PER CURIAM.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Eric J. Smith, Prosecuting Attorney, Joshua D. Abbott, Chief Appellate Attorney, and Joshua R. Van Laan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Robert D. Lewis in propria persona.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

Per Curiam.At issue is whether a sentencing court may impose attorney fees upon a defendant under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv ) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq ., without first making findings of fact in support of that amount. To answer that question, we must determine whether the language of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ), which gives trial courts the authority to assess costs without "separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case," applies to the attorney-fee provision in Subparagraph (iv ), which authorizes the imposition of expenses for legal assistance to a defendant. We conclude that it does not. Accordingly, we reverse Part V of the Court of Appeals' opinion and remand to the trial court for that court to support its findings related to the cost of providing legal assistance to defendant.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In December 2015, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b, and five counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c, for sexually assaulting his live-in girlfriend's daughters. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 25 to 50 years' imprisonment for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction and to 200 to 360 months' imprisonment for the second-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions. The trial court also assessed $4,500 in costs and fees, representing $3,625 for attorney fees and $875 as a separate judgment.

Defendant appealed, challenging his convictions on several grounds, but pertinent to this appeal, he challenged the amount of attorney fees assessed against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions and sentences in an unpublished per curiam opinion, holding that the "trial court's award of $4,500 in defense costs, without making findings of fact as to the award of attorney fees, was proper." People v. Lewis , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 18, 2017 (Docket No. 331513), p 6, 2017 WL 2200253. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the language of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) and (iv ) was clear such that a separate calculation of costs was not required—including the expense of providing defendant with legal assistance. Id .

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Gardner , 482 Mich. 41, 46, 753 N.W.2d 78 (2008).

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND APPLICATION

"When construing a statute, our primary goal is ‘to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.’ " People v. Phillips , 469 Mich. 390, 395, 666 N.W.2d 657 (2003), quoting People v. Pasha , 466 Mich. 378, 382, 645 N.W.2d 275 (2002). "When a court interprets a statute, it first looks to its ‘plain language, which provides the most reliable evidence of intent.’ " People v. McFall , 309 Mich. App. 377, 384, 873 N.W.2d 112 (2015), quoting People v. McKinley , 496 Mich. 410, 415, 852 N.W.2d 770 (2014). If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, then judicial construction is inappropriate and the statute must be enforced as written. McKinley , 496 Mich. at 415, 852 N.W.2d 770. A necessary corollary of this principle is that a " ‘court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.’ " Phillips , 469 Mich. at 395, 666 N.W.2d 657, quoting Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp. , 466 Mich. 57, 63, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002). Furthermore, when the Legislature includes language in one part of a statute that it omits in another, it is assumed that the omission was intentional. McFall , 309 Mich. App. at 385-386, 873 N.W.2d 112.

MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) and (iv ) provide, in pertinent part:

(1) If a defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or if the court determines after a hearing or trial that the defendant is guilty, both of the following apply at the time of the sentencing or at the time entry of judgment of guilt is deferred by statute or sentencing is delayed by statute:

* * *

(b) The court may impose any or all of the following:

* * *

(iii ) ... any costs reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case ...

* * *

(iv ) The expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant.

The instant issue previously appeared before the Court of Appeals in People v. Duke , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 12, 2016 (Docket No. 325473) 2016 WL 1445219. That panel held that the trial court was required to establish the cost of legal representation for the specific defendant when assessing attorney fees pursuant to MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv ). Id . at 2. The panel explained:

[W]hile language in MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) authorizes the trial court to assess costs without separately calculating the costs for the particular case, the attorney fee provision

in MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv ) does not include that same language. Compare MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) ("any cost reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case ...." (emphasis added) ), with MCL 769.1k [ (1)(b) ](iv ) ("[t]he expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant ." (emphasis added) ). When the legislature includes language in one part of a statute that it omits in another, it is assumed that the omission was intentional. People v. McFall , 309 Mich. App. 377, 873 N.W.2d 112 (2015), quoting People v. Peltola , 489 Mich. 174, 185, 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011). Thus, the trial court must establish the cost of providing legal services to the specific defendant at issue when assessing attorney fees under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv ). [ Duke , unpub op at 2.]

We agree that the inclusion of the language "without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case" under Subparagraph (iii ) evidences the Legislature's intent that the provision apply only to that subparagraph. Inclusion of average-costs language in Subparagraph (iii )—rather than the Subdivision (b) umbrella—further suggests that the Legislature intended to create an exception to the default rule of Subdivision (b); if the exception permits costs without separate calculation, then logically the default rule must require that costs be separately calculated for the particular case. Moreover, MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii ) does not include attorney fees in its list of the kinds of costs that do not have to be separately calculated for the particular defendant, namely: "[s]alaries and benefits for relevant court personnel," "[g]oods and services necessary for the operation of the court," and "[n]ecessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of court buildings and facilities." Although this list is nonexclusive, the costs of providing legal assistance to a defendant are logically distinguishable from the costs enumerated in Subparagraph (iii ), in part because to include legal-assistance costs among Subparagraph (iii ) costs would be to render Subparagraph (iv ) surplusage. See People v. McGraw , 484 Mich. 120, 126, 771 N.W.2d 655 (2009) ("In interpreting a statute, we avoid a construction that would render part of the statute surplusage or nugatory."). Moreover, the costs laid out under Subparagraph (iii ) are all fairly standard expenses for a court's operations, tend not to vary significantly by case, and are not affected by any particular case. In contrast, attorney fees can vary greatly among defendants depending on a variety of circumstances, such as the nature and number of the criminal charges.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court was required to determine the cost of providing legal assistance to defendant pursuant to MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv ). The Court of Appeals erred by holding otherwise. For this reason, we reverse Part V of the Court of Appeals' opinion and remand to the trial court for that court to support its findings regarding the cost of legal assistance provided to defendant.