Opinion
No. CV95 4003437S
October 13, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE
Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 10-39, et seq., the defendants, Anthony R. Cassetti and David Cassetti, have moved to strike the Third, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Counts of plaintiffs' First Revised Complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action for statutory recklessness against the defendants. Defendants have further moved to strike the Fourth and Eighth Counts of said Complaint on the grounds that the owner of a motor vehicle cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive or multiple damages arising out of the allegedly reckless conduct of the vehicle's operator as a matter of law. Defendants have also moved to strike plaintiffs' prayer for relief seeking double or treble damages pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs Alyce J. Thomas and Jacqueline Turner allege that they were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by defendant Anthony R. Cassetti (the "Driver") while he was operating a motor vehicle owned by his father, the defendant David Cassetti (the "Owner"), as a family car pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-182.
The plaintiffs' First Revised Complaint is in eight counts. The first four counts assert claims on behalf of the plaintiff Thomas. The First Count sounds in negligence and is against the defendant Driver. The Second Count sounds in negligence and is against the defendant Owner. The Third Count sounds in recklessness and is against the Driver. The Fourth Count sounds in recklessness and is against the Owner. The remaining four counts follow the same pattern, but are on behalf of the plaintiff Turner, who was a passenger in Thomas' vehicle. Thus, Counts Three, Four, Seven and Eight (the recklessness counts) are disputed by the defendants.
II. Standard of Review CT Page 13363
The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Connecticut Practice Book § 10-39. When considering a motion to strike, "all well pleaded facts and those necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292 (2004). The court must take the facts as they are alleged in the complaint and construe them in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff. Bhinder v. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 358, 366 (2003).III. Discussion
Plaintiffs have brought claims for recklessness and double or treble damages against each defendant pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 14-295. The statute provides as follows:
"In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle."
Defendants claim plaintiffs have alleged insufficient facts to support claims for recklessness. In Connecticut, there is a split of authority in the Superior Court as to whether plaintiffs must allege additional facts from their negligence count in order to sustain a recklessness action under Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. A majority of the courts have interpreted § 14-295 to require that a plaintiff must merely plead a violation of one of the statutes enumerated in § 14-295. Other courts have reasoned that a complaint must specifically allege facts or conduct that rises to the level of recklessness in order to assert a claim under § 14-295, and the mere assertion that a statute delineated in § 14-295 has been recklessly violated is insufficient. See O'Brien v. Daly, Superior Court, J.D. New Haven, Docket No. 4000580 (2/10/05, Zoarski, J.T.R.)
Here, plaintiffs have met both standards. In addition to alleging defendant Driver's negligence and violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 14-218a (unreasonable speed) and § 14-222 (reckless driving) and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' injuries, plaintiffs have also specified that defendant Driver made a sharp U-turn from a parked position and turned his vehicle directly into the path of oncoming traffic. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Driver recklessly disregarded the safety of the plaintiffs in that his excessive speed, coupled with the improper U-turn from a parked position on the side of the street, caused the collision. See Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Third and Seventh Counts, incorporated by reference into the Fourth and Eighth Counts. Thus, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support a claim of recklessness against defendant Driver under both the statute and at common law.
In the Fourth and Eighth Counts, plaintiffs also claim entitlement to double or treble damages against the Owner pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295, on the grounds that the Driver was operating the Owner's car with his authority and permission pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-182, also known as the "family car doctrine," which makes the Owner father presumptively liable for damages caused by the Driver son.
The longstanding common-law rule precludes imposition of liability for punitive damages on one who is only vicariously liable for the acts of another. Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 838 (2003); Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 288 (1984); and Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 379 (1899). The reasoning of Matthiessen also precludes the imposition of double or treble damages against the owner of a vehicle pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. In Matthiessen, the Court held that Connecticut General Statutes § 52-183, which makes any owner presumptively liable for "negligent or reckless operation" of his motor vehicle, does not abrogate the common-law prohibition barring the recovery of punitive damages against parties who are only vicariously liable for the acts of others. Id. at 843.
Moreover, by its plain language, § 14-295 applies only to an operator of a vehicle, and not to its nonoperating owner.
In Lyte v. Kane, Superior Court, J.D. Ansonia/Milford, Docket No. 063138 (8/25/98, Flynn, J.), ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 136), the court recognized the express application of this statute only to operators of motor vehicles: "[S]ection 14-295 of the statutes unambiguously applies to vehicles operated by a defendant. There is no need for further construction."
Plaintiffs have cited a line of cases prior to Matthiessen supporting imposition of vicarious liability for punitive damages on the owner of a motor vehicle, but these cases are clearly distinguishable. In the first place, Connecticut General Statutes § 52-182 (presumption of family car) does not include the reference to "reckless" conduct as does § 52-183 (presumption of agency in motor vehicle operation). Next, the legislature amended § 14-295 by Public Act 03-250, Sec. 2, to specifically exclude liability for punitive damages against the owner of a leased vehicle unless the owner was also the operator. And lastly, the majority of decisions rendered subsequent to this amendment and Matthiessen have precluded claims of punitive damages against the owner under both § 52-182 and § 52-183. Beyer v. McDonald, Superior Court, J.D. Fairfield, No. 566031 (1/23/04, Gordon, J.), 2004 Ct. Sup. 840; Chetty v. Pallay, Superior Court, J.D. New Haven, No. CV02 471200 (8/16/04, Arnold, J.), 2004 Ct.Sup. 12304, 37 CLR 719; Sanon v. Curcio, Superior Court, J.D. Stamford, No. CV03 195185, (9/7/04, Lewis, J.T.R.); 2004 Ct.Sup. 13283; Kelsey v. Cowern, Superior Court, J.D. New Haven, No. CV02 0470620, (5/20/05, Martin, J.), 2005 Ct.Sup. 9740; and Andrews v. Teele, Superior Court, J.D. Waterbury, No. CV03 0177457, (8/16/05, Matasavage, J.), 2005 Ct.Sup. 11953.
Accordingly, the Motion to Strike is denied as to the Third and Seventh Counts and claim for punitive damages against defendant Anthony Cassetti and is granted as to the Fourth and Eighth Counts and claim for punitive damages against defendant David Cassetti. So ordered.
The Court
By Sequino, J.