Opinion
Nos. H12CP07011279A, H12-CP07-011280A, H12-CP07-011200A
December 29, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On May 28, 2008, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("the department") filed petitions pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 to terminate the parental rights of respondent Petra S., the mother of Joshua L., born February 15, 1997, Selena L., born November 4, 1998 and Isaiah D., born December 9, 2006 and respondent, John Doe, the unknown father of Isaiah D. On August 28, 2008, the department filed motions to review permanency plans recommending termination of parental rights and adoption for all three children. Both respondent parents were properly served notice of the petitions for termination of parental rights. Respondent mother appeared to defend the petitions and was appointed counsel. Respondent father of Isaiah D., John Doe, who was duly noticed pursuant to an order of publication by the court on June 24, 2008, did not appear and was defaulted. The father of Joshua and Selena L. is deceased. The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of these children. This court has jurisdiction.
Respondent mother recently married. Prior to her marriage, she was known as either Petra R. or Petra C.
Respondent mother initially named an Eduardo D. as the putative biological father of Isaiah D., but genetic testing determined he is not Isaiah's biological father. On February 19, 2008, the court determined Eduardo D. was not Isaiah's father and removed him from the case pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(d)(9). Mother was unable to identify any other putative father.
Respondent mother filed objections to the motions for permanency plans pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1). The hearing on the motions to review the children's permanency plans, the objections thereto and the trial on the termination of parental rights petitions were ordered consolidated by the court on September 30, 2008. Trial was held on October 6, October 10, November 4 and November 19, 2008. The court has considered the petitions, the credible evidence, including the testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner, approves the department's permanency plans and terminates the parental rights of the respondent mother in all three children and the rights of the respondent father in Isaiah D.
I LEGAL STANDARD A. Termination of Parental Rights
The petitions for Joshua and Selena allege one identical statutory ground for termination of the mother's parental rights, the ground of failure to rehabilitate. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3), in pertinent part, provides for termination if "(B) the child (I) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." In the department's petition regarding Isaiah D., the department also alleges the above-mentioned ground (B) against mother, as well as the additional failure to rehabilitate ground contained in § 17a-112(j)(3)(E): "the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families." In its petition for Isaiah, the department also alleges the grounds of abandonment and no-ongoing parent-child relationship against the respondent father, John Doe. § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) states: "the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child." § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) states: "there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child."Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769, 858 A.2d 887 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) or (E), "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Jennifer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert denied 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d 770 (2003); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 231; In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000). "Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than `any' rehabilitation . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation." (Citations omitted.) In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 500. "[E]ven if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children." In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005). The issue is not whether the parent has improved her ability to manage her life but whether she had gained an ability to care for the specific needs of her children at issue. See In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001). The ability to care for another child may not constitute proof that the parent can meet the needs of the particular children in question. See In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 678, 841 A.2d 274 (2004).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756, 936 A.2d 638 (2007). Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. See In re Jason P., 41 Conn.Sup. 23, 24, 544 A.2d 286 (1988); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); Practice Book § 35a-7.
B. Permanency Plan Review CT Page 20278
General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Nine months after placement of the child or youth in the care and custody of the commissioner . . . removal of the child . . . pursuant to section 17a-101g or an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, whichever is earlier, the commissioner shall file a motion for review of a permanency plan." The court is required to hold a permanency hearing even absent an objection. The department has the burden of proving that the proposed permanency plan is in the best interests of the child. General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1).At a permanency hearing held in accordance with this provision, the court shall approve a permanency plan that "is in the best interests of the child . . . and takes into consideration the child's . . . need for permanency. The child's . . . health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan." General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2).
II PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 17, 2007, shortly after Isaiah's birth, the department invoked a 96-hour hold, and on January 18, 2007, filed an ex parte motion for custody of Isaiah and a neglect petition on his behalf. At the preliminary hearing on January 26, 2007, the court sustained the temporary custody order to the department for Isaiah. On March 12, 2007, the department filed neglect petitions on behalf of Joshua and Selena. On or about May 11, 2007, the court-appointed attorney guardian-ad-litem for Joshua and Selena filed a motion for emergency orders seeking to place Joshua and Selena in the department's custody. On May 15, 2007, the court, after a hearing which respondent mother and her attorney did not attend, issued orders of temporary custody to the department for Joshua and Selena from the bench. These orders were sustained at the preliminary hearing on May 25, 2007. On July 31, 2007, all three children were adjudicated neglected on the ground of being permitted to live under conditions injurious to their well-being and were committed to the care and custody of the department. On that date, the respondent mother was present and represented by counsel. Final specific steps for her were reviewed, approved and ordered by the court.
III FACTUAL FINDINGS
At trial, the department introduced exhibits and the testimony of five witnesses: Robert H. Gross III, mother's counselor at the Wheeler Clinic; Janet Feliciano, the department's investigator; Maria C., the foster mother for the three children; Lori Wynter, a department social work supervisor; and Ethel Dickerson, a licensed clinical social worker and therapist for Joshua and Selena. Respondent mother waived her statutory right to remain silent and testified. She also introduced 3 exhibits. The childrens' attorney introduced one exhibit. The attorney guardian-ad-litem introduced the testimony of the current treatment worker, Novelete Hinds, and the maternal grandmother, Petra C.
The court also indicated it would take judicial notice of procedural filings, filing dates, specific steps, preliminary and final court orders in the pending juvenile matters files regarding the respondent parents and the children and the pendency of a neglect proceeding on mother's newborn child, Jesse S. Counsel was advised of the court's intention to take judicial notice of these matters and no objections were posed. See In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 402, 852 A.2d 643 (2004); In re Mark C., 28 Conn.App. 247, 254, 610 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 922, 614 A.2d 823 (1992).
Counsel also stipulated to the following facts: Mother's parental rights to two older children, Angel L. and April L. were terminated in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on March 18, 1997.
The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial, and a review of the judicially noticed court records, supports the finding of the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
A. Respondent Mother
"An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires . . . a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities." In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999); In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 499.
Respondent mother has a history with the department dating back to 1992 due to ongoing substance abuse, criminal arrests which led to her incarceration and domestic violence. Two of her older children were removed from her care by the department because of physical neglect and deplorable conditions in her home. On March 18, 1997, mother's parental rights to those two children, April L. And Angel L., were terminated. Those children have since been adopted. Mother's other two older children, Alejandra R. and Jose R., were placed in the custody of their father. Mother has a criminal history, with multiple convictions for prostitution, as well as convictions for possession of narcotics, escape and failure to appear. Both Joshua and Selena were born with evidence of exposure to illegal drugs in their infant systems. On November 14, 2006, mother was arrested for prostitution while pregnant with Isaiah. During her pregnancy she tested positive for the use of opiates. At birth, tests indicated Isaiah had cocaine and methadone in his system and was considered medically fragile due to withdrawal symptoms.
After Isaiah's removal from mother's custody, she, Joshua and Selena became homeless and were living in a shelter in Hartford. Mother at this time missed most of her scheduled visits with Isaiah. Joshua and Selena were experiencing nightmares and behavioral issues during this difficult time and missed a significant amount of school. Despite prompting by Feliciano, the department investigator, mother kept neglecting to obtain state health care coverage for the children. On April 11, 2007 Feliciano interviewed mother at the shelter and noted that mother had difficulty recalling and reporting information. Feliciano noted mother "appeared to be under the influence as she had a hard time staying awake and kept apologizing reporting that she was tired." At the time of this interview with Feliciano, mother reported that she smoked crack cocaine two days prior and disclosed that she had resumed prostituting. Feliciano made a referral for mother to a substance abuse program and counseling for her children, but mother did not follow through with these referrals. Joshua and Selena reported that mother was leaving them with their maternal grandmother and living in a motel with her new boyfriend, Jesse. S., the father of her eighth child, to whom she is now married. Due to the children's expressed fears of being left in the shelter and a report that mother had taken Selena to a motel where Selena felt uncomfortable, their guardian-ad-litem brought an emergency motion before the court in May 2007, which led to orders of temporary custody to the department.
Mother was born in Mexico in 1969, but her family relocated to Texas when she was five years old. She comes from a large family and has five siblings. Her father died when she was five. At the age of six, she was sexually abused by an older brother. She attended schools in Texas but dropped out in the ninth grade. Her first boyfriend was a Mexican she met at a dance. She moved in with him after only one week, eventually marrying him. She stayed in this relationship for about ten years and had two children with this man, Alejandra and Jose R., but she ended the marriage because this husband was very strict and would not allow her to work. After ending this relationship, she moved to Hartford after she began a relationship in Texas with Rudy L., the father of Joshua, Selena and mother's two older children, April and Angel. Mother never married Rudy L., and describes him as a bad person due to his alcoholism, "split personality," (as she describes it), and the fact that he encouraged her to abuse drugs.
After the department intervened regarding her care of April and Angel in Connecticut and removed them from her custody, mother and Mr. L. relocated to Pennsylvania where one of her brothers offered to help her find an apartment. Mother returned to Connecticut and while incarcerated at York Correctional Institute in Connecticut, gave birth to Joshua at Lawrence and Memorial Hospital in 1997. Selena was born in 1998 in Allentown, Pennsylvania. Mr. L., the father of Joshua and Selena, died of a drug overdose shortly after his release from incarceration in 2001.
Mother is inconsistent on the origins of her substance abuse. She indicated she began at 15, but then maintains she started after April and Angel were removed from her care. Her drug of choice is heroin, but she also abused crack cocaine and alcohol. She began resorting to prostitution in order to buy illegal drugs about four years before Isaiah's birth, when Joshua and Selena were preschoolers. She reports that she started prostituting in Hartford and worked at a massage parlor.
Prior to Joshua's birth in 2006, mother returned to Texas and began a relationship with Eduardo D., whom she inaccurately named as the biological father of Isaiah. Eduardo D. had a history of criminal convictions for drug possession and driving under the influence. He told the department he helped mother, whom he knew only as "Christina," find illegal drugs. The couple dated and abused drugs together, but Mr. D. left mother when he realized she was pregnant and would not stop using drugs.
Mother first applied for the methadone maintenance program at the Hartford Dispensary on November 2, 2006. The intake summary reports that "She is 30 weeks pregnant . . . and has used alcohol, cocaine and heroin every day since conception. Applicant was unable to stay alert and coherent during interview, to the point that she didn't even recall her own social security number. She fell asleep repeatedly . . ." (Exhibit J., "Admission Application," p. 9.) Currently, mother continues on methadone maintenance, but has relapsed and abused alcohol on at least 4 occasions since Joshua and Selena were removed from her care in July 2007. Relapses reported include one in August 2007, requiring hospitalization for detoxification, when mother admits she drank for eight days straight. Another relapse occurred in October 2007, and consisted of days of mother's drinking, ironically to celebrate finishing the Wheeler intensive outpatient substance abuse program. She again required hospitalization for detoxification. Subsequently, on October 30, 2007, a breathalyzer test administered to mother by the Hartford Dispensary detected the presence of alcohol. A third relapse on March 28, 2008, just a few days before she was to have overnight visits commence with Joshua, Selena and Isaiah, landed mother in a hospital emergency room where she tested with an elevated blood alcohol level of .113 four hours after her admission. Mother suffers from depression and has been prescribed medication for it in the past, but there is no evidence she currently takes any anti-depressants. She is not employed and her immigration status may make employment difficult. As noted above, she married Jesse S. in May 2007, just five months after their relationship began, while her three children were in foster care. She admits to prostituting and using drugs during the early part of their relationship, where they resided together in a motel. She indicates her husband works under the table for the owner of the building where they are residing. Jesse S. owes back child support for his other grown children. He also has some sort of working relationship with a Hartford attorney. Mother does not know what he earns. In August 2008, she gave birth to her eighth child, a boy. That child, Jesse S., is now the subject of a neglect petition pending in this court, although prior to the filing of that petition, there had been a previous unsubstantiation of neglect.
This contradicts mother's testimony that she only recently began using alcohol, after she ceased using heroin and cocaine.
Although Isaiah had been removed from her care in December 2006, it was only after the removal of Joshua and Selena from her care months later that mother began to visit with him consistently. In the beginning of her participation in the Hartford Dispensary program, she was not compliant and continued to use cocaine until April 2007. On June 20, 2007, the Hartford Dispensary records disclose that mother, who then denied any drinking, was "too impaired to be medicated." A breathalyzer test was administered and revealed the presence of alcohol. Mother began intensive outpatient substance abuse program at the Wheeler Clinic in Hartford. Her counselor was Robert H. Gross III. Gross testified that he first met mother in early August 2007. She was only in the program for about a week when she required hospitalization for alcohol detoxification. She met with him three times a week in group therapy and was about to be moved to a lower level of care, a relapse prevention program in October 2007, but suffered another relapse and consequent need for detoxification. In February 2008, after another period of intensive outpatient counseling, mother was transferred to a lower level of treatment. Gross noted that a lot of addicted people have "transition problems," so they stepped mother down more gradually from 9 hours a week to six, then by March 2008, 1.5 hours in a relapse prevention program for women.
By March 2008, mother appeared to be doing well with her reunification efforts. She was attending group therapy with Gross and had finished a parenting program at the Wheeler Clinic. She was continuing with her methadone maintenance at the Hartford Dispensary, and had reached a point where the dispensary would allow her to administer her doses of methadone at home, rather than having to receive the dose at the clinic. She was keeping her visitation schedule with her children and Joshua and Selena had progressed enough in their counseling to commence family sessions with their mother. The department had moved forward with a plan for reunification and completed a reunification schedule with detailed dates of supervised, unsupervised and overnight visits with mother, Jesse S. and the children. The department also had arranged a meeting between mother, Jesse S. and the foster parents to discuss concerns about reunification, especially with respect to Isaiah. However, on March 20, 2008, mother and Jesse S. missed a meeting with the children's therapist, Dickerson, to discuss the impact mother's behavior has on her children and the need for family counseling sessions. Mother and Jesse S. were reminded about this appointment on March 17, but did not attend on March 20 and did not call to cancel. In fact, they missed at least three appointments with Dickerson and did not call to cancel or reschedule.
On March 22, 2008, the department had arranged a visit between the mother and her children at mother's home, another positive step towards reunification. The children had arrived at 9:30 A.M., but mother and her husband had left the home to get methadone and did not return until 10:00 A.M. On March 26, 2008, mother and Jesse S. cancelled their visit with Isaiah due to another appointment they said they could not reschedule. On March 28, 2008, the department received a call from St. Francis Hospital reporting that mother, accompanied by Mr. S., presented to the hospital about four hours earlier with abdominal pain. Mother was found to be intoxicated with a blood alcohol level of .113, four hours after admission. Mother suffered this relapse as a result of her attendance at party at her brother's house, which she attended to celebrate the fact that her children were coming home to visit, although she indicates that her family wasn't particularly interested in the status of her relationship with her children. Food, drinks, and a special punch were served. Mother testified that she was just so happy, she began drinking the punch, which contained tequila, and consumed three or four eight-ounce glasses of it over a period of five or six hours. She admits that despite her need to remain sober and the fact that she was pregnant, she didn't ask if the punch had alcohol in it, although this kind of celebratory punch, "orchata," is often made with alcohol. Mother claims this relapse was accidental and that she did not detect the presence of alcohol until she became very ill, but Wynter testified that mother admitted she helped make the punch. As a result of this third significant relapse in just seven months, and the fact that she imbibed during a pregnancy, the department decided to change its permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption.
In May 2008 a drug screen at the Wheeler Clinic was positive for alcohol. Mother doesn't remember drinking in May but admits that a little while after the relapse at the family party she drank for a week and then stopped. Mother insists that she is back in group counseling for relapse prevention and states she has abstained from drugs and alcohol for the last three months, but admits her new baby, born in late August, has prevented her from attending AA meetings, which Gross testified are a necessity for her, and her privilege of taking her methadone dose at home has not been reinstated. She stated she intends to resume AA meetings when this case, which she finds stressful, is over. Her current apartment has only two bedrooms, which she admits is not sufficient for her plan to reside with five children, her husband and her mother. On the last day of trial, maternal grandmother testified that one of mother's older children, Alejandra, 18, has moved to Connecticut and also intends to reside with them.
Mother has never successfully parented her children by herself. Instead she always relied on others, including her children, to pick up the slack. She indicated she planned to obtain a four-bedroom apartment, but provided no actual proof of such an effort. She is not employed and could not state how much her husband makes as the superintendent of the apartment where they now reside.
The department has inquired about relative resources for the children, but has not been successful in identifying anyone appropriate who is willing to come forward and care for these three children. The maternal grandmother is 75, does not have her own housing and appears too dependent and fragile to competently assist in the care of four young children. During a period when mother was incarcerated in Pennsylvania, maternal grandmother resided in Connecticut to care for Joshua and Selena. Her ability to care for them was sufficiently concerning to St. Francis Hospital clinical personnel, a staff person made a referral to the department. She has more or less depended on mother for her own care and support and continues to rely on mother and mother's brother for a place to live. She even left for Texas after Joshua and Selena were removed from her care and depended on the assistance of a friend there for housing. Maternal grandmother testified, presenting as confused, defensive and not open to making the hard decisions if mother were to regain custody but return to her illegitimate behaviors. She inflates mother's past parenting ability, minimizes her serious substance abuse and makes excuses for her. Neither mother nor maternal grandmother put the needs of the children ahead of their own.
On the last day of trial, the department social worker now assigned to this case, Novelete Hinds, testified and reported that on Friday, November 14, at 6:15 p.m., mother appeared to be under the influence at a scheduled visitation with Joshua, Selena and Isaiah. She was accompanied by Jesse S., their infant son, Jesse, the maternal grandmother and Alejandra R. She was very anxious, her voice was very highly pitched, and she was slurring her words. She also had trouble keeping her balance. She had great difficulty changing Jesse's diaper and never managed to put all of his clothes back on. Maternal grandmother admitted during her testimony that she had seen mother imbibing alcohol the day before. Jesse. S. acknowledged concern about mother's demeanor to Hinds and indicated he would watch out for the baby who is still in their custody. Mother explained to the worker that she was tired and stressed and had been up all night due to Alejandra's arrival in their home. She did not give Hinds any plausible explanation for her behavior that evening. While it may seem shocking that mother would appear under the influence at a scheduled visitation three days before a continuation of a trial seeking the termination of her parental rights, the court concernedly notes that she previously relapsed twice after successful completion of intensive treatment and just days before she was to begin overnight visits offered to progress to reunification shortly thereafter. She cannot seem to help sabotaging her own interests. The fact that she's allowed her mother and her teenage daughter, about whom very little is known, to move into her small apartment, adding to the economic burden Mr. S. must assume alone and the stresses they both endure due to this case and the new baby, evinces a confounding lack of insight as to her past limitations and how they contributed to her failure to adequately parent any of her children.
B. Respondent Father of Isaiah D., John Doe
Mother is unable to name a putative father for Isaiah or provide any information that would have assisted the department in identifying someone. She initially identified a former boyfriend, Eduardo D., who requested genetic testing and was scientifically excluded as a possible biological father of Isaiah. Accordingly, a John Doe has been named as Isaiah's putative father in his termination of parental rights petition. Given mother's admitted history of prostitution, it is credible that she cannot identify any actual person as Isaiah's father or provide any helpful leads. John Doe has never had any contact with the department and has been defaulted for failure to appear in defense of the termination of parental rights petition. He has never had any contact with Isaiah.
C. Joshua L.
Joshua was born in New London, Connecticut while mother was incarcerated. He experienced prenatal exposure to drugs. He is a special education student in the sixth grade and his latest report cards indicate all As and a single B. On his recent Connecticut Mastery test, he passed all parts and received the highest grade in the school in mathematics. When he was in his mother's care, he exhibited behavioral issues and was truant. His school was concerned that he appeared depressed, but mother failed to attend two scheduled parent-teacher conferences.
Joshua resides with two foster parents he calls "Grandma" and "Grandpa," who also care for his two siblings, to whom he is very attached. Although Joshua was very quiet when he was first placed in his foster home, his foster mother reports he now behaves quite normally and gets along with his foster family very well. Joshua was given an award for perfect attendance and no tardiness during his last school year, which he proudly exhibits on the wall in his room. He recently acquired eyeglasses and sees an eye doctor to address an unspecified problem.
Joshua loves his mother very much, but also understands her limitations and acknowledges them in an adult manner. Joshua has been in therapy with Dickerson since August 2007. Dickerson testified as to her counseling sessions with both Joshua and Selena. Joshua reported to her a very transient and unstructured life with his mother. He recalls being hungry and witnessing his mother's substance abuse, reporting one time when he assisted his mother during a bad withdrawal from drugs by putting cold rags on her head and trying to comfort her. Dickinson indicated that Joshua showed symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. When first placed, he had trouble sleeping and was very anxious, but he has improved significantly. While living with his mother, he often felt afraid and particularly concerned about mother's tendency to leave them with his grandmother and disappear for days. Mother kept her latest pregnancy from Joshua, telling only Selena, and he was quite angry and resentful when he found out about his new baby brother. He expressed concern that he already has other siblings he has never known, and is not sure mother can handle four young children if the family were reunited. He worries about his grandmother, but didn't see her as a solution to the family's problem. Joshua told Dickerson that he really couldn't believe that his mother was having another baby and concluded, "I just can't stand Mom and the men . . ."
D. Selena L.
Selena was born in Allentown, Pennsylvania. She too was exposed to drugs prenatally. Selena now resides with her two brothers in the C. foster home. Like Joshua, Selena was suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome and having nightmares when she first started seeing Dickerson in August 2007. She also describes a chaotic and scary lifestyle when living with her mother. She once witnessed her mother injecting drugs in a bathroom. Selena has adjusted very well to her foster parents and gets along well with them. She and Joshua adore their little brother, Isaiah.
Selena is in the 4th grade and doing well in school. She also received an award for perfect attendance last year. She is now seeing a physician for a hearing problem. She is very open with Dickerson, her therapist. Like Joshua, she loves her mother very much and wishes to be reunited with her, but does not want to experience the instability and frightening occurrences of the past if this occurs. She remembers that her mother could never help her with her homework and never once had a birthday cake for her. She expresses feeling safe in her foster home and calls her foster parents, "Grandma" and "Grandpa."
E. Isaiah D.
Isaiah is now 23 months old and has spent almost his entire life in foster care in the same foster home. His two siblings joined him there in August 2007, and the three siblings are very attached to one another. Isaiah was born premature, when he tested positive for the presence of cocaine and methadone in his system. He suffered the symptoms of withdrawal from methadone and remained in the hospital until January 17, 2007. He is doing very well in his foster home, where he has lived since his release from the hospital. He is gaining weight steadily and making some progress with delayed developmental milestones. He is engaged in Birth to Three services for motor skills and speech. Isaiah visits weekly with his mother and their interaction is appropriate. He has been showing mother some affection over the last few months, but he is very bonded to his foster relatives, whom he calls "Mommy" and "Papi." Isaiah does has special needs and it is important that his caretaker be sober and reliable in order to consistently keep his numerous appointments
IV ADJUDICATION
Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The petitioner is required to prove at least one ground alleged as to each parent in its petition by clear and convincing evidence. In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006).
A. Reasonable Efforts Finding — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).
In order to terminate parental rights, the department must show, by clear and convincing evidence, as a prerequisite, that it "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005); In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 640, 809 A.2d 119, cert. denied 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). "Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 347, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).Mother gave birth to Isaiah prematurely on December 9, 2006. She was incarcerated at the time on a prostitution charge. She named a former boyfriend who resided out of state as the putative father. The department made diligent efforts to locate and contact him, explaining Isaiah's situations and arranging for genetic paternity testing. On the date Isaiah was ordered removed from mother's care on January 18, 2007, the court issued preliminary specific steps indicating to her what she would be expected to do in order to achieve reunification with her baby. At the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody on January 26, 2007, these preliminary steps were reviewed with her and again approved as orders of the court.
When the court confirmed its bench order placing Joshua and Selena into the department's custody on May 25, 2007, the court issued another set of preliminary steps for mother, which she signed and agreed to follow. Just prior to that hearing, the department had been attempting to provide mother with services and encouraging her to provide better care for Joshua and Selena. Mother had not been cooperating and eventually she left Joshua and Selena in a shelter with their grandmother while she resumed prostituting and substance abuse.
On July 31, 2007, mother appeared in court, represented by counsel, and pled nolo contendere to an adjudication of neglect and all three children were committed to the department. She also signed final specific steps and agreed to cooperate with them.
These final specific steps were similar to the two sets of preliminary steps ordered in January and May 2007, which had not been met with much cooperation from mother. Mother was expected to cooperate with the department, keep her whereabouts known, participate in parenting, individual and family counseling, submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations for treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention, submit to random drug tests, sign releases to monitor her progress in programs, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, not engage in further substance abuse or criminal behavior, cooperate with the children's therapy and visit them as often as the department permitted.
The department placed all three children in the same foster home and facilitated mother's visits. It referred her to the Wheeler Clinic for substance abuse evaluation and treatment, monitored her progress at her pre-existing methadone maintenance program, provided therapy for Joshua and Selena, Birth to Three services for Isaiah and arranged for individual therapy for Joshua and Selena and family counseling with Dickerson, Joshua and Selena's mutual therapist. When mother suffered relapses, the department offered inpatient treatment, but mother refused this service.
On February 19, 2008, when the department confirmed through genetic testing that Eduardo D. is not Isaiah's biological father, the department made efforts to identify another putative father by interviewing mother, who provided little useful information. Nevertheless, the department named a John Doe as the putative father and published notice of the pendency of the petition pursuant to court order.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with Joshua, Selena and Isaiah, but mother's longstanding, severe addictions and her continued predilection to rely on men and other relatives of uncertain stability, rather than addressing her limitations and attain some degree of self-reliance, have rendered her unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification services. Further, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made diligent efforts to identify the father of Isaiah to the extent possible given the paucity of information that could be provided by mother, who was engaging in prostitution during the period when Isaiah would have been conceived. The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that respondent John Doe was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services.
Prior to the adjudicatory date, the department made extensive efforts to promote reunification, and these efforts occurred despite a lengthy, prior involvement with mother that unfortunately ended with the termination of her parental rights in April and Angel L. Although the department removed Isaiah from mother's care, the department attempted to keep mother, Joshua and Selena together until mother's lack of cooperation and her resumption of her illicit lifestyle at a motel left them living frightened in a shelter under the deficient care of their elderly, inept maternal grandmother. The department's treatment workers were seeking to avoid the disruption that a removal would have on the children's emotional equilibriums, but how her lifestyle affects her children does not appear to be of concern to mother. Joshua, Selena and Isaiah keep moving down on her list of priorities. She unfortunately determined to have another child despite her lack of adequate housing, stable income or sustained sobriety, and binged on alcohol during this pregnancy.
B. Failure to Rehabilitate — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I).
This is the only ground for termination alleged against mother in the petitions concerning Joshua and Selena. It is the first ground alleged against mother in Isaiah's petition.
If the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding where specific steps were provided to the parent, and that parent fails to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, this ground for termination exists.
The evidence is undisputed that all three children were adjudicated neglected and committed to the department on July 31, 2007.
"Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of the parent to a constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., supra, 270 Conn. 398; In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706; 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Also, in determining whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient and allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation further, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. See In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 485; In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230; In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).
The evidence in this case is clear and convincing that the respondent mother, as of the date of the filing of the termination petitions on May 28, 2008, had not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation. Further, there is no evidence of conduct prior or subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition which would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and intense needs of her children, she could assume a responsible position in their lives.
A parent's compliance with specific step set during the pendency of the neglect case is a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167-68; In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parenting, and has corrected any of the factors that led to the initial commitment. See In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 126, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). To terminate parental rights for the failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I) must be met: (1) that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation; and (2) there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child. In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843, 724 A.2d 546 (1999).
The final specific steps set for respondent mother were issued by the court on July 31, 2007, but she also had notice of several sets of preliminary specific steps issued at the time Isaiah, and subsequently, Joshua and Selena, were removed from her custody. Mother signed a specific steps form on July 31, 2007, indicating she understood what she was expected to do and the consequences of not doing it. As of the adjudicatory date, May 28, 2008, her level of success with the key specific step of substance abuse treatment, which included completion of inpatient drug treatment programs if deemed necessary, was negligible, despite her regular attendance. She did not comply with the step that she refrain from further substance abuse. Although she visited the children regularly, completed a parenting program and kept her whereabouts known to the department, she failed to follow through with family therapy so she could begin to understand the effects her lifestyle has had on her children and the needs her behavior has created in them. She failed to successfully complete a substance abuse program, inpatient or outpatient, and has not reached a point where one could reliably predict she will abstain from illegal drugs or alcohol in the future. She admittedly continued to abuse substances, and has not secured any legal source of income. Subsequent to the filing of the petitions seeking termination of parental rights, although attending her methadone maintenance program, she has never obtained a significant period of sobriety. Since entering intensive outpatient programs, (she has refused inpatient treatment), she has relapsed from alcohol abuse to the point of requiring hospitalization on at least three occasions. Recently, she gave the birth of her new baby as an excuse to not attend recommended relapse prevention sessions with Alcoholics Anonymous. She continues to depend on methadone and has not attained a status where the Hartford Dispensary will allow her to take her dosage at home. Her long history of substance abuse, lack of gainful employment and housing instability, which have led to her pursuit of illegal source of income in the past, have not sufficiently abated such as to justify a reunification of the family within the foreseeable future. Even if mother were definitely substance free, Dickerson said it would take a lengthy period of family counseling to educate mother on the effect her past chaotic lifestyle has had on her children before reunification could even be attempted.
This record is insufficient for the court to conclude that mother will conquer her longstanding substance abuse within a reasonable time. The expectation for long-term recovery is very unclear, and the disturbing information as to her behavior at a visitation just last week underscores the court's concern. Whether it was attributable to simple stress, her explanation, is unlikely. If it is attributable to methadone withdrawal or the introduction of a new prescription, she could have produced some confirmation of that. She did not, and did not ask for time to do so although the court was willing to permit her rebuttal. Her lack of insight, her predilection for complicating her life — notably the addition of two more people to her household when there is no room for the three children currently removed from her care, the absence of a prolonged period of abstinence from illegal drugs and alcohol and her past pattern of failure are profoundly discouraging.
Her self-proclaimed insistence that he or she is alcohol free, without independent and prolonged substantiation of such a claim, (she alleged the performance of breathalyzer tests but provided no corroborating evidence as to these), cannot be considered a basis for concluding that rehabilitation can occur within a reasonable time. It would be wrong to prolong permanence for these children and take further steps at reuniting them with their mother when her history, lack of candor, minimization of the extent of her parental deficiencies and relapses that coincidentally occur just as it appears she's made some progress belie her stated desire to reunite with them. This is not a situation where a parent has undergone a dramatic transformation and displays a newfound commitment to recovery. See In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 644. This is a sad case of a substance abuse problem that is so pervasive mother went from abstaining from heroin and cocaine, with the help of methadone maintenance, to the transcendence, less than a year ago, of an equally serious alcohol problem. Of particular concern to the court is mother's determination to bring another child into the world when she has proven incapable of adequately caring or providing for a combined total of seven other children.
Despite her completion of a parenting program and some experience with other infant children, she recently told social worker Hinds that Jesse S. knows how to care for Jessie, and she is "learning."
The evidence is clear and convincing that mother has not achieved a status where she is more able to parent their children than at the time of the last neglect adjudication on July 31, 2007. There is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation into the role of constructive parent for Joshua, Selena and Isaiah could be achieved within a reasonable period of time.
Further delay in this case in an attempt to renew efforts to rehabilitate mother would be injurious to these three children, who have suffered through prior periods of loss, fear and exposure to inappropriate lifestyle. After eighteen months in foster care for Joshua and Selena, and 23 months for Isaiah, they are thriving in a stable, safe and loving foster home that is capable of providing them with a permanency. Isaiah is securely attached to his foster parents — after all, they only parents he has known. Isaiah continues to require a sober, reliable, consistent caretaker to address his developmental delays. The three children have a bond with one another and the foster parents are willing to maintain them all together. The ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I), alleged for termination of respondent mother's parental rights, has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
B. Failure to Rehabilitate — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E)
This is the second ground alleged for the termination of mother's rights in Isaiah's petition. The department has further alleged that mother has failed to rehabilitate herself after Isaiah has been previously adjudicated as neglected and her parental rights of other children were previously terminated. This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) states in part: "[t]he Superior Court . . . may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected . . . is unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families."
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Isaiah was adjudicated neglected on July 31, 2007; (2) he was born on December 9, 2006 and is found to be less than seven years of age as of the adjudicatory date; and (3) mother had her parental rights terminated as to two other children, April and Angel L., on March 18, 1997.
In determining whether mother has achieved a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient to encourage a belief that she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children, the court adopts the definitions, meanings and findings set forth above in the discussion of her inability or unwillingness to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation and the basis for the court's finding that the department has proven failure to rehabilitate under ground (B). Mother has not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that she could, within any reasonable time, assume a responsible position in the life of Isaiah.
The department has met its burden and proven Ground (E) by clear and convincing evidence.
C. Abandonment as to John Doe, Putative Father of Isaiah — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
This ground, alleged as to the putative father of Isaiah, John Doe, is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.
Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of "interest, concern or responsibility." In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). "The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993). Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility includes "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). "Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare." In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008).
It is indisputable that John Doe has fallen far short of the above standards for exhibiting interest, concern or responsibility. After a fleeting sexual liaison with the respondent mother sometime in 2006, he was never seen or heard from again. In all likelihood, given mother's substance abuse and prostitution at the time, she will not be able to identify him.
In the case of Michael H. v. Mark K., 898 P.2d. 891, 896 (Cal. 1995), the California Supreme Court held that unless the natural father can prove "that he has promptly come forward and demonstrated his full commitment to his parental responsibilities . . . the federal Constitution protects only the parental relationship that the unwed father has actively developed." (Internal quotation omitted.) A man who engages in casual sexual relations, especially if the engagement was without protection, should be accountable for not making further inquiry to see if anything unexpected, such as the conception of a child, has occurred. No one purporting to be the father of Isaiah has come forward since his birth. The one putative father mother did identify denied paternity and sought genetic testing, which excluded him as a possible biological father. John Doe has had no contact with Isaiah. He never contacted respondent mother, the department or the court to inquire as to his well-being, and he has never supported his son or sent him any cards, gifts or letters.
Statutory abandonment on the part of John Doe has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. He has not manifested any degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Isaiah's welfare. In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 121-23; In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 37-38, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).
D. No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship as to John Doe, Putative Father of Isaiah — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).
This is the second ground alleged against John Doe, Isaiah's putative father. To prove this ground, the department must show the absence of "the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and [that] to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child." General Statutes § 17-112(j)(3)(D); In re Devaun J., 109 Conn.App. 832, 837 (2008); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 815, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). This ground encompasses a situation in which "regardless of fault, a child either has never known his . . . parent, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitely lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (internal citation omitted). The decisive question is whether the child has present memories or feelings of a positive nature for the natural parent. In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).
In this case, the evidence is clear and convincing that the required relationship between Isaiah and his putative biological father is absent. Isaiah and John Doe have never met; most likely, John Doe does not know of Isaiah's existence. After the first individual mother named as Isaiah's putative father was excluded by genetic testing, she indicated she could not identify a possible father for Isaiah. Her capacity to identify a putative father is so lacking in detail it was impossible for the department to investigate or discern an identity for him. To the extent possible, given mother's purported lack of knowledge, the department made diligent efforts to locate John Doe without success. The court ordered notice by publication to John Doe and the department fully complied with that order.
In light of the circumstances, obviously, John Doe has never contributed anything to Isaiah's physical, emotional, moral or educational development.
In deciding whether it would be in the child's best interest to permit further time for a relationship with his parent to redevelop, the court may consider several factors. See In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn.App. 816. In light of the amount of time Isaiah has spent in foster care, the complete lack of contact he has had with John Doe, whose true identify and whereabouts remain unknown, it is clearly not in Isaiah's best interests to permit additional time to pass in foster care in order to await the emergence of John Doe so he finally can be introduced to his son. The evidence is clear that John Doe either has no ability to form a relationship with Isaiah or no interest in doing so since whatever short-lived liaison he had with the respondent mother was not something he cared to continue to ascertain whether or not the relationship produced offspring. Reword: The respondent mother's lack of responsibility in her choice of sexual partners and her inability to identify a potential father for Isaiah is one sad consequence of her errant and illegitimate lifestyle.
V DISPOSITION A. Section 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that in each of the three petitions, the statutory ground alleged by the petitioner for the termination of parental rights have been proven.
Before making a decision whether or not to terminate parental rights, "the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 72, cert. denied 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005); In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
(1) "The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent."The department offered timely and appropriate services, to the extent possible, to facilitate reunification. Services offered to mother and the children included substance abuse evaluations and treatment, parenting classes, family counseling, foster care, supervised parental visitation, Birth to 3 services for Isaiah, and medical care for all three children. The nature and extent of the department's efforts to rehabilitate mother has been more fully discussed in Section A of Part IV of this decision. Despite diligent efforts, the department was never able to identify or locate a father for Isaiah, so services could not be afforded to him.
CT Page 20298
(2) "Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended." As noted above, the department made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and John Doe with their children. (3) "The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations."On July 31, 2007, respondent mother, with the advice and assistance of counsel, agreed to specific steps in order to regain custody of her children. These specific steps were approved as orders of the court. Specific steps were never issued for the unknown John Doe.
Mother complied with steps that required she keep her whereabouts known to the department, her attorney and the children's attorney. She signed releases so the department could monitor her progress in services. She visited the children consistently after Joshua and Selena were removed from her care. Although she complied with the requirement for outpatient substance abuse treatment, she refused to attend inpatient treatment even after her relapses made the efficacy of outpatient treatment questionable. Despite treatment and counseling in two programs — Wheeler Clinic and the Hartford Dispensary — she has not achieved any sustained period of sobriety. She did submit to random testing, which revealed a positive result for alcohol the same month these petitions were filed. She completed parenting classes at the Klingberg Center, but afterwards persisted in substance abuse, even when pregnant, and continued to make irrational decisions that undermined her efforts to achieve independence and stability, such as allowing her mother and her 18-year-old daughter to move in with her and her husband in a two-bedroom apartment that is already too small to accommodate the three children she has in foster care. She continues to express uncertainty as to her parenting ability. Given her history of unstable relationships with men of marginal predictability, it is troubling that she would add to the stress she and Jesse S. are undoubtedly already experiencing. She has remained overly dependent on the support and assistance of other persons. She instills no confidence that she could presently handle the care of four young children, one an infant and three with special needs.
Since John Doe is not aware of the existence of Isaiah, he has been unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. The department has made diligent efforts to identify a putative father for Isaiah, including providing genetic testing to one of mother's former boyfriends and publishing notices pursuant to court order for John Doe. The department's efforts to reunify Isaiah with his biological father have been thwarted by mother's inability to provide sufficient information to identify one.
(4) "The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties."All three children, during observed interactions, appeared comfortable and unafraid of their mother. Both Joshua and Selena are very attached to their mother. They do, however, understand her limitations and express disappointment in their mother's inability to make sufficient progress and her inclusion of another man and child in her life. Joshua and Selena feel safe and secure with their foster parents and are making significant progress in overcoming the chaos of their childhoods. They treat their foster parents as grandparents. Isaiah has only known the loving parental care of his foster parents, and refers to them as "Mommy" and "Papi."
(5) "The age of the child."
Joshua is 11, Selena is 10, and Isaiah is 2.
(6) "The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the forseeable future including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child."The mother had made some effort to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of any of the children to return home in the foreseeable future, but not in a consistent and self-reliant fashion. Instead, she has latched onto another man and become pregnant, repeating a past pattern of behavior that does not bode well for a better future for her or her other children. Given the extreme nature of her parenting deficiencies, the severity of her alcoholism, which she has yet to acknowledge, and the children's special needs, exacerbated by consistent longstanding, pervasive parental neglect, mother needs to expend much more effort to inspire any confidence the children again could be reunified with her. Despite years of court and department involvement with five of her children, with numerous service referrals, she has not managed to maintain a sustained level of competent parenting. She has exposed Joshua and Selena to unspeakable horrors, especially from a child's perspective, and she has not achieved a sufficient period of sobriety from alcohol or illegal drug use to promote any hope that she can rehabilitate in a reasonable period of time. Her judgment is extremely poor. She determined to have another baby with an individual who accepted her drug use and prostituting in the early part of 2007 and married and impregnated her in spite of it. This child, mother's eighth, also had to endure the withdrawal symptoms from exposure to her methadone dosages. She also drank alcohol to excess while pregnant despite parenting classes that discussed the effect of substance abuse on children. Her youngest child is now the subject of a neglect petition. Mother has cited this new pregnancy as a reason for not participating in certain services, particularly relapse prevention, but presented no convincing evidence of any identified reasons for not doing more. Recently, she has allowed a grown child to move into her crowded apartment and blames the stress from that on her appearing under the influence during a supervised visit just last week. Even if she has managed to refrain from abusing alcohol and there is another explanation for her behavior last week, she is clearly not achieving behavioral stability from whatever level of treatment she is now being provided if she experiences such significantly disabling effects.
John Doe never made himself available for reunification efforts and has maintained no contact with mother or Isaiah.
(7) "The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."There is no evidence that indicates that the department or any other person interfered with the respondent mother's or John Doe's ability to maintain a relationship with their children by unreasonable acts or conduct.
Visitation with all three children was offered consistently for mother and the children were transported consistently. Until mother's disturbing relapse in March 2008, the department was contemplating reunification if mother and stepfather participated in family therapy sessions. There is no evidence that economic circumstances have constituted a significant factor in either parent's failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with the children. Extensive legal and reunification services were available to the parents and the children at no cost to either parent, and mother received such services and assistance.
The department made diligent efforts to identify Isaiah's father with little information to go on.
B. Best Interests of the Children
The court must now address the issue of whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children. This is the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. "If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In this phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. 258; In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003). The trial court "must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child." In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-27.
The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq., as amended, and General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) mandate that after 12 months in foster care, a child must have a plan for a permanent home. See In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 479, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd. 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d (1998), cert. denied 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). Our supreme court has noted consistently the important of permanency in children's lives. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, n. 4, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with child's best interest). "Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child. With a statutorily mandated twelve-month limit prior to the institution of a permanency plan, foster care of nearly two years duration for Isaiah and over eighteen months for Joshua and Selena is unacceptable, and the time period that has elapsed since the filing of their neglect petitions does not include the years the department spent during the pendency of cases involving mother's older children to rehabilitate mother to a constructive parenting role, only to witness mother resume abusing drugs and alcohol during her last four pregnancies. Joshua and Selena are attached to their mother, but they have endured previous absences from her and are no strangers to her disappointing lapses. Although mother has an extended family, no competent or reliable relative has come forward to offer these children a home. In January 2005, the children's maternal grandmother, Petra C., reported to the St. Francis hospital clinic that Joshua was suffering from nightmares. At that time, mother was in jail. Grandmother reported that Joshua was easily angered. Joshua then told the hospital personnel that he thought his mother deserved to be in jail for using drugs and that his mother used to hit him. Grandmother then stated she did not talk about his parents with Joshua to avoid trauma. She told the interviewer that Joshua's "stories" were not true and that talking would not help him. Despite St. Francis' referral for counseling for Joshua, grandmother only took him to two sessions, then returned to the hospital clinic in April 2005, complaining that Joshua was exhibiting the same symptoms she reported that January: temper tantrums, nightmares, insomnia and a fear of being left in any room alone. In August 2005, a social worker at St. Francis hospital made a referral to the department due to the grandmother's lack of cooperation in providing proper medical care to Joshua and Selena. At this appointment, Selena was presenting with a urinary infection which had been a problem for months. The hospital noted that the children had difficulty conversing with their grandmother, as they did not speak Spanish that well.
Despite their turbulent and frightening childhood experiences, Joshua and Selena are miraculously flourishing in foster care and recognize the advantages that stability affords them. They are both leery of returning to live with their mother in light of the additional responsibilities she has taken on in their absence, and Joshua has definitely expressed resentment over mother's inability to emphasize reunification with them over forming a new family.
The children's lack of permanency and the effects of that uncertainty — the years Joshua and Selena have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder — should not be allowed to occur any longer. Waiting any longer for mother to demonstrate prolonged period of rehabilitation is an unjustifiable risk. Both Joshua and Selena still require therapy and will suffer if it is not consistent.
To wait any longer for mother's parental rehabilitation in Isaiah's case will only exacerbate the emotional damage removal from the only family he has ever known would cause him. It makes no sense to wait for any further information to develop as to the identity of Isaiah's biological father. That search quickly came to a dead end many months ago. Joshua is experiencing some developmental delays and participates in Birth to Three and other services. He requires a sober, reliable and informed caretaker in order to fully achieve his potential. In the past, mother has been particularly inattentive to her children's educational and medical needs. She has a history of missing appointments.
The attorney for Joshua and Selena expressed to the court the children's ambivalence, torn between a love and loyalty toward their mother and their urgent need to continue to feel safe and secure. They are particularly concerned about being separated from Isaiah and see their ability to remain a sibling unit of three to be as much of a priority as returning home to their mother. The children's guardian ad litem advocates termination of parental rights and adoption as being in the best interests of the children. All three children now have an identified potential adoptive home which will keep them together as a sibling unit, and their foster mother indicated a willingness to cooperate to ensure some appropriate contact with their mother.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered the exhibits, testimony and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interests of Joshua L., Selena L. and Isaiah D. are served by the termination of their mother's and parental rights so they may be free for adoption. The best interests of Isaiah D. also are served by the termination of John Doe's parental rights so he may be free for adoption.
CONCLUSION A. Review of Permanency Plans
Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129(k), on February 26, 2007, the department filed Motions to Review Permanency Plans for each of the three children. In its motions, the department requested the court to review and approve plans for termination of parental rights and adoption of all three of them. "Current federal law for permanency planning requires states to institute plans demonstrating "reasonable efforts" to reunify abused and neglected children with their parents after the children's placement in foster care. Within twelve months of foster home placement, state courts must hold permanency hearings to consider the future status of each child. Congress also requires states to make specific choices about the appropriate permanent placement of children in their care by specifying whether the child will be returned to a parent, placed for adoption, placed with a relative, referred to legal guardianship or, if a compelling reason is shown, placed in another planned permanent living arrangement. (Internal citations omitted.)" In re Darien S., 82 Conn.App. 169, 175, 842 A.2d 1177, cert. denied 269 Conn. 904, 852 A.2d 733 (2004).
The legislature has implemented a permanency planning process for all children in state custody. Section 46b-129(k)(1), requires that a court hold an evidentiary hearing in connection with any contested motion for review of a child's permanency plan. The department has the burden of proving that the proposed plan is in the best interests of the child. The child's "health and safety shall be of paramount concern in formulating such plan," which may include the goal of termination of parental rights and adoption. General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(2). At a permanency hearing, "the court shall review the status of the child, the progress being made to implement the permanency plan, determine a timetable for attaining the permanency plan . . . and determine whether the commissioner has made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan." General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(3).
Prior to trial, this court's determination of the department's motions for review of the children's permanency plan was consolidated, by court order, with the trial on the petitions for termination of parental rights.
Having considered the evidence presented at the consolidated permanency plan hearing and the termination of parental rights trial, including but not limited to the social study submitted in support of the permanency plans of termination of parental rights and adoption, the court hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the plans for termination of parental rights and adoption are in the best interests of Joshua L., Selena L. and Isaiah D.; and (2) the department made reasonable efforts to achieve the identified permanency plans of termination of parental rights and adoption.
Therefore, the court hereby approves the plans filed on August 28, 2008 for all three children, which call for the termination of their parents' rights so they may be placed for adoption. The respondent mother's objection is overruled.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
The petitions for termination of parental rights are granted and judgment may enter terminating Petra S.'s parental rights in Joshua L., Selena L. and Isaiah D. and John Doe's parental rights in Isaiah D.
Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(m), it is ordered that the commissioner of the department of children and families be appointed statutory parent for each of the three children so that they may be placed for adoption. In securing the adoptions, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parents and do its best to promote keeping the sibling together in the same adoptive home. The court also encourages, but is not ordering, the department to allow, if therapeutically indicated and agreed to by the adoptive family, appropriate contact between the children and their mother, and regular contact among Joshua, Selena and Isaiah if they are not all adopted by the same adoptive parent(s).
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(o), the statutory parent will file a written report on the case plan for each child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before January 29, 2009 at 9 a.m. Written status reports will be due on April 30 and July 30, 2009. If necessary, motions to review the permanency plans in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-129(k) are to be filed on or before October 29, 2009. Hearings to review any such plans will be held on December 17, 2009 at 12:00 p.m.
Additional reports and/or motions to review of the plans for each child will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as each child's adoption is finalized.
The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when the adoptions are finalized.
Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of these children is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoptions are finalized.