HECHT, J.

Howard Russell appeals from his convictions and sentences for second-degree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and indecent exposure. We affirm his convictions, but vacate his sentences and remand for re-sentencing.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. In September of 2000, Howard Russell was charged with second-degree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and indecent exposure for incidents that allegedly occurred from August 1998 through March 2000. All three counts alleged Russell was subject to the sexual predator enhancement pursuant to Iowa Code sections 901A.1(a) and 901A.2(1) (2001). Russell was accused of instigating sexual contact with his young grandson, including having the boy touch Russell's penis, spank Russell, and watch pornographic movies.

Following a jury trial in January 2002 Russell was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of fifty years, twenty-five years, and two years. Russell appeals, alleging (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel and (2) the district court erred by sentencing him as a sexual predator pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 901A.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Russell contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of the State's expert witness, Dr. Levitt, on the ground that her testimony exceeded the scope of the minutes of testimony. Specifically, Russell argues Dr. Levitt testified improperly about his grandson's delay in reporting the alleged abuse.

We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v. Risdal, 404 N.W.2d 130, 131 (Iowa 1987). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Russell must prove both that his trial counsel breached an essential duty and that prejudice resulted. State v. Shumpert, 554 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1996). In order to satisfy the first prong, Russell must overcome the presumption that his trial counsel's actions were reasonable and within the normal range of competency. Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, he must prove a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Thus, Russell must show that had his trial counsel objected to Dr. Levitt's testimony as exceeding the scope of the minutes of testimony, it would have been granted and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different.

A report written by Dr. Levitt was attached and incorporated into the minutes of testimony. That report stated that Russell's grandson

will be a reliable witness and will be able to recount his understanding of what his grandpa made him do to his penis and to his dog's penis, that it offended him, that he felt threatened by loss of Grandpa's friendship not to tell and that he told mom when he felt safe from Grandpa once mom questioned him because she suspected it.

Clearly the minutes of testimony indicate that Dr. Levitt intended to testify about the grandson's delay in reporting the abuse. We conclude Dr. Levitt's testimony did not exceed the scope of the minutes of testimony. Any attempt by Russell's trial counsel to raise the issue would have been unsuccessful, and thus trial counsel had no duty to object to Dr. Levitt's testimony on those grounds. We further note that Russell makes no allegation of prejudice resulting from trial counsel's failure to object.

III. Sentencing as a Sexual Predator. Russell contends the district court erred when it enhanced his sentences pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 901A (2001). Iowa Code section 901A.2(1) requires the imposition of an enhanced sentence when a person is convicted of a sexually predatory offense and has a prior conviction for a sexually predatory offense. Chapter 901A was originally enacted in 1996. In 1999, the Iowa Supreme Court decided State v. Tornquist, 600 N.W.2d 302, 307 (Iowa 1999), holding that only prior convictions which occurred after the date the statute was enacted could be used to enhance a sentence. The legislature subsequently amended section 901A.1(2), effective March 31, 2000, to define "prior conviction" as "a plea of guilty, deferred judgment, deferred or suspended sentence, or adjudication of delinquency, regardless of whether a prior conviction occurred before, on, or after March 31, 2000." Russell contends that because his instant offenses allegedly took place between August 1998 and March 2000, the amendment to the statute was not in effect, and thus the district court erred by enhancing his sentence pursuant to the amended statute.

We review a district court's application of a sentencing statute for corrections of errors at law. State v. Edgington, 601 N.W.2d 31, 32 (Iowa 1999). However, when a violation of constitutional rights is alleged, our review is de novo. State v. Gardner, 661 N.W.2d 116, 117 (Iowa 2003).

It is undisputed that Russell had a prior conviction for a sexually predatory offense in 1985. It is also undisputed that the alleged activities which are the basis of Russell's current conviction ended only a few days before the amendment to 901A took effect. The critical determination, then, is whether the March 31, 2000, amendment to 901A applies retroactively.

The State argues we should conclude the amendment to chapter 901A applies retroactively for several reasons. First, the State points out that the amendment was clearly in response to the supreme court's holding in Tornquist,and that the legislature noted the "immediate importance" of the amendment and determined it should take effect upon enactment. 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1030, § 4. Secondly, the State argues the supreme court, in State v. DeCamp, 622 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Iowa 2001), disavowed the analysis it relied upon in Tornquistto determine that only prior convictions occurring after July 1, 1996, could be used to enhance a defendant's sentence.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's disavowal of Tornquistin DeCampand the legislature's subsequent revision to chapter 901A, we determine that the law in effect at the time of Russell's alleged offenses was the original version of chapter 901A, as interpreted by Tornquist,specifically that only prior offenses committed on or after July 1, 1996, could be used to enhance a sentence. To conclude that the March 31, 2000, amendment applies retroactively would violate the ex post facto and due process provisions of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. SeeU.S. Const., art. I § 10, cl. 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 21. Accordingly, we conclude Russell's sentences were illegal. We vacate his sentences and remand to the district court for re-sentencing.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED, SENTENCES VACATED, AND REMANDED FOR RE-SENTENCING.