Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-2961-JD-JDA
08-18-2023
Brandon Lemar Miles, Petitioner, v. Warden of the Greenville County Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Brandon Lemar Miles (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner is a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). [Id. at 1.] He files this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the undersigned concludes that the District Court should dismiss the Petition.
The undersigned notes that Petitioner has also filed two civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at case numbers 8:23-cv-3365-JD-JDA and 8:23-cv-3593-JD-JDA related to the facts that form the basis of the claims in this habeas petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner contends he is being detained at the Detention Center without bond as he was denied bond on May 12, 2023. [Doc. 1 at 1.] He contends he is challenging a kidnapping charge that was brought against him at the Detention Center. [Id. at 2.] He contends the charge is “false” as he was “simply asking for a higher chain of command.” [Id.] Petitioner contends he filed a grievance with Major Marshall Stowers, but did not receive any response. [Id.] Petitioner asserts the following grounds:
GROUND ONE: It was a violation of my rights to not allow me access to a higher chain of command.
Supporting facts: I can clearly be seen on camera asking politely for a higher chain of command. Instead she radioed in that “Oscar dorm won't let her leave.” Then walked out. She wasn't being held without her will so I shouldn't have been charged with kidnapping or charged at all. The officer is named Eleanor Cooter.
GROUND TWO: I was then placed in segregated housing unit for the accused charged. I did 56 days in lockup, my phone privileges were taken along with my canteen and kiosk privileges.
Supporting facts: After doing 56 days in segregated housing unit (Red Pod) to my knowledge my phone, canteen, and kiosk were suspended for 90 days. But when I asked how long would my privileges [be] taken, the response was I was suspended indefinitely per Vandermosten (Director) I replied with a grievance stating it was unconstitutional but got no reply.[Id. at 6.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks “the Court to help [him] get the charge dropped completely because it is a defamation to [his] character.” [Id. at 7.]
The Court has carefully reviewed all of Petitioner's submissions in this case as well as the documents in Petitioner's pending state court actions. Notably, Petitioner has been charged with kidnapping in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions at case number 2022A2330210408, which remains pending at this time, related to the events at issue in the Petition. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number “2022A2330210408”) (last visited Aug. 17, 2023).
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the documents in Petitioner's pending criminal actions in the state court. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). This Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply the rules to § 2241 petitions).
Further, Petitioner filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”). that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Finally, Petitioner is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Petitioner had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Petition if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Petitioner could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Petitioner's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Petitioner brings this action to challenge the kidnapping charge against him, and he requests that the Court dismiss that pending charge. [Doc. 1 at 2, 7.] However, Petitioner's claims are not properly before this Court because he has failed to exhaust his state court remedies and because the Court should abstain from deciding the merits.
Exhaustion
Ordinarily, federal habeas corpus relief for a state prisoner is available post-conviction. However, pretrial petitions for habeas corpus are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, “‘which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him.'” United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 1987)). Generally though, an “‘attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution'” is not attainable through federal habeas corpus relief, Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 226 (quoting Brown v. Estelle, 530 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1976)), and a federal writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 can only be sought after the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies, see Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1973) (exhaustion required under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Thus, “[p]retrial habeas relief is available under § 2241 if the petitioner is in custody, has exhausted his state court remedies, and ‘special circumstances' justify the provision of federal review.” Allen v. Robinson, No. 92-6703, 1993 WL 46883, at *1 (4th Cir. 1993).
While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist that would protect a petitioner's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention. Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975); Brazell v. Boyd, No. 92-7029, 1993 WL 98778 (4th Cir. Apr. 5, 1993). Thus, where a threat to a petitioner's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstances are shown. Moore, 515 F.2d at 449; see also Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (double jeopardy claim entitled to pretrial habeas intervention because “the very constitutional right claimed . . . would be violated” if petitioner were forced to go to trial). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Moore, 515 F.2d at 449 (explaining the federal court should abstain from considering a speedy trial claim at the pretrial stage because the claim could be raised at trial and on direct appeal).
In this case, Petitioner has failed to show that he has exhausted his state court remedies or that “special circumstances” justify review by this Court. Petitioner asserts that his rights under the United States Constitution have been violated because he was falsely charged with kidnapping. However, because Petitioner may raise these claims in the state courts during trial and post-trial proceedings, pretrial intervention by this Court is inappropriate. See Wirtz v. Dir. of Oconee Ctny. Det. Ctr., No. 4:13-cv-387-RMG, 2013 WL 1901148, at *2 (D.S.C. May 7, 2013).
This Court finds that Petitioner can raise his federal constitutional rights claims in the state court proceedings. Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies and does not allege any special circumstances to show that pretrial intervention would be appropriate in this case. Petitioner is, therefore, precluded from federal habeas relief at this time, and his Petition should be dismissed.
Abstention
Additionally, Petitioner's claims must be dismissed because granting his requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin his pending state court proceedings. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, Petitioner is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and he asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations and to require that his charges be dismissed; thus, the first element is satisfied. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-2981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test was satisfied where the petitioner alleged that “he is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012). The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as Petitioner can raise his constitutional claims in the state court. Gaster v. Johnson, No. 8:21-cv-01449-HMH-JDA, 2021 WL 2593483, at *2 (D.S.C. June 10, 2021), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 2592823 (D.S.C. June 23, 2021).
A ruling in Petitioner's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state court proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Petitioner can raise his federal constitutional rights claims in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should dismiss this case on abstention grounds pursuant to Younger. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits”).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Petition filed in this action be DISMISSED without requiring Respondent to file a return.
The undersigned finds that Petitioner cannot cure the defects in his Petition by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Petitioner an opportunity to amend because amendment would be futile. Petitioner's state criminal charges remain pending at this time, and he can raise the issues complained of herein with the state court.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).