Opinion
Civil Action NO. 00-2656, Section "N"
November 16, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant David Gage's Motion to Dismiss Claim, For the following reasons, defendant's motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2000, Plaintiff Patrick N. Dronet ("Dronet") filed the instant suit in state court against his employer, LaFarge Corporation ("LaFarge"), and his supervisor, David Gage ("Gage"), alleging violations of the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute, La, Rev. Stat. § 23:967, and the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Dronet claims that he was unlawfully fired by the defendants after he complained about safety, health, wage, and hour law violations.
The defendants removed the lawsuit on July 28, 2000. and now defendant Gage moves the Court to dismiss Dronet's state law claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995). Dismissal is warranted if "it appears certain that the plaintiff[s] cannot prove any set of facts in support of [their] claim that would entitle [them] to relief." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Louisiana Whistleblower Statute provides that an "employer shall not take reprisal against an employee who in good faith, and after advising the employer of the violation of the law . . . [d]iscloses or threatens to disclose a workplace act or practice that is in violation of state law." LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967. Defendant Gage now moves to dismiss Dronet's Whistleblower Statute claims on the grounds that Gage is not an employer within the meaning of the statute
Both parties point out that neither the Louisiana legislature nor Louisiana case Law define the meaning of "employer" under the Whistleblower Statute. Defendant Gage argues that the Court should look to various similar Louisiana employment statutes in which the term "employer" does not encompass individual employees or managers. Dronet asserts that the Court should follow the definitions in the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., which define an employer as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee" See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (d).
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that the "words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 11 (West 1999). The plain meaning of the term "employer" is "one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 525 (6th ed. 1990). This generally prevailing definition supports Gage's position that he is not an "employer" because he does not pay Dronet's wages.
However, the Code also instructs that "[l]aws on the same subject matter be interpreted in reference to each other." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 13. Accordingly, the Court will consider the definitions of "employer" in related Louisiana statutes. In 1999, the Louisiana legislature modified the state's fundamental employment discrimination law, La. Rev. Stat. § 301, et seq., to define an "employer" as.
a person, association, legal or commercial entity, . . . receiving services from an employee and, in return, giving compensation of any kind to an employee. The provisions of this Chapter shall apply only to an employer who employs twenty or more employees within this state for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302. The Fifth Circuit has held that Louisiana's anti-discrimination law does not support a cause of action against individual supervisors, in either their individual or official capacities. See Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994). Like the anti-discrimination law which prevents discrimination based on an employee's protected status. the Whistleblower Statute prevents employers from taking discriminatory actions against employees based on their protected activities.
In light of the facts that a supervisor is neither an employer in the traditional sense nor an employer within the meaning of the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law, the Court finds that Gage is not an employer under the Louisiana Whistleblower Act. Accordingly, defendant Gage's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff Dronet's claim is GRANTED. However, the Court reserves ruling on the viability of Dronet's federal law claims which Gage has not yet addressed
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that defendant David Gage's Motion to Dismiss plaintiff Patrick N. Dronet's claims under La. Rev. Stat. § 23:967 is GRANTED.