ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Mariah Gondeiro, Freedom Foundation, Shella L. Sadovnik, Sadovnik Legal PC, Olympia, WA, for Plaintiff.

Glenn Rothner, Rothner Segall and Greenstone, Pasadena, CA, Amanda C. Lynch, Scott A. Kronland, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 2015.

Anthony P. O'Brien, Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants Betty T. Yee, Xavier Becerra.

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Motions," Dkt. Nos. 23, 24) filed by Defendants Betty T. Yee, in her official capacity as State Controller of the State of California, and Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Attorney General of California ("State Defendants"), and Defendant Service Employees International Union Local 2015 ("SEIU" or "Union"), respectively. Plaintiff Kristina Semerjyan ("Plaintiff") filed oppositions and the Defendants filed replies. The Motions are GRANTED .

I. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff characterizes her Complaint as presenting a "straightforward violation of Janus , wherein the Court held that seizing union dues or fees from public employees without their consent is unconstitutional. See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) (‘ Janus ’)." Complaint ¶ 5.

Plaintiff is an In-Home Supportive Service ("IHSS") provider in Los Angeles County. Compl. ¶ 19 1. SEIU is the exclusive representative for Plaintiff and negotiates collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with public authorities across the state. Id. ¶ 14. SEIU negotiated and agreed to a CBA with the Los Angeles public authority, the Personal Assistance Services Council ("PASC"). Id. ¶ 16. California Welfare & Institutions Code § 12301.6(i)(2) requires the State Controller to deduct monies from Medicaid payments made to IHSS providers as directed by agreements between unions and county-level public authorities that administer parts of the IHSS program. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 18. SEIU is granted authority by statute to control the deduction process, and the State Controller has a statutory obligation to deduct dues from IHSS providers in amounts prescribed by SEIU. Cal. Gov. Code § 1153(a). Plaintiff contends that the State Controller does nothing to ensure that IHSS providers like Plaintiff consented to dues deductions before garnishing their wages, and instead relies on the SEIU's certification that it obtained consent. See Cal. Gov't Code § 1153(b). Plaintiff alleges that the lack of safeguards to ensure an employee's valid consent renders § 12301.6(i)(2) unconstitutional.

Plaintiff alleges that she never signed a union membership card authorizing the deduction of union dues from her paycheck, and that the Union forged her signature on a card "to justify compelling her to subsidize its political activities, in violation of the First Amendment." Compl. ¶ 6; see also id. ¶¶ 19-39 (explaining how Plaintiff came to understand she did not have to be a Union member, that she discovered that her signature on the card was forged, and her attempts to rectify the situation with the Union). Plaintiff alleges that "Controller Yee, at the behest of SEIU Local 2015 and in coordination with it, has and will deduct union dues from IHSS payments made to providers subject to SEIU Local 2015's exclusive representation and remit those monies to SEIU Local 2015. See Cal. Welf[are] & Inst. Code § 12301.6(h)(2) [sic]." Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff names Becerra as a defendant because as the Attorney General of California "he is responsible for the enforcement of state laws, including the provisions challenged in this case. Becerra is sued in his official capacity and solely for declaratory and injunctive relief." Id. ¶ 12.

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, challenging § 12301.6(i)(2) on its face and as applied, as violating her First Amendment rights, against all Defendants; (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment Rights, against all Defendants; and state law claims, all against the Union only, for (3) fraudulent concealment; (4) fraud; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6) unjust enrichment; (7) conversion; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from all Defendants, damages (compensatory and punitive), and attorneys' fees and costs. See Compl. Prayer, pp. 19-20.

The State Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, that Plaintiff's challenge to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 12301.6(i)(2) is not justiciable, that the § 1983 claims fail because Plaintiff has not alleged any state action, and that the challenge to § 12301.6(i)(2) otherwise fails. The Union moves to dismiss on the ground that the § 1983 claims do not allege state action, that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek prospective relief, and that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims, which all arise under state law.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

To survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must "clearly allege facts demonstrating each element" required to establish he has standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (citation omitted). To meet this standard, a plaintiff must set forth facts showing he "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. (citations omitted).

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. ("Rule") 8 requires a plaintiff to present a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

To defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must provide enough factual detail to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The complaint must also be "plausible on its face," that is, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A plaintiff's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. Labels, conclusions, and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). The court must make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Nordstrom v. Ryan , 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2014). But a court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Eleventh Amendment Immunizes the State Defendants from Plaintiff's Claims.

The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend XI. Under the Eleventh Amendment, "a state is immune from suit under state or federal law by private parties in federal court absent a valid abrogation of that immunity or an express waiver by the state." In re Mitchell , 209 F.3d 1111, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2000). The amendment bars suits by citizens against a state, see Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), by citizens against state agencies, see Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. , 458 U.S. 670, 684, 102 S.Ct. 3304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1982), and by citizens "against state officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment applies to bar claims under § 1983 against the State of California. See Dittman v. State of California , 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-1026 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 530 U.S. 1261, 120 S.Ct. 2717, 147 L.Ed.2d 982 (2000) ("[t]he State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court" and " § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity") (internal citations omitted).

But Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) established an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, allowing citizens to sue state officers in their official capacities "for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief ... for their alleged violations of federal law." Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown , 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). To be subject to suit under Ex parte Young , the state official " ‘must have some connection with the enforcement of the act.’ " Id. (quoting Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441 ).

Plaintiff does not dispute that her claims against the State Defendants are barred by the Eleventh Amendment unless the Ex parte Young exception applies. To allege a claim under Ex parte Young , a complaint must assert an ongoing violation of federal law and seek prospective relief. "In determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’ " Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Maryland , 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff contends that her § 1983 claims against the State overcome the Eleventh Amendment because it accuses the State Controller of violating her First Amendment rights in implementing § 12301.6(i)(2), that is, by diverting her wages to SEIU without her genuine authorization, and she seeks an injunction to stop these ongoing violations of federal law. See Opp'n (Dkt. No. 29), 6:25-7:1 (referencing Compl. ¶¶ 41-48, 102 ). Although these paragraphs allege that § 12301.6(i)(2) violates Plaintiff's First Amendment rights "because it authorizes and compels the State to deduct union dues/fees from Plaintiff's wages" without her affirmative consent (Compl. ¶ 42), the Complaint does not allege that the State continues to make these deductions from her wages. In fact, the Complaint alleges that the Union's investigator "agreed to cancel her dues deductions by December 5, 2020," id. ¶ 38, and "the State has not deducted dues from her paycheck since January 2020." Id. ¶ 39. Thus, the Complaint, filed on March 30, 2020, does not allege an ongoing violation but instead alleges that the deductions stopped as of January 2020—before this suit was even filed. And Plaintiff's opposition does not suggest that the deductions have resumed. Accordingly, the Complaint's factual allegations establish that there is no ongoing violation. Plaintiff cursorily argues that injunctive relief is necessary because the same injury could happen again and she "remains vulnerable," but Plaintiff premises this on her claim that "imminent and ongoing violation is the State Controller's taking of Semerjyan's dues with no safeguards." See Opp'n 7:17-24. But again, Plaintiff concedes that the State Control is not currently taking Plaintiff's dues, so she alleges no ongoing violation. Ultimately, Plaintiff' factual allegations establish that the State is no longer taking her dues, and there are no factual allegations establishing she somehow remains vulnerable to the practice resuming despite her history with the Union. Therefore, a "straightforward inquiry" shows that there is no ongoing violation, so the Ex parte Young exception does not apply, and Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the State Defendants are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the State Defendants fail as a matter of law, and not because her allegations are insufficient. No amendment can overcome this bar, so these claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims Against the Union Fail Because the Union Is Not a State Actor.

The Union moves to dismiss the § 1983 claims pled against it on various grounds, and urges the Court dismiss the remaining state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion is granted.

Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the Union, a private entity, allege that it violated her First Amendment right to free speech and her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights by forging her signature on the March 2014 membership and dues deduction authorization agreement, thereby causing the State to deduct dues from her pay without her genuine authorization.

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff [1] must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and [2] must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Naffe v. Frey , 789 F.3d 1030, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2015). "Dismissal of a § 1983 claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that give rise to a plausible inference of either element." Id. at 1036.

"[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments," so "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 936–37, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a plaintiff seeking to challenge a private party's conduct under § 1983 must show that "the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the State," meaning that the private party's conduct is "state action." Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma , 723 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lugar , 457 U.S. at 936-37, 102 S.Ct. 2744 ). If the conduct "is not so attributable, then there is no ‘state action’ and no violation" of the First Amendment or Due Process Clause, and no § 1983 claim. Ohno , 723 F.3d at 993.

Here, the Union is a private entity, so Plaintiff's § 1983 claims cannot proceed unless she has plausibly alleged that the Union's conduct is "state action." "In the typical case raising a state-action issue, a private party has taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and the question is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat that decisive conduct as state action. This may occur ... sometimes if [the State] knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior." Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Tarkanian , 488 U.S. 179, 192, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988). Constitutional claims may exist only "when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n. , 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).

The Supreme Court has identified "four tests for determining whether a private individual's actions amount to state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental nexus test." Franklin v. Fox , 312 F.3d 423, 444–45 (9th Cir. 2002). The "most relevant" of these are the "public function" and "joint action tests," as these tests "largely subsume" the other two. Ohno , 723 F.3d at 995 & n.13. The "public function" test "treats private actors as state actors when they perform a task or exercise powers traditionally reserved to the government," while the "joint action" test "focuses on ‘whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.’ " Id. at 996 (quoting Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) ). Plaintiff contends that the Union is state actor under both tests. See Opp'n (Dkt. No. 29) pp. 15-19. The Court addresses these tests in turn.

The Union is not a state actor under the public function test. "Under the public function test, ‘when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.’ " Lee v. Katz , 276 F.3d 550, 554-55 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Evans v. Newton , 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) ). "To satisfy the public function test, the function at issue must be both traditionally and exclusively governmental." Id. (citing Rendell–Baker v. Kohn , 457 U.S. 830, 842, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982) ). The Supreme Court "has stressed that ‘very few’ functions fall into that category." Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1929, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019). Plaintiff's argument is somewhat opaque: that the "State has partially endowed [the Union] with the governmental function of administering how the State Controller pays certain Medicaid providers," like Plaintiff. Opp'n (Dkt. 29), 19:6-14. But this characterization is too abstract to mean much. The Union's real-world conduct is that it maintains a list of union members and represents to the State that those members have authorized the State to deduct dues from their paychecks. The Union's conduct—maintaining membership lists and providing them to the State—is not a public function.

Plaintiff also argues that the Union is a state actor under the joint action test. In summary, Plaintiff contends that the State and the Union work together to have union dues deducted from providers' wages, pursuant both to § 12301.6(i)(2) and the applicable collective bargaining agreement, and therefore the Union is a joint actor with the State. The joint action test is satisfied when "the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private entity that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A. , 639 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2011). "This occurs when the state knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior." Id.

Plaintiff's argument fails for two reasons. First, as at least two California district courts have recently held in challenges to § 12301.6(i)(2), the "state officials' ministerial role in deducting dues from the wages of reported union members did not constitute the sort of ‘significant assistance,’ or actions taken in concert and effecting a constitutional deprivation, required to meet the joint action test." Quezambra v. United Domestic Workers of Am. AFSCME Local 3930 , 445 F. Supp. 3d 695, 703–04 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Quirarte v. United Domestic Workers AFSCME Local 3930 , 438 F.Supp.3d 1108, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 2020) ). The Court finds these decisions well-reasoned and is not persuaded to reach a different conclusion. Second, the specific conduct of which Plaintiff complains and that led to her claimed injuries was the Union's allegedly forgery of her membership card, and its fraudulently representing to the State that she was a member. But Plaintiff does not allege that the State participated in the forgery of her card or knew the Union fraudulently represented her membership status. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks , 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (state action where private parties conspired with judge); Harris v. City of Roseburg , 664 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1981) (state action where sheriff assisted in repossession). Rather, Plaintiff alleges that the statute, § 12301.6(i)(2), lacks safeguards sufficient to prevent fraud committed by private actors, and that the State unknowingly accepted the Union's fraudulent representation. "This is not the kind of government ‘aid’ that courts have required to constitute state action by private parties." Yates v. Washington Fed'n of State Employees , No. 3:20-CV-05082-RBL, 466 F.Supp.3d 1197, 1204, (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020) (rejecting analogous joint action argument where plaintiffs alleged a union forged her signature on form authorizing deduction of dues from her paycheck). The Court cannot conclude that the State's involvement here renders "the State [ ] responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Brentwood Acad. , 531 U.S. at 295, 121 S.Ct. 924 (original emphasis).

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's allegations do not establish that the Union was acting under color of state law or that its conduct amounted to "state action." Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain her § 1983 claims against the Union, and they must be dismissed. Because this legal defect cannot be cured by amendment, the dismissal will be with prejudice.

C. Plaintiff Also Lacks Standing to Pursue Prospective Relief Under § 1983.

Plaintiff seeks prospective relief to enjoin Defendants from "agreeing to and enforcing a procedure for dues deductions and objections to union membership/dues deductions that violates the First Amendment." Complaint p. 19 ¶ iv (Prayer for Relief). Plaintiff lacks standing to seek this relief.

A plaintiff in federal court must establish Article III jurisdiction for each form of relief that the plaintiff seeks. Davis v. FEC , 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). "At an ‘irreducible constitutional minimum,’ Article III standing requires proof (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;’ (2) of a causal connection between that injury and the complained-of conduct; and (3) that a favorable decision will likely redress the alleged injury." Alaska Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Feldman , 504 F.3d 840, 848 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). These constitutional requirements are "rigorous." Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State , 454 U.S. 464, 475, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).

"A plaintiff may challenge the prospective operation of a statute that presents a realistic and impending threat of direct injury." Davis , 554 U.S. at 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759 (citing Babbitt v. Farm Workers , 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) ). "Past wrongs, though insufficient by themselves to grant standing, are ‘evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.’ " Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. , 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons , 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ). In analyzing whether the claimed threat of future injury, courts "must be careful not to employ too narrow or technical an approach. Rather, [courts] must examine the questions realistically[,] ... reject the temptation to parse too finely, and consider instead the context of the inquiry." Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Davis , 275 F.3d 849, 867 (9th Cir. 2001) ).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the State is no longer deducting dues from her paycheck and she has not alleged any facts form which a threat of future injury could be reasonably inferred. Thus, Plaintiff has not alleged a likelihood of a concrete injury in fact, and in the absence of an injury, it further follows that a favorable decision will not give Plaintiff any redress. Plaintiff argues that the Union "could easily reinstate [her] dues deductions without authorization," Opp'n, 21:18-19, but this is pure speculation. By contrast, the Union has presented the declaration of its Member Services Director, Tom Csekey, explaining that Plaintiff is no longer a Union member, that her name was removed from the list the Union sends to the State for deduction purpose, that dues could not be deducted from Plaintiff in the future unless she authorizes the deductions in a new membership and dues authorization agreement, and that given Plaintiff's allegations of forgery, her name has been flagged in the Union's database so any future authorization associated with Plaintiff would be reviewed by Mr. Csekey before any action is taken to process her membership. See Csekey Decl. (Dkt. No. 24-2) ¶¶ 10-11. In response, Plaintiff claims there are "[n]ine other forgery cases [ ] pending against unions in various district courts, including at least one against SEIU," arguing this "pattern of practice along with the power disparity between the parties should make this Court uncomfortable trusting SEIU will keep its word." Opp'n (Dkt. No. 28) 22:5-9. But the fact that such cases exist does not mean that the allegations on which they are premised are true. Nor do they indicate a pervasive fraudulent practice by this Union that it likely to once again impact Plaintiff. Accord, Yates , 466 F.Supp.3d at 1205–06, ("Yates has not alleged a systemic problem with WFSE's procedures that would undermine the union's trustworthiness. Instead, her claim relies on the lack of independent verification by the State, which does not itself indicate pervasive misconduct by WFSE.").

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her § 1983 claims for prospective injunctive relief.

D. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the Remaining State Law Claims.

The Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims will extinguish the basis for this Court's original subject matter jurisdiction, so the Court must decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims, all of which arise under state law. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) ("[D]istrict courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."). In deciding whether to exercise its pendent jurisdiction, district courts should consider "the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 351, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) "When the balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice." Id.

Here, the federal claims will be dismissed early in the case, and all of the relevant factors weigh in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. The Court will therefore dismiss the remaining claims without prejudice so Plaintiff may refile them in state court if she chooses.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss and hereby DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II).

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining claims, all of which arise under state law. These claims are therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Plaintiff refiling them in state court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.