(Reversing and remanding 173 Wis.2d 310, 497 N.W.2d 135 (Ct.App. 1992).)

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.

This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, In Re the Mental Condition of Billy Jo W., 173 Wis.2d 310, 497 N.W.2d 135 (Ct.App. 1992), reversing an order of the circuit court, Allan P. Torhorst, Judge. The circuit court authorized the Racine Journal Times and Gary Metro, a Racine Journal Times reporter, to review and publish portions of the court records produced as a result of Billy Jo W.'s chapter 51, Stats. 1991-92, civil commitment and recommitments.

The legislature has set forth countervailing policies favoring, on the one hand, confidentiality of records of ch. 51 court proceedings and, on the other, open court records and open court proceedings. The legislature has mandated that the courts balance these countervailing policies by enabling a circuit court to release civil commitment court records "pursuant to lawful order of the court which maintains the records." Sec. 51.30 (3). In the case at bar, this court must determine under what circumstances the sec. 51.30 (3), Stats. 1991-92, authorization of release of court files and records "pursuant to lawful order of the court," permits a circuit court to enter an order releasing civil commitment court records.

For the reasons set forth, we read the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" in 51.30 (3) to allow narrow exceptions to the closing of ch. 51 civil commitment court records. In this case we identify three narrow circumstances in which a court may release such court records under sec. 51.30 (3). A court may release ch. 51 civil commitment court records (1) when the requested access fits within one of the statutory exceptions to the confidentiality of mental health treatment records enumerated in sec. 51.30 (4)(b); (2) when the requested access is comparable to one of the statutory exceptions to the confidentiality of mental health treatment records enumerated in sec. 51.30 (4)(b); and (3) when a significant interrelationship exists between the court records of the civil commitment proceedings at issue and a criminal proceeding involving a violent felony pending prior to the civil commitment.

We conclude, as explained below, that the records requested in the case fall within the third circumstance. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' decision denying access to the records described by the circuit court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

On January 4, 1984, Billy Jo W. was charged with first degree intentional homicide. He pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. In due course Billy Jo W. was examined by a psychiatrist, and the examination raised doubts as to his competence to stand trial. The criminal court found Billy Jo W. incompetent to stand trial pursuant to sec. 971.14, and he was committed criminally. Thus the murder case did not go to trial at that time.

In 1985, when the circuit court found that Billy Jo W. was unlikely to regain competency in the time period specified by sec. 971.14 (5)(a), the court discharged him from criminal commitment as required by sec. 971.14 (6)(a), Stats. 1991-92. Civil commitment proceedings then began in Racine County circuit court pursuant to sec. 51.20. On October 8, 1985, upon finding, pursuant to secs. 51.20 (1)(a)1, (1)(a)2.b, and (1)(am), that Billy Jo W. was both mentally ill and dangerous, the circuit court committed him to Mendota Mental Health Institute for a six month period. Thereafter, recommitment hearings were held on either a semi-annual or annual basis.

Billy Jo W. was present at all but one of the recommitment hearings. Each hearing was also attended by the public defender who represented Billy Jo W.; an attorney from the Racine County Corporation Counsel's office who represented the interests of the public, pursuant to sec. 51.20 (4), Stats.; and a representative of the Racine County Human Services Department. At each hearing the court received the written report of the medical doctor or a psychologist who had been assigned to examine Billy Jo W., as well as the stipulation or testimony of that examiner. The court minutes, doctors' reports, certain medical records from the institution and memoranda from the Racine County Human Services Department are all contained in Billy Jo W.'s civil commitment court file. The record does not indicate that any of the hearings were closed.

After each of the court hearings prior to 1990, Billy Jo W. was recommitted to an institution. In August of 1990, however, he was recommitted to Cornerstone I, which is apparently a halfway house in Racine. In August 1991, he was recommitted but allowed to live independently.

While living independently in December 1991, Billy Jo W. was arrested and charged with committing three robberies. Criminal charges were filed in a separate case. The circuit court handling these three robbery charges found that Billy Jo W. was not competent to stand trial and once again committed him pursuant to sec. 974.14 (5)(a).

After Billy Jo W. was arrested in 1991, the Racine Journal Times and Gary Metro, a reporter, (hereafter the Journal Times) filed a petition in Racine County circuit court requesting access to the contents of Billy Jo W.'s civil commitment court file, asserting a belief that this file contained psychiatric examinations conducted between 1984 and 1990. In addition, the Journal Times asked for permission to print the portions of the file that the paper deemed relevant. The circuit court authorized the Journal Times to review and publish any report or correspondence dated from September 12, 1985, to February 17, 1992, that was "prepared by or on behalf of any psychologist, psychiatrist or other physician who examined [Billy Jo W.] pursuant to a court order" and, within the same dates, any evaluations prepared by the Racine County Human Services Department and any orders issued after those examinations. At oral argument in this court, counsel for the Journal Times stated that the newspaper was not seeking records beyond those provided for in the circuit court order.

The court of appeals reversed, concluding that sec. 51.30 (4)(b)4, did not give the circuit court authority to release treatment records to the news media. Evaluating the statutory exceptions to the general rule that treatment records are to be kept confidential, the court of appeals concluded that there are strict limitations on who can obtain treatment records and on what information can be released. Because the legislature had made such a great effort to preserve confidentiality of treatment records, the court of appeals reasoned that I access to the material set forth by the circuit court would be inconsistent with legislative intent.

II.

In addressing the issue before this court, we first note the statement in section 51.30 (3) that files and records of chapter 51 court proceedings "shall be closed." The legislative directive is that these records are to remain inaccessible.

This legislative mandate to close court records is grounded in the legislature's strong interest in keeping private the details of an individual's mental and emotional condition. Because individuals are still stigmatized by mental illness and commitment to a mental institution, they are entitled to privacy about these matters. Furthermore, society has a strong interest in facilitating the reintegration of individuals into the community. Section 51.30 implies that successful reintegration is more likely to occur when court records revealing personal information about an individual's mental and emotional history have not been revealed to the public. Thus it follows that to the extent that the civil commitment court records at issue grow solely out of ch. 51 proceedings, the legislative preference for confidentiality must shape our interpretation of sec. 51.30 (3).

Nevertheless sec. 51.30 (3) presents several exceptions to the general rule that civil commitment court records are closed. The records are accessible to the subject of the proceeding and to that person's attorney. The subject individual can consent to release of court records. In addition, court records may be released without the subject individual's consent "pursuant to lawful order of the court." Section 51.30 (3) provides, inter alia, as follows:

In other situations, such records may be released to other persons only pursuant to the informed written consent of the individual or pursuant to lawful order of the court which maintains the records. (Emphasis added)

The question before this court is the meaning of the statutory language "pursuant to lawful order of the court" in sec. 51.30 (3). In other words, when may a court release ch. 51 civil commitment court records to the news media?

Statutory interpretation is a matter of law that this court determines de novo. State v. Olson, 175 Wis.2d 628, 633, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993). The principal objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.

III.

On its face the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" in sec. 51.30 (3) provides no precise guide to what records the legislature intended to be released. In an effort to discern the meaning of this phrase, we examine sec. 51.30 (3) along with sec. 51.30 (4) which governs access to an individual's mental health treatment records. We look to sec. 51.30 (4) for guidance in interpreting sec. 51.30 (3) for several reasons.

First, both sections limit access to mental health records. Section 51.30 (4)(a) specifically requires that except as otherwise provided "all treatment records shall remain confidential and are privileged to the subject individual," while sec. 51.30 (3) requires that civil commitment court records be "closed."

Second, both sections allow access to records "pursuant to lawful order of the court."

Third, in section 51.30 (4) the legislature expressly set forth who may have access to treatment records and when. Section 51.30 (4)(b) lists 22 specific, detailed exceptions to its rule of confidentiality. In contrast, sec. 51.30 (3) provides no similar list of specific exceptions.

Finally, although both sec. 51.30 (3) and sec. 51.30 (4) limit access to records relating to mental health, the nature of the records governed by the two sections is substantially different. Court records are ordinarily open, while a person's health records are ordinarily confidential and privileged. Court records relating to civil commitment are closed under sec. 51.30 (3) for reasons similar, if not identical, to the reasons the treatment records governed by sec. 51.30 (4) are confidential. We can therefore assume that if the legislature is willing to allow access under sec. 51.30 (4) to treatment records that are ordinarily confidential and privileged, it would be willing to allow access to ch. 51 court records under the same circumstances.

In sum, we look to sec. 51.30 (4) for guidance in determining the meaning of the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" in both sec. 51.30 (3) and sec. 51.30 (4)(b) because the purpose of limiting access to treatment records and court records is similar, and because in sec. 51.30 (4)(b) the legislature has enumerated 22 situations under which treatment records may be released. It is reasonable to conclude that the legislature intended the scope of access to civil commitment court records to be no more narrow than the scope of access to treatment records.

The 22 exceptions to confidentiality contained in sec. 51.30 (4)(b) evidence three themes the legislature appears to consider important to allowing access to mental health treatment records. First, the exceptions clarify a particular purpose for which the treatment records are needed. For example, sec. 51.30 (4)(b)1 provides access to treatment records "for the purposes of management audits, financial audits, or program monitoring and evaluation."

Second, the exceptions provide access only to those persons who need access to effectuate a stated purpose. For example, sec. 51.30 (4)(b)1 limits access "[t]o an individual, organization or agency designated by the department or as required by law for the purpose of management audits, financial audits, or program monitoring and evaluation."

Third, the information that may be obtained is limited to that needed to achieve the delineated purpose. For example, sec. 51.30 (4)(b)8, which provides physicians access to records in medical emergencies, states that "such disclosure shall be limited to that part of the records necessary to meet the medical emergency." In exceptions where the particular purpose requires that certain individuals have access to all of the records, the exception also requires additional measures to ensure confidentiality for any purposes beyond those of the specifically allowed exception. For example, under sec. 51.30 (4)(b)1, "[i]nformation obtained under this paragraph shall remain confidential and shall not be used in any way that discloses the names or other identifying information about the individual whose records are being released. The department shall promulgate rules to assure the confidentiality of such information."

As we have stated previously, sec. 51.30 (4)(b) also allows access to records "pursuant to lawful order of the court." This language must mean something distinct from the 22 enumerated exceptions. In interpreting sec. 51.30 (4)(b) we must avoid rendering any portion surplus language, while maintaining the legislature's objective of limiting access to treatment records.

In keeping with the legislature's objective of limiting access to treatment records, we conclude that the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" in sec. 51.30 (4)(b)4 allows access in situations distinct from but substantially similar to those contained in the enumerated exceptions. The legislature intended the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" in sec. 51.30 (4) to allow a court to release treatment records under 51.30 (4) when the requested access is comparable to one of the statutory exceptions set forth in sec. 51.30 (4)(b). A court may therefore grant access to treatment records under sec. 51.30 (4) for a particular purpose that is similar to those enumerated, to those individuals who need access to achieve that particular purpose, and of those records needed to achieve that purpose. Under this exception to the sec. 51.30 (4) mandate that treatment records remain confidential, the purpose must be consistent with the purposes for which access is currently allowed: treatment, administration, research, law enforcement/investigation, protection/advocacy and legal proceedings relating to the subject individual.

Allowing access to treatment records in these limited contexts comparable to the exceptions described in sec. 51.30 (4)(b) provides the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" with enough flexibility to encompass situations that the legislature did not anticipate, while keeping access within the bounds erected by the legislature elsewhere in sec. 51.30 (4)(b).

Applying our analysis of the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" in sec. 51.30 (4)(b) to the phrase in sec. 51.30 (3), we conclude that a circuit court may release ch. 51 court records when the requested access fits within one of the statutory exceptions in sec. 51.30 (4)(b) or when the requested access is comparable to one of the statutory exceptions set forth in sec. 51.30 (4)(b).

The Journal Times argues that its request fits within the statutory public safety exception to confidentiality in sec. 51.30 (4)(b)12m, Stats. 1991-92, and that news media or any individual should be allowed access to civil commitment court records whenever public safety is a potential concern. There are several weaknesses in this argument.

Public safety is not an issue in this case. Billy Jo W. had been apprehended before the Journal Times requested his civil commitment file.

Furthermore the statutory public safety exception has a particular purpose, to assist in the apprehension of an individual who is on unauthorized absence from an institution. The exception allows release to any person, because anyone might have information that would assist in apprehending a patient on unauthorized absence. This exception, however, limits the information that can be released. Only information that would assist in apprehension of the patient may be disclosed.

The Journal Times points to Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis.2d 223, 249, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988), to support its claim that patient interests in confidentiality must yield when public safety is threatened. However, Schuster is consistent with the limited exceptions to confidentiality set forth in sec. 51.30 (4)(b); Schuster created a narrow exception to therapist-patient confidentiality. Under Schuster, when harm by a patient to a third party is foreseeable, the treating psychiatrist who fails to warn the third party or to institute commitment proceedings against the patient is liable for negligence. 144 Wis.2d at 240. Like the exceptions set forth in sec. 51.30 (4)(b), Schuster allows release of information for a particular purpose: protecting people who face foreseeable harm. Release of information is limited to people who need it: those who face the threat of harm. The information released is limited to that necessary to effectuate the purpose. Schuster is irrelevant to creation of a public safety exception that would allow release of confidential records when an individual is no longer a threat.

The broad public safety exception advocated by the journal Times creates at least one additional problem. In every case in which a patient is involuntarily civilly committed for treatment, a court has determined that the person is dangerous to himself or herself or to others. The broad public safety exception urged by the Journal Times would allow a court in the exercise of discretion to grant access to records whenever an individual had been considered dangerous at one time, even when a presently foreseeable threat of harm to others no longer existed. Accordingly, under the urged exception, all involuntarily committed patients would face the possibility of public disclosure of their records. We conclude that the legislature would not have gone to such great lengths to protect confidentiality of records only to allow a substantially unrestricted release of those records once a person left closely supervised confinement.

The Journal Times' request for access to Billy Jo W.'s civil commitment court records does not fall within sec. 51.30 (3) as analyzed in conjunction with sec. 51.30 (4)(b). The scope of the Journal Times' request does not come within the existing statutory exceptions and it is not comparable to any of the existing statutory exceptions.

Were the records at issue in the case at bar solely related to civil commitment proceedings under chapter 51, our analysis would end here. However, the case at bar requires us to broaden our analysis beyond the specific exclusions set forth in sec. 51.30 (4)(b)4 because, at bottom, this is a criminal case.

IV.

When a significant interrelationship exists between the court records of the civil commitment proceedings at issue and a criminal proceeding involving a violent felony pending prior to the civil commitment, the phrase "pursuant to lawful order of the court" must be read in light of the legislature's preference for openness in criminal court proceedings and criminal court records. In this case, the significant interrelationship between the ch. 51 civil commitment proceedings and a previously pending criminal proceeding involving a violent felony compels us to consider the Journal Times' request.

Billy Jo W. initially came to the attention of the community when he was charged with first degree murder in 1984. As stated previously, the murder case did not go to trial at that time because Billy Jo W. was determined to be incompetent to stand trial under sec. 971.14. He was then committed to various state mental institutions, at first under a criminal commitment statute and later through civil commitment proceedings.

Billy Jo W.'s path through the criminal justice and civil commitment systems brought him within the scope of several different statutory provisions relating to the confidentiality of records. When he pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, he waived the physician-patient confidentiality that ordinarily protects mental health records. He was then evaluated, pursuant to sec. 971.16 (3). The statute provides that reports on evaluations done under sec. 971.16 (3) are confidential until the physician or psychologist has testified or upon completion of the trial. The implication is that these evaluation reports are open after the events specified in the statute have occurred.

Similarly, the statutes require that reports submitted to a criminal court to determine competency to stand trial shall not be disclosed except to the parties prior to a competency hearing. Section 971.14 (4). The implication is that they are open records after the competency hearing has been held. Once Billy Jo W. had been determined incompetent to stand trial, sec. 971.14 (4)(b) required periodic re-examinations and periodic competency determinations by the court. Evaluations made pursuant to this requirement also may be disclosed at competency hearings. We can find no statute under which criminal competency hearings are closed.

Later, Billy Jo W. was civilly committed. At issue in this case is the confidentiality of the court records relating to his ch. 51 civil commitment. Involuntary civil commitment hearings and the periodic hearings to continue a commitment are open, unless the subject individual or that individual's attorney requests that they be closed. Section 51.20 (12), Stats. 1991-92. To close the proceedings, the circuit court must exercise its discretion under the guidelines set forth in La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 Wis.2d 220, 241-42, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983) and State ex rel. Wisconsin State Journal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 131 Wis.2d 515, 389 N.W.2d 73 (Ct.App. 1986). The record in this case gives no indication that any of the civil commitment hearings were closed.

This case is, in essence, a criminal case that made a detour through civil commitment proceedings. Billy Jo W. apparently did not become competent to stand trial during the 18 month period this court has deemed constitutionally reasonable for a defendant to be committed criminally while waiting for his mental health to improve. State ex rel. Haskins v. Dodge County Court, 62 Wis.2d 250, 262 214 N.W. 575 (1974). Therefore, at the end of this period, Billy Jo W. underwent civil commitment proceedings and was committed under ch. 51.

The switch from criminal to civil commitment proceedings is constitutionally required to protect defendants from perpetual confinement due to their inability to become competent to stand trial. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). However, this constitutional protection of a defendant's liberty interests does not necessarily eliminate the pending criminal case. On the contrary, the criminal court retains jurisdiction over the defendant, who can be prosecuted once he regains competency. State ex rel. Porter v. Wolke, 80 Wis.2d 197, 204, 257 N.W.2d 881 (1977). Section 971.14 (6)(c) requires that the criminal court and the district attorney be notified when a defendant who has been civilly committed under sec. 51.20 is to be discharged from an inpatient facility or from commitment.

Thus the legislature has interwoven the provisions of chapters 51 and 971 to accommodate the constitutional protections against perpetual, unjustified confinement on the one hand and the interests of the public in prosecuting criminal defendants on the other. Consequently, an individual who has been charged with a criminal offense is not removed from the purview of the criminal court simply because he fails to regain competency within 18 months and is subject to civil commitment.

This case straddles the bodies of law governing civil commitment and criminal proceedings. The facts of this case establish a significant interrelationship between the closed ch. 51 civil commitment court records at issue and secs. 971.14 and 971.16, to which the legislature's policy of openness applies. As a result, we cannot focus entirely on the civil commitment aspect; we cannot analyze the request to open Billy Jo W.'s records strictly in terms of the sec. 51.30 (4)(b) exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality for treatment records. Even though the parties examined the case only in these terms, our analysis must take into account the essential fact that this was a criminal case in civil clothing.

It is significant that the legislature applied the confidentiality provision of sec. 51.30 to both court records and treatment records in civil commitments but only to treatment records in criminal commitments. Thus, court records of individuals who have been criminally committed are not declared confidential. Sections 51.30 (3), (4) and (7). This omission is particularly relevant in light of the meticulous specificity of the rest of sec. 51.30.

It is important to remember that the Journal Times is not seeking treatment records; it is seeking civil commitment court records. The circuit court limited its release of Billy Jo W.'s records to documents relating to the court's decisions to commit him civilly and later to allow him to be discharged from an inpatient facility. In the absence of a specific provision in sec. 51.30 (3) addressing access to the court records of a criminal defendant who has been civilly committed, we must assess the question of releasing the court records in this case in terms of the legislative policy in favor of closing ch. 51 court records and the overall legislative policy in favor of opening court proceedings and records.

The legislature and this court have demonstrated a great reluctance to shield the judicial process from public view. See e.g., sec. 757.14 ("the sittings of every court shall be public and every citizen may freely attend the same"); La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 Wis.2d 220, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983). The interest protected by open courtrooms is often said to be that of the criminal defendant, whose rights might be curtailed in a secret proceeding. Where a criminal defendant has desired to exclude the public, however, courts have balanced this request against the public's interest in understanding and maintaining confidence in the courts. Cf. State ex rel. Wisconsin Journal v. Dane Circuit Court, 131 Wis.2d 515, 520-523, 389 N.W.2d 73 (Ct.App. 1986). Public confidence in the judicial system is particularly important in the context of a criminal case involving a violent felony in which the defendant has not been tried for the underlying charge because he has been found incompetent. A competency hearing, for example, should be open to the public because:

". . . [t]he community's interest in this defendant's case could easily have been transformed into suspicion and even distrust of the criminal justice process had the decision rendered behind closed doors been one of incompetency to stand trial. . .[T]he `right to know' subsumes more than merely the ability to obtain information; on a more fundamental level, it carries implications for public confidence in and respect for the institutions that define the concepts of `guilt' and `innocence.'"

Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 399 N.E.2d 518, 531 (N.Y. 1979) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring). As Justice Blackmun observed, "the ability of the courts to administer the criminal laws depends in no small part on the confidence of the public in judicial remedies, and on respect for and acquaintance with the processes and deliberations of those courts." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 429 (1979) (Blackmun, J. concurring and dissenting).

The Journal Times argues that the civil commitment court records in this case must be opened to public scrutiny to assure that public officers and public institutions have discharged their functions with fidelity to the trust placed in them. In response, some might argue that the civil commitment court records should not be open in this case because the public interest in all chapter 51 proceedings is represented by the county corporation counsel, as required by sec. 51.20 (4), and because to assist in preparation for the proceedings corporation counsel is allowed access to the treatment records concerning the admission, detention or commitment of the subject individual. Sec. 51.30 (4)(b)14, Stats.

While chapter 51 provides several checks to ensure. that the commitment, recommitment, transfer and release of patients are carried out in a manner which protects the interests of the community as well as those of the subject individual, these safeguards do not serve the same purpose as open court proceedings and open court records. Open court proceedings are designed to assure the public that public officials and the judicial system are operating properly. For example, in every criminal case the prosecutor represents the public, yet the proceedings are also open so that the public may gauge how well the prosecutorial and judicial systems are functioning.

When the legislature established the general rule that ch. 51 civil commitment court records be closed, with release possible "pursuant to lawful order of the court," the legislature obviously left to the court the task of weighing the need for public review in criminal proceedings against the need for confidentiality of ch. 51 court records. It would be inconsistent with this legislative policy of open judicial proceedings, and with the language of sec. 51.30 (3) itself, to interpret sec. 51.30 (3) as prohibiting absolutely any public access to the civil commitment court records of a criminal defendant such as Billy Jo W., who had been charged with a serious violent felony, had entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, had been found incompetent to stand trial, and had been civilly committed because of the duration of his incompetency and whose criminal case is still pending.

Once a circuit court makes the threshold determination that the facts of a case demonstrate a significant interrelationship between criminal proceedings involving a violent felony and the civil commitment, the court must assess pragmatically the privacy interests at stake. The court must weigh the nature and importance of the public interest in access to the ch. 51 civil commitment court records against the potential loss of privacy to the individual.

Thus the court must consider the fact that some records relating to an individual's mental health may have become open because the individual pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Evaluations of Billy Jo W.'s mental health may have become public because his criminal competency hearing was held in open court. Similarly, members of the public, including the press, might have attended Billy Jo W.'s civil commitment hearing, perhaps even over his objection. State ex rel. Wisconsin State Journal v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 131 Wis.2d 515, 523, 389 N.W.2d 73 (Ct.App. 1986).

It is not clear from the record before this court how much, if any, of Billy Jo W.'s mental and emotional problems and history may already be available to the public. Since much information may be public, it may not be possible for Billy Jo W. to harbor any great expectation of confidentiality in the civil commitment court records concerning his mental health. Individuals do not forfeit their right to privacy simply because they have been charged with a crime. However, to the extent that details of Billy Jo W.'s mental health may have become public, the shield of confidentiality that ordinarily protects civil commitment court records has been pierced.

The public was aware that Billy Jo W. had been charged with first degree murder. The public was also aware that he had pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, that he had been found incompetent to stand trial, and that he had been institutionalized. It is also a matter of public record that six years after his commitment to a state mental institution Billy Jo W. still had not been tried for the murder. Nevertheless he had been released from the institution and had been charged with three armed robberies allegedly committed after his release.

Thus the public may already know a great deal. What the public does not know is the basis for the circuit court's decision to discharge Billy Jo W. from commitment to an institution.

Cases such as this one are rare. Still, it is essential that the public have confidence in the justice system's management of criminal cases involving mentally ill defendants. Preventing the public from understanding Billy Jo W.'s case could undermine that confidence. Enabling public understanding may foster public faith in the courts.

This case is distinguished from most civil commitment cases by the fact that it began as a murder case. Billy Jo W. was psychiatrically examined pursuant to a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and was determined to be incompetent to stand trial. We repeat, individuals do not lose their right to privacy simply because they have been charged with a crime. The civil commitment court records of an individual released from an institution and subsequently charged with a crime would not be open under our analysis of sec. 51.30 (3) in conjunction with ch. 971. Thus, although the robbery charges filed against Billy Jo W. after his release from the institution made him the focus of public attention, those charges in no way trigger the release of the civil commitment courts records at issue. The determinative issues, under the facts of a given criminal case, are (1) whether a significant interrelationship exists between the court records of the civil commitment proceedings at issue and a criminal proceeding involving a violent felony pending prior to the civil commitment, and (2) whether the defendant's expectations of confidentiality in the civil commitment court records have been significantly diminished.

As a threshold matter, we find that a significant interrelationship exists between the court records of the civil commitment proceedings at issue in this case and the criminal proceeding pending prior to the civil commitment. A murder charge filed before Billy Jo W. was civilly committed was still pending against him at the time the newspaper made its request for access to his civil commitment court records. Furthermore, Billy Jo W. pleaded not guilty to the murder charge by reason of mental disease or defect and the criminal court determined him to be incompetent to stand trial.

We remand this case to the circuit court. We direct the circuit court to determine, in light of the facts and policy considerations stated above, whether to issue an order allowing access to any of the civil commitment court records.

The circuit court should examine in camera the records sought by the newspaper to assess how much personal information contained in the civil commitment court records has not already become a matter of public record in either the criminal or civil proceedings. The court must weigh the competing interests of Billy Jo W.'s privacy and the public's need to understand why this individual, criminally committed as incompetent to stand trial for murder, had been released from an institution without being prosecuted for that crime. Only if the nature and importance of the public interest in knowing the basis for the decision to commit Billy Jo W. to a placement outside of a locked institution outweighs the additional privacy Billy Jo W. would lose through opening more records should the newspaper be allowed access to any of the civil commitment court records.

The analysis we require of a circuit court deciding a request for access to civil commitment court records reflects the countervailing legislative policies of openness of criminal proceedings and closed records in civil commitment cases and takes a pragmatic view of the actual privacy interests at stake.

For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause remanded.