491 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2012)

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Hutton v. Astrue

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Dec 5, 2012

491 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2012)

Summary

holding the ALJ erred "in failing to include Hutton's post-traumatic stress disorder... in his hypotheticals to the vocational expert at Step Five," after finding it caused Hutton " ‘mild’ limitations in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace"

Summary of this case from Solomon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

See 25 Summaries

Opinion

No. 11-15726 D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05388-CRB

12-05-2012

JASON DAVID HUTTON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant - Appellee.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2012

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE and BEA, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.

The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
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Hutton appeals the decision of the district court affirming the determination of the administrative law judge ("ALJ") denying Hutton's application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. The ALJ committed legal error by failing to consider appropriately relevant lay testimony and in failing to include Hutton's post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") in his assessment of Hutton's residual functional capacity ("RFC") analysis at Step Four and in his hypotheticals to the vocational expert at Step Five.

The ALJ first considered Hutton's PTSD at Step Two of the disability analysis. There, he evaluated the limitations that Hutton's PTSD generated via the four functional areas outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3) (i.e. activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation). Based on Dr. Gregg's opinion, the ALJ found Hutton suffered no limitation with respect to daily activities or social functioning, "mild" limitations in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace, and no episodes of decompensation. Thus, he determined that Hutton's PTSD existed but was "nonsevere."

Regardless of its severity, however, the ALJ was still required to consider Hutton's PTSD when he determined Hutton's RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2) ("We will consider all of your medically determinable impairments of which we are aware, including your medically determinable impairments that are not 'severe[.]'"). The ALJ, however, failed to do so. Instead, the ALJ discredited Hutton, his treating physicians' opinions, and the VA's disability rating. We do not base our action, however, on any of these determinations by the ALJ. Importantly, the ALJ then mischaracterized Mrs. Hutton's testimony at least five times. Finally, the ALJ concluded that, based on Hutton's lack of credibility, his PTSD claims were in "great doubt." On that basis, the ALJ excluded Hutton's PTSD from consideration. This exclusion was legal error. To determine Hutton's RFC properly, the ALJ was required to consider Hutton's physical impairments and the "mild" limitations his PTSD caused with concentration, persistence, or pace, regardless of whether the ALJ doubted that they were caused by Hutton's ever-shifting military history. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2). Further, while the ALJ was free to reject Hutton's testimony as not credible, there was no reason for the ALJ to disregard his own finding that Hutton's nonsevere PTSD caused some "mild" limitations in the areas of concentration, persistence, or pace.

The ALJ further erred by failing to address appropriately the lay testimony presented by Hutton's wife and his counselor. "Lay testimony as to a claimant's symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must take into account, unless he or she expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).

In this case, however, the ALJ purported to credit the testimony of Hutton's wife while repeatedly mischaracterizing her testimony. In describing the statement from Hutton's wife, the ALJ noted that it "says nothing about any problems with PTSD - no hypervigilance, sleep problems, or nightmares - not a word about any of these . . . ." By contrast, Mrs. Hutton stated that "[d]ue to PTSD from military experience he has night terrors, doesn't sleep well."

Additionally, the ALJ's decision failed to refer to the testimony of Hutton's college counselor, Mr. Frank. Mr. Frank detailed an incident in which Mr. Hutton had difficulty in class due to an emotional reaction brought on by memories of his military service, forcing his withdrawal from people and class. He also indicated that due to "both [Hutton's] physical and emotional pain," Hutton's completion of his education has been a "monumental task." Again, while an ALJ may discredit testimony where it is inconsistent with the record, he must do so by providing specific reasons germane to each witness.

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is REVERSED, the determination of the ALJ is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for the ALJ to reconsider his determination in accordance with this decision.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

Summaries of

Hutton v. Astrue

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Dec 5, 2012

491 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2012)

Summary of this case from Solomon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

holding that while the ALJ was free to reject the claimant's testimony as not credible, he could not disregard his own finding that the claimant had some mild mental limitations

Summary of this case from Carlson v. Berryhill

holding that although the ALJ found that claimant's impairment of PTSD was non-severe because it caused only "mild mental limitations in the area of concentration, persistence or pace, and no episodes of decompensation," the ALJ still was required to consider the mild limitations in the RFC analysis

Summary of this case from Jones v. Berryhill

holding that while the ALJ was free to reject the claimant's testimony as not credible, he could not disregard his own finding that the claimant had some mild limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace

Summary of this case from Smith v. Colvin

finding the ALJ committed legal error by failing to consider the plaintiff's PTSD, which the Court found caused mild limitations at step two, in his assessment of the plaintiff's RFC

Summary of this case from Hecker v. O'Malley

finding error where the ALJ found mild limitations in concentration, persistence and pace based on the claimant's PTSD and then disregarded his own findings

Summary of this case from Patricia W. v. Saul

finding error where the ALJ failed to consider mental impairment in the areas of concentration, persistence, or pace, after finding mild limitations

Summary of this case from Silva v. Saul

finding that the ALJ erred by not considering the claimant's non-severe medically determinative impairment

Summary of this case from Dimartini v. Colvin

In Hutton, the Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ committed legal error because he was required to consider the plaintiff's mild mental limitations in the RFC regardless of his credibility.

Summary of this case from Weber v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

In Hutton, the ALJ determined at Step Two that the claimant had a medically determinable mental impairment of PTSD, which caused “‘mild' limitations in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace.” Hutton, 491 Fed. App'x at 850.

Summary of this case from Janet T. v. Kijakazi

In Hutton, the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant's post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) caused mild limitations in one of the four broad paragraph B functional areas and was not severe.

Summary of this case from D.L.P. v. Kijakazi

In Hutton, the ALJ determined at step two that the plaintiff's PTSD caused mild limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace, but was non-severe.

Summary of this case from Renee R. v. Kijakazi

In Hutton, the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant had a medically determinable mental impairment of PTSD, which caused “‘mild' limitations in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace.

Summary of this case from Frank S. v. Kijakazi

In Hutton, an unpublished case, the Ninth Circuit held an ALJ erred by failing to consider the claimant's non-severe mental impairment in the RFC determination, despite assigning mild limitations in the psychiatric review technique.

Summary of this case from Ward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

In Hutton v. Astrue, 491 Fed.Appx. 850, 851 (9th Cir. 2012), the ALJ found that a mild limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace due to the claimant's PTSD was nonsevere.

Summary of this case from Kitty S. v. Kijakazi

In Hutton, the ALJ refused to consider a claimant's post-traumatic stress disorder based on a finding that the claimant was not credible.

Summary of this case from Va. Estelle G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

In Hutton, the Ninth Circuit found the ALJ erred by failing to include the claimant's PTSD in the assessment of the claimant's RFC.

Summary of this case from Jann B. S. v. Kijakazi

In Hutton, the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant had a medically determinable mental impairment of PTSD, which caused "'mild' limitations in the area of concentration, persistence, or pace."

Summary of this case from Sanguras v. Saul

In Hutton v. Astrue, 491 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2012), the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant's post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") caused mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, but was non-severe.

Summary of this case from Kari P. v. Saul

In Hutton, the court held it was error for the ALJ to discredit his own step two findings that claimant had mild limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace when determining claimant's RFC.

Summary of this case from Laura M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

In Hutton, the ALJ determined at Step Two that the plaintiff's PTSD caused mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, but was nonsevere.

Summary of this case from Patricia C. v. Saul

In Hutton, the Ninth Circuit held that, in assessing the plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ could not disregard his own finding at step two that the plaintiff's mental impairment, although nonsevere, caused mild limitations in the areas of concentration, persistence, or pace.

Summary of this case from Janet G. v. Saul

admonishing ALJ for "disregard[ing]," at step four, the assessment of a mild limitation at step two

Summary of this case from Janet G. v. Saul

In Hutton v. Astrue, 491 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2012), the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant's PTSD caused mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, but was nonsevere.

Summary of this case from Aida I. v. Saul

In Hutton v. Astrue, 491 F. App'x 850 (9th Cir. 2012), the ALJ determined at step two that the claimant's PTSD caused mild limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, but was nonsevere.

Summary of this case from Kathleen S. v. Saul

Hutton v. Astrue

Summary

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2012

San Francisco, California

Hutton v. Astrue

Hutton v. Astrue

Case Details

Citations

Citing Cases

Hutton v. Astrue

Summary

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 18, 2012

San Francisco, California

Hutton v. Astrue

Hutton v. Astrue

Case Details

CitationsCopy Citation

Citing Cases

Citations