Summary
In DeGradi v. Coney Island Medical Group, P.C., 172 A.D.2d 582, leave denied, 78 N.Y.2d 860, a case cited by the defendants, the Second Department found that the subject affiliation agreement clearly characterized the private medical group doctors providing medical services to NYCHHC's Coney Island Hospital as employees of NYCHHC and therefore entitled to the benefits of an abbreviated statute of limitations period.
Summary of this case from Copeland v. WittigOpinion
April 8, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Levine, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to amend their answer so as to interpose the affirmative defense of the Statute of Limitations. It is well settled that leave to serve an amended answer should be freely granted "unless the amendment sought is palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law or unless prejudice or surprise directly results from delay in serving such amendment" (Barnes v. County of Nassau, 108 A.D.2d 50, 52; see also, Fahey v. County of Ontario, 44 N.Y.2d 934). In the instant case, the plaintiff failed to establish that any prejudice or surprise would result from the granting of the proposed amendment. The mere fact that the proposed amendment may defeat the plaintiff's cause of action is an insufficient basis for denying leave to amend (see, Burack v. Burack, 122 A.D.2d 101, 103).
Moreover, upon amendment of the answer, the defendants were further entitled to dismissal of the complaint. By the terms of the affiliation agreement between Coney Island Medical Group (hereinafter CIMG) and the Health and Hospitals Corporation of the City of New York (hereinafter HHC), it is clear that CIMG, as well as the doctors who service Coney Island Hospital, must be characterized as employees of HHC (see, General Municipal Law § 50-k [e]). Therefore, they are entitled to the benefits of the abbreviated statutory period of limitation set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-i (see, Norr v. Spiegler, 53 N.Y.2d 661, 663, affg 72 A.D.2d 20; Derlicka v. Leo, 281 N.Y. 266; see generally, Urraro v. Green, 106 A.D.2d 567; Albano v. Hawkins, 82 A.D.2d 871). As the plaintiff failed to commence his action within the abbreviated statutory period of one year and 90 days, the action is time-barred (see, General Municipal Law § 50-i). Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, Balletta and Ritter, JJ., concur.