Summary
In Johnson, this Court explained that the provisions of the Human Rights Act pertaining to employment discrimination were repealed in 1997 and replaced with the employment discrimination statute, § 23:301-369, which does not expose employees to individual liability.
Summary of this case from Miller v. BlanchardOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 01-2075, SECTION "R"(1)
October 2, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Jerry Allen, Regional Vice President of Integrated Health Services ("IHS"), who moves this court for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court grants Allen's motion.
I. Background
IHS, who is also a defendant in this matter and has filed a separate motion for summary judgment, owns and operates a nursing home called Integrated Health Services of Marrero. In March 1999, IHS hired plaintiff Julie Thrasher Johnson to be the Adminstrator of its Marrero facility. Around the same time, IHS also hired plaintiff Ronald Ruffin to be its Director of Nursing. Johnson and Ruffin allege that from the time that they started working at IHS, Christine Becnel, Social Services Designee at the Marrero facility, routinely made offensive and insensitive racial remarks in front of Ruffin, an African-American. Johnson and Ruffin also allege that Becnel violated state and federal regulations pertaining to the care provided to Medicaid patients. Plaintiffs, who were both fired by IHS on July 5, 2000, assert that they were fired in retaliation for complaining about Becnel's behavior. In addition to their claims against IHS, plaintiffs assert that Allen is liable in his individual capacity, first, under Louisiana state anti-retaliation laws, and, second, for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The Court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993). A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 2001 WL 1650961 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
B. Louisiana State Anti-Retaliation Law
Under federal law, plaintiffs may not maintain an action against Jerry Allen under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq., because the Fifth Circuit does not recognize individual liability for employees under Title VII. Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448 (5th Cir. 2002); Grant v. Lone Star Company, 21 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1994). Nor is Allen liable under the Louisiana anti-discrimination statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302, which also exposes to liability "employers," but not individual employees. See Seal v. Gateway Companies, Inc., 2001 WL 1018362, *2 (E.D.La. 2001). Nor is Allen exposed to individual liability under the Louisiana whistle-blower statute. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:967. Although the whistleblower statute does not itself define the term "employer," courts have imported the term's definition from the employment discrimination statute. See Seal, 2001 WL 1018362, at *2; Jones v. JCC Holding Co., 2001 WL 537001, *3 (E.D.La. 2001); Dronet v. LaFarge Corporation, 2000 WL 1720547, *2 (E.D.La. 2000).
Actions under Title VII may only be brought against "employers," which include any "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees, and any agent of such a person. . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The inclusion of "agents" was merely a congressional attempt "to import respondeat superior liability into Title VII." Smith, 298 F.3d at 448.
The Louisiana employment discrimination statute defines "employer" as "a person, association, legal or commercial entity . . . receiving services from an employee and, in return, giving compensation of any kind to an employee." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302.
Plaintiffs, however, assert that Allen is exposed to liability under the Louisiana statute that prohibits one or more persons from conspiring to retaliate against individuals for opposing certain unlawful practices. The statute provides that:
"It shall be an unlawful practice for a person or for two or more persons to conspire:
(1) To retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by this Chapter. . . ."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2256. The "chapter" to which the statute refers is known as the Louisiana Human Rights Act, which makes unlawful discriminatory practices: (1) in public accommodations and advertising public accommodations, § 51:2247, § 51:2248; (2) against breastfeeding mothers, § 51:2247.1; (3) by financial institutions in providing financial services, § 51:2254; and (4) in credit transactions, § 51:2255. Plaintiffs do not allege that they opposed any of these unlawful discriminatory practices. Rather, plaintiffs opposed Allen's alleged employment discrimination. Therefore, because plaintiffs did not oppose any practice made unlawful by the chapter to which § 51:2256 refers, Allen is entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
Plaintiffs' assertion that § 51:2256 still applies to unlawful employment discrimination is without merit. Before 1997, the Louisiana Human Rights Act made it an unlawful practice to engage in certain forms of employment discrimination. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2242. Thus, before 1997, § 51:2256 exposed employees like Allen to individual liability for engaging in conspiracies to retaliate against those who opposed unlawful employment discrimination. In 1997, however, the Louisiana legislature repealed § 51:2242 and passed separate, comprehensive legislation pertaining to employment discrimination. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302. As previously mentioned, these new provisions limit exposure to liability to "employers." The provisions do not expose employees like Allen to liability, including individual liability for participating in conspiracies to retaliate. Plaintiffs make no showing that the Louisiana legislature intended § 51:2256, which limits itself to practices made unlawful under the Louisiana Human Rights Act, to extend to practices now made unlawful by § 23:302. See Trahan v. Lowe's, Inc., 2002 WL 1560272, *9 (E.D.La. 2002). Accordingly, the Court concludes that liability under § 51:2256 is limited to retaliation against practices made unlawful under the Louisiana Human Rights Act and does not extend to provisions repealed from that Act and now incorporated in § 23:302.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiffs must prove "(1) that the conduct of [Allen] was extreme and outrageous; (2) that the emotional distress suffered by [plaintiffs] was severe; and (3) that [Allen] desired to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct." Roberson v. August, 830 So.2d 620, 629 (La.Ct.App. 2002); White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205 (La. 1991). Extreme and outrageous conduct is "so atrocious as to pass the boundaries of decency and to be utterly intolerable to civilized society." Roberson, 830 So.2d at 620 (citing Johnson v. English, 779 So.2d 876 (La.Ct.App. 2000)). Nothing in the record indicates that Allen engaged in such extreme and outrageous conduct. The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that "disciplinary action and conflict in a . . . workplace environment, although calculated to cause some degree of mental anguish, is not ordinarily" extreme or outrageous. White, 585 So.2d at 1210. Accordingly, Allen is entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Allen's motion for summary judgment.