Summary
In Lawlor v. Goldberg, 34 Conn. App. 189, 190-91, 640 A.2d 1016, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 922, 642 A.2d 1216 (1994), "[t]he trial court found that the [Wethersfield] officer had unlawfully stopped the plaintiff in Glastonbury for violations of [General Statutes] §§ 14-218a and 14-236 and, thus, had unlawfully arrested the plaintiff for operating a vehicle while under the influence of liquor in violation of § 14-227a (a). As a result, the trial court found the commissioner's decision clearly erroneous.
Summary of this case from State v. GuraOpinion
(12141)
Argued January 18, 1994
Decision released April 26, 1994
Appeal from the decision by the defendant suspending the plaintiff's license to operate a motor vehicle, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford and tried to the court, Maloney, J.; judgment sustaining the appeal, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
Alan N. Ponanski, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).
Thomas P. Heslin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff's appeal from the defendant's decision suspending the plaintiff's driver's license, pursuant to General Statutes 14-227b, for operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and refusing to submit to chemical breath tests. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's appeal on the sole ground that a Wethersfield police officer had unlawfully pursued the plaintiff from the town of Wethersfield into the town of Glastonbury under General Statutes 54-1f.
General Statutes 14-227b(f) provides that a hearing to determine the suspension of a driver's license for driving while under the influence of liquor "shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle or for assault in the second degree with a motor vehicle or for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or both or while his ability to operate such motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis and the results of such test or analysis indicated that at the time of the alleged offense the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person was ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight; and (4) was such person operating the motor vehicle. . . ."
General Statutes 54-1f(c) provides in pertinent part: "Members of any local police department . . . when in immediate pursuit of one who may be arrested under the provisions of this section, are authorized to pursue the offender outside of their respective precincts into any part of the state in order to effect the arrest. . . ."
At the time that the police officer first observed the plaintiff, he noted that the plaintiff was operating his motor vehicle at what appeared to be an excessive rate of speed and unlawfully changing lanes. Thus, at the time that the officer pursued the plaintiff into Glastonbury, he suspected only that the defendant had committed motor vehicle violations under General Statutes 14-218a and 14-236. When the officer stopped the plaintiff's vehicle in Glastonbury, the investigation that he conducted led him to believe that the plaintiff had been operating his vehicle while under the influence of liquor. The officer thereupon arrested the plaintiff and charged him with a violation of General Statutes 14-227a (a). The trial court found that the officer had unlawfully stopped the plaintiff in Glastonbury for violations of General Statutes 14-218a and 14-236 and, thus, had unlawfully arrested the plaintiff for operating a vehicle while under the influence of liquor in violation of General Statutes 14-227a (a). As a result, the trial court found the commissioner's decision clearly erroneous. This appeal followed.
General Statutes 14-218a(a) provides in pertinent part: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state . . . at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the width, traffic and use of highway, road or parking area, the intersection of streets and weather conditions. . . ."
General Statutes 14-236 provides in pertinent part: "When any highway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, (1) a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has ascertained that such movement can be made with safety . . . . Violation of subdivision (1) of this section shall be an infraction."
General Statutes 14-227a(a) provides in pertinent part: "OPERATION WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if he operates a motor vehicle on a public highway of this state . . . (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both or (2) while the ratio of alcohol in the blood of such person is ten hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol, by weight."
This case is controlled by our Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Harrison, 228 Conn. 758, 638 A.2d 601 (1994). In Harrison, our Supreme Court interpreted the term "offense" as used in General Statutes 54-1f to include motor vehicle violations. Id., 765. Therefore, in accordance with Harrison, we conclude that the Wethersfield officer had lawfully pursued the plaintiff across town lines, had lawfully stopped the vehicle and had lawfully arrested the plaintiff. Thus, the trial court improperly determined that the commissioner's decision was clearly erroneous.