OPINION

JESSE FRANKL, CHAIRMAN.

The respondents seek to dismiss the present appeal because claimant failed to file her Petition for Review within ten days as provided by General Statutes Sec. 31-301(a). The Commissioner at Large acting for the First District issued a Finding and Order for the respondents on July 15, 1991. The claimant's Petition for Review, however, was not filed until July 31, 1991, the sixteenth day following the Finding and Order.

The timeliness of the claimant's appeal implicates our subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Johnston v. ARA Services, Inc., 7 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 19, 765 CRD-7-88-8 (1989). In response to the respondents' motion to dismiss, the claimant submitted an affidavit from her attorney's receptionist explaining the receptionist's practice to promptly date stamp all mail received in the attorney's office. The affidavit further indicates that the July 15, 1991 Finding and Order was date stamped and received by the claimant's attorney on July 23, 1991. The claimant contends that because notice of the challenged decision was not received until July 23, 1991, she had ten days from the date of receipt, that is, until August 2, 1991, to file her appeal. We do not agree.

In Trinkley v. Ella Grasso Regional Center, 220 Conn. 739 (1992), our Supreme Court addressed the issue of calculating timeliness of an appeal from a commissioner's decision. The Trinkley court noted that the determination that an appeal untimely cannot be made on the basis of the date of decision alone. Rather, in dismissing an appeal, this Board must consider when notice of the decision was received by the appellant. Id., 743. Nowhere in Trinkley, however, did the Court state that an appealing party is entitled in all circumstances to a ten-day appeal period commencing from the date of notice.

The rules set forth in Trinkley have long been part of our jurisdictional jurisprudence. In Murphy v. Elms Hotel, 104 Conn. 351 (1926), relied on by the Trinkley court, our Supreme Court concluded that although the Workers' Compensation Act specifies that an appeal should be taken within ten days after entry of a commissioner's award, "the General Assembly intended this provision to mean ten days after notice to the party of the entry of such findings; otherwise, in the event of the failure of the commissioner to notify the party of his finding and award within the ten-day period, the taking of the appeal would be fruitless." (Emphasis added.) Id., 352.

Neither Murphy nor Trinkley, however, required that a party has ten days to appeal from receipt of notice where the party receives notice of the commissioner's award within the original ten-day appeal period. Consequently, we have interpreted Murphy narrowly to save a late appeal filed within ten days after notice of the commissioner's award only where the party did not receive notice of the decision within the ten days of the entry of the award. Thus, in Stevens v. City of Hartford, 8 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 134, 831 CRD-1-89-2 (1990), we did not rely on the date of entry of the commissioner's award where notice if award was received after the ten-day period commencing with the entry of the award. Similarly, in Paccadolmi v. Town of Newtown, 10 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev Op. 116, 117, n. 1, 1270 CRD-4-91-8 (1992), the only post-Trinkley case permitting an appeal filed more than ten days after the date of the commissioners' decision, the claimant did not receive the decision within the original ten-day appeal period and thereafter properly filed his appeal within ten days of when he received the commissioner's ruling. By contrast, in Corona v. Uniroyal Chemical, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 105, 987 CRD-5-90-3 (1991), we dismissed an appeal filed more than ten days after entry of the commissioner's award but filed within ten days of receipt of the decision by the appellant where the appellant had received the commissioner's award ruling the during the original ten-day appeal period. Accord Shaskus v. Structural Accessories, Inc., 9 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 197, 1061 CRD-5-90-6 (1991).

Moreover, such an interpretation of Sec. 31-301(a) is consistent with rationale articulated in Murphy v. Elms Hotel, supra, and which the rationale process concerns articulated in Kron v. Thelen, 178 Conn. 189, 193-97 (1979) both of which were relied on by the court in Trinkley. In Kron, the plaintiff did not receive notice of the action of the Probate Court approving an accounting until after the thirty-day statutory appeal period had expired. Id, 190. The Kron court was concerned that the right of appeal would be rendered meaningless by strict adherence to the thirty-day appeal period under the circumstances presented in that case. Id., 193; see also Murphy v. Elms Hotel, supra. Thus, the Kron plaintiff's appeal was timely because it was filed within thirty days after she became aware of the Probate Court's decree.

Significantly, the Kron court noted that had the plaintiff been properly informed that the Probate Court had issued its decree on June 6 when she made inquiry to the court on June 27, she could have thereafter taken a timely appeal. Kron v. Thelen, supra: 197. Thus, according to Kron, where notice is delayed but received within the appeal period, the plaintiff's right to appeal would not have been defeated or rendered meaningless by the use of the original deadline. Consequently, the Kron court's concern with "[f]undamental tenets of due process . . . [which] require that all persons directly concerned in the result of an adjudication be given reasonable notice and the opportunity to present their claims or defenses"; id., 193; is not implicated where the appellant received the notice of the decision within the original appeal period and is therefore able to take the necessary steps to file an appeal within that timeframe. See Hubbard v. Planning Commission, 151 Conn. 269, 272-73 (1963).

In the present case, the claimant asserts that she did not receive notice of the commissioner's July 15 decision until eight days later on July 23. Notwithstanding this delay the claimant has not suggested any reason why she could not have still filed a timely appeal during the remaining days of the original ten-day appeal period. We do not believe that such a requirement would have been unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Since the claimant received notice of the commissioner's July 15 decision within the original ten-day appeal period, she had until July 25 to timely file her appeal. Corona v. Uniroyal Chemical, Inc., supra. Her failure to do so deprived us of jurisdiction over this appeal. Id.

As the appeal is dismissible for late filing, we need not consider any other issues raised. We, therefore, dismiss the claimant's appeal.

Commissioner's Angelo L. dos Santos and Donald H. Doyle, Jr. concur.