Opinion
No. CV 02-0282415S
November 25, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#111)
Defendants Daniel Park and Hong Kun Park have moved to strike the seventh and eighth counts of the complaint, which seek double or triple damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The seventh count of the complaint alleges that the plaintiff's personal injuries and property damage were proximately caused by Daniel Park's reckless disregard of General Statutes §§ 14-218a, 14-222(a), and 14-230 while operating his vehicle. The eighth count seeks to impose vicarious multiple liability under General Statutes § 14-295 on defendant Hong Kun Park, who owned the vehicle being driven by Daniel Park, on the theory that the driver "was operating said vehicle with the express permission of the vehicle's owner, . . . as her duly authorized agent, servant and/or employee or pursuant to the family car doctrine." The motion to strike raises two specific claims: that the complaint does not allege a sufficient factual basis to support a recklessness claim and that a non-operator cannot be held vicariously liable for alleged recklessness of an operator. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike the seventh count of the complaint is denied, and to strike the eighth count is granted.
The purpose of a motion to strike is to test the legal sufficiency of an opponent's claim. "Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any . . . cross claim, or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39(a). In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576. 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). In reviewing the challenged allegation, the court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 260 Conn. 59, 64-65, 793 A.2d 1048 (2002).
This court has previously addressed the specificity of factual allegations necessary to invoke multiple liability. See Schwartz v. Kobelski, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 01-0086062S (November 22, 2002), holding that a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a violation of Section 14-295 by alleging its statutory elements. The complaint here alleges that on December 5, 2001, defendants Charu Sharma and Daniel Park were driving separate motor vehicles westbound at an excessive rate of speed on Route 243 at near the intersection of that road with Johnston Road in Woodbridge. It further alleges that their vehicles were weaving in and out of the lane of travel in an attempt to pass each other, that Sharma lost control of her vehicle, which then spun violently into an oncoming lane of eastbound traffic, collided head-on with a vehicle driven by plaintiff, thereby causing personal injuries to the plaintiff for which she seeks to recover in this action. Those allegations, along with the allegations of deliberate or reckless violation of §§ 14-218a. 14-222(a), and 14-230, plead a sufficient factual basis in the seventh count for a claim of multiple damages under § 14-295.
Since that decision is not presently included in the data base of unreported Superior Court decisions available at «http://www.loislaw.com», a courtesy copy is attached.
The eighth count of the complaint raises the question whether a non-owner may be held be vicariously liable for multiple damages under the family or business car statutes, §§ 52-182 and 52-183. Recognizing that the common law restricted vicarious liability for punitive damages and that statutes in derogation of common law "should receive a strict construction and [should not] be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in . . . scope by the mechanics of construction;" (quotations omitted) Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Company, 232 Conn. 559, 581, 657 A.2d 212 (1995); the trial bench has wrestled with how to construe these statutes. Without binding appellate authority on this question, well-reasoned opinions both support and reject vicarious multiple liability under these statutes. In joining this debate, the court need not also consider the validity of the Public Act 03-154, as both the method of statutory interpretation mandated therein and by the Supreme Court in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577, 816 A.2d 562 (2003), yield the same result.
The recent decision of Pirro v. Berardi, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV01-0165815S (Alvord, J., October 3, 2003) ( 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 541), aptly summarizes the conflicting analyses of the trial bench: "There is a division of opinion amongst the judges of the Superior Court as to whether a plaintiff may recover multiple damages from a defendant owner who is alleged to be vicariously liable for the operator's reckless conduct pursuant to § 14-295. The first line of cases, representing the minority view, holds that §§ 14-295, 52-182 and/or 52-183 do not contain language allowing for an expansion of the common-law restraint on the imposition of multiple damages upon a nonoperator owner for the reckless conduct of the defendant operator. See Clark v. Gallup, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. 074117 (June 13, 2001, Sferrazza, J.) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 655); Little v. Bonesse, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 427368 (July 5, 2000, Levin, J.) ( 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 458); Lyte v. Kane, Superior Court, judicial district of Milford at Milford, Docket No. 063138 (August 25, 1998, Flynn, J.) ( 23 Conn. L. Rptr. 136); Marin v. Plaskawicki, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 313690 (December 8, 1994, Maiocco, J.) ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 174). The majority view, on the other hand, holds that multiple damages under § 14-295 may be assessed against the nonoperator owner as a result of the defendant operator's violation of one or mere of the motor vehicle statutes. See Bostick v. Dvornek, [Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV 01-0383575 (December 13, 2001, Gallagher, J.)]; Shields v. Labriola, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 504276 (November 9, 2001, Kremski, J.) ( 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 697); Santillo v. Arredono, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 442323 (March 21, 2001, Blue, J.) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 458); McCarthy v. Yantorno, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. 78474 (August 18, 1999, Sheedy, J.) ( 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 377); Sullivan v. Skully, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury, Docket No. 125823 (March 20, 1998, Espinosa, J.) ( 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 550); Rubbo v. Rubbo, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 130961 (May 22, 1997, Pellegrino, J.) ( 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 547); Prezioso v. Greater Bridgeport 11004 Transit Authority, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport. Docket No. 333757 (December 24, 1997, Skolnick, J.) ( 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 274); Coman v. Mannix; No. 065645 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Foley J.) 2002 Ct. Sup. 4790 (31 Conn. L. Rptr. 680)."
Section 52-182 of the general statutes, the "family car statute," provides that:
[p]roof that the operator of a motor vehicle . . . was the husband, wife, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle, was being operated as a family car . . . within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.
Nothing in the language of the statute imposes or even implies imposing multiple liability on a vehicle owner. As noted by Wright and FitzGerald, Connecticut Law of Torts 2nd edition, p. 122-23. the statute codifies a common-law rule.
There is no basis in the history of the statute or its prior construction by the courts to graft the multiple liability of § 14-295 onto the family car doctrine. Connecticut first adopted the family car doctrine in Wolf v. Sulik, 93 Conn. 431, 106 A. 443 (1919), where the court held that a general vehicle agency statute enacted in 1905 encompassed the family car doctrine. That statute subjected owners to vicarious liability only for actual damages. After the legislature repealed the 1905 statute in 1921, the court adopted the family car doctrine as a matter of common law in Stickney v. Epstein, 100 Conn. 170, 123 A. 1 (1923). The Supreme Court expressly noted four years later that the family car doctrine was "a logical outgrowth of the common law principle of respondeat superior;" O'Keefe v. Fitzgerald, 406 Conn. 294, 137 A. 858 (1927). The 1925 act imposing liability on owners or lessors for damages caused by a rented or leased vehicle, on the other hand, statutorily extends liability beyond the contours of the common law, as the court noted in both Marshall v. Fenton, 107 Conn. 728, 731, 142 A. 403 (1928) and Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 192 Conn. 280, 472 A.2d 306 (1984). In 1929, the legislature added language to the 1925 statute making the owner or lessor of a rented vehicle "liable to the same extent as the operator." This year, the legislature passed legislation limiting vicarious liability for owners or lessors of rented vehicles to actual damages and expressly precluding their liability under § 14-295. See Public Act 03-250, effective for causes of action accruing after October 1, 2003.
1905 Conn. Pub. Acts. ch. 216, § 4, codified as Section 1572 of the General Statutes, provided as follows: "It the owner of any horse or other animal, or of any vehicle, shall entrust such animal or vehicle to his agent, bailee, servant or employee, to be ridden, led, driven or operated by such agent, bailee, servant or employee upon the public highways, or shall rent or loan the same to an incompetent and inexperienced person to be thus ridden, led, driven or operated, and such agent, bailee, servant or employee, while in the performance of such owner's business within the scope of his authority, or such incompetent or inexperienced person, as a result of such incompetency and inexperience, shall, by neglecting to conform to any provision of sections 1568 or 1569, cause any injury to the person or property of another, such owner shall pay to the party injured his actual damages and costs; but in every case the party injured shall elect whether he shall proceed against such owner under the provisions of this section or against the person actually causing such injury under the provisions of section 1573."
1921 Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 334.
Nor is there any language in or judicial construction of other statutes that would justify reading multiple liability into § 52-182. The family car statute was enacted in 1931, and Section 52-183 of the general statutes, the business car statute. in 1935. Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court noted the similarity in language of the statutes and construed the two together. Koops v. Gregg, 130 Conn. 185, 187, 32 A.2d 53 (1943). Section 52-183 provides that
1931 Conn. Pub. Acts, ch. 292.
General Statutes § 1661c (1935 Supp.)
in any civil action brought against the owner of a motor vehicle to recover damages for the negligent or reckless operation of the motor vehicle, the operator, if he is other than the owner of the motor vehicle, shall be presumed to be the agent and servant of the owner of the motor vehicle and operating it in the course of his employment. The defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption.
Some courts have read the reference in § 52-183 to "reckless operation of a motor vehicle" as indicating that the legislature intended to impose multiple various liability for recklessness under this statute. See, e.g., Santillo v. Arredono, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 442323 (March 21, 2001, Blue, J.) ( 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 458) ("The legislative reference to damages for recklessness in § 52-183 can reasonably be read as encompassing double or treble damages imposed under § 14-295.") This court does not agree. At common law there was no vicarious liability for reckless conduct. Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 37, 42 A. 67 (1899). Section 52-183 merely negates that common law rule; had the legislature intended farther to impose multiple damages as well, § 14-295 and its predecessors show that it knew how to do so in more express terms.
In Santillo v. Arredono, the court construed footnote four in Gionfriddo to bootstrap vicairous liability under § 14-154a and multiple vicarious liability that the Santillo court found in § 52-183 onto § 52-182. In that footnote, the Gionfriddo court opined that "[w]e have been able to discern no reason of policy . . . to distinguish between the liability of owners and of lessors." Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., supra, 192 Conn. 288. Yet the recent amendment to § 14-154a eliminating multiple liability of owners and lessors of rented or lease vehicles because of reckless operation by others counsels against reading multiple liability into §§ 52-182 and 183 solely to harmonize the statute with other laws. There is no improper inconsistency in a legislative scheme imposing multiple damages for reckless driving on those in the business of renting or leasing vehicles and not on other owners.
This court thus concludes that neither the text of §§ 52-182 and 52-183 nor their construction by our appellate courts, their history or their relationship to the common law give any reason to impose liability beyond the statutory language. Nor does the relationship of the family or business car statutes to other laws require such. These statutes allow the plaintiff here to seek double or treble damages against the allegedly active wrongdoers, here the defendants Daniel Park and Charu Sharma, both as a punishment for their allegedly reckless conduct and to promote the public policy of safe driving. This court agrees, however, with those courts that find no basis in law or policy to impose such a penalty on those who did not engage in the reckless conduct.
For the reasons stated herein, the motion to strike the seventh count of the complaint is DENIIED, and to strike the eighth count is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT
STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT