Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-03852-HMH-JDA
11-30-2022
James Staggs, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Detention Center, Spartanburg County, Sheriff Chuck Wright, Lt. Gillespie, Srgnt. Bishop, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
James Staggs (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the above-named Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the undersigned concludes that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court complaint form. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated November 9, 2022, the Court notified Plaintiff that, upon screening in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 8.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff might be able to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. [Id. at 13.] Plaintiff was also notified that “an amended complaint replaces all prior complaints and should be complete in itself.” [Id. at 14.] Further, Plaintiff was warned that if he “fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified [in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal.” [Id.] Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which was entered on the docket on November 28, 2022. [Doc. 11.]
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Amended Complaint. The allegations in the Amended Complaint are nearly identical to those contained in his original Complaint. Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. [Id. at 2, 4.] Plaintiff contends Defendants have violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, under a United Nations Treaty, and under various state and federal statutes, codes, and regulations. [Id. at 5.]
Plaintiff is being detained on multiple pending charges each of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, drug crimes, and firearms crimes in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2022) (search by Plaintiff's first and last name); see also Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The key contention in the Amended Complaint, like the original Complaint, is that Plaintiff is being subjected to harsh conditions in violation of his constitutional rights because of overcrowding in his cell. [Id. at 6.] Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the Spartanburg County Detention Center
is a vehicle through which the city government's local municipality of Spartanburg, South Carolina, uses to fill much more over the maximum capacity, quadruple celling four men in a “bathroom” cell that's only made for two.[Id.] Plaintiff contends he is forced to live in “cramped cell conditions result[ing] from facility rules creating an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the inmate's mental health.” [Id.] Plaintiff contends that Spartanburg County is conspiring with government officials to deprive him of guaranteed constitutional protections. [Id. at 7.] He contends that Sheriff Chuck Wright is ultimately responsible for the jail conditions because of his subordinates' “bias against undesirables” who punish inmates “by too close confinement of mentally ill [inmates] undergoing improper psych services” and that inmates are in lockdown “20+ hours” each day. [Id.] Finally, he contends that Lt. Gillespie “inflicts injury . . . with prejudicial disciplinary measures aimed at harassing and intimidating undesireables.” [Id. at 8.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that his constitutional rights have been violated, that he is in lockdown 20 hours a day, depriving him of sufficient access to “case law study,” that he is being denied legal representation, and that he is housed in a “quadruple” cell, which measures 7.3 feet by 11.3 feet, for a total square footage of approximately 83 square feet. [Id. at 10.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $2,100 for each day since March 23, 2021. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove her case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, for the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Defendants entitled to dismissal
As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that certain Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action for the reasons below.
Spartanburg County Detention Center
It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Spartanburg County Detention Center is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a ‘person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, vacated in part on other grounds by 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”); Williams v. Dorchester Cnty. Det. Ctr., 987 F.Supp.2d 690, 696 (D.S.C. 2013); Morrison v. Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Likewise, as noted, buildings and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Accordingly, the Spartanburg County Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Spartanburg County
Spartanburg County is also entitled to summary dismissal. Municipalities and other local governmental units cannot be sued on a respondeat superior theory for the unconstitutional acts of their employees. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). However, local governing bodies, including counties, are “persons” that can be sued directly under § 1983 when alleged unconstitutional action executes governmental policy or custom. Id. To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the county's policies caused the constitutional violation. McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997). A municipality is responsible only when the execution of its policy or custom-made by its lawmakers or individuals whose acts “may fairly be said to represent official policy”-inflicts injury. Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1385 (4th Cir. 1987). When the alleged constitutional deprivation is not an official act of a municipality, relief under § 1983 must be sought against the officer in his individual capacity. Hughes v. Blankenship, 672 F.2d 403, 405-06 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiff's claims against Spartanburg County are subject to summary dismissal because he has not identified any governmental policy or custom to demonstrate municipal liability.
Defendants Wright and Gillespie
Additionally, Defendants Wright and Gillespie are subject to summary dismissal from this action because Plaintiff provides no specific factual allegations against these Defendants to assert a plausible claim for relief under § 1983. Weller, 901 F.2d at 397 (noting dismissal is proper where there were no allegations against defendants); Gibson v. Foster, No. 5:17-cv-01333-JMC-KDW, 2017 WL 7355301, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 7, 2017) (finding summary dismissal proper where “the Complaint contains no allegations of wrongdoing by th[e] Defendant”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 690060 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2018). “Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.” Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014). Plaintiff appears to sue these two Defendants based on their supervisory positions over the jail. However, as noted, a claim under § 1983 cannot be premised on a theory of supervisory liability. Therefore, these Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal from this action.
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal. Additionally, Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal because he has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible.
Conditions of Confinement Claim
The crux of this action appears to be claims regarding the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have subjected him to overcrowded conditions at the jail by placing him in a small cell with three other inmates.
A pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement claim is evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Unlike convicted inmates, pretrial detainees have not been adjudicated guilty of a crime and may not be subjected to any form of “punishment.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir.1988). In any event, “[t]he due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Id. at 870. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Under the Eighth Amendment, protection against cruel and unusual punishment includes protection against inhumane conditions of imprisonment. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff is a prisoner in a county detention center, not a guest in a hotel, and it should be expected that conditions in such a setting are often less than ideal. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (“[T]he fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.'”); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir.1988) (“Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.”). As to Plaintiff's claim regarding four prisoners assigned to one cell measuring approximately 7.3 by 11.3 [Doc. 1 at 9], the Fourth Circuit has noted that confinement in a 7 by 9 cell of three total prisoners, while unpleasant, did not reach a constitutional magnitude of cruel and unusual punishment. Crowe v. Leeke, 540 F.2d 740, 742 (4th Cir. 1976). Instead, to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the overcrowding combined with other substandard conditions of confinement had “a mutually enforcing effect that produce[d] the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise,” or that the overcrowding created an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health, and that the defendants deliberately disregarded that risk. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993).
Here, Plaintiff has only made conclusory allegations regarding overcrowding and has failed to allege facts showing that any conditions of overcrowding have created an unreasonable risk of harm to his health or that Defendants deliberately disregarded that risk. See Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251, 1986 WL 18030, at *3 (4th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision) (noting that it is “well settled” that overcrowding of prisons, including double or triple celling, does not necessarily violate the Constitution); Jenkins v. Cannon, No. 0:09-cv-283-TLW-PJG, 2009 WL 3233484, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2009) (finding the plaintiff failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim where “seven men are in a cell made for four men, which is not quite double capacity” because “[t]he complaint does not allege any deprivations of food, medical care, or sanitation due to the overcrowding”). In sum, Plaintiff “has failed to show that the overcrowding or cramped cell conditions resulted from prison rules which can be characterized as ‘vindictive, cruel, or inhuman' or that the overcrowding resulted from an ‘arbitrary or capricious' exercise of judgment by prison officials.” Ross v. Russell, No. 7:20-cv-000774, 2022 WL 767093, at *16 (W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting Crowe, 540 F.2d at 742).
Access to Legal Materials
Next, liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert a claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights under the First Amendment by denying him access to legal materials. Plaintiff makes a number of vague allegations that the undersigned construes as asserting a claim for access to legal materials. For example, Plaintiff asserts that he has been denied “sufficient access to ‘mobile' kiosk case law study, denying ‘competent attorney representation.'” [Doc. 11 at 10.] However, any claim concerning access to legal materials is subject to dismissal for the reasons below.
“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit has unambiguously held that local jails, designed for temporary detainment, are generally not required to have a law library. See Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing applicability of Bounds, 430 U.S. 817, to pretrial detainees).
Here, Plaintiff is being temporarily held in a county detention center awaiting trial on criminal charges. The law is clear that those being temporarily detained in county facilities awaiting criminal trials do not have a constitutional right to a law library, and so Plaintiff's claim therefore fails as a matter of law. Jones v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., 586 F.Supp.2d 444, 448 (D.S.C. 2008). A careful review of the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint shows that his contentions do not raise a plausible federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because there is no constitutional right to a law library in a local, short-term detention facility. Furthermore, Plaintiff has made no allegations of any real injury and/or prejudice that Plaintiff suffered or is likely to suffer as a result of the alleged inadequate access to legal materials while in pretrial detention. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (explaining a plaintiff must allege actual injury resulting from allegedly inadequate jail library in order to state a claim under § 1983). In the absence of an alleged actual injury and prejudice to a constitutional right resulting from Plaintiff's lack of access to legal materials, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants on which this Court may grant relief. See, e.g., Payne v. Lucas, No. 6:11-cv-01767-DCN, 2012 WL 988137, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988133 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012); Crawford v. Nash, No. 4:08-cv-4092-GRA-TER, 2009 WL 580348, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2009). Plaintiff simply alleges that he has been denied adequate time to access legal materials, but he fails to allege any specific facts as to how any legal matter has been adversely affected beyond making bald assertions and conclusory allegations. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim.
Unconstitutional Detention
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is challenging the legality of his detention, he has failed to state a claim for relief. As noted, Plaintiff seeks money damages for the amount of time spent in pretrial detention. Further, some of his other allegations, though not clear, seem to suggest he is challenging the legality of his detention.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at *4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charges, including dismissal of those charges, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971); Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is challenging his detention on Fourth Amendment grounds such as claims of false imprisonment or malicious prosecution, any such claim fails because Plaintiff has been indicted on the numerous charges pending against him. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause.”); Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” (cleaned up)); Provet v. S.C., No. 6:07-cv-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (explaining § 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded based on the filing of an indictment).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that, where the district court has already afforded a litigant with an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to either afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order.” Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 Fed.Appx. 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2020). As noted above, Plaintiff was previously advised of material defects in his Complaint, but he has failed to cure those defects despite being given the opportunity to do so.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).