Opinion
20-17297
08-25-2021
COLETTE CLAIRE SAVAGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK SAVAGE, Fiduciary/Trustee, Defendant-Appellee.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 4:19-cv-07994-DMR for the Northern District of California Donna M. Ryu, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Savage's request for oral argument, set forth in the opening brief, is denied.
Colette Claire Savage appeals pro se from the district court's judgment in her diversity action challenging past Texas and California state court judgments. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Savage's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it was a "forbidden de facto appeal" of prior state court decisions and Savage raised claims that were "inextricably intertwined" with those state court decisions. See id. at 1163-65 (discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars "inextricably intertwined" claims where federal adjudication "would impermissibly undercut the state ruling on the same issues" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Savage's postjudgment motions for reconsideration because Savage failed to establish any basis for such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)).
AFFIRMED.