Opinion
No. H12-CP09-012773-A
January 11, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On August 4, 2010, the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families ("the department") filed petitions pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 to terminate the parental rights of respondents, Nikida S. and Mark E., the mother and acknowledged father of Genesis H., born October 11, 2009. Both respondent parents were properly served notice of the petition for termination of parental rights. Mother, who appeared to defend the petition on September 2, 2010, was appointed counsel and entered pro forma denials. Father has not appeared to defend the petition and was defaulted for failure to appear on September 16, 2010. The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child. This court has jurisdiction.
Genesis has a surname different from that of either parent because her mother named her after a woman, Deborah H., who at one time took care of mother when she was a child. See Exhibit A., p. 1.
Trial was held on December 10 and December 22, 2010. Mother had notice of both dates. On December 10, she appeared late and left early, exhibiting a petulant demeanor. She did not appear for the second day of trial. Despite these absences, she never requested a continuance, orally or in writing, or gave the court any credible reason to grant her one. The court, sua sponte, ordered the scheduling of a second day of trial only to permit mother's counsel additional time to discuss presenting a defense with mother and to attempt to engage her in the process. The court could have concluded the trial on the first day, but in deference to mother's counsel, gave him one more chance to secure her attendance. He was unsuccessful. Although the court did not default mother for failure to appear, since her attorney did appear and participate, her failure to contact the clerk, the department or counsel prior to the start of either day of trial, and her general disinterest in contributing to any defense of this action is duly noted. Father, previously defaulted for failure to appear, did not attend the trial at all. The court has considered the credible evidence, including the exhibits and the testimony presented, and the arguments of counsel. For the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitioner and terminates the parental rights of the mother and the father in Genesis H.
See Practice Book § 31a-1A.
I
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Termination of Parental Rights
The petition for Genesis alleges three identical statutory grounds for termination of the parental rights of the mother and father. The first is the ground of abandonment. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) provides for termination if "the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility as to the welfare of the child." The second identical ground is the failure to rehabilitate, which provides, in pertinent part, for termination if "(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." The third identical ground is contained in § 17a-112(j)(3)(D), which states: "there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child." The department also alleges as to the mother only, a fourth ground, that of failure to rehabilitate as set forth in § 17a-112(j)(3)(E), which provides: "the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families."
Termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages: adjudication and disposition. In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that at least one ground pleaded exists to terminate parental rights as of the date of the filing of the petition or last amendment. See In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 455, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010); In re Javon R., 85 Conn.App. 765, 769, 858 A.2d 887 (2004); In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842, cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1991); Practice Book §§ 32a-3(b), 35a-7. However, where the ground alleged involves failure to rehabilitate under General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) or (E), "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Jennfer W., 75 Conn.App. 485, 495, 816 A.2d 697, cert denied, 263 Conn. 917, 821 A.2d. 770 (2003); In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 527, 939 A.2d 16 (2008); In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000). "What constitutes a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis." In re Stanley D., supra. 61 Conn.App. 231; In re Michael L., 56 Conn.App. 688, 694, 745 A.2d 847 (2000). "Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than `any' rehabilitation . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation." (Citations omitted.) In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 500. "[E]ven if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children." In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450 (2005). The issue is not whether the parent has improved his or her ability to manage his or her own life, but whether he or she has gained an ability to care for the specific needs of the child at issue. See In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 627 (2010); In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 261, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 104 (2001).
If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court must then consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 756, 936 A.2d 638 (2007). "In the dispositional phase . . . the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 529, 939 A.2d 16 (2008). Procedurally, it is permissible to hear evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. See In re Jason P., 41 Conn.Sup. 23, 24, 544 A.2d 286 (1988); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 257, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984); State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); Practice Book § 35a-7.
II
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2009, the court issued a decision terminating the respondent mother's rights to Kiara S., born March 9, 2000 and Chyanne J., born October 27, 2003. These termination petitions had been filed by the department. On October 19, 2009, eight days after Genesis' birth, the department invoked a 96-hour hold, and on October 23, 2009, filed an ex parte motion for temporary custody of Genesis, as well as a neglect petition on her behalf. At the preliminary hearing on October 28, 2009, the court sustained the temporary custody order and issued amended preliminary specific steps for both parents, which were signed, reviewed and approved. On January 25, 2010, Genesis was adjudicated neglected on the ground of being permitted to live under conditions injurious to her well-being and was committed to the care and custody of the department. Both parents were present in court on that date and chose not to contest the adjudication or the disposition. Final specific steps for both parents, identical to the preliminary steps issued on October 28, 2009 were reviewed, approved and ordered by the court. On August 4, 2010, the department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. On August 19, 2010, the court ordered the parents' visits with the child suspended. On September 2, 2010, the court approved a permanency plan for Genesis of termination of parental rights and adoption.
The court granted the department's motion to take judicial notice of both termination judgments, to which no objection was posed. Contrary to what the court stated during trial, evidence of both terminations is relevant to the ground alleged in § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). It is the child whose petition is under current consideration by the court, not the child or children whose prior terminations are offered in evidence, who must be under seven years of age at the time of the court's decision terminating parental rights. However, since the court advised all counsel it would only consider the prior termination of parental rights as to the younger child, Chyanne J., in considering proof of facts under Ground B, that is what the court has done.
III
FACTUAL FINDINGS
At trial, the department introduced three exhibits and the testimony of one witness, Beatrice Velasquez, the department social worker assigned to Genesis' case. Neither mother nor the attorney for the child presented any witnesses or introduced any exhibits.
The court granted the department's motion for judicial notice and indicated it would take judicial notice of all items requested therein. In addition, the court indicated it would take judicial notice of the pleadings, filing dates and court orders in the file. See In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 402, 852 A.2d 643 (2004); In re Mark C., 28 Conn.App. 247, 254, 610 A.2d 181, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 922, 614 A.2d 823 (1992).
The credible and relevant evidence offered at trial, and a review of the judicially noticed court records, supports the finding of the following facts by clear and convincing evidence:
A. Respondent Mother, Nikida S.
"An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires . . . a historical perspective of the respondent's child-caring and parenting abilities." In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999); In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 499.
Mother is 33 years old. She never met her father and to her knowledge, has no siblings. She was raised by her mother and stepfather in Bridgeport. There was a great deal of conflict between her mother and stepfather, who was an alcoholic. When mother was only 13, her stepfather began to sexually abuse her until she ultimately became pregnant with his child at the age of 16. He threatened to kill mother if she ever disclosed the abuse to her mother. When mother finally reported the pregnancy to her mother, her mother did not believe her and she had to leave her home. Mother gave birth to this child, Tanajhia, her first, and later relinquished her rights to that child in probate court.
Lacking any parental support, mother considers herself to have been "adopted" by another woman, Deborah H., after whom Genesis is named. Unbeknownst to the probate court or the department, Deborah H., who was supposed to adopt Tanajhia, was returned to her mother's care in New York. Deborah H. had prior involvement with the department, including a termination of her parental rights in two children she officially adopted and an allegation of inappropriate touching of Chyanne, mother's third child.
Mother's relationships with men have been difficult. She reported domestic violence occurring during her involvement with both the father of Chyanne and Genesis' father, Mark E. Mother cannot identify the father of her second child, Kiara, who was born in New York. She reported that she had been with several different men during the time of Kiara's conception. Two of her daughters, Tanajhia and Chyanne, have alleged they were sexually abused by a Mr. J., Chyanne's father. Genesis' father, Mark E., is described as very violent by mother. He beat her while she was pregnant with Genesis. Mother has requested that her addresses not be disclosed to Mark E. and she does not wish further contact with him. However, at least until recently, he continued to make attempts to contact her. At the time of trial, mother reported to her attorney that she was recently married to someone unknown to the department. She had changed addresses, but would not disclose her current address to either the department or her own attorney.
Mother has an extensive history of mental health problems including a number of admissions to hospitals for psychiatric reasons. In 2000, she was diagnosed with depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder. A more recent evaluation noted an adjustment disorder and a depressed mood. Unfortunately, she lacks insight into the effect these problems have on her ability to maintain a stable and responsible lifestyle, and refuses appropriate treatment, which puts her at risk to experience relapses.
In 2001, Kiara and Tanajhia were removed from mother's care by the state of New York. Mother caused Kiara to sustain first degree burns over fifty percent of her body and second degree burns over four percent of her body when mother placed her in hot bathwater. Subsequently, the two children were returned to her care. In 2004 and 2005, subsequent to the birth of Chyanne, the family was again involved with New York child protective services due to domestic violence. In August 2007, mother and her three daughters returned to Connecticut and Deborah H. sought the custody of the three girls in probate court. On November 1, 2007, Tanajhia, Kiara and Chyanne were placed in the custody of the department due to concerns with the ability of mother or Deborah H. to care for them. On May 16, 2008, Kiara and Chyanne reported through a forensic interview at St. Francis Hospital Children's Advocacy Center that several members of their family had been touching them in a sexually inappropriate manner, including their mother, Chyanne's father, and Deborah H. Tanajhia also made a disclosure of sexual abuse by Chyanne's father when she was residing with her mother in New York.
In 2008, mother again participated in a psychological evaluation that concluded that she was cognitively and emotionally incapable of benefiting from conventional forms of psychotherapy or counseling without psychiatric medication, and even with such support, the prognosis for effective parenting was not optimistic.
Mother attended therapy through Community Health Resources (CHR) from July 2009 to December 2009. However, she suddenly stopped attending treatment in December 2009, shortly after Genesis' removal. Although she was encouraged to return to treatment by CHR, she did not respond to CHR's attempts to contact her. Ultimately, she was discharged from CHR due to poor attendance. On August 25, 2010, mother attended another intake at CHR. She saw a psychiatrist and was diagnosed with adjustment disorder and depressed mood. She was assigned an ongoing clinician and attended a first appointment with that person on September 16, 2010. Although there was some problem with mother's insurance having lapsed due to mother's failure to complete some paperwork, the department quickly helped solve it and mother did not miss any significant period of time waiting for a renewal of her treatment. Mother at this time was living less than two blocks from the clinic. After September 16, mother did not attend appointments scheduled for September 22, October 5, October 19 and November 8. As a result of this lack of compliance, she was again unsuccessfully discharged from CHR on November 12. There is no evidence that mother has been doing anything to address her mental health problems since September, which unfortunately, has historically been the case.
Mother also was provided with information for parenting and domestic violence services, to be provided by the Village for Families and Children, the Hispanic Health Council and Interval House. Mother enrolled in the Village Common Sense Parenting group on November 11, 2009, but she never completed the parenting program. Mother represented to have received domestic violence counseling from Interval House, but Interval House would not accept the department's release form. Mother also only resided at Interval House for about a month, which would not appear to be a sufficient period of time to address her continuing problem of involving herself with violent men. When the department asked mother to provide Interval House with a release the shelter would accept, mother failed to do so. As a result, the department could not assess whether the program mother claims to have participated in at the Interval House was adequate.
Since the removal of Genesis in October 2009, mother has resided in at least five different locations. In January 2010, she moved into a three-bedroom apartment with a female roommate as well as her roommate's children. This roommate has a criminal history as well as prior department involvement. Although mother was advised to secure more adequate housing, she signed a one-year lease with this roommate. Her lack of compliance with mental health and other services rendered her ineligible for a subsidized housing program, Connections, which the department had proposed, although she reported that she was on a waiting list for public housing in Windsor. Currently, the department and mother's attorney do not know where or with whom she is residing.
After Genesis was removed from mother's care, mother was scheduled for weekly supervised visits. She was fairly consistent with visiting Genesis for only the first two months. After the end of December 2009, mother visited Genesis twice, on January 4, 2010 and March 4, 2010. Out of a possible 41 visits between October 2009 and July 2010, she attended only 11, although the department provided her with a bus pass to facilitate visits and services. Velasquez encouraged mother on several occasions via personal contact, phone contact and letters to visit with her infant child in order to ensure a relationship. She did not visit or contact the department worker at all after March 4. On July 26, 2010, mother requested that visits resume, indicating that she "had been doing a lot of thinking." The department, reluctant to resume visits when mother had been making no effort to engage in services necessary for reunification, filed a motion to suspend mother's and father's visits. This motion was granted on August 19, 2010. The court indicated mother would have to show at least 3 months of consistent compliance with the services set forth in her specific steps before the court would consider reinstituting visits. Mother failed to follow through and has not contacted the worker to ask for visits or inquire about Genesis or her well being since August. She did not acknowledge the baby's first birthday on October 9 or send her any cards or gifts. There is no persuasive evidence that mother was too upset before, during or after the visits such that it made her difficult to continue with them. According to Velasquez, who observed at least half of the 11 visits, mother and the baby interacted appropriately, and mother showed no visible signs of distress during the visits she observed. Even if this were true, such a problem could have been addressed if mother bothered to attend her counseling at CHR.
Mother has a minimal work history as a telemarketer and retailer, and now supports herself on disability benefits and food stamps totaling about $900.00 per month.
B. Respondent Father, Mark E.
Mark E. has acknowledged paternity of Genesis. He was born on March 9, 1967 in Jamaica but moved to the United States with his parents at the age of 5. He reports a normal childhood and a positive relationship with both of his parents and his siblings. He has 8 children, ranging from age 21 to the infant Genesis. He reports that all of his children live in this area and he maintains contact with all of them.
There is no evidence of a history of substance abuse or mental illness on the part of father, although he admitted that drinking alcohol contributed to his being arrested for an assault on mother. He is legally married to a woman who is the mother of twins, but they have been separated because father states his wife is "crazy."
Father is a convicted felon and has a lengthy criminal history dating back to 1985. He was arrested and incarcerated in April 2009 due to an assault on mother, who was then pregnant. Mother reported that "he threatened to bash my stomach in and kill the baby." He was convicted and sentenced to a year in prison, but was released on parole in February 2010, with the condition that he have no contact with mother. There was also an active restraining order against him. On March 1, 2010, he was again arrested due to violating the restraining order and remained incarcerated until April 12, 2010 when his sentence was completed.
Father has had prior involvement with the department including substantiations for physical neglect for other children. In 2002, he was involved in a case in which his girlfriend's child tried to commit suicide by hanging. The investigation indicated father grabbed the child, handed her a steak knife and told her, "If you're going to do it, do it with this." This investigation was substantiated for physical abuse and emotional neglect by father. In 2005, there was another substantiation for physical neglect involving his girlfriend's children due to domestic violence.
Although father, convicted of an act of domestic violence, completed anger management counseling while he was incarcerated, he continues to struggle with managing his anger as evidenced by inappropriate expressions of his thoughts and feelings to Velasquez, some containing profanity and vulgar language. He also violated a restraining order after this counseling concluded.
When Genesis was removed, father was incarcerated. According to mother, father was drunk and missing his key. When she refused to open the door, he broke it down and beat her with a piece of wood trim from the door. He was provided with monthly visits while in prison. Upon his release from prison, he was scheduled for weekly supervised visits. He consistently visited for only month, in February 2010. However, on March 1, 2010, he was arrested again and remained incarcerated until April 12. He never contacted the department while he was incarcerated during this period to request visits with Genesis. He was released from prison and the department made several attempts to contact him about resuming visits. He did not respond, and has only attended approximately 5 visits out of a possible 22 as of September 10, 2010. The department offered father a monthly bus pass to facilitate transportation; which he refused, indicating that he has several cars and that transportation is not an issue. On June 6, 2010, father sent mother a text message which said: "Stop having your state peeps sending me letters to my house. I still ain't doing s____. Thank you Mark."
It is evident that father chose to ignore the department's efforts to engage him in the reunification process. On August 19, 2010, the court also granted the department's motion to cease father's visits. On September 10, 2010, father advised the department that he was not going to engage in any services because he did not need them.
The department attempted to refer father for a substance abuse assessment, a urine screen, domestic violence and mental health assessment and parenting classes, all services indicated on his orders of specific steps. Father was referred to Wheeler Clinic for domestic violence, mental health and substance abuse assessments on two occasions, in February and May 2010. He could not attend the February appointment due to his reincarceration. His also missed an appointment scheduled for June 16 after his release. Due to his rearrest, father also failed to follow through on referrals to parenting services at the Village for Children and Families' Fatherhood Program and My People's Clinical Services. Father was encouraged to avail himself of parenting and other services while in prison. He indicated the waiting list for parenting was too long. Father failed to participate in any services other than some anger management counseling while in prison.
He continues to reside in his parents' home in Bloomfield along with a number of other relatives. He reports that he is self-employed at an auto repair shop, but will not confirm this income. He is adamant that he has not done anything wrong that would warrant Genesis' removal. He blames the department social worker for his most recent incarceration for violating a restraining order by continuing to call and text mother after his release in February 2010.
Father has not called the department worker to inquire as to Genesis' well-being since February 2010. He did not recognize her first birthday, and has sent her no cards or gifts. There is no evidence that he has provided any support for Genesis other than buying a few baby supplies at the time of her birth.
C. Genesis H.
Genesis is now almost 15 months old and has spent most of her life in foster care. She was born healthy without any noted medical complications. She was discharged from the hospital directly to mother's care, as the department was unaware that mother had given birth, although mother had open cases with the department at the time, including two pending termination of parental rights petitions. When the department learned of Genesis' birth and discharge, it immediately conducted an investigation and removed her from her mother's custody due to concerns that mother, already under the department's microscope, had not been doing anything to manage her significant mental health issues and she would not permit the department access to her place of residence.
Genesis has specialized needs in that she has been referred to a pediatric orthopedic specialist for a slight difference in the length of her two legs. She also has been referred to an optometrist due to one eye appearing to turn inward. Both of these medical issues must be carefully monitored. When first removed, she was exhibiting developmental delays in the areas of gross motor skills, fine motor skills and expressive language skills. She was provided Birth to Three services as a result of noted delays, and was recently successfully discharged after progressing to the point where there were no longer any noted developmental concerns.
Genesis had established a very positive connection to her first foster family. Unfortunately, this family could not adopt her due to medical problems of the foster mother. Relatives suggested by the parents for placement of Genesis were either unsuitable or not interested in caring for her.
Another foster family was located quickly, and Genesis has been residing with her current foster mother and foster father since September 27, 2010. She has made an excellent transition into this home and her new foster parents are willing to adopt her. Her interaction with her foster parents is positive and responsive. She is now a very busy one-year-old. She hugs her foster parents readily and allows them to snuggle her. Genesis was recently ill and hospitalized for respiratory issues, which may be an indication that she is asthmatic. Her foster parents are very attentive. They have provided Genesis with her own room in their apartment, as well as many toys. The foster mother is a preschool teacher and the father works in security. They alternate their schedules so Genesis spends more time at home.
Genesis must be carefully watched as she is an active toddler. Her foster parents are beginning to facilitate contact between Genesis and her siblings, who have been adopted.
IV
ADJUDICATION
Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The petitioner is required to prove at least one ground alleged as to each parent in its petition by clear and convincing evidence. In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 46, 907 A.2d 126 (2006).
A. Reasonable Efforts Finding — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).
In order to terminate parental rights, the department must show, by clear and convincing evidence, as a prerequisite, that it "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552, 979 A.2d 469 (2009); In re Brendan C., 89 Conn.App. 511, 524, 874 A.2d 826, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 910, 882 A.2d 669 (2005); In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 640, 809 A.2d 119, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). "Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 347, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).
Prior to the adjudicatory date, the department made reasonable and appropriate efforts, to the extent possible given the parents' lack of cooperation, to promote reunification with each parent, and these efforts occurred despite a prior involvement with mother that unfortunately ended with the termination of her parental rights in two older children. Mother gave birth to Genesis on October 11, 2009. Prior to the birth of Genesis, her fourth daughter, mother had seen significant involvement with child protection agencies in both New York and Connecticut. She had not sufficiently addressed issues of mental health, lack of parenting skills and domestic violence from 2007 to 2009, despite being offered services by the department in Connecticut, and her parental rights to two of her older children were terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the department several months after Genesis was born. Undoubtedly, mother has had enough experience with the department to understand what is required of her.
The court ordered two identical sets of specific steps for the parents and the department, a preliminary set in October 2009 and a final set in January 2010. Mother and father signed these steps and indicated they understood them and would comply with them. They were expected to cooperate with the department, keep their whereabouts known to the department, their attorneys and the child's attorney, participate in parenting, domestic violence and individual counseling, sign releases to monitor their progress in programs, secure adequate housing and legal income, not engage in illegal drug use or have involvement with the criminal justice system. Father was asked to submit to a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations for treatment, including inpatient treatment if necessary, aftercare and relapse prevention. Both parents were to submit to random drug tests at the department's discretion, sign releases to monitor their progress in programs, secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, not engage in further substance abuse or criminal behavior and visit Genesis as often as the department permitted.
The department provided Genesis with Birth to Three services and two appropriate, loving foster homes. The department also addressed Genesis' specialized medial needs. It facilitated visits by both parents, offering supervision and transportation. It transported Genesis to the prison where father was incarcerated. It referred mother for parenting classes, mental health treatment and domestic violence counseling. It attempted to confirm mother's claim that she had received domestic violence counseling from Interval House. The department made efforts to assist mother in securing housing, but her unwillingness to comply with services rendered her ineligible for supportive housing suggested by the department.
Although mother's steps included references to substance abuse, this is not described as one of her presenting issues by her worker or in any of the exhibits.
Father was offered parenting classes and individual counseling to address anger issues and domestic violence. In February and May 2010 he was referred to Wheeler Clinic for assessments regarding domestic violence, substance abuse and mental health. He failed to attend two separate appointments.
When father was released from prison on February 3, 2010, the department sought out parenting classes for him through My People's Clinical Services and the Village for Families and Children's fatherhood program. However, father was subsequently rearrested and unable to engage in parenting services. When he was released from prison again on April 12, 2010, the department made several attempts to contact father to discuss parenting, mental health, substance abuse and domestic violence evaluations and referrals. He did not respond to the department worker's communications.
The department also sought to send mother a "wake up call" when it filed a motion to suspend visits in August 2010. The court obliged, suspending mother's visits for three months and indicating visits could be reinstated if she complied with services, but even the court order made no impression on the mother. The court suspended the father's visits indefinitely. Father never bothered to appear after being served with notice of the termination of parental rights petition.
The department's reasonable efforts were not met with much cooperation from either parent. Both parents ignored communications from the department reminding them of their obligations. At times, father was unable to engage in services other than an ineffective anger management program due to his two periods of incarceration. After his release, he refused services and stopped visiting, despite entreaties from the department. True to his word, he has, since February 2010, done "s____."
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify mother and father with Genesis. Mother's longstanding and inadequately treated mental illness, lack of independent living skills and her predilection to rely on men and other persons of uncertain stability, rather than developing insight into and addressing her limitations so she could attain some degree of self-reliance, have rendered her unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification services. Father has vociferously refused to engage in services, telling the department he doesn't need any and refusing to admit his own responsibility for his most recent conviction and subsequent parole violation. He, too, has been unwilling or unable to benefit from services.
The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that both parents were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services.
B. Abandonment as to Mother and Father — § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).
This first ground for termination of parental rights, alleged as to both mother and father, is established when a child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.
Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of "interest, concern or responsibility." In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). "The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993). Indicia of interest, concern and responsibility includes "attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997). "Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare." In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, 936 A.2d 674 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 918, 943 A.2d 475 (2008).
It is indisputable that both parents have fallen far short of the above minimal standards for attentive parenting and have exhibited little interest, concern or responsibility. Mother has not seen Genesis since March 4, 2010. Her consistent visits stopped even earlier, back in December 2009. Father's last visit was in February 2010. Neither has called the department social worker to ask how Genesis is doing. They have not sent her any cards or gifts, not even for her first birthday. According to Velasquez, mother, when she bothers to call, has been more concerned about getting a bus pass than anything else, and then does not use the pass appropriately. Father's text message to mother that he wanted no further interference from the department's "peeps" speaks for itself.
Both parents acknowledged their responsibility in the promotion of reunification when they were presented with specific steps over a year ago. They have failed to participate in services or visits in any reasonably consistent manner. They do not inquire about their child or express love and affection for her. There is no evidence that either has contributed anything toward Genesis' support or that either is currently maintaining a domicile that is adequate for a child.
Currently, mother is not returning any of the department worker's phone calls. She moved and has failed to tell the department or even her own attorney where she is staying. If something dire happened to her daughter, no one could reach her. Father never bothered to appear and defend the termination petition, and mother could not be bothered to attend the majority of the trial, seemingly uninterested in what might happen to her rights or her child. Such extreme disinterest is appalling and certainly indicative of affection toward their little girl.
Statutory abandonment on the part of both parents has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. They have not manifested any reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to Genesis' welfare. In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 112, 121-23, 614 A.2d 832 (1991); In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 37-38, 534 A.2d 897 (1987). In the case of In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 314-15, 771 A.2d 160 (2001), the ground of abandonment, as then set forth in § 45a-717(f), was discussed by the court. "Section 45a-717(f) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child. A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child. Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern . . ."
C. Failure to Rehabilitate — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).
This is the second ground for termination alleged against both parents in the petition. If the parent of a child who has been found by the superior court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding where specific steps were provided to the parent, and that parent fails to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, she could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, this ground for termination exists.
The evidence is undisputed that Genesis was adjudicated neglected and committed to the department on January 26, 2010. On two occasions, on October 28, 2009 and January 26, 2010, both parents were provided with specific steps for reunification.
"Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of the parent to a constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jazmine B., 121 Conn.App. 376, 383-84, 996 A.2d 286, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 924, 998 A.2d 168 (2010); In re Jeisean M., supra, 270 Conn. 398; In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706; 741 A.2d 873 (1999). Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). Also, in determining whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient and allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation further, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. See In re Jennifer W., supra, 75 Conn.App. 485; In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230; In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).
The evidence in this case is clear and convincing that the respondent mother and father, as of the date of the filing of the termination petitions on August 4, 2010, the adjudicatory date, had not achieved a reasonable degree of rehabilitation. Further, there is no evidence of conduct prior or subsequent to the date of the filing of the petition which would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of their child, that either one of them could assume a responsible position in her life.
A parent's compliance with specific steps set during the pendency of the neglect case is a relevant and important consideration in reaching a rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167-68; In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 179, 743 A.2d 165 (1999). The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parenting, and has corrected any of the factors that led to the initial commitment. See In re Michael M., supra, 29 Conn.App. 126. To terminate parental rights for the failure to achieve rehabilitation, both prongs of the test incorporated in § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) must be met: (1) that the parent has failed to achieve rehabilitation; and (2) there is no reason to believe that the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child. In re Danuael D., 51 Conn.App. 829, 843, 724 A.2d 546 (1999).
The specific steps essentially map out a guide to the efforts and requirements both the department and the parent must meet in order to achieve family reunification. The final specific steps set for respondent mother were issued by the court on January 26, 2010, but she also had notice of preliminary specific steps issued at the time Genesis was removed from her custody. Mother signed a specific steps form during the preliminary custody hearing on October 28, 2009, indicating she understood what she was expected to do and the consequences of not doing it. On that same date, she agreed that Genesis should remain in the temporary custody of the department. In addition, when Genesis was removed from mother's care, her older children had been in the department's custody for several years and petitions to terminate her parental rights to two of them were pending. There is no doubt that mother had a very clear picture of what she was expected to do if she seriously desired to raise this child and the consequences of not doing it.
Mother agreed to cooperate with the department and with visits to her home by the department and the child's attorney, announced and unannounced, and to keep the department, her attorney and the child's attorney apprised of her whereabouts at all times. As of December 2010, mother was not returning the phone calls of the department worker and refusing to provide her new address to the department or any of the attorneys, including her own. She also agreed to participate in parenting and individual counseling to address her mental health issues, including medication management, improve her parenting, provide a home free of domestic violence and to cooperate with service providers as recommended. Although she was attending appointments for mental health counseling in the latter half of 2009, she stopped attending two months after Genesis' removal. When referred again in August 2010, she only made her first two appointments and dropped out again. She went to an intake for a parenting class at the Village for Families and Children, but never attended again. She agreed to provide the department with releases but refused to obtain a proper release for Interval House to allow the department to verify her claim that she had been provided adequate domestic violence counseling there. She agreed to secure adequate housing and legal income to support the child, but her housing situation remains tenuous. She relocated at least five times since the child's removal, and at her last known address, she was residing with a person with a criminal and child protection history of whom the department did not approve. She failed to immediately advise the department about any changes in the make-up of her household. She did not advise the department of a recent marriage. The department currently does not know where or with whom she is living. Most disturbing of all, mother failed to keep her commitment to visit Genesis as often as she was permitted. She has seen her child only 11 times since October 2009, and not at all since March 2010. When the court gave her 3 months to comply with her specific steps so she might resume her visits, she failed to cooperate in order to regain the right to see Genesis. Although she provided the department with the name of a friend as a potential placement for Genesis, the friend was unacceptable because she would not agree to keep the child away from Deborah H., whom mother's older children had accused of abusing them.
Father also agreed to and signed specific steps during the preliminary temporary custody hearing, and agreed to sustain the temporary custody order. In the beginning of the case, he was showing a degree of interest and asserting his parenting abilities with his other 7 children. He did keep his whereabouts known to the department. After he was incarcerated for assaulting mother, he participated in an anger management group in the correctional facility, but it did not seem to improve his ability to control his anger as he continued to harass the mother, and after his release, he was again arrested and incarcerated for having prohibited contact with her. This behavior also violated his step not to have any further involvement with the criminal justice system and to comply with his parole conditions. He agreed to accept referrals upon his release from incarceration and to sign releases to attend individual counseling for substance abuse, domestic violence, mental health assessments and parenting classes. The goal was to provide a safe, nurturing environment for the child, free of domestic violence and substance abuse. He refused all referrals and indicated that he did not feel he needed any services; that he was already a perfectly adequate father. In fact, he told the mother in a text message to keep the department "peeps" away from him, that he was not going to do "s____" Father was supposed to cooperate with any existing restraining or protective order, but promptly violated a restraining order barring him from contact with mother once he was paroled on charges of assaulting her. He agreed to keep his whereabouts known, and he has done so. He maintained a residence with his parents, but it is unknown if that home is adequate to reside there with Genesis, as a number of other adults live there. He never confirmed his income from auto maintenance with the department. He agreed to visit Genesis as often as he could. He initially had a few visits with Genesis, notably when he was incarcerated and the department was brining the child right to him, but he failed to ask for visits when he was reincarcerated and has not visited her since his release in April 2010.
This is not a situation where either parent has undergone a dramatic transformation and displays a newfound commitment to recovery. See In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 644. This is a disappointing and lamentable case of two persons who will not acknowledge their own deficiencies and refuse to accept any responsibility for their baby's plight or any help in seeking her return to their care. Their lack of disinterest in Genesis is profound, and a clear indication that they have no ability to place the child's needs over their own selfish pursuits.
The evidence is clear and convincing that as of the adjudicatory date, August 4, 2010, neither mother nor father had achieved a status where either one was more able to parent Genesis than at the time of her neglect adjudication on January 26, 2010. There is no evidence to conclude that rehabilitation into the role of a constructive parent for Genesis could be achieved by either of them within a reasonable period of time. Since the adjudicatory date, they have done nothing to improve their compliance with their specific steps. They have not even visited Genesis. They have failed to show any sustained commitment to regaining her custody, and the court has found that the ground of abandonment has been proven.
Further delay in this case in an attempt to renew efforts to rehabilitate mother or father into the role of a suitable parent would be injurious to Genesis, who has already experienced the loss of her first foster mother, to whom she was very attached. She has fortunately adjusted well and is thriving in the care of a new set of foster parents who are devoted to her and capable of addressing her special needs. After fourteen months in foster care, Genesis needs permanency to assure she meets her full potential. She continues to require a sober, reliable, consistent caretaker to address her needs as a rapidly developing infant and monitor her three medical issues. Before a court could consider returning Genesis to either parent's care, the court would have to grant sufficient time to persuade one of them to cooperate, engage in visits and services and to monitor his or her progress. When their own issues — mental health, domestic violence and substance abuse — were adequately addressed, an additional prolonged period of time would be necessary to aid them in forming or improving an attachment with their child, since Genesis has had no contact with either of them for almost a year.
Prolonging this child's status in the limbo of foster care to assist two parents who have made it clear that they do not wish to cooperate with the department, services or court orders would appear futile and potentially harmful to Genesis, who is now firmly secure in a loving, attentive home that wishes to adopt her.
The ground of failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), alleged for termination of both the mother's and the father's parental rights, has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
D. No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship as to Mother and Father — General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).
This is the third ground alleged against both respondents. To prove this ground, the department must show the absence of "the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and [that] to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child." General Statutes § 172-112(j)(3)(D); In re Devaun J., 109 Conn.App. 832, 837, 953 A.2d 913 (2008); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 815, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). This ground encompasses a situation in which "regardless of fault, a child either has never known his . . . parent, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitely lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 645, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (Citation omitted). The decisive question is whether the child has present memories or feelings of a positive nature for the natural parent. In re Tabitha F., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999). If the child is so young the child's present feelings cannot be confidently discerned, as in this case, the focus must shift on the positive feelings of the natural parent.
In this case, while the evidence may be sufficient to establish that neither parent exhibits any positive feelings toward the child, especially with the father, given his blunt text message to mother. However, the court is faced with the ruling in the case of In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 531, 613 A.2d 748 (1991), where our Supreme Court held that the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship is not fairly alleged when a child is removed from the parents' custody at birth. Genesis, although not removed at birth, was removed when she was only eight days old, which, factually, is not much different than being removed at birth.
"[A] state may not, consistent with due process of law, create the conditions that will strip an individual of an interest protected under the due process clause. Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner's assertion and maintenance of custody of the child led directly to the conditions supporting the termination of parental rights under [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(D)]." Id., 534-35.
Under the similar facts of this case, the conclusion in Valerie D. fatally undermines the court's ability to find a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship. The court concludes that the department has failed to prove the ground set forth in § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) by clear and convincing evidence as to either parent.
E. Failure to Rehabilitate — General Statutes § 17a-112(i)(3)(E) As to Mother, Nikida S.
This is the fourth ground alleged for the termination of mother's rights in the petition. The department has further alleged that mother has failed to rehabilitate herself after Genesis, who is a child under the age of seven, has been previously adjudicated as neglected, and that the mother's parental rights of another child were previously terminated. This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) states in part: "[t]he Superior Court . . . may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected . . . is unable or unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Children and Families."
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Genesis was adjudicated neglected on January 26, 2010; (2) she was born on October 11, 2009 and is found to be less than seven years of age as of the adjudicatory date; and (3) mother had her parental rights terminated to another child, Chyanne J., on December 14, 2009.
In determining whether mother has achieved a degree of personal rehabilitation sufficient to encourage a belief that she could assume a responsible position in the life of her children, the court adopts the definitions, meanings and findings set forth above in the discussion of mother's inability or unwillingness to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation and the basis for the court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that the department has proven the mother's failure to rehabilitate under the ground set forth in § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). (See Part III and Section B of Part IV of this decision.) Mother has not achieved rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that she could, within any reasonable time, assume a responsible position in the life of Genesis. After over a year, she has not even begun to make a serious attempt at rehabilitation and has been unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. There is no point in making Genesis wait any longer for the reformation of one who is so disinterested. Genesis deserves a permanent home.
The department has met its burden of proving ground § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) by clear and convincing evidence.
V
DISPOSITION
A. Section 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that all but one of the statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of parental rights have been proven.
Before making a decision whether or not to terminate parental rights, "the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Devon W., 124 Conn.App. 631, 648, 6 A.3d 100 (2010); In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 835, 863 A.2d 72, cert. denied, CT Page 3346 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 403 (2005); In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
(1) "The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent."
The department offered timely and appropriate services, to the extent possible, to facilitate reunification. Mother was offered mental health services, a psychiatric evaluation and medication management, parenting classes, case management and visitation. Father was offered a substance abuse evaluation and treatment, if recommended, a domestic violence assessment and treatment if recommended, an anger management evaluation and treatment, parenting classes, transportation, case management and visitation.
The nature and extent of the department's efforts to rehabilitate mother and father have been more fully discussed in Part IV of this decision. Both were unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
Neither parent took acceptable advantage of the offered services to facilitate reunification within the foreseeable future.
(2) "Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended."
As noted above, the department has made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and father with Genesis.
(3) "The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations."
Amended preliminary steps and finals steps were agreed to by both parents and the department on October 28, 2009 and January 26, 2010. At the time, both parents were represented by counsel. These specific steps were approved as orders of the court.
Neither parent adequately fulfilled the steps they were expected to complete, as more fully discussed in Part III and Sections A and C of Part IV of this decision.
(4) "The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties."
Genesis is almost 15 months old and non-verbal, so it is impossible to ascertain her feelings or emotional ties to either parent. It should be noted she has not seen either of them since she was 5 months old, as they both failed to attend scheduled, supervised visits. Genesis has only been in the care of her current foster parents since September 2010, but she is thriving under their care and forming a positive relationship with both of them.
(5) "The age of the child."
Genesis is almost 15 months old.
(6) "The effort the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communications with the guardian or other custodian of the child."
The parents have made very little effort to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return her to them in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to their lack of regular visitation with the child, their refusal to follow through with services and their lack of maintenance of regular contact or communications with the department, any of the foster parents, or the child. Their contributions to the welfare of the child have been miniscule.
(7) "The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable acts or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent."
There is no evidence that indicates that the department or any other person interfered with the respondents' ability to maintain a relationship with their child by unreasonable acts or conduct.
Visitation with Genesis was offered consistently for mother and father. The child was even transported to the jail for visits with the father. Visitation was justifiably suspended by court order only after both parents failed to appear for a visit in many months, and even then, the mother, who at least bothered to appear and defend the termination petition, was told if she adhered consistently to the other specific steps for a three-month period, visitation might be resumed.
There is no evidence that economic circumstances have constituted a significant factor in either parent's failure to maintain a meaningful relationship with the child. Extensive legal, case management and reunification services were available to the parents at no cost to either of them. Unfortunately, the parents' level of cooperation and compliance was minimal.
B. Best Interests of the Child, Genesis H.
The court must now address the issue of whether the termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. This is the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. "If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In this phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alejandro L., supra, 91 Conn.App. 258; In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 469-70, 816 A.2d 707 (2003); see also In re Devon W., supra, 124 Conn.App. 648. The trial court "must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the child." In re Vanna A., supra, 83 Conn.App. 17, 26-27.
The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq. as amended, and General Statutes § 46b-129(k)(1) mandate that after 12 months in foster care, a child must have a plan for a permanent home. See In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 479, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd. 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). Our supreme court has noted consistently the importance of permanency in children's lives. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, n. 4, 436 A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or further delaying permanency would be inconsistent with child's best interest.) "Virtually all experts, from many different professional disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from continuous, stable home environments." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 285, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Foster care should be a strictly limited episode in the life of a child. With a statutorily mandated twelve-month limit prior to the institution of a permanency plan, a transition from foster care of nearly fifteen months duration to the achievement of a permanent adoption for Genesis still falls within the acceptable timelines. In addition, the time period that has elapsed since the filing of Genesis' neglect petition does not include the years the department and the child welfare authorities in New York spent during the pendency of cases involving mother's older children to rehabilitate mother to a constructive parenting role without success. Although the department checked out placement alternatives suggested by both parents, no competent or reliable relative came forward to offer Genesis a home.
Waiting any longer for mother or father to demonstrate a sustained period of rehabilitation is an unjustifiable risk since they rejected most offers of assistance and failed to visit Genesis for nearly a year. In addition, mother has had prior opportunities to rehabilitate and resume the care of other children removed from her custody and has consistently failed to follow through. Genesis will require a very responsible caretaker, as she has special needs and must consistently see an orthopedist and an optometrist. She may recently have developed asthma, which also requires special vigilance.
To wait any longer for parental rehabilitation in Genesis' case will only exacerbate the emotional damage removal from the family she knows would cause her. She already has had to adjust to new caretakers twice in her young life. She requires a sober, reliable and informed caretaker in order to fully achieve her potential. There is no satisfactory evidence that either parent in this case even cares enough about Genesis to begin to address achieving the goals set out for them over a year ago so they could meet the required level of parenting and attentiveness that Genesis' medical and developmental needs require. The parents exhibit a smug sense of self-satisfaction and are incapable of recognizing how they contributed to the loss of the custody of their child. Father is a violent, angry man who continues to blame mother and the department for what has happened. Mother, for the brief time she decided to grace the court with her presence during the trial, acted as if the process was just a major inconvenience to her.
The child's attorney advocates termination of parental rights and adoption as being in the best interests of the Genesis. She now has an identified potential adoptive home which will also keep her in touch with her adopted siblings in the future, thus fostering some additional familial connections for Genesis.
Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered the exhibits, testimony and arguments of counsel, the court concludes that the evidence is clear and convincing that the best interests of Genesis H. are served by the termination of her mother's and father's parental rights so she may be free for adoption.
CONCLUSION
B. Termination of Parental Rights
The petition for termination of parental rights is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Nikida S. and Mark E. in Genesis H.
Pursuant to General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(m), it is ordered that the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed statutory parent for the child so that she may be placed for adoption. In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parents.
Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(o), the statutory parent will file a written report on the case plan for the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before February 10, 2011 at 9 A.M. A written status report will be due on April 12, 2011. As previously ordered, a motion to review the permanency plan for Genesis, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-129(k), is to be filed on or before May 5, 2011, and a hearing to review any such plan will be held on June 6, 2011 at 2:15 P.M.
Additional reports and/or motions to review of the plan for the child will be filed in accordance with state and federal law at least every three months until such time as the child's adoption is finalized.
The department is also ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when the adoptions are finalized.
Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of these children is ordered to notify in writing the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoptions are finalized.