Opinion
CV176068559S
07-03-2018
Anne DROPICK v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INS. CO.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Markle, J.
The defendant, Liberty Mutual, moves for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) the plaintiff’s action is time-barred because it was not filed within eighteen months of the date of loss as required by the insurance policy and General Statutes § 38a-307; (2) the plaintiff does not meet the insurance policy definition of an "insured" and therefore is not entitled to coverage thereunder; and (3) the plaintiff lacks an insurable interest in the property for which she seeks benefits under the insurance policy. For the reasons that follow, the court grants Liberty Mutual’s motion for summary judgment.
FACTS
On February 27, 2017, the plaintiff, Anne Dropick, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual), alleging breach of her homeowners’ insurance policy (policy). The plaintiff alleges the following facts. The plaintiff maintained her residence at 145 South Orchard Street, Wallingford, Connecticut (premises) and that Liberty Mutual insured the premises. On or about January 7, 2014, the premises sustained property damage (due to water). The plaintiff asserts she performed all of her obligations with respect to the policy, but Liberty Mutual has refused to pay the plaintiff for her covered loss.
Liberty Mutual filed an answer denying the allegations and filed special defenses on May 9, 2017, claiming the plaintiff was not an insured as the policy was issued to a trust. Thereafter, on November 30, 2017, Liberty Mutual filed a motion for summary judgment in which it asserted that: (1) the plaintiff’s action is time-barred because it was not filed within eighteen months of the date of loss as required by the insurance policy and General Statutes § 38a-307; (2) the plaintiff does not meet the policy definition of an "insured," and, therefore, is not entitled to coverage thereunder; and (3) the plaintiff lacks an insurable interest in the property for which she seeks benefits under the policy. The motion was supported by a memorandum of law and several documents including a certified copy of the policy. On March 9, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Liberty Mutual’s motion for summary judgment. On August 6, 2018, Liberty Mutual filed a reply brief in support of its motion. On April 9, 2018, the court heard oral arguments on the motion at short calendar. At argument the court was presented with uncontested assertions that the property was held by the plaintiff’s brother John Dropick, as trustee and that all claims on the property were settled through him. Further, at the time of the damage the plaintiff was living in the premises and was subject to eviction proceedings.
In addition to a certified copy of the policy, Liberty Mutual has also submitted the following documents: copy of the complaint of Dropick v. Dropick, Trustee, dated December 6, 2016; declaration of irrevocable trust, dated June 24, 2009; copy of docket sheet in Dropick v. Dropick, Trustee, dismissal of petition to terminate trust dated June 9, 2015; affidavit of Dawn Janisaitis, Claim Resolution Specialist III, Liberty Mutual Group Companies; and Affidavit of John J. Dropick, Trustee.
Despite references made by the plaintiff and Liberty Mutual to the plaintiff’s exhibits, none were attached or filed with the court.
In connection to the present motions before the court, on June 4, 2018, the court scheduled final arguments on June 25, 2018.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bozelko v. Papastavros, 323 Conn. 275, 282, 147 A.3d 1023 (2016).
"[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred ... A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002). "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ... and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015).
II
"Insured"
The court will first address the defendant’s second argument that the plaintiff does not fall under the definition of an "insured" under the terms of the policy because it is dispositive. Liberty Mutual argues that the plaintiff does not meet the definition of an "insured" under the policy because she is not "a relative" to the named insured, and, therefore, is not entitled to coverage thereunder. In particular, Liberty Mutual argues that a trust cannot have relatives. In response, the plaintiff simply argues that she is an "insured" under the policy as either the relative of the trustee or beneficiary of the trust.
Neither the plaintiff nor Liberty Mutual disagree that the plaintiff is not a named insured under the policy. Upon review of the policy, it is indisputable that "Hcd Trust John J. Dropick Trustee" is the named insured. Consequently, the analysis under this section will be limited to whether the plaintiff qualifies as a "relative" to the named insured, not whether the plaintiff is the named insured under the policy.
The policy defines the term "insured" as "you and residents of your household who are: ... Your relatives; or ... Other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person named above." Def.’s Ex. A, p. 8. "Under Connecticut’s rules of contract construction, the language of a policy must be accorded ‘its natural and ordinary meaning’ and courts have deferred to the dictionary definition of terms that are undefined in an insurance policy. See Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, [ 278 Conn. 779, 784-85, 900 A.2d 18 (2006) ]. ‘To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of the term.’ Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., [ 259 Conn. 529, 539, 791 A.2d 489 (2002) ]. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the term ‘relative’ as ‘a person connected with another by blood or affinity; especially one allied by blood ...’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986). The term ‘affinity’ is defined, in relevant part, to mean ‘a relationship by marriage (as between a husband and his wife’s blood relatives) ... broadly: any familial relationship.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986)." Slokus v. Utica First Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-08-5011071-S (July 14, 2011, Ozalis, J.) (52 Conn.L.Rptr. 287, 291).
In light of the definition of the term "relative," in order to qualify as such under the policy, the plaintiff would have to be connected to another person by blood, marriage, or adoption. See Slokus v. Utica First Ins. Co., supra, 52 Conn.L.Rptr. 291; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014) (defining "relative" as "[a] person connected with another by blood or affinity; a person who is kin with another" [emphasis added] ). Here, the named insured, "Hcd Trust John J. Dropick Trustee," is not a person. Therefore, and as Liberty Mutual contends, a trust cannot have relatives as the person-to-person connection is clearly missing. Consequently, the plaintiff did not qualify as a "relative" under the policy. Cf. Wasko v. Manella, 269 Conn. 527, 543 n.14, 849 A.2d 777 (2004) (holding that insurance policy was clear and unambiguous insofar that social guest did not qualify as "relative" of named insured); Slokus v. Utica First Ins. Co., supra, 291 (holding that fiancéof named insured did not qualify as "relative" under insurance policy); see generally Goytizolo v. Moore, 27 Conn.App. 22, 28-29, 604 A.2d 362 (1992) (holding that defendant’s position as trustee did not vest her husband with any rights over property in dispute).
Accordingly, the court holds that the plaintiff was not an insured "relative" for purposes of the policy and therefore was not entitled to any coverage thereunder.
III
Suit Limitation Provision
Because the court finds that the plaintiff does not qualify as a "relative" under the terms of the policy and, consequently, was not entitled to any coverage thereunder, any further claims, even those on the basis of promissory estoppel, do not change the outcome of present case.
Even assuming arguendo that the plaintiff qualifies as a "relative" under the terms of the policy, the plaintiff has failed to commence the action pursuant to the suit limitation provision. Liberty Mutual argues that the plaintiff’s action is time-barred because the policy (as modified by statute) requires that the action be commenced within eighteen months of the date of loss. The alleged loss here occurred on January 7, 2014, but the action was commenced on February 17, 2017, more than three years later. Therefore, according to Liberty Mutual, the action is untimely. The plaintiff counters that the action was timely filed. In particular, the plaintiff argues that the date she discovered that her loss would not be covered by Liberty Mutual was the date of loss. The plaintiff contends that she discovered that her loss would not be covered on August 25, 2015 and the plaintiff filed suit on February 17, 2017; therefore, the present action was within the suit limitation provision.
In support of its arguments that the action is time-barred, Liberty Mutual relies upon the "Suit Against Us" provision found in the policy. The "Suit Against Us" provision provides in relevant part: "No action can be brought [against Liberty Mutual] unless ... the action is started within one year after the date of loss." See Def.’s Ex. A, p. 17.
The court notes the discrepancy between the language of the policy, indicating that the action must be started within one year, and Liberty Mutual’s argument that the plaintiff had eighteen months to commence action because the suit limitation provision was modified by § 38a-307. The court will not address whether § 38a-307 modifies the suit limitation provision to eighteen months for two main reasons. First, whether the suit limitation provision requires the present action to be commenced within one year or eighteen months does not change the outcome of the analysis. Second, the parties have not taken issue with it.
"The Connecticut Supreme Court has long held that a contractual condition in an insurance policy requiring an action to be brought with a particular time period is a part of the contract ... [and] is valid and binding upon the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Charter Oak Trust, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-10-6012621- S (May 4, 2012, Robaina, J.) (54 Conn.L.Rptr. 19, 21); see Voris v. Mutual Co., 297 Conn. 589, 600, 999 A.2d 741 (2010) ("[c]ontracting parties are free to adopt an unambiguous contract provision limiting the time in which an insurance claim must be filed" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Moreover, our Supreme Court has made clear that "such a condition requiring suit to be brought within one year does not operate as a statute of limitations." Monteiro v. American Home Assurance Co., 177 Conn. 281, 283, 416 A.2d 1189 (1979). "This condition is a part of the contract so that it controls the rights of the parties under the contract and, hence, such rights must be governed by the rules of law applicable to contracts." Id.
"It is a basic principle of insurance law that policy language will be construed as laymen would understand it and not according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters, and that ambiguities in contract documents are resolved against the party responsible for its drafting; the policyholder’s expectations should be protected as long as they are objectively reasonable from the layman’s point of view ... However, [a] court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 273 Conn. 448, 462-63, 870 A.2d 1048 (2005).
In Holmes v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6032368-S (April 16, 2015, Wilson, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 268, 277), aff’d 171 Conn.App. 597, 157 A.3d 1147 (2017), the court construed an identical suit limitation provision and held that "there [was] no ambiguity in the language of this provision." The court added, "[t]he clear and unambiguous language of this provision requires that the insured bring an action within one year after the loss or damage." Id. ; see also Knapp v. New London Country Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-12-6034028-S (June 1, 2015, Wilson, J.) (60 Conn.L.Rptr. 203, 206) (holding that "no ambiguity emanates from the language" in identical suit limitation provision). Thus, any attempt by the plaintiff to create an ambiguity- i.e., arguing that the date of loss is the date of breach- is unpersuasive. Additionally, a review of the relevant case law involving date of loss provisions supports Liberty Mutual’s contention that this provision refers to the date on which the insured sustains the damage that gives rise to a claim. See, e.g., Bates v. Cambridge Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-16-6013380-S (August 30, 2016, Pickard, J.) (62 Conn.L.Rptr. 913, 915) (holding that date of loss was date of water damage to premises); Holmes v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 277 (concluding that date of loss was date of structural damage as a result of heavy snowfall and ice); Riggs v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4010671-S (February 7, 2006, Scholl, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 704, 706) (determining that date of loss was date premises suffered break-in).
Accordingly, the court concludes that, even if the plaintiff somehow qualified as a "relative" under the terms of the policy, the plaintiff should have commenced this action within eighteen months of January 7, 2014, the date of water damage to the premises. In effect, under the terms of the policy, any action against Liberty Mutual needed to be commenced on or before July 7, 2015. Here, the action was commenced on February 17, 2017, more than three years later. Further, the plaintiff’s claim that she was led to believe she was covered by the policy is inconsistent with the fact that her brother had made a claim and collected on his claim.
IV
Insurable Interest
Finally, similar to the court’s analysis previously, because the court finds that the plaintiff does not qualify as an insured under the policy she consequently is not entitled to coverage under the policy as claimed and cannot recover for any alleged loss of personal property.
The policy provides in relevant part: "We cover personal property owned or used by an ‘insured’ while it is anywhere in the world." (Emphasis added.) Def.’s Ex. A, p. 9. As previously established, the plaintiff is neither the named "insured" nor a "relative" of the insured. Therefore, the plaintiff does not have an insurable interest under the policy.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Liberty Mutual’s motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant.