LARKIN, Judge

Douglas P. Seaton, James V. F. Dickey, Upper Midwest Law Center, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for appellants)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, Jacob Campion, Alec Sloan, Assistant Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Jennifer L. Olson, Best & Flanagan LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae Minnesota Public Health Association)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.

LARKIN, Judge In this remand from the Minnesota Supreme Court, appellants challenge the district court's dismissal of their petition for a writ of quo warranto, which sought to prevent enforcement of an executive order issued during a peacetime emergency declared under the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996. On the single issue that is before this court on remand, we hold that the Act authorizes the declaration of a peacetime emergency based on a public-health emergency. We therefore affirm.

FACTS

This case arises from Governor Tim Walz's declaration of a peacetime emergency under the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996, based on the COVID-19 pandemic, and his ensuing executive order that required Minnesotans to wear face coverings. See Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-01, Declaring a Peacetime Emergency and Coordinating Minnesota's Strategy to Protect Minnesotans from COVID-19 (Mar. 13, 2020); Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-81, Requiring Minnesotans to Wear a Face Covering in Certain Settings to Prevent the Spread of COVID-19 (July 22, 2020).

Appellants Drake Snell, et al. petitioned the district court for a writ of quo warranto challenging the face-covering mandate. Appellants claimed that the Governor's declaration of a peacetime emergency in response to a public-health emergency exceeded his powers under the Act and that the face-covering mandate violated their constitutional rights. Appellants challenged the mandate on several grounds, including that it constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Appellants asked the district court to enjoin enforcement of the face-covering mandate, as well as any other COVID-19 related emergency executive order issued under the Act.

Respondents, Governor Walz and Attorney General Keith Ellison, moved to dismiss appellants’ petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted respondents’ motion and dismissed the case, and appellants filed an appeal with this court. While the appeal was pending, the peacetime emergency and mask mandate ended. This court therefore dismissed the appeal as moot.

The supreme court granted appellants’ petition for further review on the mootness issue. The supreme court concluded that, although the appeal was technically moot, the legal question of whether the Act authorizes the declaration of a peacetime emergency based on a public-health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic "is functionally justiciable and an important issue of statewide significance that should be decided immediately." Snell , 985 N.W.2d at 280-81. The supreme court therefore reversed this court's decision not to exercise jurisdiction and remanded that single issue to this court for consideration of its merits. Because appellants’ other challenges to the mask mandate did not meet any of the mootness exceptions, the supreme court otherwise affirmed.

ISSUE

Does the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996 authorize the declaration of a peacetime emergency based on a public-health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic?

ANALYSIS

The Minnesota Emergency Management Act grants the governor certain "emergency and disaster powers" to address "natural and other disasters of major size and destructiveness." Minn. Stat. § 12.02, subd. 1. In particular, the governor may "make, amend, and rescind the necessary orders and rules to carry out [the Act's] provisions." Minn. Stat. § 12.21, subd. 3. The governor may use these powers during a "peacetime emergency," and any orders or rules promulgated by the governor during a peacetime emergency, if properly approved and filed, have "the full force and effect of law." Minn. Stat. §§ 12.31, subd. 3, .32. However, the governor may declare a "peacetime emergency" only if "an act of nature, a technological failure or malfunction, a terrorist incident, an industrial accident, a hazardous materials accident, or a civil disturbance endangers life and property and local government resources are inadequate to handle the situation." Minn. Stat. § 12.31, subd. 2. In declaring a peacetime emergency, the governor designated the COVID-19 pandemic an "act of nature."

Appellants’ primary argument throughout these proceedings has been that a public-health emergency like COVID-19 is not an "act of nature" within the meaning of section 12.31, subdivision 2. That argument presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Shire v. Rosemount, Inc. , 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016).

In a recent nonprecedential opinion, Hanson v. State , we addressed the precise issue presented on remand in this case: whether Governor Walz had "statutory authority to declare a peacetime emergency based on the COVID-19 pandemic." No. A22-0884, 2023 WL 1943169, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 13, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2023). Hanson had been convicted of operating a bar and restaurant during the COVID-19 pandemic in violation of certain executive orders issued by the Governor during the peacetime emergency. Id. at *1. On appeal to this court, Hanson argued that "the executive orders on which her convictions were based exceeded the governor's statutory authority" under the Act because "the governor did not have statutory authority to declare a peacetime emergency based on the COVID-19 pandemic." Id. at *2-3.

We concluded that "the COVID-19 pandemic was an ‘act of nature’ constituting a valid basis for declaring a peacetime emergency." Id. at *3. In doing so, we first looked to dictionary definitions to define "act of nature," noting that if a statute does not define a word or phrase, we must construe words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning and may consider dictionary definitions, including those in Black's Law Dictionary , when determining a phrase's plain and ordinary meaning. Id. ; Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc. , 777 N.W.2d 755, 759 n.2 (Minn. 2010) ; State v. Jama , 923 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2019).

We explained:

Black's does not define "act of nature," but its entry for "act of God" states that "act of nature" is synonymous. Black's Law Dictionary 43 (11th ed. 2019). Black's defines "act of God" as "[a]n overwhelming, unpreventable event caused exclusively by forces of nature, such as an earthquake, flood, or tornado." Id. As noted in Black's , a federal statute gives a broader definition of "act of God" that includes "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (2018). Similarly, although the American Heritage Dictionary does not define "act of nature," that dictionary defines an "act of God" as (1) "[a] violent or destructive natural event, such as a lightning strike or earthquake" or (2) "[a]n occurrence, such as a natural event, that is beyond human control and whose consequences are therefore not a basis for legal liability." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 17 (5th ed. 2011).

2023 WL 1943169, at *3.

We concluded that, given the entire context of the Act, treating the COVID-19 pandemic as an "act of nature" was consistent with those definitions, stating that this court "need not specify the precise contours of the phrase ‘act of nature’ to conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic—an unexpected and uncontrollable event caused by a naturally occurring virus—falls within the phrase's broad scope." Id. at *4-5.

Next, we rejected the argument that because a virus cannot endanger "property," as required under section 12.31, subdivision 2(a), the COVID-19 pandemic could not be an "act of nature." Id. at *4. This court once again turned to dictionary definitions, in the absence of a statutory definition, and noted that

Black's Law Dictionary defines property as "[c]ollectively, the rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible" and "[a]ny external thing over which the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment are exercised." Black's Law Dictionary 1470 (11th ed. 2019). The American Heritage Dictionary presents similarly expansive definitions of property: "Something owned; a possession"; "A piece of real estate"; "Something tangible or intangible to which its owner has legal title"; "Something tangible or intangible, such as a claim or a right, in which a person has a legally cognizable, compensable interest"; and "Possessions considered as a group." The American Heritage Dictionary

of the English Language 1412 (5th ed. 2011).

Id. Because those broad definitions include both tangible and intangible property, we declined to limit "property" to only real property. Id.

We further reasoned that the relevant question was not whether "a virus, in the abstract," endangers property. Id. at *5. Instead, because the Governor designated the COVID-19 pandemic as the basis for the emergency, the question was whether "that pandemic" endangered life and property. Id. And because it was undisputed that the COVID-19 pandemic endangered life and that it caused "major economic impacts throughout Minnesota and put Minnesotans’ housing, livelihood, and jobs at risk," we concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic endangered property. Id.

We went on to explain that "[o]ur conclusion that the COVID-19 pandemic [was] a valid basis for a peacetime emergency under the plain language of section 12.32 is confirmed by other sections in [the Act] that contemplate that a communicable disease may be the basis for a peacetime emergency." Id. Specifically,

Minnesota Statutes section 12.39 (2022) protects an individual's fundamental right to refuse treatment despite directives made during a peacetime emergency. That section also provides that individuals who refuse treatment may be placed into isolation or quarantine, but only if the individual is infected with or reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease and that communicable disease "is the basis for which the ... peacetime emergency was declared." Minn. Stat. § 12.39. Concluding that a communicable disease like COVID-19 is not a valid basis for a peacetime emergency would contradict the express language of section 12.39, violating the principle of statutory interpretation that we "consider a statute as a whole to harmonize and give effect to all its parts." See Strommen , 943 N.W.2d at 177 (quotation omitted).

Id. (footnote omitted).

Finally, although we concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic was "unambiguously within the scope of section 12.32," we nonetheless addressed arguments regarding the Act's legislative history to demonstrate that it was consistent with this court's ruling. Id. ; see Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022) (permitting courts to consider legislative history if "the words of a law are not explicit"); First Nat'l Bank of Deerwood v. Gregg , 556 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a court generally turns to legislative history only if the statute under review is ambiguous). We explained:

Hanson's legislative history argument centers on the 2005 amendments to [the Act], which removed "public health emergency" as a specific basis for declaring a peacetime emergency. H.F. 1555, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess., § 10 (5th engrossment). The 2005 amendments did remove all references to "public health emergency" throughout [the Act], including from section 12.31. H.F. 1555, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (5th engrossment). But we disagree with Hanson's conclusion that the amendments suggest the legislature's intent to disallow the declaration of a peacetime emergency based on a communicable disease. Rather, the amendments simply subsumed emergencies based on a communicable disease within the other emergencies remaining in [the Act].

Read as a whole, the amendments confirm that a communicable disease may still be a basis to declare a peacetime emergency. For example, although the legislature amended section 12.39 to remove the phrase "public health emergency," the legislature retained language

stating that a "communicable disease" may be "the basis for which the national security emergency or peacetime emergency was declared." H.F. 1555, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess., § 10 (5th engrossment). And the 2005 amendments removing "public health emergency" also added section 12.61, which provides that an "emergency plan" includes "any plan for managing an emergency threatening public health" developed by the commissioner of health, local public health agency, or other health care facilities. H.F. 1555, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess., § 12 (5th engrossment). In addition, section 12.61 similarly grants the governor specific authority to issue an emergency executive order, during a peacetime emergency, "upon finding that the number of seriously ill or injured persons" exceeds the capacity at regional hospitals. H.F. 1555, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess., § 12 (5th engrossment); Minn. Stat. § 12.61, subd. 2 (2022).

2023 WL 1943169, at *5-6 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, we concluded that "taken as a whole, the legislative history aligns with our conclusion that the governor did not exceed his statutory authority under [the Act] by declaring a peacetime emergency based on the COVID-19 pandemic." Id. at *6.

The issue in this case is not readily distinguishable from the relevant issue in Hanson . Nonprecedential opinions of this court, such as Hanson , are not binding, but they may be persuasive. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch , 502 N.W.2d 796, 800-01 (Minn. App. 1993). Appellants urge us not to follow Hanson , arguing that the Act is ambiguous and that other canons of construction compel the conclusion that the COVID-19 pandemic was not an "act of nature."

The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether a statute's language is ambiguous. 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis , 837 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Minn. 2013). If the legislature's intent is clear from the plain and unambiguous language of a statute, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant , 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). However, if a statute is ambiguous, "then we may apply the canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity." State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017).

"A statute is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." 500, LLC , 837 N.W.2d at 290. Hanson concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic was "unambiguously within the scope of section 12.32." 2023 WL 1943169, at *5 (emphasis added). Appellants argue that the phrase "act of nature" does not unambiguously include a viral outbreak. Specifically, appellants argue that the phrase "act of nature" is ambiguous because it can reasonably be interpreted to include only natural disasters "like tornadoes, floods, and blizzards, which do inherently threaten both ‘life and property.’ "

The dictionary definitions of "act of God" on which Hanson relied to define "act of nature" arguably include language supporting appellants’ argument that an event caused by human action—as opposed to natural forces—is not an "act of nature." See , e.g. , Black's Law Dictionary 43 (11th ed. 2019) ("An overwhelming, unpreventable event caused exclusively by forces of nature , such as an earthquake, flood, or tornado. " (emphasis added)); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 17 (5th ed. 2011) ("A violent or destructive natural event , such as a lightning strike or earthquake " or "[a]n occurrence, such as a natural event, that is beyond human control and whose consequences are therefore not a basis for legal liability." (emphasis added)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (2018) ("[A]n unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." (emphasis added)).

But "dictionary definitions are not binding if context suggests a different meaning." In re City of Cohasset's Decision on Need for an Env't Impact Statement for Proposed Frontier Project , 985 N.W.2d 370, 380 (Minn. App. 2023) ; see also State v. Gibson , 945 N.W.2d 855, 858 (Minn. 2020) ("[W]e are not bound by dictionary definitions when context directs us otherwise."). In Hanson , we considered the context in which the phrase "act of nature" is used and concluded that its meaning is unambiguous. 2023 WL 1943169, at *5 ; see also Cohasset , 985 N.W.2d at 380-81 (concluding that a term in an administrative rule was unambiguous when considered in context). For example, we noted that our plain-language approach was confirmed by other sections in the Act that "contemplate that a communicable disease may be the basis for a peacetime emergency." 2023 WL 1943169, at *5. And even though we concluded that "act of nature" is unambiguous, we noted that the Act's legislative history was consistent with our conclusion that the Act authorized a peacetime emergency based on the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at *5-6 ; see Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (providing that the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering the contemporaneous legislative history).

Appellants argue that although legislative history indicates an intent to adopt an "all hazards" approach and a pandemic "could" constitute an "act of nature" under that approach, that outcome results only "if the virus causing the pandemic is naturally occurring." Appellants assert that because the COVID-19 pandemic "most likely" originated from a laboratory leak, the resulting pandemic did not occur "naturally" and therefore was not an "act of nature." We declined to read such a requirement into the Act in Hanson , reasoning that to "require a court to identify whether any human action had contributed at all to naturally occurring forces or events" could "prove impossible to resolve" and that such a requirement "d[id] not appear in the statute." Id. at *4 n.3 ; see Great River Energy v. Swedzinski , 860 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Minn. 2015) (stating that appellate courts "cannot add words to a statute that the Legislature intentionally or inadvertently left out" (quotation omitted)).

Building on our prior reasoning, we note that all of the other grounds for declaration of a peacetime emergency listed in the Act originate from human activity: "a technological failure or malfunction, a terrorist incident, an industrial accident, a hazardous materials accident, or a civil disturbance." Minn. Stat. § 12.31, subd. 2. It is easy to imagine the ways in which those circumstances could give rise to a public-health emergency—consistent with the legislature's "all hazards" approach. Declining to recognize the COVID-19 pandemic as an "act of nature" because it may have been caused by human activity is inconsistent with the other grounds set forth in the Act and would unreasonably put form over substance. Thus, appellants’ proposed interpretation of "act of nature" is not reasonable, and we once again conclude that the phrase is not ambiguous.

The only issue raised in this case that was not addressed in Hanson is appellants’ constitutional challenge to the Act. Appellants argue that rejecting their interpretation of the Act would render the Act "unconstitutional under Article III, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution because it [would result] in the total surrender of the Legislature's powers without a threshold basis for the declaration—the Governor's say-so is enough." Appellants assert that "nondelegation problems" are inherent in respondents’ interpretation of the Act. See W. St. Paul Fed'n of Tchrs. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 , 713 N.W.2d 366, 376 (Minn. App. 2006) ("The non-delegation doctrine applies to the Minnesota legislature through the separation-of-powers provision of our state constitution."). Respondents counter that appellants’ constitutional challenge is beyond the scope of the supreme court's limited remand instruction in this case.

This court's review on remand is limited by the supreme court's remand instructions. Mortenson v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety , 918 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 2018). "A court abuses its discretion on remand when it exceeds the scope of the remand." KCP Hastings, LLC v. County of Dakota , 931 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Minn. 2019).

Appellants contend that the supreme court did not "limit the parties from arguing whether a statutory interpretation of [the Act] which extends the Governor's authority to the declaration of a public health emergency would, itself, make the statute violate Article III, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution." Appellants note that in "ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may be guided by the following presumption[ ]: ... the legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this state." Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2022) ; see Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue , 698 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn. 2005) ("[I]f the language of a law can be given two constructions, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutional one must be adopted, although the unconstitutional construction may be more natural." (quotation omitted)).

Generally, "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible." Dean v. City of Winona , 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). But an appellate court has discretion to determine an issue that is functionally justiciable if the issue presents an important question of statewide significance that should be decided immediately. Snell , 985 N.W.2d at 284. We declined to apply that exception in our previous decision in this case, relying, in part, on Limmer v. Swanson , 806 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 2011). 2021 WL 5764234, at *3-4. The Limmer court refused to apply the exception, reasoning:

The petition asks us to resolve fundamental constitutional questions about the relative powers of the three branches of our government. We generally do not decide important constitutional questions unless it is necessary to do so. The constitutional questions posed by this case are currently moot and will not arise again unless the legislative and executive branches fail to agree on a budget to fund a future biennium. In addition, the legislative and executive branches have the ability to put mechanisms in place that would ensure that the district court is not again called upon to authorize expenditures by executive

branch agencies in the absence of legislative appropriations, even if a budget impasse were to occur. Resolution of these budget issues by the other branches through the political process is preferable to our issuance of an advisory opinion adjudicating separation of powers issues that are not currently active and may not arise in the future.

806 N.W.2d at 839 (quotation and citation omitted).

On appeal to the supreme court in this case, respondents argued that the court should also decline to exercise jurisdiction because the issue "involves a question about the powers of the legislative and executive branches." Snell , 985 N.W.2d at 286. The supreme court rejected that argument, reasoning that "this case does not involve a dispute between branches of government or even an argument among government actors" and that "[t]his case does not require the courts to adjudicate the relative powers of the branches of government" or present "separation of powers concerns." Id. Instead, the supreme court said this case "is a dispute between the government on the one hand and Minnesota citizens on the other" and presents an issue of "straightforward" statutory interpretation. Id.

Appellants’ contention that review of their constitutional challenge to the Act falls within the supreme court's remand instructions is at odds with the supreme court's statement that the remanded issue "does not require the courts to adjudicate the relative powers of the branches of government or present the separation of powers concerns that animated [the] decision in Limmer ." Id. (emphasis added). If the supreme court intended this court to address the constitutional issue that appellants raised before this court—which the supreme court acknowledged in its opinion—the supreme court would have said so. See id. at 282 (noting that appellants challenged the legality of face-covering mandate on the ground that it was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). Instead, the supreme court said that this case does not present such an issue. Id. at 286. Thus, appellants’ constitutional challenge to the Act exceeds our limited scope of review on remand, and we therefore do not address it.

In sum, Hanson is highly persuasive. We therefore adopt its reasoning and conclude that the Act authorizes the governor to declare a peacetime emergency based on a public-health emergency such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

DECISION

As to the single issue that is before this court on remand, we hold that the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996 authorized the Governor to declare a peacetime emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of appellants’ petition for a writ of quo warranto.

Affirmed.