Opinion
2:23-cv-00236-BHH-MGB
05-22-2023
Marlin Elrico Coffy, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Officer Michael S. Hannon, Jr., #692; PFC Kevin Dani Herbst, #681; Sgt. Robert Blaschke, #665; FTO Douglas Richards, #717; and PFC Ditrrich, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Marlin Elrico Coffy, Sr. (“Plaintiff”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purported violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the Amended Complaint be summarily dismissed in part and stayed in part, pending the outcome of Plaintiff's ongoing state court proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action challenging his recent arrest at the Walmart Supercenter located at 3000 Proprietors Place in Mount Pleasant, South Carolina.After reviewing the initial Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his claims were subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (See Dkt. No. 8.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the identified pleading deficiencies by filing an amended complaint with the Court within twenty-one days. Although Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint within the time permitted by the order, the undersigned afforded him another opportunity to comply with the instructions and extended his deadline in an abundance of caution. (Dkt. No. 15.) Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. No. 17) and, shortly thereafter, an Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 18). The undersigned granted Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 20) and the Amended Complaint is now before the Court on initial review.
The undersigned takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's underlying criminal proceedings pending before the Charleston County Court of General Sessions. See https://www.sccourts.org/casesearch/ (last visited May 19, 2023) (entering Case No. 2021A1010203440); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same).
In granting Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (Dkt. No. 17), the undersigned noted that-despite the label-the filing read more like a pleading and thus should be treated as part of the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 18). (See Dkt. No. 20 at 1.) Accordingly, any further references to the Amended Complaint herein shall encompass both Dkt. Nos. 17 and 18.
According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was racially profiled as a shoplifter by Walmart loss prevention employees on or around June 27, 2021, and subsequently framed for armed robbery by officers with the Mount Pleasant Police Department. (Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) Plaintiff maintains that he paid for his items before exiting the store and did not have a weapon on his person at any point during his visit. (Id. at 2-3.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that Officers Hannon, Herbst, Blaschke, Richards, and Ditrrich (collectively, “Defendants”) conspired against him to effectuate the arrest.
Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants arrested him despite receiving confirmation from Walmart employees that “nothing was taken from the store by [Plaintiff]” and reviewing video footage that verified Plaintiff “committed no crime.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants ultimately resorted to using tools found in his car--which he claims were in the vehicle before he arrived at the Walmart-to manufacture evidence that would satisfy the elements of an armed robbery charge. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants intentionally omitted from their arrest reports any mention of the money that was apparently found on his person at the time of his arrest so that he would appear “as a broke black man who intended to go to Wal-mart to commit a crime.” (Id.)
Based on the above, the Amended Complaint raises claims of false arrest and denial of equal protection under the law in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively. (Id. at 2; see also Dkt. No. 17 at 1-2.) With respect to relief, Plaintiff asks that the Court dismiss the armed robbery charge pending against him before the Charleston County Court of General Sessions; award him monetary damages; and order the return of his tools and vehicle, which apparently remain in police custody as evidence in his criminal proceedings. (Id. at 4.) This is the extent of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Amended Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also id. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”).
DISCUSSION
As stated above, the Amended Complaint alleges claims of false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment and denial of equal protection under the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, both of which fall under the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed in part and stayed in part.
The undersigned notes that the Amended Complaint also includes a single, isolated reference to the Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments in the first sentence of the pleading. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) The allegations in the Amended Complaint, however, do not address-or even allude to-any such causes of action, and a mere reference to these federal violations simply does not state an actionable claim for purposes of Rule 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016) (finding complaint's “vague references to [pro se] Plaintiff's rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim”), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017); Windham v. Graham, No. 9:08-cv-1935-PMD-GCK, 2008 WL 3833789, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (noting that “a complaint is insufficient where it simply expounds a collection of legal buzzwords but fails to make any factual allegations against the defendants”). To be sure, the Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985). To that end, this Court is neither inclined nor empowered to transform itself into an advocate on Plaintiff's behalf and construct “full blown claims” from his solitary reference to certain amendments in the introduction of the Amended Complaint. See id. at 1278. Thus, the undersigned finds that to the extent Plaintiff intended to bring causes of action under the Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and/or Fifteenth Amendments, those claims are subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
At the outset, Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are barred under the Younger abstention doctrine, which states that federal courts should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); see also Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021) (“What lies behind Younger is the premise that state courts are capable of adequately protecting constitutional rights.”). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
In the instant case, the first criterion is met because Plaintiff is plainly involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Boyd v. South Carolina, No. 1:11-cv-2981-TMC-SVH, 2012 WL 786341, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2012) (noting the first prong of the abstention test is satisfied where the plaintiff “is currently awaiting trial in an ongoing state criminal proceeding”), adopted, 2012 WL 786356 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2012). The second criterion is also met, as the Supreme Court has explained that “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986); see also Scott v. Davis, No. 4:17-cv-3036-RBH, 2018 WL 1663404, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 6, 2018) (rejecting plaintiff's claims because, “[b]y alleging that his arrest and warrants were invalid, Plaintiff [was] effectively asking [the] Court to intervene in a pending state criminal matter”). And finally, the third criterion is satisfied because Plaintiff can address his claims in his pending criminal proceedings. See Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 904 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that “ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights”) (internal citations omitted). Because Plaintiff's case meets all three criteria for abstention under Younger, federal relief is available under § 1983 only if “special circumstances” justify the provision of federal review. Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220, 224-26 (5th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not reflect the type of extreme misconduct or extraordinary circumstances that would warrant federal interference in a pending state criminal case. While “special circumstances” lacks any precise, technical meaning, courts have essentially looked to whether procedures exist which would protect a plaintiff's constitutional rights without pretrial intervention; thus, where a threat to the plaintiff's rights may be remedied by an assertion of an appropriate defense in state court, no special circumstance is shown. See Askins v. Dir. of Florence Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 9:20-cv-2846-DCC-MHC, 2020 WL 7001015, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 3, 2020) (referencing Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 449 (3d Cir. 1975)), adopted, 2020 WL 6110960 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2020). Further, where the right may be adequately preserved by orderly post-trial relief, special circumstances are likewise nonexistent. Id.
Here, Plaintiff can pursue his constitutional claims in state court both during and after trial; consequently, he fails to demonstrate any “special circumstances” or irreparable injury if denied the requested equitable relief here. See, e.g., Yerby v. Summerville Police Dep't, No. 2:22-cv-4175-BHH-MGB, 2023 WL 2666648, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2023) (dismissing false arrest claim pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine because plaintiff had ability to raise claims regarding his arrest and accuracy of the related police reports before the state court handling his criminal proceedings), adopted, 2023 WL 2666582 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2023); Bailey v. Marsh, No. 5:09-cv-180-F, 2009 WL 1705610, at *3 (E.D. N.C. June 11, 2009) (finding that plaintiff was not foreclosed from raising claims during the pendency of his state criminal case regarding state officials' purported perjury in obtaining the warrant that led to arrest). Accordingly, as the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 8 at 3), any claims seeking injunctive relief and intervention in his state criminal proceedings are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine at this time.
With respect to Plaintiff's claims for damages, Younger and its progeny generally require courts to stay, rather than abstain and dismiss, suits for monetary relief where the same issues are pending before a state court. Stewart v. Beaufort Cty., 481 F.Supp.2d 483, 494-96 (D.S.C. 2007); see also Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that “a federal court is not precluded, in the exercise of its discretion, from staying proceedings in the action before it pending a decision by the state court, with a view to avoiding wasteful duplication of judicial resources and having the benefit of the state court's views”) (internal citations omitted). This approach “ensures that a federal plaintiff who is unable to pursue damages in the parallel state proceedings can return to federal court and reassert his claim for damages without being time-barred.” Stewart, 481 F.Supp.2d at 494 (referencing Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1998)). Nonetheless, dismissal is still “appropriate when a plaintiff's damages are ‘plainly barred' for other reasons.” Pilgrim v. Delaney, No. 7:20-cv-2325-DCC, 2021 WL 274301, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2021) (referencing Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Turning first to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim, allegations of false arrest are typically analyzed as unreasonable seizures. See Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that claims of false arrest “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”). To establish false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must show that the officer arrested him without probable cause. Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002). In other words, “[t]he Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
The undersigned notes that Plaintiff also seems to use the term “false incrimination” in relation to his Fourth Amendment protections. To be clear, “false incrimination” does not reflect a proper cause of action; rather, Plaintiff appears to be conflating the term and/or using it interchangeably with “false arrest.” The undersigned therefore does not construe “false incrimination” as a cause of action here.
It is well-established that “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Staggs v. Spartanburg Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:22-cv-3852-HMH-JDA, 2022 WL 17742423, at *6 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2022) (referencing Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012)), adopted, 2022 WL 17741327 (D.S.C. Dec. 16, 2022); see also Jordan v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:22-cv-3521-DCN-SVH, 2022 WL 13840029, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (explaining that a grand jury indictment is affirmative evidence of probable cause sufficient to defeat claims for false arrest under § 1983). However, a grand jury's decision to indict will not necessarily shield a police officer “who deliberately supplied misleading information that influenced the decision.” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 356-57 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 369 n.8 (2017) (explaining that if an indictment “is tainted . . . by fabricated evidence[,] and the result is that probable cause is lacking, then the ensuing pretrial detention violates the confined person's Fourth Amendment rights”). To contravene the Constitution, “the false statements or omissions must be ‘material,' that is, necessary to the finding of probable cause.” See Massey, 759 F.3d at 357 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the Amended Complaint asserts that Walmart employees ultimately confirmed that Plaintiff did not take anything from the store, and that the video footage reviewed by Defendants showed the same. (See Dkt. No. 18 at 2.) Nevertheless, Defendants still arrested Plaintiff, apparently relying on tools found in his car-which he claims to have owned-to generate evidence in support of the armed robbery charge. (See id. at 2-3.) Without this allegedly fabricated evidence, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants would be unable to satisfy the elements of an armed robbery charge as prescribed under South Carolina law. (Id. at 3-4.) Construing these allegations liberally, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a material falsity for purposes of his Fourth Amendment claim and therefore recommends that the Court stay this claim pending the resolution of Plaintiff's state criminal proceedings.
This Report and Recommendation makes no determinations regarding the potential success or merits of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. Rather, the undersigned addresses only whether Plaintiff's claim meets the most minimal pleading standard required in a pro se action.
Turning to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Therefore, “[t]o succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 252 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to satisfy each of these requirements in order to state a cognizable equal protection claim.”).
In support of his equal protection claim, Plaintiff seems to suggest that Defendants purposely omitted from their police reports the money that he was carrying at the time of his arrest due to his race: “Had it been another race, [Plaintiff] believes police would have implemented the money [he] had on his person in their reports. This is proof of racial profiling and raises an equal protection claim. . . .” (Dkt. No. 17 at 1-2.) As the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 8 at 5), such speculative, conclusory assertions do not demonstrate that Defendants' purported actions “were tainted by any race-based motivations” or that Plaintiff was “treated differently from similarly-situated white suspects.” Waller v. City of Danville, 212 Fed.Appx. 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (explaining that “bald allegations” are insufficient to state a claim to relief under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting that a plaintiff must allege more than “labels and conclusions”).
Because Plaintiff's bald allegations fall short of an equal protection violation, the undersigned finds that his Fourteenth Amendment damages claim is subject to summary dismissal.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned RE COMMENDS that the Court STAY Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim for monetary damages pending the outcome of his state criminal proceedings and summarily DISMISS all remaining claims without further leave to amend, as he has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).