Opinion
No. H12-CP08-012217-A
September 29, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On March 17, 2011, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("the department") filed petitions pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 to terminate the parental rights of respondents, Trina G. and Matthew O., Sr., the mother and father of Matthew O., Jr., (Mattie), who was born on February 23, 2007. Both respondent parents were properly served notice of the petition for termination of parental rights. Father appeared in court on July 26, 2011 and entered pro forma denials. His application for counsel was granted. Mother has not appeared to defend the petition and was defaulted for failure to appear on June 2, 2011. The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child. This court has jurisdiction.
Trial was held on September 6, 2011. Father had notice of the date, but did not attend the trial. His attorney represented he was working out-of-state, but she indicated she was not seeking a continuance on his behalf and was prepared to proceed with the trial. The court did not default father for failure to appear since his attorney did appear and advocated vigorously in opposition to the petition.
The court has considered the credible evidence, including the exhibits and the testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of the respondent mother and respondent father in Matthew O., Jr.
I LEGAL STANDARD A. Termination of Parental Rights
The petition for Mattie alleges three statutory grounds for termination of the parental rights of the mother and one statutory ground for the termination of the parental rights of the father.
The first ground alleged as to mother is abandonment. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) provides for termination if "the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility as to the welfare of the child."
The second ground alleged as to mother is contained in § 17a-112(j)(3)(D), which states: "there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child."
The third ground alleged as to both parents is failure to rehabilitate, which provides, in pertinent part, for termination if "(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."
Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010); In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769, 858 A.2d 887 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234, 19 A.3d 227 (2011); In re Jennfer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert denied 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d. 770 (2003); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231; In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000). "Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than `any' rehabilitation . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation." (Citations omitted.) In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 500. "[E]ven if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children." In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005). The issue is not whether the parent has improved his or her ability to manage his or her own life, but whether he or she has gained an ability to care for the specific needs of the child at issue. See In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 627, 5 A.3d 575 (2010); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756, 936 A.2d 638 (2007). "In the dispositional phase . . . the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interests of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 479, 21 A.3d 858 (2011); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 529, 939 A.2d 16, cert. denied CT Page 21090 287 Conn. 902, 947 A.2d 342 (2008). Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. See In re Jason P., 41 Conn. Sup. 23, 24, 544 A.2d 286 (1988); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); Practice Book § 35a-7.
II FACTUAL FINDINGS
At trial, the department introduced five exhibits and the testimony of four witnesses. Three social workers who have worked on Mattie's case testified: Patrice Palmer, Tracy Wright and Anita Patel. Donna C., Mattie's maternal great aunt and foster mother, also testified. The attorney for the child introduced no testimony or exhibits. Father introduced two exhibits and no testimony.
The court granted the department's motion for judicial notice in part, after resolving father's objection, and indicated it would take judicial notice of this court's March 24, 2010 decision on the department's motion to reopen and modify the disposition in this case. See In re Matthew O., superior court, juvenile district at Hartford, Docket No. H12-CP08-012217-A (March 24, 2010, Keller, J.). The court also took judicial notice of the fact that mother and father failed to attend any of the hearings on the department's permanency plan. In addition, the court indicated it would take judicial notice of the pleadings and their filing dates, court memoranda of hearing, and court orders, including specific steps in the court file.
After fully considering the credible evidence, including the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, items of which the court took judicial notice, and the arguments of counsel, the court bases its decision on the following facts.
A. Respondent Mother
Mother, Trina G., is 31 years old. She has a significant history with the department dating back to 1996 due to mental health issues, domestic violence, and physical abuse and inadequate supervision of her four children.
During her childhood, she was exposed to her mother's substance abuse and her stepfather's physical abuse of her. When she was twelve years old, her stepfather began to sexually molest her frequently. The abuse continued until she moved out of the house. Mother attended an alternative school as a teen and dropped out of school in the 11th grade, after she became pregnant with her first child. As an adolescent, mother was hospitalized for approximately a year due to depression and suicidal behaviors. By the time she was twenty years old, mother had given birth to three children by the same man, Richard K. This relationship had incidents of domestic violence, one of which resulted in mother being the subject of a protective order, and substantiated allegations of parental neglect, which resulted in an order of protective supervision in 2002. When her three children by Richard K. became the subject of a department neglect petition, mother failed to cooperate with the department and service providers and ultimately lost custody of her three older children. Their father moved to North Carolina with them. It is unclear if mother has regular contact with them, although the foster mother testified that mother did have a visit with one of her older sons this past summer.
Mother has a sparse employment record. She also has a history of alcohol abuse. She reported to the department that she started drinking after she lost custody of her older sons. Although she claims to have successfully completed a substance abuse program, she refused to sign a release so the department could verify this information. In 2002, she was arrested after drinking alcohol, driving through a stop sign, and colliding with a police car after failing to stop.
Mother's criminal record reveals a number of convictions for misdemeanors and probation violations, the most recent occurring in 2005.
Around the time of Mattie's birth, mother and father lived together for about one year. Father reported that there was no domestic violence. He stated that after Mattie's birth, mother's behavior changed dramatically. Her emotions and moods were widely fluctuating. Father described mother as having "a hundred personalities." Despite this erratic behavior, father left for work as an auto body technician and left mother alone with Mattie. One day, father came home from work and was advised that mother had left with Mattie in a U-Haul truck. At two months of age, in April 2007, Mattie was ordered into the department's care when mother was found living and caring for him in that U-Haul truck. That is the last time mother took care of him.
After Mattie's first removal, a neglect petition was filed in the juvenile district at Rockville. Mother completed a parenting program and individual therapy; however, she stopped visiting with Mattie in November 2007. Mattie was eventually returned to his father's care under an order of protective supervision for six months on December 7, 2007. Mattie was removed from his father's care by the department on November 7, 2008 and a second neglect petition was filed in Hartford. Mother didn't seek visits with Mattie until January 9, 2009. Visits continued until March 27, 2009, when mother refused any future visits. Until the department learned, during the trial on this petition, that the foster mother had initiated and permitted, without the department's knowledge, some contact between mother and Mattie this past summer, department records indicated her last visit with Mattie prior to this summer was March 27, 2009. During the visits mother had with Mattie this summer, she requested that he not be told she is his mother. She was introduced to the child as a friend of foster mother's, and he called her "Trina." Mattie does not remember her as his mother, as he has not seen her since he was two.
The foster mother's testimony on this subject was rather poignant. Apparently, after hearing that mother was having a reunion with one of her older sons, foster mother tearfully explained she arranged to bring Mattie to a mutual family function, where mother was present, and they both took Mattie swimming.
The social study in support of termination of parental rights notes that the foster mother, who is mother's maternal aunt, could have supervised visits with mother. Apparently, this summer is the only time mother chose to take advantage of this permitted contact since 2009, and it was initiated by the foster mother, not mother. The foster mother testified that mother has never called her to initiate a visit and that, prior to the contact this summer, the foster mother had not supervised contact between Mattie and his mother for at least three years.
From 2009 through 2011, the department workers attempted to engage mother through letters, home visits and by telephone, but most of their attempts were unsuccessful. In March of 2010, mother did attend a case status conference at court, where she agreed to sustain the third order of temporary custody for Mattie, issued on March 5, 2010. On April 8, 2010, social worker Palmer completed a home visit where mother reported she would be interested in resuming supervised visits with Mattie. Mother was advised to contact Palmer to arrange visits, but she did not call. On September 28, 2010, Palmer made contact with mother by telephone, when she declined to visit, stating, she "didn't want to confuse [Mattie] anymore than what he already is." She further stated, "I don't have a relationship or bond with him and I'd rather leave it that way."
Although mother told the worker she would participate via teleconference with an administrative case review to be held on October 8, 2010, she failed to do so. Palmer did not hear from mother again. Mother's phone went out of service and she did not respond to Palmer's letters. Mother also did not contact the foster mother. According to Palmer, mother "shut down."
Mattie has spent approximately 39 months of his life in foster care. During that time, there is no evidence that mother has provided consistent financial support for Mattie, except that she gave the foster mother some of her older son's hand-me-downs this past summer for Mattie's use. She has not sent Mattie cards, gifts or letters since March 2009 and, until April 11, 2011; she had not contacted the department to inquire about his well-being for over one year. She has not contacted the foster mother to inquire as to Mattie's welfare, either, even though the foster mother is her maternal aunt. When mother last contacted the department by phone on April 11, 2011, social worker Wright informed her that the department had filed a motion to terminate her parental rights. Wright provided her with the upcoming court date and time of hearing. Mother told Wright she had no plan for Mattie, did not want to confuse him, wanted things to remain the way they are and that she would rather not be involved. She indicated she was too busy to meet with Wright, and hung up when Wright informed her that abandonment was one of the grounds alleged for termination.
On April 28, 2011, social worker Patel sent a letter to mother's home identifying herself as the new worker, but mother has never contacted her. Patel also sent additional letters, left several voicemails and attempted to reach mother through maternal relatives. These efforts have not resulted in any renewed engagement on the part of mother. Patel has had no contact with mother.
Mother has made it clear to the department that she is not interested in reunification with Mattie. Although in the past she completed recommended services, since Mattie's last removal in March 2010, she has been unwilling to engage in services to address her continuing mental health, domestic violence and parenting issues. She has not attended a single court hearing since March 17, 2010. The foster mother also testified that recently, mother is in one of her "down" periods, and foster mother would not be permitting her any further contact with Mattie due to mother's moods. The foster mother described mother as very dysfunctional when she is in one of her low periods.
B. Respondent Father, Matthew O., Sr.
Father is 38 years old and is an only child. He grew up in Rhode Island. His parents divorced when he was ten, and his father was mostly absent from his life due to significant periods of incarceration. Father completed the 11th grade. While still residing in Rhode Island, he had a relationship with a woman for nine years and the couple had a daughter. Father stopped seeing this woman when he left Rhode Island and moved to Florida. He owes the mother over $18,000.00 in child support. The nature of his relationship with this daughter, if any, his oldest child, is unknown, as is the nature of his relationship with a daughter born several years ago.
Father admits he has been abusing cocaine "on and off" for six years. He claims he had been in recovery for three years and became completely clean by April 2007, shortly after Mattie's birth. When Trudi G. left with Mattie, he relapsed on cocaine.
Father has auto technician skills and has worked in various auto body shops, but he has never provided the department with verification of employment or hours worked when requested to do so. Although father's attorney indicated father was working on the date of this trial, she did not indicate the name or nature of his employment. The totality of the evidence does not reveal any verified period of sustained employment.
Father has an extensive criminal history, with numerous convictions in Connecticut dating back to 2004 for larcenies, failures to appear, driving under suspension and violations of probation. He also has convictions for burglary and possession of narcotics. He recently served about half of a 60-day sentence for violating his probation.
C. History of Mattie's Child Protection Involvement
This child protection case has been pending in the juvenile district of Hartford for nearly three years. Prior to the pendency of this case, another child protection case, filed in the juvenile district of Rockville on April 20, 2007, was closed after Mattie was adjudicated neglected and father completed a six-month period of protective supervision on June 21, 2008. In his four years of life, Mattie has been removed from parental custody three times. He last came into care on March 3, 2010. At the preliminary temporary custody hearing on March 12, 2010, mother indicated, through counsel, that she was not objecting to either the sustaining of the temporary custody order or the granting of the motion to reopen and modify the disposition to a commitment. She agreed to preliminary specific steps, and she and her counsel were excused from attending a consolidated March 17, 2010 hearing on the sustaining of the order of temporary custody and the department's motion to reopen and modify the disposition. Father, who had been reunified with the child under an order of protective supervision on January 21, 2010, objected to the motion to reopen and exercised his right to a hearing within ten days on the sustaining of the temporary custody order.
This court presided over the consolidated hearing on March 17, 2010, and issued a memorandum of decision dated March 24, 2010. In this decision, this court reviewed a good portion of Mattie's family history with the department:
[Mattie] has a history with the department dating back to his birth. One month after he was born, he was the subject of an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition in the Juvenile District of Rockville, but was eventually returned to the father's custody under a six-month period of protective supervision which expired in June 2008. On September 24, 2008, the department received a report that father had broken up with his fiancée and that he was not coping well with this event. The reporter alleged father had begun to use alcohol and marijuana excessively. The department was unable to substantiate this report.
Less than two months later, on November 7, 2008, the department sought an order of temporary custody and filed a neglect petition on behalf of [Mattie]. The new case was initiated based on allegations that the respondent father had brought the child, then approximately 18 months of age, to an adoption agency and left him there after being provided with family portfolios to review. At the preliminary custody hearing on November 12, 2008, both respondent parents agreed to sustain the order of temporary custody. Preliminary specific steps issued for father required that he attend parenting classes and individual counseling to address mental health issues and domestic violence. He also was ordered to submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, [and,] if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention. He was to not engage in substance abuse and to submit to random drug screens. Further criminal involvement was prohibited, and he was to comply with any conditions of probation.
Mother was ordered to keep all appointments set by or with the department and cooperate with home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child's attorney. She was ordered to participate in parenting, domestic violence and individual counseling. She also was required to secure and maintain adequate housing and a legal income and visit Mattie as often as the department permitted.
On February [24], 2009, [Mattie] was adjudicated neglected on both of the grounds alleged. The court found that as of the adjudicatory date, he was being denied proper care and attention and being permitted to live under conditions injurious to his well-being. [Mattie] was committed to the department. Father did not attend the neglect hearing and was defaulted for failure to appear. Mother was permitted to stand silent, as she was not the custodial parent of [Mattie] at the time of the filing of this second petition regarding his care. At the time of the neglect adjudication in February 2009, father expressed no interest in engaging in services to regain custody of [Mattie]. He apparently had relocated to New Jersey. Nevertheless, final specific steps were issued for both parents at the time of [Mattie's] commitment. Despite father's absence, the preliminary specific steps that had been set for respondent father, which he had acknowledged receiving on November 12, 2009, were reaffirmed and ordered as final specific steps. In the summer of 2009, father contacted the department and expressed an interest in reunification with [Mattie]. He worked to improve his parenting skills with My People's Clinical Services, an intensive reunification service. A series of unsupervised visits with the child caused no significant concerns for the department. Father completed individual counseling at Hockanum Valley, but on November 16, 2009, father's clinician reported father never started drug relapse prevention because he missed an excessive number of visits. On December 16, 2009, father's attorney arranged for a substance abuse evaluation for father at The Counseling Cooperative in East Windsor . . . Substance abuse services for father were not recommended at the time, although this evaluator did not perform a drug screen on father. The department wanted another urine screen, but did not refer father to the Genesis Center for one until January 20, 2010, only one day before agreeing, on January 21, 2010, to the court's granting father's motion to revoke [Mattie's] commitment. [Mattie] was returned to father's care under a period of protective supervision, set to expire on July 22, 2010. New specific steps ordered on January 21, 2010 required father to continue to cooperate with My People's Clinical Services and with department visits, announced or unannounced, to not engage in substance abuse, and to not have any further involvement with the criminal justice system.
On January 27, 2010, father attended an appointment at the Genesis Center at the department's request to render a urine screen, which tested positive for marijuana. [Here, this court noted in a footnote: At the Genesis Center on January 27, 2010, father was advised that the screen was positive for cannabis and checked a box that stated `I accept the results of recent use of the drugs shown in the urine drug screen.' He did not check the other box, which stated, `I challenge the results of the drug screen and have not used these drugs.' Subsequently, he continued to deny use of marijuana to the department social worker.] As a result, father was recommended to cooperate with random urine screening through April 1, 2010 to monitor his sobriety. On January 28, 2010, father admitted to the department social worker, Patrice Palmer, that he had used marijuana around the New Year's holiday because he was stressed over the pending outcome of his motion to revoke [Mattie's] commitment. He denied any drug use after the holiday and agreed to comply with additional random urine screens.
On February 16, 2010, after [Mattie] had been returned to father's care, mother appeared at court for a hearing on the maternal great aunt's motion to intervene, which was denied since [Mattie] had been returned to his father. Mother asked how she could go about terminating her rights because she didn't wish any further involvement in what she termed "craziness." Respondent mother had not visited [Mattie] since March 2009.
During February, father and the Genesis Center had difficulty making an appointment for him to have a drug screen. The Genesis Center employee called and left several messages on voice mail, but father indicates he only received one because either his phone wasn't functioning properly or Genesis didn't call the correct number. Despite the specific steps that father have no further involvement with the criminal justice system and that he comply with any conditions of probation, father did not inform the department that he had been placed on another probation on February 2, 2010. A prior probation he had been serving was terminated unsatisfactorily. The department learned about his new probation on March 2, 2010, when his adult probation officer, Lisa Mandeville-McGeough, who testified at trial, made a report to the department's child protection hotline that she had concerns regarding father's ability to care for his son. Father had been placed on probation after convictions for criminal impersonation and operating a motor vehicle while his driver's license was under suspension. His probation included conditions that he not violate any laws and that he submit to substance abuse treatment if deemed necessary. After being sentenced, but before meeting for his initial intake interview with Mandeville-McGeough, father picked up additional motor vehicle charges in East Hartford on February 20, 2010 for operating while his license was under suspension and improper use of a marker. He attended a scheduled intake visit with Mandeville-Geough on February 26, 2010 and provided a urine sample that tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. Mandeville-Geough was concerned that his marijuana level was extremely high. Noting his long history of criminal behavior and substance abuse, she assessed him at high risk in determining what level of probationary supervision was warranted. As of the date of trial, on March 17, [2010,] Mandeville was going to discuss violating father's probation with her supervisor, since this was his second probation for operating a motor vehicle under suspension and illegal drug usage is a violation of one of his probationary conditions. In addition, father also [had] new charges now pending due to the February 20, [2010,] incident, which resulted in a charge of operating a motor vehicle while his license is under suspension, the same offense for which he was just placed on probation.
On March 3, 2010, despite the probation officer's report, father denied any substance abuse, telling Palmer that he went out on February 25, the day before the probation urine screen, and only had a few drinks. However, during his testimony on March 17, [2010,] father admitted to using marijuana as recently as 13 days prior to trial, after the visit to his probation officer on February 26 . . .
On March 3, 2010, as a result of the information on father's two recent, positive drug screens, Palmer and another worker paid an unannounced visit to father's home to remove [Mattie] under an administrative hold. The department safety assessment had been completed and resulted in an unsafe score given father's drug relapse. The two workers encountered father's new roommate, William Sanchez, who reported concerns about the way father was handling his recent breakup with his former fiancée. The day after [Mattie] was returned home in January, she and father's younger child, an infant, moved out. Sanchez indicated that father's intense focus on what he perceived to be his fiancée's betrayal — apparently she had filed an action in the family court and allegedly "stole" his rent money — was affecting his ability to adequately parent [Mattie]. He indicated father's state of anxiety could lead to poor decision-making. He noted that father's stress was unhealthy and was affecting [Mattie], although he was evasive during his testimony when asked to relay concrete observations that formed the basis for these opinions. Sanchez believes he will have a stabilizing affect on father by helping him out emotionally and financially, although Sanchez was emphatic that he has a two-year-old child he absolutely cannot have exposed to the presence of illegal substances . . .
If there was any doubt about Sanchez' description of father's emotional anxiety affecting his ability to parent [Mattie], all doubt was put to rest when father met with Palmer and a program supervisor, Loida Reyes, on March 8, [2010]. Father requested this meeting through his counselor from My People's Clinical Services. At this meeting, father informed Palmer and Reyes that he wanted to start all over again in Florida, where he had a line on some employment, and he was going to ask that his probation supervision be transferred to that state. He also asked if he could sign papers immediately and terminate his parental rights in [Mattie]. Father appeared very anxious at this meeting, indicating he couldn't breathe and that his chest hurt. His emotional state so concerned Reyes that she offered to call a mobile crisis psychiatric unit to evaluate him. Alternatively, she suggested he visit a hospital emergency room. Father lamented that [his fiancée,] Moore, his main support, had left him and wrecked his life. He couldn't believe she lied about him at a family court hearing. He indicated she had helped him with [Mattie] when he worked odd jobs and he needed her help, even though he complained that she was a pothead and an alcoholic, drinking so much she would wake up intoxicated. He indicated he had hit "rock bottom," and he knew his son would be okay if he left. Reyes consulted with a staff attorney at the department and advised father he needed to talk to his attorney about terminating his parental rights. She encouraged father not to leave for Florida without at least seeing [Mattie]. He said he was too busy that day, but would call later that week. He did not call. Palmer called him and discussed a visit on March 15, as [Mattie], whom father had not seen since his removal on March 3, had been asking about him. Father finally came for a visit on March 16.
In opposing the motion to reopen and the sustaining of the order of temporary custody, father relie[d] on the argument that when the department removed [Mattie] on March 3 and sought to reopen the disposition, there was no proof at the time that [Mattie] suffered any physical harm and his living environment appeared adequate. However, father minimize[d] the potential effects of his emotional state, which in the past ha[d] led him to consider abandoning the child, his admission that he left the child with his ex-girlfriend despite her serious substance abuse, and the fact that he ha[d] relapsed into substance abuse. In mid-February, he voiced feeling stressed about caring for Matthew to Palmer, who offered to find him daycare for Matthew to help give him respite even though he had no stable employment. (Footnotes 1 and 3 omitted.) In re Matthew O., supra, 2-8.
In granting the motion to reopen and recommitting Mattie, this court concluded:
This three-year old child requires a vigilant, sober and reliable caretaker, not one in the throes of emotional desperation whose physical liberty is potentially at risk due to his inability to comply with the conditions of his criminal probation. It is also disturbing that father considered his ex-fiancée, whom he describes as an alcoholic, an appropriate caretaker for Matthew as well as for his younger child, who is only an infant. In this instance, Matthew will be at imminent physical risk if returned to the care of his father whose behaviors and lack of judgment, could, at any time, leave Matthew improperly and dangerously supervised, or worse, abandoned. Father left for another state at the time of Matthew's commitment in February of 2009. Since then, on two separate occasions, the fiancée's break up with him led to his expressed willingness to hand the permanent care of Matthew over to someone else. Id., 10.
This court found that father failed to fully benefit from the services with which he was provided, even those he reportedly "successfully" completed, such as the counseling services at Hockanum Valley and substance abuse treatment. It also found father failed to comply with the revised specific steps ordered pursuant to the January 21, 2010 protective supervision order for Matthew. This court determined that Mattie's best interests required a commitment to the department.
Currently, it is not clear father successfully completed the Hockanum Valley individual counseling in 2009. He missed three of nine sessions, and the termination study indicates he was unsuccessfully discharged. See Exhibit D, 16.
When this court issued its written memorandum of decision on March 24, 2010, it also issued revised final specific steps for both parents and ordered father to participate in a psychological evaluation, which recommended he engage in counseling to address his relational and emotional problems.
The specific steps essentially map out a guide to the efforts and requirements both the department and the parent must meet in order to achieve family reunification. Revised final specific steps set for mother and father were issued by the court on March 24, 2010, one year before the termination petition adjudicatory date of March 17, 2011.
Both parents were ordered to keep appointments set by or with the department and to cooperate with department home visits. Mother's compliance with this step was very minimal. She complied with a home visit on April 8, 2010, but then lost contact with the department until September 28, 2010, when she reported she would participate by telephone in an administrative case review on October 8, 2010, but failed to do so. Since that time, mother has had minimal contacts with the department or her extended family with regard to Mattie and his well-being. The department's attempts to contact her through letters, telephone calls and home visits have mostly been unsuccessful. Mother did speak to social worker Wright on April 11, 2011, who advised her of the pending termination of parental rights petition. Mother reiterated her lack of interest in reunification and refused services. Wright also made several unsuccessful attempts to contact father through letters and telephone messages after she was assigned the case, and finally made an unannounced visit to his residence in Ellington to achieve contact. At this point, father advised Patel he didn't see the point of visits with Mattie, as he thought he was going to jail at the end of April and then his plan was to move to Florida.
Social worker Patel was never able to achieve contact with the mother despite sending letters and leaving phone messages.
The parents were ordered to let the department, their attorneys and the child's attorney know where they were at all times. Father did not fully comply with this step when he traveled to California in September and did not advise the department or My People's Clinical Services, a provider attempting to supervise his visits with Mattie, of his whereabouts until two weeks after his departure. In October 2010, father did not inform the department of a new Ellington address until after he had lost his apartment and relocated.
The stability and assistance father's roommate, William Sanchez, testified he was going to provide father did not last very long. No one paid the rent.
Both mother and father were ordered to cooperate with service providers recommended for parenting and individual counseling. Father also was to cooperate with substance abuse treatment, including aftercare and relapse prevention, and he was to submit to random drug screens, including hair tests at least once every three months. Mother did not comply with this step. Although she successfully completed parenting classes and individual therapy in 2009, she chose not to pursue reunification with Mattie, ceding the parental role to father. After Mattie's last removal in March 2010, mother expressed no desire to reunify with him and indicated she was not willing to engage in services. Father has not fully complied with this step. Prior to Mattie's removal in March 2010, he had begun working with My People's Clinical Services Intensive Family Reunification Program in order to promote, and later, preserve reunification with Mattie. The program goals were to assist him with developing a better understanding of basic parenting, teach him to create a safe home environment free of domestic violence, abuse and substance abuse and resolve any emotional or behavior problems affecting family stability. Father at first satisfactorily engaged with this program and began to demonstrate positive effects, but he never finished the program and was unsuccessfully discharged after he attempted to place Mattie for adoption, one factor which led to Mattie's removal on March 3, 2010. Other factors contributing to this removal were father's relapse into illegal drug usage, his violations of the conditions of his probation and the poor judgment he exercised in leaving Mattie in the care of his admittedly substance-abusing fiancée.
Father again was referred to individual parenting classes at Kid Safe on June 23, 2010 after completing a substance abuse outpatient program at River East. Kid Safe contacted father and left a voicemail to begin parenting instruction. In October 2010, father admitted he never returned the Kid Safe phone call. On November 4, 2010, father reported to the department worker that he had not yet followed up with parenting services. He indicated he still needed time to get himself together before attempting to parent Mattie full time. Although the provider contacted father, he did not respond. He has attended no parenting sessions at Kid Safe or anywhere else since early 2010.
Father did engage in parenting classes in the past, but mere attendance is not compliance if a parent incurs no benefit. Notably, after Mattie was returned to father under an order of protective supervision in January 2010, father's work with My People's Clinical Services Home Based Intensive Reunification Services failed to reap any sustained improvement, as father quickly became overwhelmed with the care of his son.
Father also was referred to Kid Safe for individual counseling in July 2010. In 2009, he also engaged in individual therapy at Hockanum Valley. The referral for counseling followed the recommendation of a psychologist who evaluated father pursuant to this court's order of March 24, 2010. On August 24, 2010, father's assigned therapist, Judy Clarke, reported father did not show for his intake appointment, which had been specifically arranged for him on a Sunday. He had overslept. Father indicated he would contact the provider to reschedule but waited until October to schedule an intake for October 19, 2010. He attended this intake, but did not attend further counseling because he did not like the therapist's remark about his bad choices. On November 29, 2010 the department worker faxed a new payment authorization to Kid Safe in another effort to begin counseling. Father was contacted on December 1, 2010 by Judy Clarke, who requested he call for another appointment. Clarke tried contacting father again on December 13, 2010, and left three messages with father requesting a call back. As of the date of trial, father has not followed through with individual therapy or parenting instruction with Kid Safe. His inattention to individual counseling is particularly perplexing, as father admitted to Palmer and Reyes in March 2010 that he had hit "rock bottom," which appeared to be a cry for help.
Father also was issued steps to address ongoing substance abuse, which had recurred as a problem in early 2010, right after he had Mattie's custody returned to him. In the past, he had been referred to both the Adult Drug and Rehabilitation Center (ADRC) and the Genesis Center for substance abuse treatment. His past failure to attend a relapse prevention group may have contributed to the resurgence of the problem. Father did attend an intensive outpatient substance abuse program at River East shortly after the March 24, 2010 modification orders. He did test negative for all drugs in 4 toxicology screens in May and June. This court also ordered he submit to a hair test at least once every three months. A hair test scheduled on April 22, 2010 revealed positive results for cocaine and marijuana, and another performed on August 10, 2010 was positive for marijuana. After successfully completing the outpatient program, it was recommended that he participate in AA or NA meeting weekly to avoid relapse. Father did not comply with recommendations for relapse prevention. He also did not attend a hair test scheduled for December 9, 2010.
Both parents were ordered to maintain adequate housing and a legal income. Neither mother nor father has verified their claimed employment to the department. Mother resides in a one-bedroom apartment in Meriden and father was last reported to be living with a female friend after being evicted from his own apartment in the fall of 2009. Father's living situation at this time is unclear, as his attorney reported he could not attend the trial because he was working in Rhode Island. The court heard no evidence as to whether the Ellington locale is a long-term arrangement with appropriate accommodations for Mattie. Father's employment has not been proven to be steady. There are, notably, reports from him that he was receiving unemployment benefits at the end of 2010 and also not working in April 2011 when interviewed by Wright. He was recently incarcerated on June 7, 2011 for approximately one month. Father's financial problems as a result of failure to pay rent and child support have made it difficult for him to secure a new apartment of his own.
Another step was that both parents provide releases to the department so their participation in services could be arranged and monitored. Mother never provided releases to the department to facilitate the provision of services. When father requested new referrals to services in August 2011, he failed to provide Patel with the releases she needed to make the referrals.
The final significant step was to visit Mattie as often as the department permits. When mother returned to court in March 2010, she had not visited Mattie for a year and indicated she would like to resume visits. However, by September 2010, she declined further visits, indicating she didn't want to confuse Mattie anymore than he already was. She stated, "I don't have a relationship or bond with him and I would rather leave it that way." Her last contact with Mattie was arranged by the foster mother this summer, and she made sure Mattie did not know her real identity. Prior to that, she had not seen Mattie since March 27, 2009.
From the time of Mattie's third removal on March 3, 2010 until September 1, 2010, father was offered 26 visits and only attended 12. Visits missed when Mattie vacationed with his foster family were not included in this count. When Mattie went on two weeks of vacation with his foster mother, the department was prepared to offer extended or make-up visits. In July 2010, father was offered an extended visit the week of July 14 due to one of these vacations. It is not clear if this extended visit or any other make-up visit occurred, or why they may not have occurred. When father left for California to assist an ailing relative, per his report, he missed six more visits. Both the department and, subsequently, My People's Clinical Services, tried to arrange visits for father after March 2010. My People's Clinical Services reported to the worker on August 18, 2010 that father had missed four or five consecutive visits. On November 4, 2010, father was informed by the department worker that he needed to contact Lareese Cooper, the supervising case manager for Mattie, to confirm and agree to visit every Tuesday at a local library. On November 9, 2010, father reported he had become employed and would not be available for visits until after 6:00 P.M. during the week. On November 29, 2010, the department informed father that weekend visitation would not be an option and asked if he could adjust his work schedule slightly and still fulfill his eight-hour day. Father reported he had asked his supervisor and was awaiting a response and would contact worker when a decision was made. On December 9, 2010, the worker left father a voicemail regarding his work schedule and arranging visits and requested he call back. As of December 15, 2010, father had not contacted the worker. On January 10, 2011, father agreed to a visit beginning on January 18, 2011 and every Tuesday thereafter from 5:30 to 6:30 P.M. The January 18, 2011 visit was cancelled due to bad weather. On January 25, 2011, the department was unable to contact father to confirm a visit, so it did not occur. On February 1, 2011, the visit was cancelled again due to bad weather. There were two successful visits on February 3 and February 9. The visit the following week, on February 16, 2011, was cancelled by father on February 15. He said he had errands to complete and would be too late to visit. In sum, from September 2010 to February 9, 2011, father only had two visits with Mattie. Social worker Wright inherited the case from Palmer on March 8, 2011. She had to make an unannounced visit to Ellington on April 13, 2011 to contact father, as her attempts through letters and telephone messages went unanswered. At this meeting, Wright discussed father's lack of visits, as he had only kept two visits since the date she received the case. At this time, he knew the department was considering filing to terminate his parental rights. He told Wright he felt visits were unnecessary and pointless. He also pointed out that he would soon be going to jail soon, (although he did not enter prison until June), and he didn't want Mattie visiting with him in prison. He also indicated to Wright that he was not going to show up for any more court hearings. During the time Wright had the case, father made only two visits. His last visit was on March 29, 2011, and he did not send Mattie any cards, gifts or letters. Mattie never asked Wright about either of his parents when she visited him.
Father's special request to not visit Mattie at the department's offices had been honored and Mattie was driven to a mutually agreed point halfway between father's home or work and the foster home.
Wright transferred the case to Anita Patel in mid-April 2011. Her last contact with father prior to July 26, 2011, after a court hearing, was on May 19, 2011. On May 19, 2011, Patel spoke to father, who expressed that he was not interested in any services or in visiting with Mattie as he did not want to confuse him. He did express a willingness to participate in a goodbye visit following the June 2, 2011 court hearing, but he was unsure if he was even going to attend court. Father said he could not bring himself to consent to the termination of his parental rights. He did not attend court on June 2, 2011 to discuss a goodbye visit with Patel. Such a visit has never been arranged. Father did not inform Patel when he was incarcerated and did not ask for visits while he was in prison. He did not notify her when he was released. He only served half of his 60-day sentence.
After his release from jail, father asked Patel if visits with Mattie could resume in July 2011, after the petition for termination of parental rights had been filed. He had not visited Mattie since March 29, 2011. Patel indicated to him he would need to engage in services and she needed to discuss resuming visits with Mattie's therapist and Mattie's attorney. After discussing resuming visits with Mattie's attorney and therapist, Patel told father on August 5, 2011 that the therapist was not recommending visits resume. She asked him to provide releases so he could be again referred to services, but father stated he first needed to speak with his lawyer. He never provided any releases, which are needed to make service referrals. As of the date of trial, Patel had not heard from father since August 5, 2011. Since she has been the worker, he has not sent Mattie any cards, gifts or letters.
Mattie's attorney did file a motion to suspend father's visits, but all parties agreed on September 6, 2011, prior to the commencement of trial, that this motion would not need to be considered unless the court did not terminate father's parental rights. The motion was marked off.
Patel has had no contact with mother since she was assigned the case. On April 28, 2011, Patel sent a letter to mother's home and asked her to contact Patel. She also left several voice mails for mother at the last phone number mother provided to the department. Patel also attempted a home visit without success and contacted maternal relatives to obtain updated contact information for mother. These efforts were not successful.
Patel has seen Mattie at least once a month in his foster home. Mattie has never mentioned his mother. Neither the child's therapist nor his foster parents have told Patel Mattie is asking to be returned to his father. He is observed by Patel as comfortable in his foster home and equally comfortable with both the women who care for him.
The revised specific steps issued on March 24, 2010 also required that father have no further involvement with the criminal justice system and that if he was on probation, he follow his conditions. When Mattie was last removed, he was in danger of having his probation violated, but apparently was given another chance. Since March 24, 2010, he violated the conditions of his probation twice. The first violation involved a domestic dispute with his ex-girlfriend and the mother of his youngest child. The most recent violation occurred on December 10, 2010, when he was arrested by Vernon police for illegal operation of a motor vehicle while under suspension and traveling unreasonably fast. Father was convicted of violating this probation on June 7, 2011.
D. Child, Matthew O., Jr.
Mattie is now four and a half years old, and has spent much of his life — 39 of 55 months — in foster care. Fortunately, he has been placed with his maternal great aunt, Donna C., who lives with a partner, Carmen C. He refers to both women as his aunts. The couple resides in Wethersfield in a home they renovated in order to be licensed as foster parents. Mattie has his own bedroom and is the only child in the home. Mattie was placed in this licensed relative home after the department filed its neglect petition in the juvenile district of Hartford in November 2008. He made a smooth transition back into Donna C.'s home after his removal from father's care in March 2010. He is comfortable and happy in this home, although there have been displays of aggression and the testing of limits. He also was exhibiting anxiety before and after some of his visits with his father. To address these issues, the department referred Mattie and his foster mother to play therapy with Rebecca Wilson in May 2010, which he has attended weekly. The therapy has improved his behaviors.
Donna C. and Carmen C. have been observed as very loving and attentive to Mattie. With the help of the therapist, they have improved their ability to redirect and discipline Mattie. Mattie has been receptive to the structure.
Mattie is shy, precocious and very lovable. He has no special health issues and is medically up to date. He enjoys reading, attending daycare and playing outside with his friends. He is bonded to his father and his foster mother, Donna C. He has seen his mother very infrequently since 2009 and does not identify her as anything more than a nice stranger whom he calls "Trina." He does not ask to see his mother.
In February 2011, Mattie was diagnosed with separation anxiety based on behaviors he was demonstrating. The foster parents reported that Mattie was very clingy, reluctant to attend school and separate from his aunts, showing a fear of "monsters" and a reluctance to go to bed at night for fear his foster mothers were going to leave him. In addition, he had been exhibiting aggressive behavior toward his foster mother and one child at daycare. He continues in play therapy once a week and his therapist works with him on an interactive approach that combines family therapy and includes the foster parents. Donna C. is very capable and following the recommendation of Mattie's therapist to promote positive behavior and allow him to express his feelings. Mattie has shown significant improvement.
Donna C. and Mattie have been referred to participate in a Mid Level Developmental Assessment (MLDA). This is a quick, comprehensive developmental assessment for children under age six. It is a family-centered evaluation and Mattie and Donna C. will receive intensive case management services during and beyond the evaluation. It also will provide an overview of Mattie's biological, psychological, social and educational functioning and develop a comprehensive service plan for the family.
The foster home is clean, neat and free of any safety hazards. Mattie's foster home continues to be appropriate to meet his daily and developmental needs, and gives him the nurturing, stability and safety he deserves. Mattie has at times questioned if he will be going back to Donna's house, seeking reassurance after visits with father. Although he is happy and affectionate toward his father, he does not inquire about living with him. Mattie is very comfortable and happy in his foster home.
Mattie continues to attend day care. The day care center reports there are no longer concerns with Mattie acting out aggressively or hitting as he did in the past. He is now doing very well there. Mattie appears on track with his developmental milestones.
Donna C. and her partner, Carmen C., are willing to adopt Mattie and continue to provide him with a nurturing, loving and permanent home.
III ADJUDICATION
Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The petitioner is required to prove at least one ground alleged as to each parent in its petition by clear and convincing evidence. In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006).
A. Reasonable Efforts Finding — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).
In order to terminate parental rights, the department must show, by clear and convincing evidence, as a prerequisite, that it "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d 469 (2009); In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005); In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 640, 809 A.2d 119, cert. denied 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). "Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 347, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).
Prior to the adjudicatory date, the department made reasonable and appropriate efforts to promote reunification with each parent to the extent possible, given the parents' lack of cooperation or failure to follow through with services and other directives in their specific steps. In fact, the department twice succeeded in reunifying Mattie with his father, only to have father determine that Mattie's care was too overwhelming.
The extent of the department's efforts is fully discussed in Part II of this decision. Each time Mattie was removed from parental custody, mother was offered services to address her mental illness, domestic violence issues and parenting skills, as well as visitation with Mattie, but she has been unequivocally stating her intention not to reunify with Mattie since 2009, and she has done nothing since that time to make the court believe she has wavered from her longstanding position.
Father was offered parenting classes, intensive family reunification services, counseling, substance abuse treatment and testing, daycare and visits with Mattie. Although father managed to reach a point of acceptable rehabilitation where he appeared to be capable of caring for Matthew in 2008 and 2010, his commitment to the child has been inconsistent, and he has proven ambivalent about assuming the responsibility of a full-time parent, particularly when there is no other adult in the home to help out.
Not many parents react to a child's removal by offering to terminate their parental rights. Here, both parents have offered to do so on more than one occasion. After Mattie's return to his father's care in January 2010, father concealed his relapse into substance abuse, his live-in girlfriend's substance abuse and his problems with the criminal court. He concealed his involvement with the department from his probation officer. He was untruthful to the department social worker about his substance abuse, as evidenced by his testimony on March 17, 2010, where he admitted to marijuana use. Father's resistance to drug testing and lack of candor undermined the department's ability to complete the period of protective supervision mandated by the court on January 21, 2010. It is clear that respondent father cannot handle the stressors prevalent in his life without resorting to self-medication, criminal behavior, and deceitful and evasive interaction with state agencies which courts have ordered to supervise him. Even with the assistance of an intensive reunification program, father was unable to maintain the care of Mattie. He lost his apartment at the end of 2010 and had to move in with a friend. His income level is uncertain, and his employment has not been steady. At the end of 2010, he owed both his landlord and the mother of one of his daughters thousands of dollars.
The department's reasonable efforts were not met with adequate cooperation from either parent. Both parents ignored communications from the department reminding them of their obligations. At one time, father was unable to engage in services due to incarceration. He claimed work as an excuse not to visit Mattie, but there is nothing in the evidence that proves his claim that he was never able to reach an acceptable schedule with the department. He never provided the department or the court with any verification of a work schedule conflict, nor did he file any motion with the court seeking weekend visitation. He did not ask for any time accommodations November 2010. Prior to that, he was not objecting to weekday visits in the late afternoon, and in January 2011, he agreed to visits every Tuesday from 5:30 to 6:30 at a location convenient for him. Unfortunately, his visits were still sporadic. Since 2007, despite, at times, proof of some limited capacity to parent Mattie, often, it appears, with assistance, he has been incapable of accepting the long-term sacrifice and commitment being a full-time parent requires. Father should have known that after two failed efforts, this last round of reunification efforts for Mattie could be his last, yet he has not seemed to have gained any greater sense of urgency. However, his ambivalent, evasive and lackadaisical pattern has persisted. He refused parenting instruction and individual counseling and did not attend recommended relapse prevention programs. He continued to engage in illegal behavior. He again relapsed into the use of illegal drugs and violated his probation to such an extent that he ran out of excuses, and once found guilty, was sentenced to jail. Currently, his housing and work status are not known to be stable or secure, and there is no reason to conclude he is maintaining his sobriety.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and father with Mattie. The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that mother's longstanding and inadequately treated mental illness, lack of a stable lifestyle and general disinterest in her youngest son have rendered her unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification services. Father has failed to engage in much needed parenting classes, individual counseling and drug relapse prevention programs since the date of Mattie's latest removal. Despite his loving and affectionate relationship with Mattie, father's interest in maintaining a bond with him has been half-hearted, as evidenced by his lack of adherence to the visitation schedule. The evidence is clear and convincing that he, too, has been unwilling or unable to benefit from services.
B. Abandonment as to Mother — § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
This first ground for termination of parental rights, alleged as to mother, is established when a child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.
Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of "interest, concern or responsibility." In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). "The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993). Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility includes "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). "Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare." In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008).
It is indisputable that mother has fallen far short of the above minimal standards for acceptable parenting and has exhibited little interest, concern or responsibility toward Mattie. Mother had not seen Mattie since March 2009 until the foster mother arranged a series of contacts at a family gathering and swimming lessons after learning that mother had participated in some planned fun activities with one of her older sons, who had come to Connecticut to visit his grandmother. Understandably, the foster mother's heart must have gone out to Mattie, so she called the maternal grandmother and suggested mother might want to see Mattie, too. As far as the foster mother remembered, it had been nearly three years since mother had seen Mattie in the presence of the foster mother. During these contacts with Mattie this summer, mother made it clear to the foster mother that Mattie was not to know she was his mother. When the foster mother no longer precipitated the contact, mother returned to her usual pattern of indifference. Mother rarely called the department social workers to ask how Mattie is doing. For the most part, she did not respond to the social worker's letters or phone calls, and at times, the social workers had no working phone number for her. Other than providing Mattie with some hand-me-downs from one of his brothers this summer through the foster mother, she has not sent him any cards, gifts, or letters, not even on his birthday.
Mother acknowledged her role and responsibilities in the promotion of reunification when presented with specific steps in 2008, 2010 and 2011. She has failed to participate in services or visits in any reasonably consistent manner. She does not inquire about her child or express love and affection for him. There is no evidence that she has regularly contributed anything toward Mattie's support or that she is currently maintaining a domicile that is adequate for a child.
Mother has failed to keep the department advised as to her whereabouts or where she can be contacted, even in an emergency. She chose not to appear and defend the termination petition, and has missed numerous prior court hearings. Such extreme disinterest is appalling and certainly indicative of a lack of affection toward her little boy. She in fact, admits she has no bond with Mattie, and has clearly and unequivocally expressed to more than one department worker that she has no intention of reestablishing the mother-child relationship.
Statutory abandonment on the part of the mother has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. She has not manifested any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Mattie's welfare. In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 112, 121-23, 614 A.2d 832 (1991); In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 37-38, 534 A.2d 897 (1987). In the case of In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 314-15, 771 A.2d 160 (2001), the ground of abandonment, as then set forth in § 45a-717(f), was discussed by the court. "Section 45a-717(f) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern . . ." Id.
C. Failure to Rehabilitate — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
This ground for termination is alleged against both parents in the petition. If the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding fails to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, this ground for termination exists.
The evidence is undisputed that Mattie was most recently adjudicated neglected on February 24, 2009, when the court recommitted Mattie to the care of the department. On January 21, 2010, that commitment order was modified to one of protective supervision with the father. Subsequently, that disposition was modified to commitment on March 24, 2010. Prior to the February 24, 2009 neglect adjudication in Hartford, Mattie also was adjudicated neglected by the Rockville district juvenile court on December 7, 2007. Since November 2008, on four separate occasions, the Hartford court provided mother and the department with specific steps to promote reunification. Specific steps for father were provided on five separate occasions. The issues sought to be addressed were always similar: the parents' mental health and lack of parenting skills, domestic violence, father's substance abuse and criminal behavior, and both parents' lack of stable housing and income.
"Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of the parent to a constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jazmine B., 121 Conn.App. 376, 383-84, 996 A.2d 286, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 924, 998 A.2d 168 (2010); In re Jeisean M., supra, 270 Conn. 398; In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706; 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Also, in determining whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient and allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation further, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. See In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 485; In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230; In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).
The evidence in this case is clear and convincing that the respondent mother and father, as of the date of the filing of the termination petition on March 17, 2011, the adjudicatory date, had not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation. Further, there is no evidence of conduct on the part of either of them, prior or subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition, which would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Mattie, either one of them could assume a responsible position in his life. Both have failed to make the changes necessary in their lifestyles that would indicate they would be safe, responsible or nurturing parents for Mattie.
A parent's compliance with specific steps set during the pendency of the neglect case is a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167-68; In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parenting, and has corrected any of the factors that led to the commitment. See In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 126. To terminate parental rights for the failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) must be met: (1) that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation; and (2) there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child. In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843, 724 A.2d 546 (1999).
In reviewing the issue of rehabilitation, the court has considered evidence antedating Mattie's latest commitment on March 24, 2010, which it deems appropriate. "Acts or events occurring before the [conclusion] of [an] earlier [matter] should be considered if they have continued or have been repeated or if, when coupled with new acts, they present a change of circumstances." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re John B., 20 Conn.App. 725, 729, 570 A.2d 735 (1990). (Trial court did not err in considering evidence antedating a prior proceeding with which state's petition for termination had been denied.) "An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires . . . a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities." In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999); In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 499.
The specific steps essentially map out a guide to the efforts and requirements both the department and the parent must meet in order to achieve family reunification. The most recent set of specific steps set for mother and father were issued by the court on March 24, 2010 as revised final steps, one year before the adjudicatory date of March 17, 2011. These steps are not dissimilar from several other sets of specific steps issued to the parents since 2008.
The evidence did not provide the court with any information on specific steps which may have been issued by the court in the judicial district of Rockville in 2007.
Both parents were ordered to keep appointments set by or with the department and to cooperate with department home visits. Mother's compliance with this step was minimal. The department's attempts to contact her through letters, telephone calls and home visits have mostly been unsuccessful. On April 11, 2011, Wright made an attempt to meet with mother, who reported that she was working and would not be able to meet. Patel has never been able to meet with her.
The parents were ordered to let the department, their attorneys and the child's attorney know where they were at all times. Father did not fully comply with this step when he traveled to California in the fall of 2010 and did not advise the department or My People's Clinical Services of his whereabouts until two weeks after his departure. In October 2010, father did not inform the department of a new Ellington address until after he had lost his apartment and relocated.
Both mother and father were ordered to cooperate with service providers recommended for parenting and individual counseling. Father also was to cooperate with substance abuse treatment, including aftercare and relapse prevention, and he was to submit to random screens, including hair tests at least once every three months. Mother did not comply with this step. Although she successfully completed parenting classes and individual therapy in 2009, she chose not to pursue reunification with Mattie, ceding the parental role to father. After Mattie's last removal in March 2010, mother expressed no desire to reunify with him and indicated she was not willing to engage in services. Father has not fully complied with this step. He was again referred to individual parenting classes at Kid Safe on June 23, 2010 after completing a substance abuse outpatient program at River East. Although the provider contacted father, he did not respond. He has attended no parenting sessions at Kid Safe. Father also was referred to Kid Safe for individual counseling. This is the second time he was ordered to engage in such a service. This court's March 24, 2010 strongly expressed father's need for further individual counseling to address his ambivalence toward caring for Mattie and the drastic manner in which he reacted to the stress of his parenting on two occasions: give up the child and move out of state. The court-ordered psychological evaluation of father subsequently recommended counseling. He did not follow through with recommended counseling at Kid Safe because he became upset that a therapist noted he had made some bad choices in his life. Father has a long way to go if he can't stand hearing that assessment. Although father has admitted hitting "rock bottom" in March 2010, and the need to "get himself together" before he can care of Mattie, he shuns services that will help him do that.
Father did engage in parenting classes in the past, but mere attendance is not compliance if a parent incurs no benefit. Notably, after Mattie was returned to father under an order of protective supervision in January 2010, father's work with My People's Clinical Services Home Based Intensive Family Reunification Program, both prior to and after this reunification failed to reap any sustaining benefit, as father quickly became overwhelmed with the care of his son after his fiancfiancée and infant daughter moved out.
Father was issued a number of steps to address ongoing substance abuse, which recurred in early 2010 right after he had Mattie's custody returned to him despite his completion of several prior treatment programs. Undoubtedly, his failure to attend a relapse prevention group contributed to his renewed use of illegal drugs, including cocaine. He completed another outpatient program at River East in 2010. Although he rendered four negative urine screens in a one-month period in the spring of 2010, two hair tests in April and August 2010 were positive for marijuana and/or cocaine. The court had mandated he attend a hair test every three months, and he did not attend the one scheduled in December 2010 after failing the two earlier ones. He was recommended for NA/AA sessions to avoid relapse, but chose not to attend. He has not convinced the court that he is substance-free. As this court wrote in its decision of March 24, 2010:
Given the succession of episodes of parental failure in [Mattie's] life, before this court can consider returning [Mattie] to father's care, he will need to demonstrate a lengthy period of sustained sobriety, evidenced by both negative urine screen and hair testing . . . He will need to convince the court that he is serious about avoiding behaviors that place him at risk for incarceration. The court also feels it is necessary to ascertain whether father suffers from any mental disorder that may explain why he reacts so anxiously and irresponsibly when he encounters stress, and what is the best way to address those behaviors. In re Matthew O., supra, 12.
Both parents were ordered to maintain adequate housing and a legal income. Neither mother nor father has verified their claimed employment to the department. Mother resides in a one-bedroom apartment in Meriden and father lives with a friend after being evicted in the fall of 2009. There is no evidence either parent's living situation is appropriate for Mattie. Father's money problems as a result of failure to pay rent and child support have made it difficult for him to secure a new apartment.
Another step was that both parents provide releases to the department so their participation in services could be arranged and monitored. Mother never provided releases to the department to facilitate the provision of services. When father requested new referrals to services in August 2011, he failed to provide Patel with the releases she needed to make the referrals.
The final significant step was to visit Mattie as often as the department permits. When mother returned to court in March 2010, she had not visited Mattie for a year and indicated she would like to resume visits. However, by September 2010, she declined further visits, indicating she didn't want to confuse Mattie anymore than he already was. She stated, "I don't have a relationship or bond with him and I would rather leave it that way." Her last contact with Mattie was arranged by the foster mother this summer, and she refused to appear to him as his mother. Prior to that, she had not seen Mattie since March 27, 2009. Father agreed to visit Mattie as often as he was permitted, but made less than half of the visits offered to him and did not verify any acceptable reason for missing so many or take sufficient steps to remedy his claimed problems with visiting. Mattie enjoyed his visits and has suffered from the lack of consistency.
This is not a situation where either parent has undergone a dramatic transformation and displays a newfound commitment to recovery. See In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 644. This is a disappointing and lamentable case of two persons who acknowledge their own deficiencies, but do not possess the will or motivation to address their problems. The fact that Mattie is in the loving care of a relative who has been willing to step forward on more than one occasion also makes their failure to display a satisfactory degree of responsibility easier for them, especially for mother. Their lack of disinterest in Mattie has been inexplicably acute, and a clear indication that neither of them has the ability to place the child's needs over their own or address the issues that most affect their capacity to take care of him.
As soon as Mattie was returned to his father on January 21, 2010, father abdicated his parenting role to his new girlfriend, who also had a baby to take care of. She made no bones about complaining about his delegation of his duties to her to the department. He continued to abuse illegal drugs and commit other violations of the law which jeopardized his probation status. Shortly after Mattie's return to father's care in January 2010, he advised the department he would like to leave the state and have Mattie adopted for the second time. He had expressed such a desire once before, in the fall of 2008. The shocking callousness of his behavior was amplified by his request in 2010 that Mattie not be returned to his former relative foster mother, Donna C., but rather be placed with a stranger willing to adopt him. His ambivalence toward reunification and lawlessness has persisted. Significantly, he did not attend the counseling or parenting instruction ordered to address his predilection to become frustrated caring for Mattie, which has led him to make insensitive, hasty decisions which can harm a child emotionally. He continued to engage in criminal behavior which led to his probation being violated and a term of incarceration.
The evidence is clear and convincing that as of the adjudicatory date, neither mother nor father had achieved a status where either one was more able to parent Mattie than at the time of his neglect adjudication on February 24, 2009. There is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation into the role of a constructive parent for Mattie could be achieved by either of them within a reasonable period of time. Since the adjudicatory date, neither parent has done anything to improve their relationship with Mattie or to comply with specific steps. Mother stated she is definitely uninterested in regaining his custody, which she has expressed on numerous occasions. The bizarre incidental contact mother had with Mattie this past summer is also not encouraging. When father learned of the department's intended filing of the termination of parental rights petition, he declined visits and services this past spring. Late this summer, he renewed requests for visits and services, one month before the trial date. Engagement with services would have been key to his proof of renewed commitment, but he did not follow through with providing Patel with requested releases.
Father has had three chances to prove he can be a full-time father to Mattie. Each time, he has either failed to follow through with services or completed others without any lasting, beneficial effect. Undoubtedly, after four years of almost continuous court involvement, both parents clearly knew what they had to do in order to regain custody of Mattie. Father twice showed sufficient resolve to regain Mattie's custody, but his custodial time was always short-lived. His ambivalence was such that he twice discussed giving up Mattie for adoption. In addition, mother had prior experience with the child protection system which had previously resulted in the loss of her three sons by Richard K.
Further delay in this case in an attempt to renew efforts to rehabilitate mother or father into the role of a suitable parent would be injurious to Mattie, who has experienced the loss of a parent's care on three separate occasions. He fortunately has adjusted well and is thriving in the care of his foster parents, who are devoted to him and capable of addressing his separation anxiety disorder, the onset of which is understandable given the loss and abandonment he has experienced. After years in foster care, including the last eighteen months, Mattie needs and deserves permanency to assure he meets his full potential. He requires a sober, reliable, consistent caretaker.
Prolonging this child's status in the limbo of foster care to assist two parents who have had an inordinate amount of time to cooperate with services in order to rehabilitate would be futile and potentially harmful to Mattie, who is now exhibiting behaviors and concerns connected to a fear that he will lose the love and care of the only two consistent adults in his life, who provide him with a loving, attentive home and who wish to adopt him.
The ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), alleged for termination of both the mother's and the father's parental rights, has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
D. No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship as to Mother — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).
This is the third ground alleged against mother. To prove this ground, the department must show the absence of "the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and [that] to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child." General Statutes § 172-112(j)(3)(D); In re Devaun J., 109 Conn.App. 832, 837, 953 A.2d 913 (2008); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 815, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). This ground encompasses a situation in which "regardless of fault, a child either has never known his . . . parent, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitely lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous). (Citation omitted.) 181 Conn. 638, 645, 436 A.2d 290 (1980). The decisive question is whether the child has present memories or feelings of a positive nature for the natural parent. In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999). If the child is so young the child's present feelings cannot be confidently discerned, the focus must shift on the positive feelings of the natural parent. In this case, it is possible to determine both the child's present feelings as well as those of his mother.
Mattie does not perceive "Trina" as anything other than a nice stranger who is a friend of his foster mother. Mattie first was removed from a homeless mother as an infant, and since then, she has made little effort to assume any responsibility for his care and paid little attention to him. There is no evidence that during the times Mattie was not in foster care and living with his father, mother made any concerted effort to help care for him or stay connected with him. At mother's request, Mattie does not recognize the woman he calls "Trina" as his mother, and mother does not want to be identified as his mother, fearing it will confuse him. Mattie never asks about his mother, nor does he ask to see her. He has no present memories or feelings of a positive nature toward his mother. According to the foster mother, mother never calls her to ask to see him or even ask how he is — and the foster mother has been willing to permit this. Frankly, mother has been pervasively disinterested in Mattie's needs. She has clearly expressed no interest in resuming his care and custody to several department social workers, and has acknowledged the lack of any parent-child bond.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Mattie and his mother and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of that relationship with a mother who has a longstanding aversion to promoting one would be detrimental to Mattie's best interests. Mattie has spent a prolonged amount of time in foster care and experienced a number of disruptions in his young life. He deserves permanency now.
IV DISPOSITION A. Section 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that all of the statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of parental rights have been proven.
Before making a decision whether or not to terminate parental rights, "the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Devon W., 124 Conn.App. 631, 648, 6 A.3d 100 (2010); In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 72, cert. denied 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005); In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). These criteria and this courts findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
(1) "The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent."The department offered timely and appropriate services, to the extent possible, to facilitate and preserve reunification after it occurred on two separate occasions. The department managed to reunify Mattie with his father twice, only to have father twice decide to relinquish his care back to the department due to the stress of caring for Mattie. Mother was offered mental health services, parenting classes, case management and visitation. Father was offered substance abuse evaluation and treatment, individual counseling, a psychological evaluation, parenting classes, including intensive reunification services, daycare, (even when he wasn't working), and case management. Both were offered visitation at a location more convenient and conducive for parent-child interaction than a department office. The department transported Mattie to visits with mother until March 2009 and with father until March 2011.
The department also licensed a willing relative as a foster parent for Mattie, and has assisted the foster parent in special services to address Mattie's behaviors and separation anxiety.
Department workers made reasonable efforts to keep both parents engaged in services and visits whenever their interests appeared to be waning, even after the termination of parental rights petition was filed. The frequency with which one parent or another seemed to be losing interest in having Mattie returned was countered by the efforts of three separate social workers who contacted them and attempted to re-engage each parent. Unfortunately, they were not met with a sufficient effort and cooperation by the parents.
The nature and extent of the department's efforts to rehabilitate mother and father have been more fully discussed in Parts II and III of this decision. Both were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Neither parent took acceptable advantage of the offered services or visits to facilitate reunification within the foreseeable future.
(2) "Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended."As noted above, the department has made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and father with Mattie to the extent possible.
(3) "The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations."Preliminary and final steps were ordered and/or agreed to by both parents and the department on November 12, 2008, February 24, 2009, January 21, 2010 (father only) March 5, 2010 and March 24, 2010. On those dates, both parents were represented by competent, court appointed counsel.
The department met its obligation, but neither parent adequately fulfilled the steps they were expected to complete, as more fully discussed in Parts II and III of this decision.
(4) "The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties."Mattie has lived with his current foster parents for the last eighteen months, and prior to the last reunification with his father, he lived in Donna C.'s home in 2009. Mattie has a bond with his father and expresses love for him and a desire to visit with him. However, he has been affected by the uncertainty of his situation and clings to the security of his foster home, where he enjoys the love and affection of two women. According to the current social worker, Patel, Mattie never mentions either parent during her visits. Mattie is loved and well-cared for by his aunts in his foster home, where he gives and receives a great deal of attention and affection as the only child. Mattie has no bond with his mother.
(5) "The age of the child."
Mattie is four and a half years old.
(6) "The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child."Mother has made very little effort to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Mattie to return her to them in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to her lack of regular visitation with the child, her refusal to follow through with services and her lack of maintenance of regular contact or communications with the department, the foster parents, or the child.
In 2008 and 2009, father was displaying an acceptable degree of interest in parenting Mattie, but on the two occasions Mattie was returned to his care, he became overwhelmed and changed his mind about maintaining custody of Mattie. Since the date of Mattie's last removal in March 2010, father had a clear idea of what he needed to do to regain his son's custody, but he did not sufficiently comply with his specific steps in order to address the issues that have twice led him to surrender the care of his son to others. Even the threat of incarceration failed to keep him from re-offending or abusing illegal drugs.
Neither parent attended the permanency plan hearing or the termination of parental rights trial. Neither parent visited Mattie on a consistent basis.
(7) "The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."Mother had access to Mattie both through the department and the foster mother, who is her maternal aunt, and failed to exercise it. Until this past summer, she had not seen Mattie since 2009. Visitation with Mattie was offered consistently for mother and father. The department workers made efforts to contact them in an attempt to resume visits when they failed to visit for periods of time. The claim that father's work schedule required weekend visits is not supported by the evidence. Even during the times when he advised the department worker he was not working, he missed visits. In January 2011, he agreed to a schedule of Tuesdays from 5:30 to 6:30 P.M., but visited Mattie only twice after that. In April, before father was incarcerated in June 2011, he told Wright he did not see the point of regular visits, and he did not want Mattie brought to the prison for visits.
There is no evidence that economic circumstances have constituted a significant factor in either parent's failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Extensive legal, case management, visitation and reunification services were available to the parents at little or no cost to either of them. Unfortunately, the parents' level of cooperation and compliance was far from satisfactory.
B. Best Interests of the Child
The court must now address the issue of whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. This is the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. "If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In this phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. 258; In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003); see also In re Devon W., supra, 124 Conn.App. 648. The trial court "must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child." In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-27.
The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. as amended, and General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) mandate that after 12 months in foster care, a child must have a plan for a permanent home. See In re Samantha B., 45 Conn. Sup. 468, 479, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd. 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 (1998), cert. denied 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). Our supreme court has noted consistently the important of permanency in children's lives. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, n. 4, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with child's best interest). "Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child. With a statutorily mandated twelve-month limit prior to the institution of a permanency plan, a transition from foster care of approximately thirty-nine months duration, including the last uninterrupted eighteen months, to the achievement of a permanent adoption for Mattie, does not fall within the acceptable timelines. By achieving reunification twice, and then failing to preserve it, father has greatly contributed to the needless prolongation of instability in Mattie's life, and the child is now at an age where he is expressing anger and anxiety due to the resulting insecurity. In addition, the time period that has elapsed since the filing of the neglect petition in Hartford does not include the years the department worked with the parents through the pendency of an earlier Rockville case without achieving enduring permanency. Waiting any longer for mother or father to demonstrate a sustained period of rehabilitation is an unjustifiable risk since they have rejected or not benefited from offers of assistance and court-imposed services, and failed to visit Mattie on an acceptable level for far too long. Both have had prior opportunities to rehabilitate and resume the care of Mattie which have been unsuccessful.
To wait any longer for parental rehabilitation in Mattie's case will only exacerbate the emotional damage removal from the loving family to which he is now securely attached would cause him. He already has had to adjust to new caretakers at least three of four times in his young life. Like all children, he requires an interested, sober, reliable and informed caretaker in order to fully achieve his potential. There is no satisfactory evidence that either parent in this case cares enough about Mattie to adequately address achieving the goals repeatedly set out for them during Mattie's extensive involvement in the child welfare system. Mother and father are nowhere near the point of rehabilitation where a return of Mattie to parental care would ensure him a safe, loving and permanent home. After Mattie's third removal from home, mother essentially did nothing, and father, this time around, has put forth less effort than he did after the first two removals.
The child's attorney advocates termination of parental rights and adoption as being in the best interests of the Mattie. Mattie has an identified potential adoptive home which will keep him in touch with other members of his biological extended family and foster additional connections for Mattie.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered the exhibits, testimony and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interests of Matthew O., Jr. are served by the termination of his mother's and father's parental rights so he may be freed for adoption.
CONCLUSION B. Termination of Parental Rights
The petition for termination of parental rights is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Trina G. and Matthew O., Sr. in Matthew O., Jr.
Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(m), it is ordered that the commissioner of the department of children and families be appointed statutory parent for the child so that he may be placed for adoption. In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present relative foster home.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(o), the statutory parent will file a written report on the case plan for the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before October 29, 2011 at 9 A.M. As previously ordered when Mattie's last permanency plan was approved, a motion to review a permanency plan for Mattie, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-129(k), is to be filed on or before December 20, 2011, and a hearing to review any such plan will be held on January 31, 2012 at 10:30 A.M.
Additional reports and/or motions to review of the plan for the child will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the child's adoption is finalized.
The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when the adoptions are finalized.
Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of these children is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoptions are finalized.