MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ( #112)

JANE S. SCHOLL, JUDGE.

In this action, the Plaintiff, Andrea Riggs, claims that the Defendant, The Standard Fire Insurance Company, issued her a homeowner's insurance policy and that on January 1, 2004, while the policy was in effect, her home was broken into resulting in a theft of personal property belonging to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant has breached its contract with the Plaintiff in that it has refused to pay the loss in accordance with the terms of the policy. The Defendant has moved for summary judgment on this claim, which is contained in Count One of her complaint, alleging that the Plaintiff's suit is barred by the one-year suit provision of the insurance contract. That provision provides: "Suit Against Us. No action shall be brought UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN COMPLIANCE WITH THE POLICY PROVISIONS AND THE ACTION IS STARTED WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE OCCURRENCE CAUSING LOSS OR DAMAGE."

The loss here occurred on January 1, 2004. This suit was instituted by service on the Defendant on April 6, 2005.

The standards for granting summary judgment are well settled. "Practice Book § 17-49, provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) Leisure Resort Technology, Inc. v. Trading Cove Associates, 277 Conn. 21, 30-31 (2006). "Where there is no question of fact or law which remains to be answered as appears from the record of this case, a motion for summary judgment should be granted. If the sole question is one of law, it could properly be determined on a motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense incident to a trial when there is no real issue to be tried." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Schlott v. Zaremski, 32 Conn.Sup. 567, 569 (1975).

There is no dispute as to the facts of this case but only as to the meaning of the language of the insurance policy. Construction of a contract of insurance is a question of law for the court. R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 456 (2005).

The Defendant cites Collins v. Peerless Insurance Company, DN: CV 03 0194959, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford (Lewis, J.T.R., January 6, 2004) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 294), where the court reviewed the identical same language as present in the policy in this case. There the court, relying on the decision in Bocchino v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 246 Conn. 378 (1998), held that the provision barred an action for breach of the insurance contract not commenced within one year of the date of loss.

The Plaintiff claims that if the Defendant had intended that lawsuits be initiated within one year it should have used the language of General Statutes § 38a-307 which states: "Suit. No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within twelve months next after inception of the loss." Yet in Bocchino v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 246 Conn. 378 (1998), relied on by the court in Collins, the Court held that the language of the policy there, which provided that "no action can be brought unless . . . the action is started within one year after the date of loss or damage" was mandated by this statute and, thus, implicitly held it was consistent with the language of the statute cited by the Plaintiff. Thus the Supreme Court has held that language of a policy, almost identical to the language of the policy at issue here, is equivalent in effect to the statutory language. The Court in Bocchino held that such language acts as a contractual time bar to an action on the policy and that the accidental failure of suit statute did not operate to save an untimely action. Therefore the Plaintiff's claim that use of the language of the statute would have achieved a different result is unavailing.

The Plaintiff also cites R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 456 (2005), in support of her argument that the word "action" in the policy includes more than initiation of a lawsuit and that her sending of notice to the Defendant of her claim and intention to file a lawsuit was sufficient to constitute "action" under the policy. In R.T. Vanderbilt Co. the Court held that the sending of a potentially responsible party letter by the United States Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 constitutes a "suit" within the meaning of a comprehensive general liability insurance policy sufficient to trigger the duty to defend provisions of the policy. The Court there emphasized that the letter was more than just the type of demand letter the Plaintiff claims here is sufficient to constitute an "action" within the meaning of the policy. The Court stated: "We emphasize that our determination in the present matter is predicated on CERCLA's extremely burdensome provisions and the immediate legal consequences that arise upon the receipt of a PRP letter. Thus, we find that the consequences of the receipt of the EPA letter are so substantially equivalent to the commencement of a lawsuit that a duty to defend arises immediately. The EPA letter was not the equivalent of a conventional demand letter based on a personal injury claim." (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, 466.

Under the Plaintiff's argument, any type of action, including the making of the claim itself, would save her from the bar of the limitation language of the policy. But as the court noted in R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., supra, 462-3, "It is a basic principle of insurance law that policy language will be construed as laymen would understand it and not according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters, and that ambiguities in contract documents are resolved against the party responsible for its drafting; the policyholder's expectations should be protected as long as they are objectively reasonable from the layman's point of view. However, a court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings." (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) The policy language here is clear in requiring that no suit against the insurance company shall be brought unless it is started within one year after the occurrence causing the loss. Here there is no dispute that it was not.

A policy provision such as the one here is a valid contractual obligation, and the failure to comply therewith is a defense to an action on the policy. Monterio v. American Home Assurance Co., 177 Conn. 281, 283 (1979). Where it is undisputed that the provision has not been complied with, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. Therefore the Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment is granted.