Opinion
C. A. 8:21-cv-01449-HMH-JDA
06-10-2021
Frank M. Gaster, Petitioner, v. Director Neil Johnson, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Frank M. Gaster (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, brings this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is a detainee at the Georgetown County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). He files this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the undersigned concludes that the District Court should dismiss the Petition for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
As noted, Petitioner filed this case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking habeas relief related to his present incarceration at the Detention Center. He makes the following allegations in his Petition. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner contends he is being detained at the Detention Center pursuant to a civil commitment petition filed under S.C. Code § 44-48-10, the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVP”). [Id. at 1-2.] Petitioner contends that an SVP petition was filed on November 12, 2020, in the Georgetown County Court of Common Pleas at No. 2020-cp-22-00928; that he has been incarcerated since January 20, 2021, at the Detention Center; that he was evaluated on April 5, 2021, for a mental abnormality/personality disorder; and that the results of that evaluation remain pending.[Id. at 2.] Petitioner contends he has not yet been committed, and he is challenging his incarceration on the ground that he has not been afforded due process of law. [Id. at 3.]
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the documents in the pending action against Petitioner in the Georgetown County Court of Common Pleas at No. 2020CP2200928, see Georgetown County Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Georgetown/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by No. “2020cp2200928”) (last visited June 8, 2021), as well as Petitioner's prior actions filed in this Court and other actions previously filed or currently pending in the state courts. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Petitioner asserts the following grounds for relief in his Petition: that he has been incarcerated since January 20, 2021, without the availability of a bond; that he has not been given any discovery material or paperwork; that he has been incarcerated without correspondence from his appointed counsel; and that he is being incarcerated for the same triggering offense used in a prior SVP petition, in which a jury found him not guilty. [Id. at 6-8.] For his relief, Petitioner requests release from incarceration. [Id. at 8.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Further, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (allowing district courts to apply the rules to other § 2241 petitions). Following the required initial review, it is recommended that the Petition submitted in this case be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
As noted, Petitioner seeks release from incarceration at the Detention Center, claiming his constitutional rights have been denied. Nevertheless, this action should be dismissed because Petitioner's claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). The Fourth Circuit has held that the Younger abstention doctrine applies “to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved, ” Harper v. Public Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 396 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), and courts in this district have held that Younger applies to South Carolina state-court SVP proceedings, see Tyler v. Bogle, No. 9:18-cv-1513-MGL-BM, 2018 WL 4017687, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2018) (collecting cases), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4005792 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2018).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Petitioner is involved in ongoing state court proceedings, and he asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations and to require his immediate release; thus, the first element is satisfied. See Lott v. Sheek, No. 8:19-cv-00954-DCC-JDA, 2019 WL 3308415, at *8 (D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2019) (noting the first prong of the abstention test was satisfied where the petitioner was involved in ongoing state civil commitment proceedings under the SVP Act), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 2511253 (D.S.C. June 18, 2019). The second element is satisfied as the South Carolina Court of Appeals has held that protecting minors from sexual predators is an important state interest. See State v. Reid, 679 S.E.2d 194, 201 n.6 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009). The third element is also satisfied, as Petitioner can raise his constitutional claims in the state court. See Lott, 2019 WL 3308415 at *8.
Petitioner was convicted in 1988 of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, second degree, and was found to be a sexually violent predator in 1999 as defined in the SVP Act. See Gaster v. SCDC, No. 2:02-cv-2708-HMH-RSC (D.S.C. Jan. 30, 2003), Doc. 12 at 2.
In sum, a ruling in Petitioner's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). Thus, this Court should dismiss this case on abstention grounds pursuant to Younger. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “when a district court abstains from a case based on Younger, it should typically dismiss the case with prejudice; not on the merits”); Hamm v. South Carolina, No. 9:16-cv-2922-RMG-BM, 2016 WL 11214095, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2016) (dismissing § 2241 habeas petition as barred by Younger where the petitioner asserted a claim related to ongoing SVP proceedings), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 176294 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2017).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Petition filed in this action be DISMISSED without requiring the Respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.