Opinion
2:22-CV-01772-SPB-RAL
06-01-2023
BRYAN ANGLE II, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY LITTLE, SUPERINTENDENT ARMEL, DEPUTY WALKER, DEPUTY TREMPUS, CCPM HAWKINBERRY, MAJOR HAWKINBERRY, U.M. RIDDLE, CAPT WALKER, C.O. SHAW, C.O. FARRELL, SGT DOBISH, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
ECF NO. 25
RICHARD A. LANZILLO Chief United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Bryan Angle H's motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 25) be DENIED.
II. Report
A. Procedural Background and Plaintiffs Pending Motion
Plaintiff Brian Angle II (“Angle”) was formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI-Fayette”) and, following completion of his sentence of incarceration, is now detained at the Fayette County Prison (“FCP”). While incarcerated at SCI-Fayette, he initiated this pro se civil rights action in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County against Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, George Little, SCI-Fayette Superintendent Armel, and eight other employees at that correctional institution. See ECF Nos. 1-1,3. The Defendants removed the action to this Court. ECF No. 1. Angle's complaint alleges that the Defendants retaliated against him after they learned that he had filed injunction motions in his two other cases pending in this Court. Angle claims that Defendants' actions violated his “rights under the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania Constitution,” and he seeks “a permanent and emergency preliminary injunction forbidding any further retaliation and to release plaintiff from the R.H.U./gang unit,” declaratory relief, and monetary damages. Id.
Angle v. Montag, l:21-cv-252, which the Court closed on February 27, 2023, and Angle v. Smith, et al., l:22-cv-33.
Although Angle's request for injunctive relief in his complaint is distinct from the injunctive relief he requests in his present motion and is not presently at issue, the Court notes that his completion of his sentence and release from SCI-Fayette would appear to render that request moot.
In the instant motion, Angle explains that on April 11, 2023, he was released from SCI-Fayette and taken into the custody of Fayette County Sherriff. ECF No. 25, ¶¶ 1,2. Angle avers that upon his release from SCI-Fayette, “Defendant Shaw refused to allow [him] to take his property with him and lied to the shariffs [sic] to get them to not take his property.” Id., ¶ 3. He further alleges that “the D.O.C. will destroy [his] property on 5-11-23.” Id., ¶ 4. For relief, Angle seeks an order “bar[ring] the D.O.C. from destroying [his] property until a hearing can be held” on the motion. Id., ¶ 4.
In Defendants' May 19, 2023 response to the motion, they maintain that “SCI-Fayette did not destroy [Angle's] property,” which “consists of fourteen boxes (14) and one (1) typewriter,” and that the prison will “hold[] it pending the outcome of the instant Motion.” ECF No. 27, ¶ 6, 8. Defendants assert that “upon his release, [Angle] was offered the opportunity to send his property home and he refused,” even though they informed him that the “Fayette County Sheriff[] would not transport his property to the Fayette County Prison.” Id., 9, 10. Defendants further contend that they are no longer responsible for Angle's property; however, they are willing to ship it to him at his expense or store it for a reasonable period of time.
B. Standard of Review
As a matter of substance, the party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187,191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Angle bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the movant must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 616 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” ...'”. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Discussion
Because Angle's pending motion is based on factual allegations and a request for injunctive relief that are distinct from those raised in his Complaint, it does not support a likelihood of success on the merits of the claims asserted in this action. His Complaint alleges that the Defendants previously retaliated against him because he filed lawsuits and other injunction motions. His current motion is based on SCI-Fayette's routine practice of requiring an inmate to take his property with him or arrange for its transfer elsewhere upon the inmate's release. The crux of his motion is that Defendants allegedly prohibited him from taking his property to FCP and intend to destroy it. Because Angle's current motion for injunctive relief is not tethered to facts alleged or claims asserted in his Complaint, it should be denied. See Harrison v. Little, 2022 WL 18359018, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Harrision v. Little, 2023 WL 275985 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2023); Angle v. Montag, 2022 WL 1156606, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022) (citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122F.3d41,43 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting injunctive relief where it “is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945))).
To the extent Angle may allege that Defendants alleged conduct constitutes further acts of retaliation, the allegations relate to matters of routine prison administration concerning which the Court is loath to interject itself.
His allegations also fail to demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted” at this time. Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). He argues that injunctive relief is necessary because Defendants will destroy his property absent a court order. But in Defendants' response, they assert that they have his property and will continue storing it for him for a reasonable period of time. As such, Angle has failed to meet his burden for injunctive relief because he has also failed to show that he faces imminent harm.
Nevertheless, the undersigned recommends that Angle be given forty-five days to arrange for either the shipment or pick-up of his property. Angle must provide SCI-Fayette with the necessary details within this timeframe and pay the associated costs. If, after sixty days, Angle has not informed SCI-Fayette of his property arrangements or paid the expenses, the prison should be permitted to dispose of Angle's property in accordance with DOC policies and procedures.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Angle's motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 25) be denied.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).