ORDER

VAUGHN R WALKER, United Stated District Judge:

Plaintiff Stephane Moreau sued his former employer, Air France (AF), and his supervisor, Joseph P Bouloux, for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq, and related state law claims. Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims pursuant to FROP 56. See Def Br (Doc # 80). Moreau opposes the motion and argues that he should be allowed more time for discovery. See Pl Opp (Doc # 133). In addition, defendants have filed a motion to strike Moreau's statement of undisputed fact. See Doc # 159. For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc # 80) and DENIES both of the other motions as moot (Doc ## 133, 159).

I

Moreau brings suit under the FMLA and the California Family Rights Act, California Government Code § 12945.1 et seq (CFRA), California's FMLA statute. See FAC (Doc # 11). Because the FMLA and the CFRA are substantively identical, the court discusses only the FMLA claim. SeeMarchisheck v San Mateo County, 199 F.3d 1068, 1074 n2 (9th Cir 1999). The parties have stipulated that AF is an employer as defined under the FMLA. The FMLA provides, in pertinent part, that an eligible employee is entitled to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for a seriously ill parent. 28 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). An eligible employee must provide 30 days notice of his intention to take leave. 28 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(B). Paragraph 2611(2)(A) defines eligible employee as an employee who has worked for his employer for a least one year, with at least 1,250 hours of service in the previous 12 month period. Paragraph 2611(2)(B) limits this definition, stating:

The term "eligible employee' does not include —

* * *

(ii) any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.

According to Department of Labor (DOL) regulations, this calculation is made when the employee requests leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(f); see also Gazda v Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co, 10 F. Supp.2d 656, 673 (SD Tex 1997); Washington v Fort James Operating Co, 110 F. Supp.2d 1325, 1330 (D or 2000). Both parties seem to argue that the relevant time period to decide eligibility is January 1, 1996 to May 31, 1998. This may well be the relevant time period to decide whether AF is an employer covered by the FMLA; it is not, however, the relevant time period to decide whether Moreau was an eligible employee. Similarly, both parties argue that AF must employ 50 or more persons within 75 miles of SF0 for 20 or more workweeks in order for Moreau to be eligible for FMLA leave. This conflates the test for employer coverage with the test for employee eligibility. In order to demonstrate he was eligible for FMLA leave, Moreau must show only that AF employed 50 or more persons within 75 miles of SF0 at the time of his request for leave. Gazda, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 673. Moreau requested leave on March 27, 1998.

While the parties disagree regarding the exact number of AF employees, it is undisputed that AF did not have on its payroll 50 or more persons within 75 miles of SF0 in March 1998. In its motion papers, AF specifically retained its right to require Moreau to prove that each of these employees should count toward the 50 employee requirement. Def Br (Doc # 80) at 12 n15. The court will assume for the purposes of this motion, however, that AF directly employed 43 employees when Moreau requested leave. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84). This is the greatest number of persons on AF's payroll for which any party contends and thus is the view of the facts most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. Moreau argues that AF also jointly employed up to 43 ground service personnel from Ogden/SkyChefs (Ogden), DynAir/Swissport (DynAir) and Aeroground, AF's ground service contractors. Specifically, Moreau relies on the DOL's regulations regarding employee eligibility:

[W]hen an employee is jointly employed by two or more employers * * * [t]he employee is also counted by the secondary employer to determine eligibility for the secondary employer's full-time or permanent employees.

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. The burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party.Celotex Corp v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If the nonmoving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may meet its burden by pointing out — not by a conclusory statement but by demonstration — the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id at 325-26. Summary judgment is granted only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

II

Except as noted, the facts are undisputed. Some evidentiary objections need first to be addressed. Evidence presented in support or opposition to a summary judgment motion must be admissible. See FRCP 56(e). Moreau objects to several declarations filed by defendants. See Docs ## 145-48. With the exception of the declaration of Marc Richard, the court does not rely on this evidence in making its findings and therefore does not rule on the objections. With respect to Richard's declaration, Moreau objects to the declaration asserting that it lacks foundation because Richard does not specify a time period or state the specifics of his job as the Cargo Operations Manager for AF. Richard specifically states that he is the Cargo Operations Manager for AF Cargo and that he is testifying to facts within his personal knowledge. See Richard Decl (Doc # 82) at ¶¶ 1-2. This is sufficient to provide a foundation for his testimony. See FRE 602. In addition, Richard specifically states that he discusses the contractual relationship between AF and Aeroground between 1996 and 1998. Richard provides sufficient foundation for his testimony which is relevant to this motion. The court therefore overrules Moreau's objection to Richard's declaration (Doc # 146).

A

Turning to the material facts:

Moreau is a French national living in California. See FAC (Doc # 11) at ¶ 7. He began working for Air France at its San Francisco airport location (SFO) in 1990. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh F (hereinafter Moreau Tr) at 31:3-5, 59:19:25. Until the absence which led to his dismissal, Moreau has always received favorable reviews and periodic merit-based raises. See Pl Exh Vol I (Doc # 135), Exh B at 256:8:11. In 1997, Moreau was promoted to Assistant Station Manager, directly under Bouloux, the Station Manager. See Moreau Tr at 59:19-25. As the Assistant Station Manager, Moreau assisted Bouloux in running AF's SFO operations and ran the operations when Bouloux was away. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh E (hereinafter Bouloux Tr) at 29:13:20.

On March 27, 1998, Moreau requested leave to care for his father, who was seriously ill. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84) at Exh Q. Moreau provided medical certification from his father's physician in his written request. See Pl Exh Vol I (Doc # 135), Exh B at 342:14-15. When Moreau did not hear back regarding his request for leave, he contacted Howard Weisser, head of personnel for AF in the United States. See Pl Exh Vol II (Doc # 136), Exh J at 289:1- 294:5. Weisser denied the request for leave on April 1, 1998; Moreau responded to Weisser's denial via counsel by stating his belief that AF was covered under FMLA because it was a joint employer of ground service personnel and therefore employed 50 or more persons during the requisite time period. See Pl Exh Vol II (Doc # 136), Exh M at 92:9-21. Weisser did not investigate whether AF was a joint employer of ground service employees. See id at 116:6-11. He did check the number of employees on AF payroll. See id at 55:15-56:4. Based on these numbers, Bouloux determined that Moreau was not eligible for FMLA leave. On May 1, 1998, Moreau was scheduled to return to work. He did not. On May 5, 1998, Bouloux terminated Moreau's employment with AF, citing as justification his failure to return to work as scheduled. See Pl Exh Vol III (Doc # 137) at Exh X.

As observed above, the central issue in this case is whether AF employs 50 or more persons within 75 miles of SFO. AF's operations within 75 miles of SFO include AF cargo service, see Richard Decl (Doc # 82) at ¶ 1, a small travel agency and AF ticket office in San Francisco, see Compl at ¶ 13 and Ans at ¶ 13, and the AF personnel at the airport, see Bouloux Tr at 107:6-13. The number of employees at each of these facilities is a matter of some dispute; AF argues that the number was no more than 43 from January 1, 1996 to May 31, 1998; Moreau's own analysis demonstrates a maximum of 42 employees during that time period. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84) at ¶ 3, Exhs A-C; Sandberg Decl (Doc # 143), Exh D. These figures do not count flight crews based in Paris or the employees of ground service companies.

In 1998, AF regularly scheduled one passenger flight to and from SFO per day. See Moreau Tr 78:3-10. These flights also carried cargo. See id at 78:11-18. Ground crew provided several specialized services which included catering, cleaning of aircraft, loading and unloading of baggage and cargo and ramp operations (tow-in and tow-out). See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exhs L-N (ground service contracts). AF contracted with Aeroground to provide cargo services, Ogden to provide catering services, and DynAir to provide ramp operation, cleaning and baggage services. Because AF did not employ more than 50 individuals at the relevant time, as stated above, the primary issue raised in this summary judgment motion is whether ground service personnel employed by AF's contractors can be attributed to AF for purposes of FMLA eligibility. The court now turns to this question.

B

Section 825.106 of the FMLA regulations describes joint employment:

(a) Where two or more businesses exercise some control over the work or working conditions of the employee, the businesses may be joint employers under FMLA. Joint employers may be separate and distinct entities with separate owners, managers and facilities. Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as:

(1) Where there is an arrangement between employers to share an employee's services or to interchange employees;

(2) Where one employer acts directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer in relation to the employee; or,

(3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employee's employment and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, because one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.

(b) A determination of whether or not a joint employment relationship exists is not determined by the application of any single criterion, but rather the entire relationship is to be viewed in its totality. For example, joint employment will ordinarily be found to exist when a temporary or leasing agency supplies employees to a second employer.

Moreau points to a DOL opinion letter which states that "[t]he standards established under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are used to determine joint employment under the FMLA." See 2000 DOL FMLA LEXIS 4 (September 11, 2000) at *4 As the agency directed to interpret and enforce the FMLA, the DOL's interpretation of its own regulations is given significant deference. See Thomas Jefferson University v Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). As further evidence that the FLSA standard should apply, under FMLA, an employee is defined by reference to the FLSA definition of employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2). As a joint employer relationship is based on whether the individual is the employee of two separate businesses, using a test based on the same definition of employee is appropriate. The court will therefore apply the FLSA test for joint employment in deciding whether AF and ground service companies were joint employers under the FMLA.

"The Supreme Court has instructed that courts are to interpret the term 'employ' in the FLSA expansively." Hale v Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir 1992). The FLSA's definition of 'employ' encompasses "striking breadth." Nationwide Mutual Ins v Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992). Accordingly, employment status is determined based on the economic reality of the relationship between the individual and the business, rather than technical concepts of traditional agency law. See Hale, 993 F.2d at 1393. The touchstone in analyzing an alleged employer/employee relationship is economic dependency. See Bureerong v Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1468 (CD Cal 1996).

In Bonnette v California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir 1983), the Ninth Circuit identified four factors which inform the economic realities test: "whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records." Recognizing that this list is not exhaustive, the court cautioned that the factors "are not etched in stone and will not be blindly applied." Id. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has applied other factors in different factual situations. See Torres-Lopez v May, 111 F.3d 633, 640 (9th Cir 1997). The factors cited in Torres-Lopez mirror, with different emphasis, those found in Bonnette:

(A) The nature and degree of control of the workers;

(B) The degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work;

(C) The power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of the workers;

(D) The right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the employment conditions of the workers; [and]

(E) Preparation of payroll and the payment of wages.

Id. While the lists of factors provide a guide, the court must rely not on "isolated factors, but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity" in determining whether an employer/employee relationship exists. Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469. Finally, the court notes that whether an employer/employee relationship exists is a question of law. See id.

C

Moreau claims that AF jointly employed Ogden, Aeroground and DynAir employees. As the specific relationship with each of these contractors is critical to the question whether the ground service employees count toward the 50 employee requirement, the court details the relationships below before making its legal determination of the status of AF as a joint employer with respect to each ground service contractor. Because the facts underlying the joint employment issue are without dispute, the court determines the employment status of each of these sets of employees as a matter of law.

1

AF prides itself on the quality of food and beverages that it serves. See Pl Exh Vol II (Doc # 136), Exh F at 31:26- 32:3. Ogden provided catering service to AF during the relevant time period.

The relationship between AF and Ogden is characterized by the following facts:

• Pursuant to its contract with AF, Ogden was paid for the total number of meals and other goods and services it provided. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh N at AF185.

• AF did not recruit or have any involvement in the recruitment or hiring of Ogden employees. See Brown Decl (Doc # 157) at ¶ 9. AF did not set the work schedules of individual Ogden employees. See id at ¶ 11.

• AF did not pay the Ogden employees directly. See id at ¶ 9.

• Ogden employees Ruben Martin and Amauri Devales were the primary liaisons between AF and Ogden. See Brown Decl (Doc # 157) at ¶ 8. Any problems were brought to the attention of Martin or Devales. See id. Ogden typically remedied any problems brought to its attention by AF. See id. Martin was designated to work full-time for AF; Devales spent 5-6 hours per day working for AF. See id.

• AF employee Goyeneche visited the Ogden kitchen daily, monitoring the quality of food, food placement on meal trays and proper loading of meal and beverage carts. See Pl Exh Vol II (Doc # 136), Exh F at 20:19-21:9. Goyeneche also discussed the in-flight crew's food quality reports with Ogden staff. See id.

• AF directly trained Ogden employees regarding specific procedures for loading food and beverage onto AF's carts and then properly loading the carts onto the aircraft. See Pl Exh Vol I (Doc # 135), Exh D at 62:7-63:15.

• AF did not directly discipline any Ogden employees, although AF had specific standards it required Ogden to meet. See Brown Decl (Doc # 157) at ¶ 11.

• Both companies had significant investment in equipment: Ogden provided a commercial kitchen and AF provided all of the equipment used on the aircraft. See id at ¶ 3-4

• Ogden provided AF with space at Ogden's site to store wine and cheese imported from Paris for the flights, as well as AF's proprietary equipment. See id at ¶ 5.

• Ogden allowed AF to keep an office at Ogden's SFO site; Moreau was often at the office overseeing the catering process for AF. See id at ¶ 6.

In sum, AF indirectly supervised Ogden employees. AF did not determine the individual work schedules of Ogden employees, pay rates or methods of payment for Ogden employees. Nor did AF prepare the payroll for Ogden employees. AF did not have the power to hire or fire Ogden workers. The bulk of the work for AF was provided at Ogden's site. The court concludes that AF did not exert sufficient control over the terms and conditions of Odgen's employees to be a joint employer.

2

• DynAir provided cleaning, baggage and cargo loading services to AF. DynAir's relationship with AF is characterized by the following facts:

• AF paid DynAir based on the type of aircraft serviced, with additional overtime payments if flights were significantly delayed. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh L at § 2.

• AF personnel ensured that DynAir cleaning crew, baggage and cargo employees were at the gate 10 minutes prior to a plane's arrival. See Pl Exh Vol I (Doc # 135), Exh E at 34:9-23. When an aircraft was late arriving or had other difficulties, DynAir employees worked overtime if necessary to complete the maintenance, cleaning and baggage services. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh L at § 2.9.

• AF required that 1-2 cleaners remain on the plane until AF's chief purser's final inspection. See Pl Exh Vol I (Doc # 135), Exh # at 113:12-26.

• As assistant station manager, Moreau provided detailed instructions to DynAir employees cleaning the aircraft. See Pl Exh Vol II (Doc # 136), Exh J at 87:11-89:6. An AF employee discussed any inadequately cleaned areas with the cleaning crew and DynAir supervisors. See Pl Exh Vol I (Doc # 135), Exh C at 113:3-26.

• AF also required its own training for cleaning and baggage handling. See id at 125:19-21, 182:17-19. AF's loading instructions required that only trained DynAir employees load the aircraft. See id at 183:23-26.

• An AF employee made sure that the DynAir employees loading cargo followed the "load sheet" prepared by AF instructing DynAir on proper loading of baggage and cargo. See Pl Exh Vol II (Doc # 136), Exh J at 80:9-21. These "load sheets" were created to comply with FAA regulations. See Pl Exh Vol I (Doc # 135), Exh B at 62:17-22.

In sum, AF closely supervised the DynAir cleaning crews. AF exerted very limited control over the individual DynAir employees' work schedules. Again, AF did not prepare the payroll for DynAir employees or have the power to hire or fire DynAir workers. AF therefore exercised significant control over work environment but essentially no control over other employment conditions of DynAir's cleaning crew. Balancing all of these factors, AF did not jointly employ DynAir's cleaning crew.

A similar analysis applies to the DynAir baggage and cargo handlers. While AF did not prepare the payroll for DynAir employees or the have the power to hire or fire DynAir workers, AF did require specialized training and closely supervised the work. Again, AF did not control whether an individual employee was assigned to AF or which shift an employee worked. The court concludes that AF supervised DynAir employees but exercised little control over their conditions of employment. Looking to all the circumstances, the court finds that DynAir baggage handlers were not jointly employed by DynAir and AF.

3

Aeroground provided cargo services to AF. AF's relationship with Aeroground is characterized by the following facts:

• AF did not recruit or hire any Aeroground employees. See Richard Decl (Doc # 82) at ¶ 4. Nor did AF directly discipline any Aeroground employees. See id. Aeroground was required to provide 13 full-time employees to AF. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh M at § 2.2.

• Pursuant to Aeroground's contract with AF, AF paid Aeroground based on the total weight of cargo handled. See id at § 5.2. AF did not set Aeroground employee pay rates. See Richard Decl (Doc # 82) at ¶ 4.

• AF personnel supervised Aeroground's work, inspecting cargo pallets, verifying weight and balance calculations and ensuring proper loading of dangerous materials. See Pl Exh Vol II (Doc # 136), Exh L at 45:5-16.

• As with Ogden, AF personnel primarily interacted with Aeroground supervisors; they interacted with Aeroground employees as necessary to assure that AF specifications were met. See id at 50:15-21.

• Similar to the Ogden relationship, AF maintains an office at the Aeroground site. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh M at § 2.1. This office displays the AF name and logo. See id at § 4.7.

• Aeroground provided its own equipment to handle and transport the cargo. See Richard Decl (Doc # 82) at ¶ 6. AF provided some limited equipment, primarily computers and expendables such as pallets and plastic rolls. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh M at § 4.6.

In sum, as with Aeroground and Odgen employees, AF supervised Aeroground employees to some extent. AF did not have the ability to determine pay rates or methods of payment and did not determine the Aeroground employees' work schedules. Again, AF did not have the power to hire or fire Aeroground workers. Finally, Aeroground employees worked at Aeroground's site; AF exerted little control over the conditions of their employment. The court finds that Aeroground employees were not employed by AF.

D

Having found that none of the ground personnel was an employee of AF for the purposes of FMLA eligibility and there being no material dispute about the facts upon which this determination rests, the court concludes that AF has demonstrated that the number of personnel employed by AF was not 50 or greater. AF employed at most 43 employees at the relevant time. The court finds that Moreau was not an eligible employee under FMLA. The court therefore GRANTS AF's motion for summary judgment with respect to Moreau's FMLA claim.

As Moreau's FMLA claim against AF fails, Moreau's FMLA claim against Bouloux must fail as well. The court GRANTS Bouloux's motion for summary judgment with respect to Moreau's FMLA claim.

III

Defendants also move for summary judgment on Moreau's state law claims. Specifically, Moreau alleges four state law causes of action: violation of CFRA, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, breach of employment contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Compl (Doc # 1). CFRA's eligibility requirements track those of FMLA. See Cal Govt Code § 12945.2(b); 2 CCR § 7297.10. As the court has already granted defendants' motion with respect to Moreau's FMLA claims, the court also grants defendants' motion with respect to Moreau's CFRA claims. The court now turns to Moreau's other state law claims.

A

Under California law, employment is at will unless the parties contract otherwise. See Cal Labor Code § 2922. California courts have, however, carved out a specific exception to this general rule: an employer will be liable if it terminates an an employee in violation of public policy. See Stevenson v Superior Court, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 (1997). California public policy emanates from its constitution and statutes. See id. Discharge in violation of the CFRA is, as a matter of law, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See Nelson v United Technologies, 88 Cal.2d 239, 246 (Cal App 1999) Defendants, however, did not violate CFRA because Moreau was not an eligible employee under CFRA. Moreau cannot re-tool his failed CFRA claim as a wrongful discharge claim. See Jennings v Marralle, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 284 (Cal 1994) ("The Legislature's decision to exclude small employers from the FEHA and the omission of any other legislation barring discrimination on the basis of age precludes finding a fundamental policy that extends to age discrimination by small employers."). The court therefore GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Moreau's wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim.

B

AF argues that Moreau's employment was at will and therefore AF did not breach Moreau's employment contract when AF terminated Moreau's employment. Moreau counters that AF's course of dealing, memoranda and employee handbook created an implied-in- fact contract requiring good cause for termination. See Pl Opp (Doc # 133) at 23.

Absent a contract stating otherwise, employment in California is at will. See Cal Labor Code § 2922. Employment contracts can be express or implied; one possible provision of an employment contract is a provision contract requiring "good cause" before termination. See Guz v Bechtel Nat, Inc, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 365 (Cal 2000). Both parties agree that under California law, courts must "inquire into the parties' conduct to determine if [that conduct] demonstrates an implied contract."Foley v Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal.3d 654, 677 (Cal 1988). They disagree whether the parties' conduct demonstrates an implied contract in this case and if so, what the terms of that contract include.

While the Foley court asserted that courts must examine the totality of circumstances in deciding whether an implied contract exists, the court also provided several factors for courts to consider, including "the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the plaintiff is engaged." See Foley, 254 Cal Rptr at 225 (citingPugh v See Candies, Inc, 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 (Cal App 1981)). Whether an implied-in-fact contract exists is a question of fact. See id at 223.

AF notes that its employee handbook contained an express disclaimer of any employment relationship other than employment at will. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exhs P1, P2. The disclaimer stated:

YOUR EMPLOYMENT STATUS Full-time employees are hired for "longer-term," "seasonal" or "short-term" employment. Whichever of these three categories is applicable to your employment status, it should be understood that neither you, nor the Company, has entered into any expressed or implied contract for continued employment. Our relationship is and will continue to be one of voluntary employment "at will." Your employment with Air France is entered into voluntarily. of course you can resign at any time, and similarly, Air France can conclude an employment relationship at any time.

Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh Pl at 6.

This disclaimer is strong evidence of an at-will contract, but not dispositive of the issue. See Guz, 100 Cal.Rptr. 2 d at 371. In Guz, the California Supreme Court noted that employee handbooks are strong evidence of the terms and conditions of employment:

When an employer promulgates formal personnel policies and procedures in handbooks, manuals, and memoranda disseminated to employees, a strong inference may arise that the employer intended workers to rely on these policies as terms and conditions of their employment, and that employees did reasonably so rely.

100 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 371. Moreau contends that the disciplinary provisions in the AF employee handbook provide evidence that he would only be terminated for good cause. See Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exhs P1, P2. These provisions provide examples of conduct which could trigger graduated discipline, as well as examples of conduct that would be cause for immediate dismissal. See id. As the manual states, "[t]he above Company Rules are examples of reasons for which disciplinary actions may be taken; however, the Company Rules are not all-inclusive, and therefore there may be other appropriate reasons for which disciplinary action may be necessary." Burns Decl (Doc # 84), Exh Pl at 17. Again, the manual is quite clear that these examples do not constitute the entire range of discipline that AF may take. The examples provide no evidence of anything other than an "at-will" contract.

Moreau also points to a letter he received which required him to repay the costs of training, $25,000, if he left AF within two years of completing that training as further evidence of a "good cause" provision. AF counters that Moreau simply benefitted from a voluntary training program. While it may not be unusual for an employer to require repayment of training costs in certain circumstances, that requirement affects the terms and conditions of the employment contract. It does not, however, change the terms and conditions to include a "good cause" provision or otherwise alter the terms of Moreau's employment after the two year period.

Finally, Moreau points to the course of dealing between AF and its employees as evidence of a "good cause" provision. In Guz, the court held that length of service and merit of performance are probative only insofar as they allow the parties an opportunity to make specific verbal commitments; without such specifics, the fact a plaintiff was employed for many years is simply indicative of a well-run organization. See id at 370-71. Similarly, Moreau's contention that no employee was fired at SFO during the eleven years he worked at AF suggests that Bouloux and Moreau, as managers, did a good job managing employees. Without specific verbal statements by AF implicitly refuting at-will status, neither this assertion nor Moreau's longevity of service provide evidence that an implied-in-fact contract existed. See id. As Moreau does not provide such specific statements, the court looks only to the AF's written policies clearly stating that Moreau's employment was at-will.

The court therefore GRANTS defendants AF and Bouloux's motion for summary judgment with respect to Moreau's breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims.

IV

In summary, the court GRANTS defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to all of Moreau's claims. In addition, Moreau improperly filed a statement of undisputed fact. See Civil LR 56-2(a). Such submissions will be disregarded. The court therefore terminates the AF's motion to strike as moot (Doc # 159). As a final housekeeping matter, in his opposition memorandum, Moreau requested that the court postpone the summary judgment motion for 30 days to give Moreau sufficient time to complete discovery. For unrelated reasons, the court rescheduled the hearing on this motion from October 11, 2001 to November 15, 2001. The court therefore DENIES Moreau's request as moot. The clerk is directed to close the file and terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.