Summary
recommending § 1915(e) dismissal of claims "based on the patently frivolous and thoroughly discredited notion that [the plaintiff] has special status in the United States as a function of her association with some 'Moorish' group"
Summary of this case from Lindiment v. JonesOpinion
1:09CV711
04-17-2012
NOBLE CORNELIA HEMINGWAY-EL, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF HIGH POINT, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER AND
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Applications for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Docket Entries 1, 4), filed in conjunction with Plaintiff's pro se Complaint (Docket Entry 2). The Court will grant Plaintiff's request to proceed as a pauper for the limited purpose of recommending dismissal of this action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), as frivolous, for failing to state a claim, and/or due to Defendant's immunity.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
"The federal in forma pauperis statute, first enacted in 1892 [and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915], is intended to guarantee that no citizen shall be denied access to the courts 'solely because his poverty makes it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs.'" Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). "Dispensing with filing fees, however, [is] not without its problems. Parties proceeding under the statute d[o] not face the same financial constraints as ordinary litigants. In particular, litigants suing in forma pauperis d[o] not need to balance the prospects of successfully obtaining relief against the administrative costs of bringing suit." Nagy v. Federal Med. Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2004).
To address this concern, the in forma pauperis statute provides that "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that - . . . (B) the action or appeal - (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). As to the first of these grounds for dismissal, the United States Supreme Court has explained that "a complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "The word 'frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition. . . . The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim." Nagy, 376 F.3d at 256-57 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
Alternatively, a plaintiff "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii), when the complaint does not "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). This standard "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. In other words, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id.
Although the Supreme Court has reiterated that "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has "not read Erickson to undermine Twombly's requirement that a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions," Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying Twombly standard in dismissing pro se complaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("A pro se complaint . . . 'must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' But even a pro se complainant must plead 'factual matter' that permits the court to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, respectively)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2064 (2010).
The third ground for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) generally applies to situations in which doctrines established by the United States Constitution or at common law immunize governments and/or government personnel from liability for monetary damages. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (discussing sovereign immunity of states and state officials under Eleventh Amendment); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (describing interrelationship between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common-law immunity doctrines, such as judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial immunity); cf. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that, even where "damages are theoretically available under [certain] statutes . . ., in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy").
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's Complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to support any claim of wrongdoing by Defendant. (See Docket Entry 2.) In sum, Plaintiff appears to allege that police officers who encountered Plaintiff in High Point, North Carolina, should not have cited her for driving a vehicle without a proper license plate and registration and/or should not have asked her for her driver's license, based on the patently frivolous and thoroughly discredited notion that she has special status in the United States as a function of her association with some "Moorish" group. (See id.) This Court, per United States District Judge Thomas D. Schroeder, has aptly characterized proponents of such views as "scofflaws and ne'er-do-wells who attempt to benefit from the protections of federal and state law while simultaneously proclaiming their independence from and total lack of responsibility under those same laws." United States v. $7,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 583 F. Supp. 2d 725, 732 (M.D.N.C. 2008). Moreover, the Court consistently has denied plaintiffs permission to proceed as paupers in suits predicated on such principles. See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Durham, No. 1:10CV706, 2010 WL 3785538, at *2-3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 22, 2010) (Dixon, M.J.) (unpublished); El-Bey v. North Carolina Dep't of Health and Human Servs., No. 1:09CV693, 2010 WL 520877, at *2-3 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2010) (Sharp, M.J.) (unpublished). In sum, Plaintiffs' claims clearly warrant dismissal on grounds of frivolity, failure to state a claim, and/or Defendant's immunity.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's instant Applications requesting to proceed as a pauper (Docket Entries 1, 4) are GRANTED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE COURT TO CONSIDER A RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), as frivolous, for failing to state a claim, and due to the immunity of Defendant.
___________________________
L. Patrick Auld
United States Magistrate Judge