. v. NLRB, 182 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See also NLRB v.
Starbucks Corp., 679 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2012); Meijer, Inc. v. NLRB, 130 F.3d 1209, 1214 (6th 20
Cir. 1997); and NLRB v. Malta Construction Co., 806 F.2d 1009, 1022 (11th Cir. 1986). The
Board has found such special circumstances in various situations, including where the button
would unreasonably interfere with the public image the employer had established through
appearance rules as part of its business plan. See W San Diego, 348 NLRB 372, 377 (2006)
(hotel’s ban on any adornments other than minimal jewelry, pursuant to its business plan to 25
create a distinct, trendy, and chic “wonderland” atmosphere, was lawful to the extent it applied to
servers who wore professionally designed all-black uniforms and a small “W” pin while in
public areas).13

11 The General Counsel’s motion to strike the Casino’s June 2 notice of the Court’s Bay Mills
opinion is denied. The Casino’s notice is somewhat lengthy (5 pages), and thus fails to comport
with the 350-word limitation announced in Reliant Energy, 339 NLRB 66 (2003) governing such
postbriefing notices filed with the Board on exceptions to an ALJ’s decision. However, it
consists mostly of excerpts from the Court’s majority and concurring opinions. While it also
contains brief explanations why the excerpts are significant, the explanations were helpful in
understanding and addressing the Casino’s position.
12 As indicated by the following excerpt, the Board majority in San Manuel also found some
support in the Court’s opinion:
Oklahoma Tax Commission [ ], upon which our dissenting colleagues relies, is
distinguishable. At issue in that case is amenability of a tribe to suit by a State
government to collect a tax on commercial transactions on a reservation; whereas,
in the instant case, the Federal Government's regulatory power is at issue.
Moreover, the Court found that the State could hold the tribe liable for taxes on
sales by Indians to non-Indians because such liability imposed only a minimal
burden on the tribe. [485 U.S.] at 512–515.
13 As discussed in the above cited cases, the Board has also found special circumstances in
other situations not relevant here, such as where the employer showed that the size or placement
JD(SF)–30–14
6
As indicated above, the Casino’s handbook appearance rule here broadly prohibits
employees from wearing “any badges, emblems, buttons or pins on their uniforms” other than
their ID badge. Thus, it plainly encompasses union buttons and is presumptively unlawful.
Further, although many employees wear uniforms, unlike in W San Diego the Casino does not
contend that the rule is intended to prevent any variation in employee appearance or create a 5
distinct or unique look in general. Indeed, the uniforms themselves vary; some employees are
given white shirts, some are given brown shirts, and some are given purple and gray striped
shirts. In addition, employees are expressly permitted by the rule to wear other “casual business
attire” —which “includes, but is not limited to: slacks, khakis, sport shirts, skirts and dresses,
turtlenecks, and sweaters” —and they frequently wear their own pants, socks, and shoes. 10
Employees are likewise permitted by policy or practice to sport other items, including decorative
badge clips and frames of any color (including hot pink) or design (including zebra or leopard
stripes).14
Nevertheless, the Casino argues that its rule is justified because union or other 15
“emblematic” buttons containing a political or religious message might offend its customers.
The Casino asserts that, while it has permitted other, decorative items, it has consistently
required employees to remove any such “emblematic” buttons or pins, including those
supporting U.S. Troops or celebrating U.S. holidays such as Independence Day (July 4th) and
Christmas.1520
However, there are two significant problems with this argument. First, it is contrary to
the evidence, which indicates that the Casino has allowed employees to wear a variety of holiday
pins on the casino floor over the last several years.16 Moreover, the rule applies to all employees,
even though some do not work on the casino floor or around customers.17 25

of the buttons could be unsafe or cause damage, or the wording or message on the buttons could
exacerbate employee dissension.
14 R. Exh. 2; GC Exhs. 4, 7, 11; Tr. 60, 72, 82–85, 99, 102–103, 113–114, 119–121, 155,
164–165, 171, 174–177, 180, 200–201, 235–240, 308–309, 338–341, 356.
15 See Tr. 301, 314–315, 302, 334.
16 See, in addition to the record citations in fn. 14 above, Tr. 92–93, and 200–227. I discredit
the testimony of the Casino’s general manager and HR director that they simply did not notice
such items being worn by employees around customers. The general manager admitted that he is
on the casino floor for 16 hours every Friday and Saturday night, is “very aware” of employees,
and is “very hands on” (Tr. 313). The HR director likewise admitted that she walks through the
casino at least twice a day and sees a lot of employees (Tr. 354). See also Tr. 335 (everyone in
supervision is supposed to enforce the rule); and GC Exh. 5 (acknowledging that standards and
policies had been “relaxed” prior to April 2013).
17 See Tr. 307 (rule applies regardless of where employee works); and Tr. 179, 181–196 (rule
was enforced against pantry attendant who wore union button even though she works in the
kitchen all day and does not go on the casino floor). The record indicates that employees might
occasionally be seen walking to or from their cars by customers who sometimes park in the
designated employee parking area on the far side of the casino, near the rear employee entrance
(R. Exh. 1; Tr. 281–284, 294). However, there is no evidence that the Casino bars employees
from having stickers or emblems on their cars. Nor is there any evidence that customers have
complained about seeing employees wearing emblematic buttons in the parking lot.
JD(SF)–30–14
7
Second, even assuming the argument was supported by the facts, it is contrary to law.
The Board has repeatedly held that employer bans on all buttons or emblems, including union
buttons, are not justified merely because employees have contact with customers. See, e.g.,
Target Corp., 359 NLRB No. 103, slip op. at 28 (2013); P.S.K. Supermarkets, Inc., 349 NLRB
34, 35 (2007); Ark Las Vegas Restaurant, 335 NLRB 1284, 1288 (2001); Mauka, Inc., 327 5
NLRB 803, 809–810 (1999); and Nordstrom, Inc., 264 NLRB 698, 701–702 (1982). See also
Pay ‘n Save, above (rejecting employer’s similar argument that its button ban was meant to avoid
the appearance of an endorsement of a controversial position that might offend customers).
Further, there is nothing remarkable about the union button here that might arguably justify the
Casino banning it from public areas. As indicated above, the button is relatively small and does 10
not contain any vulgar or offensive language or images.18
Accordingly, consistent with the above-cited precedent, I find that the Casino violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged.19
15
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Casino Pauma is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
20
2. By maintaining a handbook rule prohibiting employees from wearing any union
buttons, and enforcing that rule by threatening to suspend or terminate employees who wore a
union button and instructing its managers, supervisors, and agents to surveil employees to see if
they were wearing a union button, Casino Pauma has interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in the exercise of their rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.25
REMEDY
The appropriate remedy for the violations found is an order requiring the Casino to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action. Specifically, the Casino will be required to 30
rescind the subject handbook rule and advise the employees that this has been done in the
manner set forth in Target Corp., above. The Casino will also be required to rescind the April
18, 2013 email it sent to Huerta about violating the rule, and to notify him in writing that this has
been done and that it will not be used against him in any way. In addition, the Casino will be
required to post a notice to employees, in both English and Spanish, assuring them it will not 35

18 Compare Leiser Construction, LLC, 349 NLRB 413 (2007), and cases cited therein. The
Union presented evidence that similar inoffensive union buttons are commonly worn by
represented employees who work in public areas at other casinos in California and Nevada (Tr.
368–412; CP Exhs. 1–5, 19–21). I credit this evidence, but would reach the same conclusion
without it based on the Board and court decisions cited above.
19 It is either stipulated or undisputed that the Casino took the alleged actions previously
described above. See Jt. Exh. 1; GC Exhs. 3, 5, 10, 13; CP Exh. 7; Tr. 42, 67–68, 91–92, 103,
116–118, 162–164, 188–195, 234, 247–248, 303–304. Although the complaint alleges that the
Casino’s April 18, 2013 email to Huerta also violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, it is
unnecessary to address this additional allegation as it would not materially affect the remedy. See
Fairfax Hospital, 310 NLRB 299 fn. 4 (1993).
JD(SF)–30–14
8
violate their rights in this or any like or related manner in the future. Finally, as the Casino
communicates with employees by email, it shall also be required to distribute the notice to
employees in that manner, as well as by any other electronic means it customarily uses to
communicate with employees.20
5
Accordingly, based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended21
ORDER
10
The Respondent, Casino Pauma, Pauma Valley, California, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
15
(a) Maintaining or enforcing a rule that prohibits employees from wearing any union
buttons or insignia.
(b) Threatening to discipline employees, either orally or in writing, for wearing any union
buttons or insignia.20
(c) Surveilling employees to see if they are wearing any union buttons or insignia.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
25
(a) Rescind its handbook rule banning employees from wearing any union buttons or
insignia.
(b) Furnish all current employees with inserts for their current employee handbooks that
(1) advise that the unlawful rule has been rescinded, or (2) provide a lawfully worded rule on 30
adhesive backing that will cover the unlawful rule; or publish and distribute to all current
employees revised employee handbooks that (1) do not contain the unlawful rule, or (2) provide
a lawfully worded rule.
(c) Within 14 days of the Board’s order, rescind and remove any reference from its files 35
to the April 18, 2013 email it sent to employee Victor Huerta about violating the rule, and, within
3 days thereafter, notify Huerta in writing that this has been done and that the email will not be
used against him in any way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Pauma Valley, 40
California copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix” in both English and Spanish.22

20 The Union’s additional request for litigation costs is denied. See Waterbury Hotel Mgmt.,
333 NLRB 482 fn. 4 (2001).
21 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules,
be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)–30–14
9
Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the notices
shall be distributed by email, as well as by other electronic means if the Respondent customarily 5
communicates with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees 10
employed by the Respondent at any time since April 1, 2013.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.15
Dated, Washington, D.C. June 25, 2014
___________ ____________________20
Jeffrey D. Wedekind
Administrative Law Judge

22 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to
a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor
Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a rule that prohibits you from wearing any union buttons or
insignia.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discipline you, either orally or in writing, for wearing any union
buttons or insignia.
WE WILL NOT watch or monitor you to see if you are wearing any union buttons or insignia.
WE WILL rescind our handbook rule banning employees from wearing any union buttons or
insignia.
WE WILL furnish you with an insert for your current employee handbook that (1) advises that
the unlawful rule has been rescinded, or (2) provides a lawfully-worded rule on adhesive backing
that will cover the unlawful rule; or publish and distribute to you a revised employee handbook
that (1) does not contain the unlawful rule, or (2) provides a lawfully-worded rule.
WE WILL rescind and remove any reference from our files to the April 18, 2013 email we sent
to employee Victor Huerta about violating the rule.
CASINO PAUMA
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
888 South Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017-5449
(213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (213) 894-5184.