Summary
finding that no allegations suggested that the union's unilateral actions in reporting its membership roll or forging signatures could be attributed to the state
Summary of this case from Todd v. Am. Fed'n of StateOpinion
Case No. 8:19-cv-00927-JLS-JEM
06-03-2020
Maria QUEZAMBRA v. UNITED DOMESTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA AFSCME LOCAL 3930 et al.
Karin Moore Sweigart, Mariah Gondeiro, Freedom Foundation, Redwood City, CA, for Maria Quezambra. Scott A. Kronland, Rebecca C. Lee, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for United Domestic Workers of America AFSCME Local 3930. Jennifer R. Young, Michael L. Wroniak, Collins Collins Muir and Stewart LLP, Orange, CA, for Orange County. Lara Haddad, CAAG—Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA, for Betty T. Yee, Xavier Becerra.
Karin Moore Sweigart, Mariah Gondeiro, Freedom Foundation, Redwood City, CA, for Maria Quezambra.
Scott A. Kronland, Rebecca C. Lee, Altshuler Berzon LLP, San Francisco, CA, for United Domestic Workers of America AFSCME Local 3930.
Jennifer R. Young, Michael L. Wroniak, Collins Collins Muir and Stewart LLP, Orange, CA, for Orange County.
Lara Haddad, CAAG—Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice, Los Angeles, CA, for Betty T. Yee, Xavier Becerra.
PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss: one filed by Defendant United Domestic Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930 (Union MTD, Doc. 30), one filed by Defendants Xavier Becerra and Betty Yee (Officials MTD, Doc. 31), and one filed by Defendant Orange County (County MTD, Doc. 36). Plaintiff Maria Quezambra opposed each Motion. (Union MTD Opp., Doc. 46; Officials MTD Opp., Doc. 47; County MTD Opp., Doc. 52.) Defendants replied. (Union MTD Reply, Doc. 55; Officials MTD Reply, Doc. 54; County MTD Reply, Doc. 56.) Having taken the matter under submission and reviewed all papers on file, for the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions, dismisses Quezambra's federal claims, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims.
Quezambra has sued Becerra and Yee in their official capacities, as California State Attorney General and California State Controller respectively. (Comp. ¶¶ 15-16, Doc. 1.)
Becerra also joins in the UDWA MTD. (Officials MTD at 2 n.2.)
The Court has reviewed all supplementary authority filed by the Parties since the Court took this matter under submission. (Docs. 59-66.)
For the purposes of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court deems true the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint.
In 2012, Quezambra became an In-Home Supportive Services ("IHSS") provider to care for her disabled daughter. (Compl. ¶ 17, Doc. 1.) Quezambra receives state-provided income for these services and is represented exclusively for collective bargaining purposes by Defendant United Domestic Workers of America, AFSCME Local 3930 (the "Union"). (Id. ¶¶ 18-21.) Under California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 12301.6 and the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between UDWA and Defendant Orange County, Defendant Yee is authorized to collect dues on behalf of UDWA. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 12301.6(i)(2) directs the state controller to "make any deductions from the wages of [IHSS] personnel ... that are agreed to by [the public authority/employer (Orange County) ] in collective bargaining with the designated representative of [IHSS] personnel ... and transfer the deducted funds as directed in that agreement." In this instance, the MOU operates as the collective bargaining agreement. The iteration of the MOU that was effective until June 30, 2016 states Orange County would "advise the State Controller, as the payroll agent for its IHSS Individual Providers, to deduct all authorized membership dues, fees and/or assessments as required by the Union, or as voluntarily requested by the providers." (2012 MOU Art. 2, Section 2(a), Maldonado Decl. Ex. B, Doc. 30-4.) The MOU was revised, with the operative version taking effect July 1, 2016, stating that the "Union will advise California Department of Social Services (CDSS) or the designated payroll agent for Providers in the bargaining unit covered by this agreement, to deduct all authorized dues, assessments and/or fees required by the Union. All such dues deductions shall be made in compliance with all applicable laws." (2016 MOU, Maldonado Decl. Ex A, Doc. 30-3.)
Quezambra argues that, in deciding the instant Motions, the Court should decline to consider, and strike from the record, the declarations and related documents submitted by Defendants. (Union MTD Opp. at 21-22.) Insofar as the Court references the Maldonado Declaration and attached documents, her objections are OVERRULED. Regardless, the Court does not substantively rely on that information and provides it primarily for background purposes. Additionally, the iterations of the MOU are appropriate subjects of judicial notice as "a court may take judicial notice of material which is included in, referenced in, or relied upon by the complaint." Better Homes Realty, Inc. v. Watmore, Case No. : 3:16-cv-01607-BEN-MDD, 2017 WL 1400065, at *2 (S.D. Cal. April 18, 2017).
Pursuant to the MOU, beginning in 2013, Defendant "Yee deducted money from Ms. Quezambra's [IHSS] wages and remitted it to the Union." (Compl. ¶ 30.) Quezambra states that she "never chose to financially support or join the Union," she "does not believe that the Union adequately advocates for her interests," and "she does not support the political, ideological, and social causes for which the Union advocates." (Id. ¶ 31.) She was never solicited to join the Union and never signed a document indicating that she sought to become a union member or pay dues. (Id. ¶ 32.) Quezambra assumed that Union membership was mandatory because the dues deductions began in 2013 without her input. (Id. ) In February 2019, Quezambra discovered that she was required neither to be a member of the Union nor make financial contributions to it. (Id. ¶ 33.) On February 8, 2019, she sent the Union a certified letter "object[ing] to union membership and the payment of any union dues." (Id. ¶ 34.) Then, on March 21, 2019, Quezambra requested that the Union provide her a copy of her signed membership card. (Id. ¶ 39.)
Matthew Maldonado, Union Director of Organizing and Field Services, states that from March 2013 to July 2014, it collected fair-share agency fees from Quezambra. (Maldonado Decl. ¶ 8, Doc. 30-2.) However, according to Union records, she became a Union member in September 2014 upon the Union's receipt of a signed membership card, and at that point, the Union began deducting dues from her paychecks. (Id. ¶ 9.)
On March 22, 2019, Mat Kostrinsky, a Union official notified Quezambra that a review of her file revealed she "did not properly authorize the dues deductions." (Id. ¶ 41.) Accordingly, the Union would not deduct Union dues from Quezambra's future wages and had "taken steps to discontinue the dues previously deducted retroactive to December 2015 ... consistent with the three-year statute of limitation applicable to claims for dues refunds." (Id. )
Quezambra also alleges that she twice requested that no Union representative come to her home. (Compl. ¶¶ 35, 40.) Nevertheless, "[o]n March 29, 2019 ... the Union sent a representative to Ms. Quezambra's home scaring her disabled daughter and causing anxiety, fear, apprehension, distress, and unhappiness in both Ms. Quezambra and her daughter." (Id. ¶ 43.)
On May 16, 2019, Quezambra filed this action, asserting five claims. She brings three claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the First Amendment arising out of: (1) "Defendants' dues extraction scheme [which lacked] the necessary procedural safeguards;" (2) the deduction of "union dues/fees from Ms. Quezambra's wages pursuant to California State and Welfare and Institutions Code Section 12301.6 [ (i) ](2);" and (3) "the deduction of union/dues fees from Plaintiff's wages pursuant" to the terms of "Article 2 Section 2 and other provisions of the MOU." (Id. ¶¶ 58-73.) Finally, she asserts California common law claims for (4) trespass and (5) the intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. ¶¶ 74-81.)
Quezambra brings her Section 1983 claims against all Defendants but brings her common law tort claims against only the Union.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for ‘failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’ Dismissal of a complaint can be based on either a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Alfred v. Walt Disney Co. , 388 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept as true all "well-pleaded factual allegations" in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Courts must also draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n , 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). Yet, "courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ).
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable. When "a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Finally, the Court may not dismiss a complaint without leave to amend unless "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't , 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Becerra and Yee filed a request for judicial notice. (State Defendants' RJN, Doc. 31-1.) As the Court finds neither of the documents referenced in the RJN necessary to resolve this Motion, the RJN is DENIED. Neylon v. Cty. of Inyo , No. 1:16-CV-0712 AWI JLT, 2016 WL 6834097, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (citing Adriana Intern. Corp. v. Thoeren , 913 F.2d 1406, 1410 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1990) ) ("if an exhibit is irrelevant or unnecessary to deciding the matters at issue, a request for judicial notice may be denied").
Each of Quezambra's three Section 1983 claims is premised on the assertion that the deduction of dues from her wages and remission of those dues to the Union, pursuant to the terms of the MOU and California Welfare & Institutions Code § 12301.6(i)(2), violated her First Amendment rights. Specifically, she claims Defendants violated her rights "(a) not to associate with a mandatory representative; (b) not to support, financially or otherwise, petitioning and speech; and (c) against compelled speech." (Compl. ¶ 59.)
However, as explained below, Quezambra's Section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law.
A. The Post-Janus Landscape and Quezambra's Claims
In Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018), the Supreme Court overruled Abood v. Detroit Board of Education , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) and its progeny, holding that no form of payment to a union, including both union dues and fair-share agency fees, can be deducted or attempted to be collected from an employee without the employee's affirmative consent. Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2486. In the wake of Janus , lawsuits have been filed throughout the country by both non-members and members of various unions challenging the constitutionality of wage deductions for union dues and compulsory agency fees. In those cases, plaintiffs have often complained of being forced to subsidize union activities via the payment of compulsory non-member agency fees, or, alternatively, have asserted that, although they agreed to membership in the union, they would not have done so had they known that agency fees were illegal. See, e.g., Babb v. California Teachers Ass'n , 378 F. Supp. 3d 857 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (discussing five cases with slightly varying fact patterns). This Court has addressed the legal questions raised in such lawsuits on numerous occasions. See, e.g., id. ; Seager v. United Teachers Los Angeles , No. 2:19-cv-00469-JLS-DFM, 2019 WL 3822001, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019) ; Few v. United Teachers Los Angeles , No. 2:18-cv-09531-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 633598, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020).
Quezambra's theory of this case is, in brief, that she "was a union nonmember forced by the State and Orange County to support the Union, a clear constitutional violation." (County MTD Opp. at 6.) As she puts it, her First Amendment rights were violated, under color of state law, when the State deducted dues from her wages based on a membership card forged by the Union. (Union MTD Opp. at 17.) And this deduction was a product of the system created by California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 12301.6(i)(2) and the MOU, which lacked requisite procedural safeguards to ensure that such unconsented-to deductions did not occur. (Id. ) Quezambra alleges that the Union was incentivized to "actively conceal[ the forgery] from the State and others." (Compl. ¶ 56.)
However, Quezambra cannot maintain the instant lawsuit based on this theory because (1) the Union cannot be fairly characterized as a state actor, and (2) the California State Officials and Orange County are not responsible for the specific conduct of which Quezambra complains.
B. The Union Conduct Does Not Constitute State Action
"To state a claim under [ 42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff must [ (1) ] allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and [ (2) ] must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins , 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). "Dismissal of a § 1983 claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper if the complaint is devoid of factual allegations that give rise to a plausible inference of either element." Naffe v. Frey , 789 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court addresses the second prong first, analyzing the alleged acts of each Defendant. Because the requisite state action is absent, the Court does not reach the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred.
" ‘[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments,’ so that ‘the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State.’ " Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma , 723 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lugar , 457 U.S. at 936–37, 102 S.Ct. 2744 ) (alterations in original). For that reason "constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains." Id. (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky , 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) ) (emphasis in original).
Although Section 1983 makes liable only those who act "under color of" state law, a private entity may bear liability for a constitutional deprivation under the Section where a plaintiff demonstrates that " ‘the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [was] fairly attributable to the State.’ " Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. , 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) ) (alteration in original). There is a general rule that unions are not state actors and that rule "is not discarded merely because of the existence of a [collective bargaining agreement] negotiated with a government entity." Smith v. Teamsters Local 2010 , 2019 WL 6647935, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2019) (citing Bain , 2016 WL 6804921, at *7 ). "The Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining whether a [non-governmental person's] actions amount to state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental nexus test." Naoko , 723 F.3d at 995 (quoting Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) ) (internal quotations omitted). Contrary to Quezambra's assertions, (see Officials MTD Opp. at 9-17), the Union satisfies none of these tests.
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the public function and joint action tests "largely subsume the state compulsion and governmental nexus tests." Naoko , 723 F.3d at 996 n.13. Nevertheless, for purposes of clarity and thoroughness, the Court addresses all four tests.
First, "[u]nder the public function test, when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations." Kirtley v. Rainey , 326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). "The public function test is satisfied only on a showing that the function at issue is ‘both traditionally and exclusively governmental.’ " Id. (quoting Lee v. Katz , 276 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir. 2002) ). And the Supreme Court "has stressed that ‘very few’ functions fall into that category." Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1929, 204 L.Ed.2d 405 (2019). Quezambra's argument that the Union fulfills a public function is founded on the assertion that "it cannot be overstated that paying public employees their lawfully-owed wages is quintessentially an exclusive and traditional public forum.’ " (Officials MTD Opp. at 14.) However, the Union does not pay public employees, the government does – the Union merely reports to the government a list of individuals who it represents as having authorized the deduction of dues. Quezambra fails to explain, and the Court is unable to discern, how that membership reporting qualifies as a function "both traditionally and exclusively governmental."
Second, the joint action test is satisfied when "the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private entity that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A. , 639 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2011). "This occurs when the state knowingly accepts the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior." Id. Quezambra argues that "the Union works in concert with the State Controller and other governmental entities like the California Department of Social Services, California counties, and public authorities established by counties, to accomplish the deduction of union dues from IHSS provider's wages." (Officials MTD Opp. at 9-13.) In a similar challenge to California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 12301.6(i)(2), a district court rejected this exact argument, explaining that state officials' ministerial role in deducting dues from the wages of reported union members did not constitute the sort of "significant assistance," or actions taken in concert and effecting a constitutional deprivation, required to meet the joint action test. Quirarte v. United Domestic Workers AFSCME Local 3930 , No. 19-CV-1287-CAB-KSC, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 619574, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020). And as explained in greater depth below, state law mandates that the County occupy a similarly ministerial role – the County must accept the Union's certifications regarding which employees have authorized dues deductions. This "mandatory indifference," exhibited as "mere approval [of] or acquiescence" to the Union-supplied membership list is insufficient to render the Union a state actor under the joint action test. See Belgau v. Inslee , 359 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1014 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
A case cited by Quezambra, Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012), is indicative of the kind of interdependence that meets the joint action test. In Tsao , members of the casino's private security force were provided with police-operated training, then given the typically governmental authority to issue citations to appear in court for the crime of misdemeanor trespassing. Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). That arrangement allowed the private party to take on the role of law enforcement, and the Ninth Circuit noted that the private actor "invoked the authority of the state" when engaging in the conduct at issue. Here, the issue is whether the private agreement between the Union and Quezambra was based on a forgery. It implicates no joint action or interdependence with the state.
Third, "[s]tate action may be found under the state compulsion test where the state has ‘exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the [private actor's] choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State.’ " Johnson v. Knowles , 113 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Blum , 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777 ). Quezambra contends that "[b]y allowing unions to dictate the terms and conditions under which the deduction of money from an employee's paycheck is valid, the State Defendants and the Union display a symbiotic relationship of mutual overt encouragement." (Officials MTD Opp. at 14.) Again, the Quirarte court rejected a nearly identical argument regarding Section 12301.6(i)(2) and found the state compulsion test not met, clarifying that even if the Union can dictate deductions made, that Court was "not convinced that the State Controller's deduction of membership dues, or allowing the Union [to so dictate], on its own leads to a finding of significant encouragement, overt or covert, by the State." Quirarte , ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 619574, at *5. This Court is equally unconvinced; there are no allegations here suggesting that there has been such a coercive exercise of state power or the provision of significant encouragement that unilateral Union actions in reporting its membership roll or forging signatures may be deemed that of the state. See Johnson , 113 F.3d at 1119-20 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co. , 419 U.S. 345, 357, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) ) (explaining that a private party's simple exercise of choice or autonomy authorized under state law "does not make its action in doing so ‘state action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment").
Fourth, "[u]nder the governmental nexus test, a private party acts under color of state law if ‘there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Naoko , 723 F.3d at 996 n.13. The Ninth Circuit and the parties each recognize that the governmental nexus test is the most vague of the four tests and its answer tends to track those of the other three tests. See Kirtley v. Rainey , 326 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003) ; Officials MTD at 13-15; Officials MTD Opp. at 16-17. For the reasons already discussed above, there is no sufficiently close nexus in this instance. Cf. Bain , 2016 WL 6804921, at *7 ("The government's ministerial obligation to deduct dues for members and agency fees for nonmembers under a collective bargaining agreement does not transform decisions about membership [ ] into state actions.")
Accordingly, the Complaint is devoid of factual allegations that give rise to an inference of state action carried out by the Union, and Quezambra has failed to state a Section 1983 claim against the Union.
C. The State Officials and County are Not Subject to Section 1983 Liability
1. The State Officials
Quezambra claims that, in violation of the First Amendment, she was compelled to support Union speech when Controller Yee deducted dues from her wages. (See Union MTD Opp. at 17-20.) As noted above, in an analogous challenge to California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 12301.6(i)(2), another district court recently concluded that "[t]he fact that the State performs a ministerial function of collecting Plaintiffs' dues deductions does not mean that Plaintiffs' alleged harm is the result of state action." Quirarte , ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 619574, at *3 (quoting Smith v. Teamsters Local 2010 , 2019 WL 6647935, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2019) ). This Court agrees with that assessment. "Automatic payroll deductions are the sort of ministerial act that do not convert the Union Defendants' membership dues and expenditures decisions into state action." Id. (quoting Bain v. California Teachers Ass'n , 2016 WL 6804921, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2016) ). Rather, a finding of state action is warranted where "private parties make use of state procedures with the overt, significant assistance of state officials." Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope , 485 U.S. 478, 486, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 99 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (emphasis added). "The ‘statutory scheme’ if anything, merely authorizes Controller Yee to legally perform this ministerial function." Id. Accordingly, state officials' mere deduction of dues from the wages of individuals identified and reported to the state as voluntary Union members cannot be characterized as state action causing a constitutional deprivation.
2. The County
While local governing bodies are subject to suit under Section 1983 where "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), here the complained of delegation of authority by the County does not so qualify. California Government Code Section 1157.12 provides that public employers, such as the County, shall:
(a) Rely on a certification from any employee organization requesting a deduction or reduction that they have and will maintain an authorization, signed by the individual from whose salary or wages the deduction or reduction is to be made. An employee organization that certifies that it has and will maintain individual employee authorizations shall not be required to provide a copy of an individual authorization to the public employer unless a dispute arises about the existence or terms of the authorization. The employee organization shall indemnify the public employer for any claims made by the employee for deductions made in reliance on that certification.
(b) Direct employee requests to cancel or change deductions for employee organizations to the employee organization, rather than to the public employer. The public employer shall rely on information provided by the employee organization regarding whether deductions for an employee organization were properly canceled or changed, and the employee organization shall indemnify the public employer for any claims made by the employee for deductions made in reliance on that information. Deductions may be revoked only pursuant to the terms of the employee's written authorization.
California Government Code Section 1153(h) additionally states that (1) "[e]mployee requests to cancel or change deductions for employee organizations shall be directed to the employee organization, rather than to the Controller," (2) "[t]he employee organization shall be responsible for processing these requests," and (3) "[t]he Controller shall rely on information provided by the employee organization regarding whether deductions for an employee organization were properly canceled or changed."
Cal. Gov. Code § 1157.12(a) - (b). Thus, state law mandates that (1) the Union exclusively process all employee requests to alter their union dues deduction from their wages; (2) the County accept Union certifications regarding which employees have authorized dues deductions; (3) the County not require a copy of an employee's dues authorization unless a dispute arises over that authorization. Therefore, the terms of the MOU do not evince any discretionary delegation of authority by the County to the Union – instead, "it appears that the [County was] simply complying with state law." Aliser v. SEIU California , 419 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2019). And "[w]hen a municipality exercises no discretion and merely complies with a mandatory state law, the constitutional violation was not caused by an official policy of the municipality." Id. (citing Vives v. City of New York , 524 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2008) ; Evers v. County of Custer , 745 F.2d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 1984) ; Sandoval v. County of Sonoma , 912 F.3d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 2018) ). As the court explained in Aliser , "the general decision to contract with [the Union] ... did not ‘cause’ the specific allegedly unconstitutional" compelled speech "that forms the basis of the claim." Aliser , 419 F. Supp. 3d at 1165 (quoting Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Association , 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008) for that proposition that "there must be a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation").
Accordingly, for the purposes of Quezambra's Section 1983 claims, her avowed constitutional deprivation can only fairly be said to have resulted from the forgery of her membership dues authorization, and the subsequent use of the forgery by the Union. "At its core, then, the source of the alleged constitutional harm is [the forgery], not the procedure for [dues] collection that the State [and County] agreed to follow." Belgau , 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1013. Therefore, Quezambra has failed to plead facts connecting the claimed constitutional deprivation to anything that could be fairly characterized as state action. For that reason, her Section 1983 claim fails at the outset.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions are GRANTED. Because Quezambra's Section 1983 claims fail as a matter of law and not due to insufficient factual allegations, the Court dismisses those claims with prejudice. Further, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismisses those claims without prejudice to refiling in the appropriate state court. Lacey v. Maricopa County , 649 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) ("[T]he district court retains discretion whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims even after all federal claims [have been] dismissed."); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill , 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (citations omitted) ("[W]hen the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.").
Defendants shall submit a proposed judgment consistent with this Order, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order .