Opinion
C. A. 6:23-cv-05017-DCC-KFM
10-12-2023
Plantation at Haywood, Plaintiff, v. Timaya Jenkins, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
KEVIN F. MCDONALD, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The defendant, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, purportedly removed the present action from the Greenville County Magistrate Court, asserting a claim here that a federal question arises from an eviction action filed against her for non-payment of rent (doc. 1). The docket number for the state court action was Case No. 2023cv2311003748 (id.). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
ALLEGATIONS
This case arises from a state eviction action (2023cv2311003748) filed against the defendant by the plaintiff Plantation at Haywood (doc. 1) (hereinafter “the Eviction Action”). The defendant asserts that final judgment was entered against her in the Eviction Action on October 3, 2023 (id. at 1). On October 6, 2023, the defendant filed her notice of removal and appeal of the Eviction Action in this court (see doc. 1). It appears that the defendant alleges that the Eviction Action caused a breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 689n and that she should be provided legal title to the property in question (id).
APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
The defendant removed this action without prepayment of the filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a [party] who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the defendant's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction, however, does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them.” Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Removal Jurisdiction
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “a civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants.” The burden of demonstrating jurisdiction - and the propriety of removal, however, rests with the removing party. See Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 2004). In determining federal question jurisdiction, the complaint controls. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). As noted, it appears that the defendant purports to remove the Eviction Action to this court based upon Federal Question jurisdiction (see doc. 1). However, the defendant alleges that judgment was entered in the Eviction Action prior to the filing of this case (id. at 1). As such, it appears that this court cannot accept the defendant's purported removal because the Eviction Action is not currently pending. See Rome v. Everbank, C/A No. 2:13-cv-01819-CWH, 2013 WL 4505415, at *1, *10 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2013) (denying the plaintiff's purported removal of a state foreclosure action where final judgment had been entered in the state foreclosure action prior to the notice of removal).
Even presuming, arguendo, that the Eviction Action was pending at the time the defendant filed the notice of removal, remand of the matter would be appropriate based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) requires that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Here, the defendant's allegations in her notice of removal are unclear; however, it appears that she alleges federal question jurisdiction based on violations of the United States Code (doc. 1). However, the defendant cannot manufacture federal question jurisdiction in the present matter by referencing sections of the United States Code because the complaint in the Eviction Action, seeking a writ of ejectment for nonpayment of rent, did not reference the United States Code or other federal laws. See Gully v. First Nat' Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) (noting that the basis of federal question jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the state court complaint, and it cannot be supplied by reference to the answer or petition); In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 585 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that “actions in which [state court] defendants merely claim a substantive federal defense to a state-law claim do not raise a federal question” (internal citations omitted)). Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to accept removal from the state court to consider the defendant's claims because the Eviction Action terminated prior to the filing of the notice of removal as well as because the complaint in the Eviction Action for a writ of ejectment does not raise a federal question.
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Even treating the defendant's filing in this court as a separate civil action challenging the judgment entered in the Eviction Action, it would still be subject to dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional and may be raised by the Court sua sponte. Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself.” Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006). As noted above, on October 3, 2023, judgment was entered in the eviction action against the defendant (doc. 1). Greenville County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter 2023cv2311003748) (last visited October 12, 2023). In the instant matter, the defendant appears to request that the judgment be vacated and she be given legal title to the property
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine gets its name from two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court finding that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments where the district court is requested to review and reject those judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 4
in question (see generally doc. 1). It is well-settled, however, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues; instead, only the United States Supreme Court may review those state-court decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476-82 (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can be conducted only by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719 (explaining how the expansive interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)); see also Dukes v. Stone, C/A No. 3:08-cv-505-PMD-JRM, 2009 WL 398079, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (explaining that only the United States Supreme Court is empowered with appellate authority to reverse or modify a state court judgment).
The doctrine applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 892-93 & nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that a federal court must accord full faith and credit to a state court judgment); Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986). As such, because the defendant appears to seek an order from this court vacating the judgment entered in the Eviction Action, the instant action is subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Frivolous
Additionally, the undersigned notes that this matter is also subject to dismissal for frivolousness. See Feurtado v. McNair, C/A No. 3:05-cv-1933-SB, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2 (D.S.C. Jun. 15, 2006) (noting that frivolousness encompasses inarguable legal conclusions and fanciful factual allegations), aff'd, 227 Fed.Appx. 303 (4th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. dismissed, 553 U.S. 1029 (2008). Here, the defendant's contentions - that the Eviction Action was unlawful because she was “the equitable owner with rights of subrogation of the lease agreement for the” property in question (doc. 1 at 1) - are clearly frivolous, and they fail to show any arguable basis in fact or law. Feurtado, 2006 WL 1663792, at *2. Indeed, the defendant's assertions appear to be based on the notion that she has special status in the United States based on her status as a “Moorish American” - however, such allegations of a special status on this basis have been thoroughly discredited and noted as patently frivolous. See Hemingway-EL v. City of High Point, C/A No. 1:09-cv-00711, 2012 WL 1313312, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Apr. 17, 2012) (collecting cases rejecting claims based upon special status with a “Moorish group”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 1867113 (M.D. N.C. May 22, 2012). As such, in addition to the foregoing, this matter is also subject to dismissal as frivolous.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that this matter be dismissed without leave to amend and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 791 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). It is further recommended that the United States District Judge assigned to this case warn the plaintiff regarding the entry of sanctions in the future should the plaintiff continue to file frivolous litigation in this court. The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Room 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).