Opinion
Civil Action No: 02-2347 Section "R" (1)
December 12, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Production Systems, Inc. and defendant Wayne Jackson's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's claims under the United States Constitution and the Louisiana Constitution. In addition, defendants move to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims against Jackson. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses plaintiff's constitutional claims and also dismisses plaintiff's claims against Jackson.
I. Background
Plaintiff Roy Miller alleges in his complaint that he was fired by his employer, Production Systems, Inc., because of his race. The reason given for his termination was a reduction in the workforce, but Miller asserts that he was the only employee terminated. Moreover, he was replaced by a white employee. Prior to his termination, plaintiff was stationed on an offshore rig owned and operated by Unocal.
Named as defendants in the matter are Production Systems, Inc., Unocal, and a number of individuals. Among these individuals is Wayne Jackson, an employee of Production Systems, who plaintiff asserts unlawfully conspired to terminate him. Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that "[d]efendants' discriminatory, hostile, harassing and retaliatory actions . . . constitute violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Constitution of the United States of America, the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, [and] the statutes of the State of Louisiana." (Compl. ¶ 14.) Production Systems and Jackson move to dismiss plaintiff's constitutional claims. In addition, defendants seek dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Jackson.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court must resolve doubts as to the sufficiency of the claim in plaintiffs' favor. Vulcan Materials Company v. City of Tehuacana, 238 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted if it appears certain that plaintiffs cannot prove any set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. Id.; Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)).
B. Analysis
A. Plaintiff's Constitutional Claims
The due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of Louisiana apply only to state action and do not apply to private action. Morris v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2001); Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company v. Gavin, 882 F.2d 178, 181 (5th Cir. 1989); Country Club of Louisiana Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Dornier, 691 So.2d 142, 146 (La.Ct.App. 1997). Plaintiff has named only private actors as defendants and seeks recovery for a private act, namely, defendants' adverse employment decision. Plaintiff's complaint does not allege that any of the defendants acted under color of state law. Therefore, even when the allegations in the complaint are construed in his favor and assumed to be factually correct, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a a federal or state constitutional claim. Fenelon v. Byrd, 1999 WL 600380, *1 (E.D.La. 1999). It follows that plaintiff's complaint also fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a remedy for damages arising from constitutional violations. Defendants' motion to dismiss these claims is granted.
B. Plaintiff's Claims Against Wayne Jackson
Having dismissed plaintiff's constitutional claims, the Court now turns to plaintiff's statutory claims against Jackson. The complaint identifies Jackson as an employee of plaintiff's employer, Production Systems. First, plaintiff asserts that he states a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq. Actions under Title VII may be brought only against "employers," which include any "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The inclusion of "agents" signals congressional intent "to import respondeat superior liability into Title VII." Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit, however, does not recognize individual liability for employees under Title VII. Id.; Grant v. Lone Star Company, 21 F.3d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1994). It follows that plaintiff does not state a Title VII claim against Jackson.
Second, Miller asserts claims for relief under two Louisiana statutes, the Louisiana employment discrimination statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:301-369, and the Louisiana Human Rights Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2256. Like Title VII, the Louisiana employment discrimination statute exposes to liability "employers" but not individual employees. See Seal v. Gateway Companies, Inc., 2001 WL 1018362, *2 (E.D.La. 2001). It defines "employer" as "a person, association, legal or commercial entity . . . receiving services from an employee and, in return, giving compensation of any kind to an employee." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302. Because Jackson is not alleged to be plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of the employment discrimination statute, plaintiff fails to state a claim against Jackson under this statute.
Last, plaintiff asserts that Jackson is exposed to liability under the Louisiana Human Rights Act, which prohibits one or more persons from conspiring to retaliate against individuals for opposing certain unlawful practices. The statute provides that:
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person or for two or more persons to conspire:
(1) To retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by this Chapter. . . .
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2256. The "chapter" to which the statute refers is the Human Rights Act, which makes unlawful discriminatory practices: (1) in public accommodations and advertising public accommodations, § 51:2247, § 51:2248; (2) against breastfeeding mothers, § 51:2247.1; (3) by financial institutions in providing financial services, § 51:2254; and (4) in credit transactions, § 51:2255. Plaintiff, however, does not allege that he opposed any of these unlawful discriminatory practices. Rather, plaintiff seeks recovery for an alleged conspiracy to commit employment discrimination, which the Human Rights Act no longer covers. See Johnson v. Integrated Health Services, 2002 WL 31246762, *2-3 (E.D.La. 2002). In Johnson, this Court explained that the provisions of the Human Rights Act pertaining to employment discrimination were repealed in 1997 and replaced with the employment discrimination statute, § 23:301-369, which does not expose employees to individual liability. Id. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against Wayne Jackson.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion.