Opinion
1:22-CV-00105-SPB-RAL
12-02-2022
JIHAAD AMORE HARRISON, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY GEORGE LITTLE, LONNIE OLIVER, SCI-ALBION SUPERINTENDENT; SKINNER, SCI-ALBION CAPTAIN; S. A. SMITH, SCI-ALBION CORRECTIONS OFFICER; MS. KEENER, AREA COORDINATOR; PATRICIA THOMPSON, SCI-ALBION DEPUTY; CARL JONES, SCI ALBION; KURT SUESSER, CCPM; MAJ JASON ZILLMAN, CHCA; MIKE EDWARDS, HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATOR; DR. CRAIG RUSH, CHIEF PSYCHIATRIST; DR. SUSAN EVANS, C. GRIDDINGS, GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR; DHU KOHLER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; C/O CRUM, C.O. DANIEL NOLEN, SGT MALUK, DR. LUCAS, Defendants
Susan Paradise Baxter, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN RE: ECF NO. 51
Richard A. Lanzillo, Chief United States Magistrate Judge
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction be denied. ECF No. 51.
II. REPORT
A. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Jihaad Amore Harrison, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”), has filed a one-page, unverified motion for injunctive relief in which she alleges that she sent a request slip to the Defendants, asking: “What would you give me if I help you defeat Leonard Young QA-0396 in Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00327-RAL, you help me, I help you?” ECF No. 51. Shefurther alleges that on November 22, 2022, Defendants ordered prison officials to give this correspondence to Inmate Young, who Harrison asserts is the “leader of '52 Hoover Crips” and allowed Young to “place[] a $25,000 hit on [Harrison's] head.” Id. As relief, Harrison seeks an “immediate[] transfer . . . to either SCI-Benner or SCI-Mercer, due to money on her head and life in danger in other institutions.” Id.
Plaintiff has informed the Court that she identifies as female and uses the pronouns “she/her/hers.”
B. Legal Standard
The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). As the moving party, Harrison bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. Id.; Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated, as determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). Facts clearly supporting a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied are critical to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a “clear showing of irreparable injury.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief.
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are “in court” . . .'”. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Discussion
1. Harrison's motion is untethered to the allegations and claims of her Amended Complaint and should be denied on that basis.
The facts alleged in Harrison's motion do not relate to the claims asserted in her underlying Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint asserts that Defendants violated Harrison's constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to her medical and mental health needs, including denying her access to adequate care for gender dysmorphia; subjecting her to unconstitutional living conditions by confiscating certain hygienic items and denying her access to “female commissary items”; failing to protect her from other staff and inmates, who she asserts have threatened and bullied her due to her status as a transgender; denying her equal treatment and access to grievances; harassing her; and retaliating against her. ECF No. 49. For relief, Harrison seeks an injunction ordering Defendants to place her in protective custody, provide her with mental health treatment, and stop “bullying her;” as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Id. Harrison's current motion for injunctive relief is not tethered to facts alleged or claims asserted in the Amended Complaint and should be denied on that basis. See Angle v. Montag, 2022 WL 1156606, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022) (citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting injunctive relief where it “is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945))).
2. Harrison's allegations do not support a likelihood of success on the merits.
Even if the Court were to ignore the disconnect between Harrison's Amended Complaint and her current motion, the unverified allegations of the motion fail to support a plausible likelihood of success on the merits. While Harrison “need not prove [her] case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). This burden is “particularly heavy” where the requested injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief,” such as the transfer requested in the instant motion. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
Harrison's motion fails to proffer allegations sufficient to meet her heavy burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. Her motion posits that she is in danger because unspecified Defendants disclosed a letter she wrote to them offering to help defeat the claims asserted by Inmate Young in Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00327 (Action 327). Harrison and Young, as co-plaintiffs, commenced Action 327 in this Court on October 27, 2022.The complaint filed in Action 327 described Young as a “non-violent offender” and alleged that both Harrison and Young are transgender females who are being harassed and medically neglected in SCI-Albion. 1:22-cv-00327, ECF No. 1-1. Harrison now describes Young as the “leader of ‘52 Hoover Crips,'” and “a very aggressive and dangerous person.” ECF No 51. In reviewing submissions in this case and Action 327, the Court has noted that several appear to be in the same handwriting and that Harrison and Young appear to be collaborating with respect to their claims. Now, Harrison alleges that she wrote to Defendants to initiate negotiations to obtain unspecified benefits in exchange for her helping them to “defeat” Young's claims. She further alleges that unspecified Defendants disclosed the letter to Young, resulting in Young taking out “a $25,000 hit” on Harrison. The wildly varying and sometimes fantastical allegations that Harrison has asserted in this action and Action 327 create serious doubt regarding the plausibility of her present motion and indicate that Harrison may be contriving or manipulating her allegations and claims to achieve objectives other than vindication of any legal right. In addition, she has alleged no facts to support an inference that any Defendant has failed to act to address any threat to her safety. She has provided no evidence to support the fantastical allegations of her motion. See Young v. Medden, 241 Fed.Appx. 45, 47 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the denial of a temporary restraining order where prisoner provided no evidence, outside of his allegations, to support his claim of wrongdoing). These allegations are insufficient to show that Harrison is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims, particularly when they are viewed in the context of her other pleadings and submissions in this action and Action 327.
Young has since filed an amended complaint because the Court ordered the severance of her and Harrison's claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21. See ECF No. 12.
3. Harrison's allegations do not support a probability of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.
Harrison's allegations also fail to demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). As noted above, a party seeking injunctive relief bears a “particularly heavy” burden where she is seeking to alter (rather than preserve) the status quo. Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582. See also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.”). Thus, a request for mandatory injunctive relief, such as Harrison's demand for an immediate transfer, must be viewed with exacting scrutiny and extreme caution. Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *6.
Harrison has failed to meet her burden. She has failed to demonstrate that the risk of harm is imminent because she has not alleged any facts to support a finding that prison personnel are failing to take proper action to protect her from any actual or perceived threat. See Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence “that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury”) (emphasis in original). Harrison's recent motion requesting that the Court protect Young from retaliation (ECF No. 33), which she filed on October 30, 2022, further undermines any claim she faces imminent harm initiated by Young.
Harrison's failure to allege facts that support a likelihood of success on the merits and an imminent risk of irreparable harm is fatal to her motion. Therefore, it is recommended that Harrison's motion for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF No. 51) be denied.
III. CONLCUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Harrison's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 51) be denied.
IV. NOTICE
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).