Opinion
3:22-CV-00242-SPB
01-02-2024
SHAWN L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. CO II STEPHEN POBORSKY, CO 1 BRADLEY MORGAN JR., CO 11 C.A. NEYMAN, CAPTAIN JEREMY JONES, REBECCA REIFER, VINCENT DEFELICE, CO 11 JONES, CO 11 ELLIOT YOUNG, BETH RUDZIENSKI, FREDDY NUNEZ, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ECFNO. 40
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Shawn L. Williams's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction be DENIED. ECF No. 40.
IL Report
A. Procedural Background and Plaintiffs Pending Motion
Plaintiff Shawn L. Williams, an individual currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), initiated this pro se civil rights action against ten employees at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”): Unit Manager Defelice, Captain J. Jones, Sergeants Jones and Young, Grievance Coordinator Reifer, Hearing Examiners Nunez and Rudzienski, and Corrections Officers Poborsky, Morgan, and Neyman (collectively, “Defendants”). The Complaint alleges that the Defendants harassed and retaliated against Williams in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania tort law and seeks injunctive and monetary relief. See ECF No. 15.
On June 16, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss some of the claims of the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 29. Williams's brief in opposition to the motion was due on July 28, 2023. See ECF No. 31. On November 3, the Clerk of the Court received Williams's Notice of Change of Address advising the Court of his transfer to SCl-Brenner. See ECF No. 37. That day, Williams also moved for a copy of the docket, which the Court granted on November 6, 2023. See ECF Nos. 36, 38. When the Court had not received Williams's opposition brief on December 27, 2023, it issued an order to show cause and extended the deadline for the filing of the brief to January 9, 2024. See ECF No. 44. As of the issuance of this Report and Recommendation, Williams has not filed his opposition brief.
Pending before the Court is Williams' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Defendants “and their successors in office, agents, and employees and other persons acting in concert and participating with them” “to ensure that [he] be free from interference with court access.” ECF Nos. 40, 41. Williams submitted a declaration (ECF No. 41) and brief (ECF No. 42) in support of his motion. In his declaration, Williams explains that he transferred from SCI-Houtzdale to SCI-Benner on October 10, 2023, and that four “record center boxes” consisting entirely of his “legal product and materials” arrived eight days later. Id., ¶¶ 5, 8. The SCI-Benner property room officer “permitted [Williams] to keep only one” of these boxes in his cell and “advised [him] that the Facility Manager/Designee may permit an inmate extra storage boxes for legal materials for active cases.” Id., ¶¶ 9, 10. Later that day, Williams submitted a DC-135A Request to Facility Manager Bradley Booher “citing [his] active case numbers and requesting approval to retain the three (3) record center boxes of legal materials.” Id., ¶ 11. On October 24, Williams received a denial of this request from the Superintendent's Assistant, Holly Quist. He submitted a second DC-135A Request to Booher that day. That same day, it was returned unanswered. The next day, he submitted a third DC-135A Request to the Superintendent's Assistant Ms. Burd. Ms. Quist denied this request on October 30. About two weeks later, Williams “personally addressed [his] concerns” to Booher and Quist. Id., ¶ 19. In response, they “denied any knowledge of the issue but claimed that they would look into the matter.” Id.
Williams further asserts that on November 4, 2023, he filed a grievance against “property room officer ‘Donnelley', ‘Sgt. Koleno', ‘Bradley Booher', ‘Holly Quist', and ‘Deputy Superintendent Curtis Grice' for frustrating and impeding [his] access to the court, obstructing [his] ability to effectively litigate [his] active court cases, and lawsuits and post-sentence appeals.” Id., ¶ 16. About two weeks later, “Lt. Berry entered an Initial Review Response to [the grievance] which falsely alleged that” Williams had characterized his lawsuits as inactive. Id., ¶ 22. The next day, November 21, SCI-Benner Deputy Superintendent Grice allegedly admitted to Williams “that SCI-Benner prison officials usually do not approve extra storage boxes for inmates with active lawsuits against [DOC] employees.” Id., ¶ 22. Nine days later, Ms. Quist issued Williams a Memo “acknowledging] his ‘two active' court cases” and permitting him to keep one of the three additional box of materials. Id., ¶ 26. Williams now possesses his “court filings, transcripts, notes of testimony, and notes prepared by [him] self,” but not “legal reference materials, books, or photocopied cases needed to litigate [his] two active cases.” Id., ¶27.
B. Standard of Review
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed under the same standard. The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court should issue the injunction only if the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 192 (citing ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The facts clearly must support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a “clear showing of irreparable injury.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief.
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiffs confinement simply because they are “in court” .. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D, Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Discussion
Williams' pending motion is based on factual allegations and a request for relief that are wholly distinct from those raised in his Complaint. The Complaint avers that SCI-Houtzdale prison officials previously retaliated against him by subjecting him to cruel and unusual conditions of confinement, acting with deliberate indifference to his health and safety, issuing him false misconducts, denying him due process at his disciplinary misconduct hearings, and harassing him. All conduct challenged in the Complaint occurred at SCI-Houtzdale and was allegedly committed by personnel at that institution. In contrast, Williams' motion for injunctive relief is based on the actions of personnel at SCI-Benner and the DOC's requirement that inmates obtain permission from the prison facility manager to possess more than the approved number of personal property boxes in their cell. The crux of the instant motion is that SCI-Benner prison officials' approval of only one additional property box, as opposed to all three, impairs his ability to prosecute this and one other lawsuit. Because the factual basis for and relief requested in Williams' motion are distinct from the claims asserted and relief requested in his Complaint, the motion provides no basis for the entry of a TRO or preliminary injunction. See Harrison v. Little, 2022 WL 18359018, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2022), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Harrision v. Little, 2023 WL 275985 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2023); Angle v. Montag, 2022 WL 1156606, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022) (citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting injunctive relief where it “is not of the same character, and deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit”) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945))). Moreover, the Court cannot enter a TRO or preliminary injunction “against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.” Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 117 (1897) (“The decree is also objectionable because it enjoins persons not parties to the suit.”)); see also Angle v. Montag, 2022 WL 1156606, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022) (quoting Marshall v. Sobina, 2014 WL 4437705, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2014) (denying prisoner's motion for preliminary injunction against non-parties; citing cases) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2))). There is no basis upon which the Court can find that the Defendants in this action are responsible for Williams' property dispute with SCI-Benner personnel or that they can provide the relief he seeks in his motion.
III. Conclusion
Because Williams' motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 40) is not tethered to facts alleged or claims asserted in his Complaint and does not request relief against any Defendant in this action, it should be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).