Opinion
126 MDA 2023 J-S27042-23
02-24-2025
DARREN EUGENE CLEVER, JR. Appellant v. KENNA VICTORIA CLEVER
Appeal from the Order Entered January 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Civil Division at No(s): 2020-01964
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION
BOWES, J. [*]
Darren Eugene Clever, Jr. ("Husband") appeals from the order that granted the petition for special relief filed by Kenna Victoria Clever ("Wife"). We reverse.
Husband and Wife were divorced on November 10, 2020, after each filed an affidavit of consent. Neither party raised ancillary claims such as equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets, which included two Cardigan Welsh Corgi dogs named Bentley and Bailey. Nor did they divide the marital property through a settlement agreement. Bentley and Bailey remained with Husband in the marital residence after Wife left.
Under Pennsylvania law, all dogs are personal property. See 3 P.S. § 459-601(a).
More than a year and a half later, Wife filed a petition for special relief seeking partition of the dogs pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3507 (discussed in full infra). The trial court initially denied Wife's petition by order of August 5, 2022, but granted her motion for reconsideration. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court vacated its August 5, 2022 order and afforded the parties time to decide how they wished to sell the dogs. On January 17, 2023, having received no indication that there was an agreement on the partition process, the trial court issued an order granting Wife's petition and directing the sale of Bentley and Bailey at auction or by consignment with a reputable breeder.
Husband filed a timely notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. He also filed, and the court granted, a motion to stay the January 17, 2023 order. Husband presents the following questions for our consideration:
1. Whether the granting of a divorce under Pennsylvania law terminates a divorced party's right to seek possession and ownership of property or other relief that was not addressed by either a marital settlement agreement or an order of court during the divorce case?
2. Whether 23 Pa.C.S. § 3507 applies to personal property that was owned by the parties as marital property during the parties' marriage but was not addressed in equitable distribution proceedings during the parties' divorce proceedings?
3. Whether the [trial court] erred as a matter of law by finding that the personal property that was owned as marital property . . . should be sold pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3507(a)?
Husband's brief at 4 (cleaned up).
We begin by observing that, since partition is an equitable proceeding, we may not reverse the trial court's decision unless we discern an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. See Marchetti v. Karpowich, 667 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa.Super. 1995)). The interpretation and construction of the statute is a question of law to which we apply de novo, plenary review, affording no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See, e.g., Bold v. Dep't of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 320 A.3d 1185, 1191 (Pa. 2024).
As we find it dispositive, we turn to Husband's claim that the legislative intent of § 3507 was to permit partition post-divorce of real estate that had been held as entireties property, and not to allow post-divorce litigation of personal property that was acquired during the marriage. That statute provides:
(a) General rule.--Whenever married persons holding property as tenants by entireties are divorced, they shall, except as otherwise provided by an order made under this chapter, thereafter hold the property as tenants in common of equal one-half shares in value, and either of them may bring an action against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them.
(b) Division of proceeds.--Except as provided in subsection (c), the proceeds of a sale under this section, after the payment of the expenses of sale, shall be equally divided between the parties.
(c) Liens.--The amount of any lien entered of record jointly against both of the parties, together with any interest due on the lien and docket costs, shall be deducted from the proceeds of sale and the amount of the liens entered of record against either of the parties, together with any interest due on the liens and docket costs, shall be deducted from the share of the party against whom
the lien is filed and paid to the person or persons to whom the amount of the lien is due and payable.
(d) Record of divorce decree.--No decree of divorce shall be effective to change the existing law relating to liens upon property held by tenants by the entireties except a decree of divorce that is valid in this Commonwealth and not until the decree of divorce or a certified copy of the decree is recorded in the office of the recorder of deeds of the county where the property is situate. The decree shall be indexed in the grantor's index against each of the tenants by the entireties.23 Pa.C.S. § 3507.
By its terms, § 3507 applies only to property held by the spouses during the marriage as tenants by the entireties. This form of ownership of a piece of property "requires a legally binding marriage plus the satisfaction of all four unities." In re Estate of Rivera, 194 A.3d 579, 586 (Pa.Super. 2018). We have explained those unities as follows:
Unity of time requires that the interests of the tenants vest at the same time. Unity of title requires the tenants to have obtained their title by the same instrument. Unity of possession requires the tenants to have an undivided interest in the whole estate. Unity of interest requires the tenants to have estates in the property of the same type, duration and amount.Id. (cleaned up). "If one of the unities is lacking, then, by common law, there can be no joint tenancy or entirety." Jones v. McGreevy, 270 A.3d 1, 15 n.18 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).
In some instances, a judicially-created presumption of a tenancy by the entireties applies. Most notably, it is well-settled that "[t]he placing of the property in [the names of both spouses], without more, creates an estate by the entireties." In re Holmes' Estate, 200 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1964). Indeed, "[w]here property or an account is placed in the names of a husband and wife, . . . the creation of an estate by the entireties is presumed[.]" Id. However, where the property is held in the name of only one spouse, a tenancy by the entireties is not established, by presumption or otherwise. See, e.g., Gilliland v. Gilliland, 751 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding that entireties property was not established where wife assumed that her name would be included on the deed to a marital property because she co-signed for the mortgage, but only husband's name was on the deed).
These "same principles apply whether real estate, personal property[,] or stocks and securities are involved." Id. Our High Court elucidated:
Many types of personalty have been held as subjects of tenancies by entirety. [Cases so deciding included] the personal estate of a deceased daughter passing to her parents; a bond and mortgage; letters of credit purchased by the husband in the name of himself and his wife[;] a bank deposit in the name of husband and wife . . . . In [another case], a similar status was given certificates of deposit in the names of husband and wife. Various other types of obligations and securities have been held to be the subject of tenancies by the entireties[, such as] mortgage trust certificates; bonds and mortgages; building and loan stock.Madden v. Gosztonyi Sav. & Tr. Co., 200 A. 624, 628-29 (Pa. 1938) (citations omitted).
Additionally, as we discuss in greater detail below, during the waning days of title-based post-divorce property division, our Supreme Court extended the presumption to household goods such as furniture, appliances, and kitchen utensils, the acquisition of which was "generally made without specifying whose funds are used and/or who holds title," to enable a dependent spouse to seek partition of such goods rather than forfeit them all to the spouse whose earnings paid for the goods. See DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 179 n.14 (Pa. 1975).
Turning to the case sub judice, the trial court concluded that § 3507(a) entitled Wife to partition of Bailey and Bentley because Husband failed to rebut the legal presumption that property held by married persons is held as tenants by the entireties. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/23, at 5 (citing Jones, 270 A.3d at 15 n.18). Since it was undisputed that Bailey and Bentley were marital property that was not otherwise disposed of through the Divorce Code, the court held that Wife was entitled to bring a partition action to have the dogs sold and the proceeds divided between her and Husband. Id.
The trial court acknowledged that Husband made "a compelling argument" that its "interpretation of § 3507 is inconsistent with § 3503," which provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a decree or judgment is granted which nullifies or absolutely terminates the bonds of matrimony, all property rights which are dependent upon the marital relation, except those which are vested rights, are terminated unless the court expressly provides otherwise in its decree. All duties, rights and claims accruing to either of the parties at any time theretofore in pursuance of the marriage shall cease[.]23 Pa.C.S. § 3503. The court further recognized that its decision that any and all marital property was subject to partition "could be the harbinger of doom for the 'finality' of past and future divorce cases," as "[i]t does not take much imagination to foresee a petition filed under § 3507, years after the entry of a divorce decree, seeking partition of a lamp, book, or other relatively innocuous personal property that was not addressed by the divorce court through equitable distribution." Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/23, at 5. Nonetheless, it determined that the language of the statute left it with no other option than to order what it plainly viewed as an unreasonable outcome. Id. at 6.
We agree with the trial court's assessment of the repercussions of its ruling. However, we conclude that its interpretation and application of § 3507 is neither mandated nor permitted under the law. Rather, we hold that the trial court misapprehended and misapplied the governing law by conflating the concepts of "marital property" and "personal property" with "entireties property" and "household goods," respectively.
The Dissent acknowledges that "marital property is not de facto entireties property." Dissenting Opinion at 2 n.2. Nonetheless, it then proceeds to treat the two as coterminous.
We begin our explanation for this conclusion with a bit of history. "Prior to enactment of the Divorce Code [of 1980], property could be distributed to [divorcing] parties only on the basis of actual ownership, as established by title to individual assets." 17 West's Pa. Prac., Family Law § 22:1 (8th ed.). In other words, the husband took his separate property, the wife took hers, and what property was owned together as tenants by the entireties was divided equally between them pursuant to the predecessor to § 3507. See 68 P.S. §§ 501, 503 (repealed) (providing that property held by the entireties was converted to a tenancy in common subject to partition and satisfaction of liens held against either of the parties). However, in the absence of titled property, household goods, generally paid for by the husband, were deemed to belong to him. See, e.g., In re Chadwick's Estate, 35 A.2d 582, 583 (Pa.Super. 1944) ("In general where husband and wife live in the same house, ownership of personal property in possession of both is presumed to be in the husband.").
Before the adoption of the Married Persons' Property Act of 1848, a woman's property, be it owned by her prior to the marriage or acquired during the marriage, became her husband's property under the common law concept of marital unity, i.e., a merger of identities under the control of the husband. See, e.g., Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859, 861-62 (Pa. 1981).
Under the common law, property held by the entireties remained entireties property even after a divorce. See Mertz v. Mertz, 11 A.2d 514, 515 (Pa.Super. 1940) ("Real estate held by tenants by entireties prior to [a 1927 enactment] is not a subject of partition although the parties are subsequently divorced."). Our legislature amended the law in 1949 to automatically convert the property to a tenancy in common, making it subject to partition and encumbrance by a creditor of only one spouse. See 68 P.S. §§ 501, 503 (repealed).
The result of this title-based division of assets meant that, at the end of a long-term marriage, "a dependent spouse sometimes received no assets in a divorce proceeding if the economically-superior spouse controlled title to all of the real estate and retirement interests." Mark A. Momjian & Catherine M. McFadden, The 40th Anniversary of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code of 1980, 91 Pa. B.A. Q. 55, 57 (2020). Rather, "[a]limony and counsel fees/expenses were the only economic claims available to the dependent spouse." Id. at 57 n.15.
This state of affairs, allowing only title-based property division following fault-based divorce, "remained virtually unchanged from 1785 until enactment of the Divorce Code of 1980." 17 West's Pa. Prac., Family Law § 8:3 (8th ed.). The 1980 enactment "revolutionized the law of divorce in Pennsylvania by introducing three remedial concepts: no-fault divorce, equitable distribution of marital property, and alimony following divorce." Id. at § 8:4. The main impetus of the new legal framework was to address "[t]he fact that, in a property settlement, a financially disadvantaged spouse was not entitled to a share of any assets held in the other spouse's name." Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 469 A.2d 987, 991 (Pa. 1983). Indeed, "[t]he expressed purpose of the divorce law became remedial rather than punitive, to mitigate the harm to parties and their children[,] and to effectuate economic justice rather than the vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs." 17 West's Pa. Prac., Family Law § 8:4 (cleaned up).
Pursuant to the new Divorce Code, including amendments, "[a]ll real or personal property acquired by either party during the marriage is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the parties in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common or tenancy by the entirety." 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(b). In a divorce action, either party can request the court to "equitably divide, distribute or assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital property between the parties" as it deems just upon considering a host of factors, such as the length of the marriage, the present economic circumstances of the parties, and the future income and capital asset opportunities of each party. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a). Once a divorce terminates a marriage:
[A]ll property rights which are dependent upon the marital relation, except those which are vested rights, are terminated unless the court expressly provides otherwise in its decree. All duties, rights and claims accruing to either of the parties at any time theretofore in pursuance of the marriage shall cease, and the parties shall severally be at liberty to marry again as if they had never been married.23 Pa.C.S. § 3503.
Despite the availability of equitable distribution to allocate entireties property along with all other marital property, our legislature retained a provision for the post-divorce partition of property held as tenants by the entireties in the event that such division did not occur. As noted, the current version of that statute provides:
Whenever married persons holding property as tenants by entireties are divorced, they shall, except as otherwise provided by an order made under this chapter, thereafter hold the property as tenants in common of equal one-half shares in value, and either of them may bring an action against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them.23 Pa.C.S. § 3507(a).
Before the enactment of the Divorce Code of 1980, the effect of divorce upon property held by the entireties was governed by Chapter 13 of the Real and Personal Property Code. See 68 P.S. §§ 501-504 (repealed). By 1990, all of these entireties provisions of the Property Code were repealed, and § 3507 was enacted into the Domestic Relations Code to replace them. Former § 501 was materially the same as § 3507(a). See 68 P.S. § 501 (repealed) ("Whenever any husband and wife, hereafter acquiring property as tenants by entireties, shall be divorced, they shall thereafter hold such property as tenants in common of equal one-half shares in value and either of them may bring suit against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them."). Section 503 provided details concerning liens and the divisions of partition proceeds, topics now covered by § 3507(b).
In sum, before 1980, the title under which property was held during a marriage wholly determined how it was distributed upon divorce. Since 1980, the timing of the property's acquisition, not its title, became the pertinent consideration, and the court was tasked with dividing all property acquired during the marriage in a manner that achieved economic justice if either party so requested. However, if a property that had been held by the parties as tenants by the entireties was not disposed of by a court order directing its distribution, the divorce ipso facto converted it into a tenancy in common to which the former spouses were entitled to equal shares after recorded liens were satisfied.
Mindful of this legal framework, we turn to the facts of the instant case. Wife sought, pursuant to § 3507, to partition Bentley and Bailey as entireties property that had not been disposed of by an order entered pursuant to the Divorce Code. "[A]s the proponent claiming the existence of these unpartitioned properties of the entireties," Wife "had the burden of proving what properties were subject to partition." Winpenny v. Winpenny, 442 A.2d 778, 781 (Pa.Super. 1982).
In her petition for special relief, Wife averred that: the parties were married in 2011; they acquired the property at issue in 2018 and 2019, respectively; they were divorced by decree of November 10, 2020; ownership of the property was not addressed in the divorce action; and Husband had possession of the dogs. See Petition, 5/26/22, at ¶¶ 3-10. Wife then baldly alleged that, "because the dogs were acquired during the marriage, they were owned by the parties as tenants by the entireties." Id. at ¶ 11 (some capitalization altered). Husband responded by largely admitting the facts but denying that the dogs were entireties property. Instead, he asserted that they were personal marital property to which Wife relinquished any claim by not requesting equitable distribution. See Amended Answer, 7/22/22, at ¶¶ 10-12.
The trial court initially agreed with Husband, denying Wife's petition on the basis that she lost the right to litigate ownership of the dogs by failing to raise economic claims before the divorce became final. See Order, 8/5/22. Wife filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that she did not seek equitable distribution of the dogs, but their partition pursuant to § 3507 now that they had been converted from entireties property to property owned as tenants in common by that statute. See Motion for Reconsideration, 8/18/22, at 2-3. The trial court granted the motion and allowed Husband time to file a response. Therein, Husband argued as follows:
[T]enancy by the entireties is a form of co-ownership that exists only between husband and wife and is presumed to exist whenever property is held in their joint names. It is characterized by the four unities of interest, title, time, and possession. Real estate and vehicles are property that have titles. Dogs and other items of personal property do not have titles or certificates. [Wife] is requesting that the ownership of the dogs be characterized in a manner which is only applicable to items that hold titles, such as real estate.Answer to Motion for Reconsideration, 9/15/22, at ¶ 20 (emphasis added).
The trial court then held a hearing on the issue. Wife's position was that "the law is very clear" that "property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed to be tenants by the entirety and it is the party who is claiming that it is not who has the burden to prove it is not and the burden is by clear and convincing evidence." N.T. Hearing, 12/2/22, at 29. In other words, Wife suggested that all marital property was held as entireties property unless it is proven otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court accepted Wife's position. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/23, at 4-6; N.T. Hearing, 12/2/22, at 64.
In so ruling, the trial court misapprehended the law by conflating marital property with entireties property. "The presumption that all property coming into the marriage is matrimonial property is not equivalent to the creation of entireties property, which requires that the property be acquired in joint names of husband and wife." Fratangelo v. Fratangelo, 520 A.2d 1195, 1201 (Pa.Super. 1987) (emphases added). Rather, our Supreme Court has established that a presumption that property acquired by a married couple is entireties property arises when the "property or an account is placed in the names of a husband and wife. . . . The placing of the property in both names, without more, creates an estate by the entireties." Holmes' Estate, 200 A.2d at 747 (citations omitted, emphases added). Where the documentation of the property interest does not include both spouse's names, there is no presumption that the property is entireties property, even if its acquisition renders it what the Divorce Code of 1980 characterizes as marital property. See, e.g., Jones, 270 A.3d at 15 ("Given the documentation in the record establishing that the checking account was an individual account titled in [husband's] name only, and [the creditors'] failure to produce any evidence to the contrary, we determine there is no presumption that [husband's] opening of the account created an estate by the entireties.").
Perhaps the confusion is attributable to the language used in more recent opinions which recount this area of the law. For example, in Jones v. McGreevy, 270 A.3d 1 (Pa.Super. 2022), we indicated that the import of our Supreme Court's Holmes' Estate decision was that there is a presumption that "husbands and wives take property as tenants by the entireties unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." Jones, 270 A.3d at 14 (cleaned up). However, what Holmes' Estate actually specified was that the presumption arises "[w]here property or an account is placed in the names of a husband and wife[.]" In re Holmes' Estate, 200 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1964) (emphasis added). Likewise, in Johnson v. Johnson, 908 A.2d 290 (Pa.Super. 2006), this Court cited Constitution Bank v. Olson, 620 A.2d 1146 (Pa.Super. 1993), for the proposition that, "in this Commonwealth, a presumption exists that property held by a husband and wife is held by the entireties[.]" Johnson, 908 A.2d at 296. Yet Olson did not suggest that the "holding" in question was merely having the property in the marital household, but instead quoted Holmes' Estate to reiterate that it is the holding of the property in the names of both husband and wife that triggers the presumption. See Olson, 620 A.2d at 1150 (quoting Holmes's Estate, 200 A.2d at 747).
In this vein, at the reconsideration hearing, Wife testified that, for the years 2020 through 2022, the dogs "were licensed to me," not held in the name of both spouses. See N.T. Hearing, 12/2/22, at 21. She also repeatedly referred to Bentley and Bailey as "my dogs," and insisted that she and Husband had an agreement that she would get her dogs back after she completed her military training. Id. at 11, 12, 15. On cross-examination, Husband's counsel questioned Wife about title to the dogs as follows:
Q. Okay. So you are here today that you're asking that this court do a division of the dogs as property that is being held in tenants by the entirety?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay. And do you have any documentation saying these dogs are held as tenants by the entirety?
A. I'm not sure what documents you're asking for.
Q. Well, I'm not sure either but I'm --- I don't know of any but that's why I'm asking you.
Do you own or are you in possession or have knowledge of any documents that say Bentley and Bailey are held by [Husband] and [Wife] as tenants by the entirety?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. You'e not sure if you have any such documents?
A. I'm not sure what documents that you would be looking for. I'm sorry. I don't understand the question.
I'm here today because I obviously feel that way but I'm not sure what you're asking.
. . . .
THE COURT: . . . Ma'am, you need to answer the question. Although, you tried to answer. The question bluntly is, do you have any documents stating that you and [Husband] own the dogs as tenants by the entirety?
THE WITNESS: Not specifically by tenants by the entirety but we do have documentation that shows that we are both owners.
THE COURT: Can you explain what that is?
THE WITNESS: So there are vet records that do have both of our names on them and the registration is registered to our --what was our marital address.
Q. Now, the vet records you have understand that that is what the vet records may say back when the two of you were together. Have you checked with the vet since then to see if the records still say that?
A. I certainly have.
Q. Okay. Do you have them?
A. I do not.Id. at 28-39.
For his part, Husband proffered evidence that the dogs were held in his name, as both the Franklin County dog licenses and the American Kennel Club registrations listed him as the dogs' sole owner. See Husband's Exhibits 1-3. Husband further pointed to the record evidence that Wife, in her verified waiver of notice of intention to file the praecipe to transmit the record to the court for the entry of the divorce decree, acknowledged that she "may lose rights concerning alimony, equitable division of property, lawyer's fees, costs and expenses, or other important rights if [she did] not claim them before a divorce is granted." Waiver of Notice, 11/9/20, at ¶ 3.
The American Kennel Club registration for Bailey, issued on July 14, 2020, predated the parties' November 10, 2020 divorce decree. Bentley's certificate was issued on November 25, 2020, and the licenses were for 2022. The certified record contains no other documentation about the dogs' ownership.
From our review of the certified record, we perceive that Wife failed to meet her burden of establishing the applicability of the partition statute by either triggering the presumption that the dogs were entireties properties or by establishing the requisite unities. First, Wife offered no documentation to show that she and Husband acquired the dogs in both their names by the same instrument. Nor did she establish that the dogs were held in both of their names at any point during the marriage. On the contrary, the only evidence in the certified record of how the dogs were held pointed to either Wife or Husband listing themselves as the sole owner. Hence, Wife failed to establish either that the presumption that the dogs were entireties property applied or the existence of the requisite unities. Accord Jones, 270 A.3d at 16 (holding trust was not entireties property because the wife "failed to provide any evidence that she was vested an interest in the trust at the same time and by the same document as [husband]"); Estate of Rivera, 194 A.3d at 587 (holding husband was not entitled to a share of properties that were not in his name but transferred by wife during her lifetime, as no deeds or agreements of sale established that they were entireties property).
Second, even if Bailey and Bentley are deemed to be within the "household goods" category of personal property along with plates, rugs, and end tables for purposes of DiFlorido's presumption, we conclude that the Divorce Code of 1980 abrogated the DiFlorido Court's effort to inject equity into the division of property upon divorce prior to legislative action to modernize Pennsylvania divorce law. See 17 West's Pa. Prac., Family Law § 22:1 (citing the DiFlorido decision as one of Pennsylvania courts' "relatively minor incursions upon the title standard in the years immediately prior to the enactment of the Divorce Code").
We are cognizant that in Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230 (Pa.Super. 2002), this Court indicated that a husband, in attempting to enforce a marital settlement agreement that recognized the wife's ownership of a dog which the parties had adopted from the SPCA but allowed him to have visitation, was "seeking an arrangement analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule for a table or a lamp." Id. at 232. Ultimately, we ruled that the agreement in question, to the extent that it established a custody schedule for the dog, was unenforceable, as 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502 gave the court authority to distribute property, not award custody, and § 3504 furnished the parties with full freedom of disposition of their separate property after the divorce. Id. at 232-33. Perhaps this ruling was why Wife in this case filed a petition to partition the dogs rather than one to enforce the oral agreement that she suggested had existed concerning the dogs' custody. See N.T. Hearing, 12/2/22, at 27-28 (indicating that the parties had an oral agreement about the dogs that she was not asking the court to address).
As we observed in Lohmiller v. Weidenbaugh, 448 A.2d 583 (Pa. Super. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 469 A.2d 578 (Pa. 1983), the purpose of 68 P.S. § 501, the predecessor to § 3507, was "to provide for a ready, uncomplicated method for achieving some sense of economic justice upon dissolution of a marriage." Id. at 586. Our legislature, after the repeal of § 501, put in its place the present scheme for the equitable distribution of all marital property, "whether title is held individually or by the parties in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common or tenancy by the entirety." 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(b). Therefore, unlike the parties in DiFlorido, or in any of the cases decided before the effective date of the 1980 divorce law, Wife had every opportunity to seek equitable distribution of the parties' marital property in connection with the divorce proceedings rather than seeking a partition after the divorce was final. Instead, Wife knowingly surrendered that right. See Waiver of Notice, 11/9/20, at ¶ 3.
Wife testified that she sought through these proceedings "to buy out [Husband] for his portion of ownership for the dogs," not to obtain half of the value of the dogs after they are offered for a public sale to the highest bidder. See N.T. Hearing, 12/2/22, at 40. Thus, despite Wife's protestations to the contrary, Husband accurately depicts her proffered reasons for initiating this litigation as an attempt to achieve what she should have sought and could have obtained through equitable distribution, namely separate ownership of the dogs with an appropriate compensation to Husband. See Husband's brief at 11.
Thus, upon a thorough examination of the history of, and changes to, property distribution upon divorce, it is apparent that our General Assembly did not retain a provision for the partition of entireties property post-divorce as a mechanism for a spouse who regretted her decision not to seek equitable distribution to come back months, years, or decades later to obtain half the worth of a couch, refrigerator, or set of bath towels that she left behind. Rather, the plain value of § 3507 under the present Divorce Code is to make property that would otherwise be inalienable or incapable of satisfying the debt of one spouse available for sale or encumbrance by the parties. Since the certified record contains no evidence of a title, deed, or other instrument listing ownership of the dogs in both parties' names that makes them unalienable or not subject to encumbrance by virtue of that instrument, there is simply no reason for § 3507 to apply to them.
As noted by one jurist, ownership as tenants by the entireties furthers "a strong policy which serves to prevent harm to a spouse who does not join in a conveyance of entireties property and to preserve entireties assets from the creditors of one spouse who incurs bad debts." Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 385 (Pa. 1986) (Larsen, J., concurring). However, once the marriage is terminated, § 3507(c) allows a creditor of only one spouse, who had recorded a theretofore-uncollectable lien on entireties property, to obtain payment from the debtor spouse's partition share.
We agree with our esteemed colleague in dissent that the law's equation of beloved family pets with inanimate personal property is not in alignment with modern beliefs. However, our decision today does not invade upon the province of the General Assembly by creating a special category for pets. Rather, our ultimate holding is that the General Assembly, in enacting the Divorce Code of 1980, abrogated our Supreme Court's decisional law which had created a presumption that household goods purchased during the marriage were titled in the name of both spouses so that a dependent spouse would not be bereft of assets upon divorce. Since the legislature's grant of a right to seek division of marital property regardless of title destroyed the foundation of the household goods presumption, we hereby recognize that no untitled marital property, be it pets, furnishings, or other household goods, is subject to post-divorce partition pursuant to § 3507.
Of note, our General Assembly considered legislation that would codify a special status for pets among marital property and provide factors for trial courts to consider in determining custody of pets in divorce cases. See 2023 H.B. 1108 (referred to Senate Judiciary Committee 6/30/23) (proposing to, inter alia, amend 23 Pa.C.S. § 3102 to include the finding that "[c]ompanion animals occupy a special category of personal property which does not include inanimate personal property"). The creation of that unique status for pets would abrogate this Court's pet custody decision in Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230 (Pa.Super. 2002), but, as explained above, our ruling herein is not dependent upon any such reclassification.
Accordingly, because Wife produced no instrument or other documentary evidence demonstrating that the dogs in question were held in the names of both parties, the dogs, although marital property, were not entireties property. As a result, their prospective ownership was a subject not for post-divorce partition pursuant to § 3507, but for a marital settlement agreement or equitable distribution litigated in connection with the Divorce Code. Wife's failure to avail herself of those available remedies resulted in the extinguishment of her claim to recover her share of the value of the dogs pursuant to § 3503.
As indicated hereinabove, § 3503 provides in pertinent part that, after a divorce decree is entered, "all property rights which are dependent upon the marital relation, except those which are vested rights, are terminated unless the court expressly provides otherwise in its decree. All duties, rights and claims accruing to either of the parties at any time theretofore in pursuance of the marriage shall cease[.]" 23 Pa.C.S. § 3503. Wife offered no basis for the existence of any right or claim to personal property that she left in Husband's possession that is not dependent upon the fact that they were acquired during the marriage with marital funds. Thus, her failure to seek and obtain an express order addressing her right to any such property was terminated upon entry of the divorce decree.
Since the trial court should have denied Wife's petition for special relief rather than granted it, we reverse the appealed-from order.
Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
P.J.E. Bender joins this Opinion.
Judge Sullivan files a Dissenting Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
DISSENTING OPINION
SULLIVAN, J.:
When, as here, the law does not keep pace or align with modern-day values and beliefs, the outcome can seem unjust. This is plainly the case where twenty-first century pet ownership meets property rights in divorce cases. The initial framing under the law of our beloved pets as "personal property" is, in my personal opinion, the fundamental shortcoming from which the remaining legal analysis veers from keeping pace with modern societal practices and beliefs. However, the current law is clear: "Pennsylvania law considers dogs to be personal property." Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. Super. 2002) (disallowing a supplementary divorce agreement awarding custodial visitation of a dog purchased during the marriage). Regrettably, under the current law, dogs are akin to a table or a lamp for purposes of dividing marital property, and are not treated as living, breathing creatures that become enmeshed in the fabric of a family. See id. Likewise, under current law there is a presumption that personal property acquired during the marriage is "marital property." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501(b). The presumption is broad and encompasses "all property acquired by either party during the marriage" unless one of the eight exceptions within the statute applies. See Focht v. Focht, 32 A.3d 668, 670 (Pa. 2011) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Further, this Court has recognized that "in this Commonwealth, a presumption exists that property held by a husband and wife is held by the entireties and that said presumption can be overcome only when the opposing party demonstrates, through clear and convincing evidence, that the property was not intended to be held by the husband and wife as entireties property." Jones v. McGreevy, 270 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson 908 A.2d 290, 295 (Pa. Super. 2006)) (emphasis added); accord In re Estate of Navarra, 113 A.3d 829, 833 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that "there is a presumption under Pennsylvania law that property held by husband and wife is held as a tenancy by the entireties and this presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the property was not intended to be held by the entireties"). Finally, when married individuals hold property in the entireties and then divorce, the property, by operation of law, is (post-divorce) held as tenants in common with equal one-half share, and either party may bring an action to have the property sold and proceeds divided. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3507(a) (emphasis added). Given the applicable law and the facts before us, many of which are uncontested, I am constrained to agree with the trial court's disposition, and do not believe the court below abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Indeed, the "scope of appellate review of a decree in equity is limited. Absent an abuse of discretion or an error of law, we are bound to accept the findings of the trial court ...." Spears v. Spears, 769 A.2d 523, 524 (Pa. Super. 2001) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also Werner v. Werner, 573 A.2d 1119, 1121 (Pa. Super. 1990) (noting that "we are bound to accept the findings of the trial court . . ., particularly where the findings are largely dependent upon the credibility of the witnesses"). I echo the trial court's reasoning that "if [Husband's] interpretation is to be accepted[,] it must be [by] a higher court than this one[,]" or if the General Assembly amends the statute(s) at issue. Trial Ct. Op., 3/10/23, at 6. Because the trial court's findings and conclusions were reasonably supported by the record, and the law applied thereto is valid, I am compelled to follow it, and respectfully dissent.
Neither party invoked any of the eight "marital property" exceptions set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3501(a)(1)-(8).
While it is well settled law that the presumption exists where property is obtained during a marriage, marital property is not de facto entireties property, an analysis to determine whether the marital property is held by the entireties is done by the court. See Jones, 270 A.3d at 16. Jones concerned the property subject to garnishment including several accounts held only in the husband's name (although the opposing party agreed without argument that a joint checking account and an individual IRA account were held in the entireties and not subject to garnishment). As this Court noted in Jones, because the contested property was clearly held individually and solely by husband with no evidence that there was comingling of funds, the presumption never attached; thus, no subsequent analysis was required.
Concerning questions of credibility and weight accorded the evidence at trial, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact. See Linde v. Linde, 220 A. 3d 1119, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2019). It is not the province of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence and we are prohibited from making contrary credibility determinations or reweighing the evidence in order to reach an opposite result. See In re: Petition of the Board of School Directors of the Hatboro-Horsham School District for the Sale of Real Property, 306 A.3d 981, 987 n.9 (Pa. Commw. 2023); see also Commonwealth v. Hunt, 220 A.3d 582, 590 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2019) (this Court may cite Commonwealth Court decisions for their persuasive value).
Initially, I must emphasize, a prefatory but noteworthy clarification regarding the burden shifting vis-a-vis the tenancy by the entireties presumption. The sole matter before us on appeal is the Appellee/Wife's petition for special relief filed by the Appellee/Wife eighteen months after the divorce was finalized. The actual divorce proceedings, other than the caption used here, are irrelevant and are not under review or analyzed here. Wife's Petition for Special Relief did not attempt to reopen the divorce proceedings; it specifically asked for relief under section 3507 of the Divorce Code to partition property obtained during the marriage. There is some confusion throughout the record with Husband being referred to as Plaintiff and Wife as Defendant, and ambiguities as to the movant and opposing party. In the matter under our review, it is clear that Wife is the moving party for purposes of the petition for special relief and Husband is the opposing party. See Jones, 270 A.3d at 14.
The following facts are uncontested by the parties: The parties were married in December 2011. See Order, 12/6/22, Joint Ex. A (Joint Stipulation of Facts and Law), ¶ 1. In December 2018, the parties acquired a male Corgi dog named "Bentley." See id. at ¶ 2. The parties acquired a female Corgi dog in July 2019 named "Bailey." See id. at ¶ 3 (collectively "the dogs"). The parties stipulated that the dogs are personal property, and they also agreed the dogs are marital property. See id. at ¶ 10 (joint stipulation that the dogs are personal property); see also Plaintiff's Amended Answer, 7/22/22, at ¶ 10 (Husband admitting that the dogs are marital property) and N.T., 12/2/22, at 8 (counsel for both parties agreeing the parties acquired the property during the marriage). Additionally, the parties agreed that "during the time that they . . . lived together [as a married couple]," they "handled the dogs in the same manner they handled other household goods, furnishings, and personal property. ... [T]hey shared them. They each had full access to the property ...." N.T., 12/2/22, at 8. The parties purchased Bailey and Bentley using funds from a joint account and took possession of the dogs at the same time during their marriage. See generally id. at 6-10. During the marriage, Wife "filled out the paperwork [for the dogs]. They were licensed to [her]." Id. at 21 (emphasis added); see also id. at 48 (Husband conceding that Wife acquired licenses for the dogs, and that "initially in the first year that she had left, I know she had renewed them").
There is no evidence of record that the dogs are titled property or that either party obtained "legal title," i.e., an instrument evincing ownership of the dogs. Additionally, Husband maintained that dogs are not titled property. See, e.g., Pl.'s Ans. to Def.'s Pet. for Mot. for Reconsideration, 9/15/22, at ¶ 20 (Husband asserting that "[d]ogs and other items of personal property do not have titles or certificates").
"Title" is defined, in relevant part, as legal evidence of a person's ownership rights in property; an instrument, such as a deed, that constitutes evidence of a person's ownership rights in property. See Black's Law Dictionary 1788 (11th ed. 2019).
The parties separated in May 2020. See Order, 12/6/22, Joint Ex. A (Joint Stipulation of Facts and Law), at ¶ 5. At the time of separation, Wife left the marital residence to reside briefly in Chicago and enlist in the military. See N.T. 12/2/22, at 11-12. Husband retained physical possession of the dogs while Wife was away. See id. at 12.
The parties later disputed whether they had an oral agreement that Husband would return the dogs to Wife upon completion of her military training. See N.T., 12/2/22, at 12, 42.
In November 2020, the parties divorced by mutual consent. See Order, 12/6/22, Joint Ex. A, at ¶ 6. Neither party filed for equitable division of marital property pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 3502. There was no property settlement agreement between the parties, and the dogs, which the parties agreed are both personal and marital property purchased during the marriage with money taken from a joint checking account, were not addressed during the divorce action. See id. at ¶ 10 (joint stipulation that the dogs are personal property); id. at ¶ 7 (joint stipulation that the parties did not address, dispose of, or resolve the dogs' ownership); see also Plaintiff's Amended Answer, 7/22/22, at ¶ 10 (Husband admitting that the dogs are marital property).
In June 2022, Wife/movant filed the Petition for Special Relief currently before us pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3507(a), in which she averred that the dogs were marital property owned as tenants by the entireties that converted into tenants in common by operation of law post-divorce. See Petition, 5/26/22, at ¶¶ 11, 12. She sought a sale of the dogs between the parties via auction. See id. at ¶ 16. Husband opposed the petition; the trial court initially denied the petition; Wife moved for reconsideration, which Husband opposed. As the opposing party, husband argued, inter alia, that Wife's petition was contrary to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503 and that the dogs are untitled property and not subject to partition under section 3507(a). See, e.g., Pl.'s Ans. to Def.'s Pet. for Mot. for Reconsideration, 9/15/22, at ¶ 20 ("Dogs and other items of personal property do not have titles or certificates.").
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which the parties both testified, and the trial court heard the evidence synopsized above. Additionally, Husband offered into evidence documentation of AKC registration, and PA dog license registration from 2021, both of which postdated the separation of the parties, and both parties agreed that Wife was the individual who obtained the dog licenses during the marriage. See id. at 21, 52.
The AKC is an organization whose stated purpose/mission is "promoting the sport of purebred dogs and breeding for type and function." https://www.akc.Org/about/mission/#: ~:text=The%20American%20Kennel %20Club%20isibreedjnci%20for%20type%20and%20function (last visited 4/15/24). Nowhere does the AKC assert that registration of a dog with its organization is a written instrument proving ownership or title, and there is no caselaw in this Commonwealth that supports AKC registration papers as a title instrument or written proof of ownership. Regardless, neither dog was registered with the AKC during the marriage; husband registered the dogs with the AKC post-separation and post-divorce. N.T. 12/2/22 at 50-51.
I note that Husband confirmed Wife's testimony that she registered the licenses of both dogs during the marriage. See N.T., 12/2/22, at 52. Wife testified that in addition to registering the dogs during the marriage, she continued to renew the licenses in 2020, 2021 and 2022, post-separation and post-divorce. See id. at 21.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined the dogs were marital property, and that the parties jointly decided "to make the purchase and to own the dogs together." See N.T., 12/2/22, at 64. Based on the stipulations and testimony, the trial court found the parties: acquired the dogs together during the marriage, shared possession of them, and had the same interests as to both dogs. See id. at 62. The trial court additionally found no evidence of title, and it specifically found there was no legal support for Husband's testimony that post-separation AKC registrations and dog licenses constituted title. See id. The trial court accurately noted that the law presumes unity of title and tenancy by the entireties unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary offered by the party opposing the presumption (the Husband here). See id. at 64; see also Trial Ct. Op., 3/10/23, at 5. The court found that "it's quite clear" that the property was not intended to be held by only one of the parties to the marriage during the marriage and the opposing party failed to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See id. As credited in the trial court's opinion, the parties agreed that the dogs were marital property, and paid for out of a joint bank account. See N.T., 12/2/22, at 6-8, 41. And the trial court noted the stipulation that neither party requested equitable division of property per section 3502 of the Divorce Code, nor did they enter into a marital settlement regarding any property. See id. at 11, 27, 57. The trial court found under the evidence presented the "plain language of § 3507" applied and required partition. Id.
A plain reading of section 3502 neither compels equitable distribution upon either party in a divorce, nor does it express any indication that property rights shall be lost in these circumstances if equitable distribution is not pursued. See also infra notes 18 and 19.
Husband, in all three of his issues, asserts the trial court erred in granting Wife's petition for partition pursuant to section 3507. See Husband's Brief at 4. Our standard of review is abuse of discretion or error of law. See Spears, 769 A.2d at 524.
Section 3507(a) provides that "[w]henever married persons holding property as tenants by entireties are divorced, they shall . . . thereafter hold the property as tenants in common . . ., and either [one] . . . may bring an action against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3507(a) (emphasis added). Because the tenancy in common created by section 3507(a) arises subsequent to divorce, a petition for partition under section 3507(a) must necessarily occur after the divorce is final. See, e.g., Spears, 769 A.2d at 523 (addressing a petition for partition filed approximately twenty-four years after divorce pursuant to section 3507's predecessor statute). Section 3507 was passed into law in 1990, and remains viable. See id.
To the extent the Majority attempts to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting section 3507, such history is only employed when the language is ambiguous. See, e.g., Jones, 270 A.3d at 18-19 (noting that "[i]f the terms of a statute are clear and free of all ambiguity, we will not disregard the letter of the law in favor of pursuing its apparent spirit"; that the plain language of a statute is the best indication of legislative intent; and only where the statutory language at issue is determined to be ambiguous does this Court go beyond the text to consider other considerations such a legislative history); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (providing that when a statute is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit); id., § 1921(c) (providing that where a statute is ambiguous, courts may consider, inter alia, "contemporaneous legislative history"); contra Maj. Op. at 21. There is no ambiguity in section 3507; it clearly allows divorced persons to continue to have a right in property and compel sale of property that was obtained during the marriage and owned by the entireties during the marriage.
Section 3507 concerns property held by married persons as tenants by the entireties. "A tenancy by the entireties exists when real or personal property is held jointly by a husband and wife, with its essential characteristic being that each spouse is seised of the whole or the entirety and not a divisible part thereof." Gilliland v. Gilliland, 751 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Pa. Super. 2000) (internal citation and quotations omitted) (emphases added).
Our Supreme Court has long held that personal property in Pennsylvania may be held by a husband and wife by the entireties. See, e.g., Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings &Trust Co., 200 A. 624, 628 (Pa. 1938). This Court has likewise held that personal property may be held by the entirety. See, e.g., Fascione v. Fascione, 416 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Pa. Super. 1979) (holding that a husband and wife had held property, including, inter alia, furniture, by the entirety); Banko v. Malanecki, 451 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Pa. 1982) (recognizing that the Court previously "held that household goods purchased by a husband and used during the marriage by both spouses are presumed to be the property of both spouses 'held jointly by the entireties'"). I note that, "[n]evertheless, it is equally well established that an estate by the entireties may be terminated by agreement, express or implied, of the parties." Fascione, 416 A.2d at 1025. In the instant matter, however, there was no evidence of an agreement prior to the divorce, either written or implied; nor did the parties seek equitable distribution or a property settlement agreement. Other than some text messages back and forth, which only showed the parties were totally at odds about how to handle the dogs, both parties were under the impression that each of them would get the dogs after the divorce. This testimony clearly shows there was no implied meeting of the minds on the division of this property.
A legal presumption exists that "property held by a husband and wife is held by the entireties and that said presumption can be overcome only when the opposing party demonstrates, through clear and convincing evidence, that the property was not intended to be held by the husband and wife as entireties property." Jones, 270 A.3d at 14 (internal citation and quotations omitted). However, the petitioning party must first prove what properties were held by the entireties and, thereby, subject to partition. See Winpenny v. Winpenny, 442 A.2d 778, 781 (Pa. Super. 1982).
While this Court has held that a tenancy by the entireties requires a legally binding marriage, plus satisfaction of the four unities of time, title, possession, and interest, see Jones, 270 A.3d at 15 n.18, a presumption of ownership by the entireties nevertheless applies where marital property is untitled, if the parties used joint funds to purchase the property, and they shared possession of, and interest in, the property. See, e.g., In re Estate of Matson, 542 A.2d 147, 153 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that a purchase of untitled personalty, made with proceeds from a loan obtained on the credit of both spouses, creates a presumption of entireties ownership). Further, when a party seeks to overcome the presumption of a tenancy by the entireties of untitled marital property, that party can only overcome the presumption through clear and convincing evidence that the property was not intended to be held by the husband and wife as entireties property. See Jones, 270 A.3d at 14.
As noted above, personal property may be held as entireties property; and it is similarly "well established that tenants in common of personal property, like tenants in common of real estate, own and possess in equal shares an undivided interest in the whole property." In re Engel's Estate, 198 A.2d 505, 507 (Pa. 1964).
It is well settled law that dogs are personal property. See Desanctis, 803 A.2d at 232 (stating that "Pennsylvania law considers dogs to be personal property"); see also Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania, 929 A.2d 1169, 1181 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating the same); Baltruasaitis v. Schilpp, 296 A.3d 623 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum at *8).
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value.
In sum, marital property that is also personal property is subject to section 3507 if it is held by the entireties. That is, where marital property is not otherwise addressed by equitable distribution or a marriage settlement agreement, section 3507 provides that a "dissolution of the . . . marriage by divorce terminate[s] the tenancy by the entireties," and creates a tenancy in common. Barrett v. Barrett, 614 A.2d 299, 301 (Pa. Super. 1992).
Here, Wife initially filed the post-divorce petition, averring the dogs were marital property subject to partition under section 3507. Wife, the moving party, identified the dogs as the property to be partitioned pursuant to section 3507 and submitted evidence (largely uncontested) that the dogs were purchased during the marriage with joint funds, and both had equal possession of the dogs during the marriage. Husband, as the opposing party, agreed with the Wife's assertions regarding the purchase and possession of the dogs during the marriage; however, he asserts on appeal that section 3507 is inapplicable to personal property (i.e., it is limited to real property) and, consequently, the dogs are not subject to partition under section 3507. See Husband's Brief 10-14. He further asserts that since he had possession of the dogs at the time the divorce was finalized, he can claim the dogs "as his separate property under 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 3503 and 3504." Id. at 14.
The trial court noted that the plain language of section 3507 "is clear in its mandates providing [that] when married individuals are divorced[,] and they're holding property as tenants by the entirety at the time that they are divorced, [they] thereafter[] hold the property as tenants in common ...." N.T., 12/2/22, at 61. As such, the trial court recognized the statute provides that either party "may bring an action against the other to have the property sold and the proceeds divided between them." Id. The court noted that the presumption applied to the facts presented by the parties, as the facts provided by both parties showed the parties acquired the dogs at the same time, shared possession of the dogs, and had an undivided interest in the whole of the property. See id. at 62. Since the presumption clearly applied, the burden shifted to Husband to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption did not apply, and the property was not owned by the entireties. See Jones, 270 A.3d at 14.
The trial court found there was no evidence of title, and, specifically, Husband's AKC registrations and dog license were not instruments constituting title. See id. Accordingly, the trial court determined the law "presumes it to be [held by the entireties] until there's . . . clear and convincing evidence otherwise. And we don't have clear and convincing evidence ...." Id. at 64. The trial court specifically found that Husband, as the opposing party, failed to carry his burden of rebutting the presumption that the property was held by the entireties, the property was thus subject to conversion by operation of law to a tenancy in common and thereafter subject to partition pursuant to section 3507. See id.; accord Trial Ct. Op., 3/10/23, at 5.
During the hearing, husband testified that he had written documentation of the signed purchasing contracts for the dogs but "[didn't] have them present" at the time of the hearing. N.T., 12/2/22, at 58. Although the trial court could not consider this in its factual determination, I find it curious that husband brought dog licenses and AKC registrations unarguably obtained post-separation as proof of individual ownership of property, but did not bring paperwork to court, which would have been dispositive of whether the purchase of the dogs at issue was individual or joint.
Pennsylvania courts have not required property to be titled for it to be held by the entireties or in common. Further, nothing in the plain text of section 3507 limits its application to titled property. See generally 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3507(a); Commonwealth v. Miller, 364 A.2d 886, 887 (Pa. 1976) (noting that "statutes are not presumed to make changes in the rules and principles of the common law or prior existing law beyond what is expressly declared in their provisions"); Carrozza v. Greenbaum, 916 A.2d 553, 566 (Pa. 2007) (stating the same). Furthermore, courts are to apply the plain meaning to statutory provisions, and "[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S.A. §1921(b). Indeed, post-1980, this Court has held that "untitled personalty" can be owned by the entireties. See In re Matson, 542 A.2d at 153; Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. 1986) (a tenancy by the entireties "exists when property, either real or personal, is held jointly by a husband and wife, with its essential characteristic being that each spouse is seised of the whole or the entirety and not a divisible part thereof") (emphasis added); Gilliland, 751 A.2d at 1172 (stating that a husband and wife may own personal property by the entireties); In re Estate of Navarra, 113 A.3d 829, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015). As such, a plain reading of section 3507 renders it applicable to any property owned by the entireties, which includes untitled personalty. Contra Maj. Op. at 21.
It is uncontested that the dogs are personal property acquired during the marriage, and, as such, were marital property. See, e.g., Order, 12/6/22, Joint Ex. A. There was no dispute that the parties acquired the dogs at the same time, with joint funds, and they shared possession and full access to the dogs during the marriage. See N.T., 12/2/22, at 8. Additionally, Husband conceded, and the trial court concluded, the dogs were not titled property. See Pl.'s Ans. to Def.'s Pet. for Mot. for Reconsideration, 9/15/22, at ¶ 20 (Husband asserting that "[d]ogs and other items of personal property do not have titles or certificates").
Additionally, Wife, whose testimony the trial court credited, testified that she and Husband: made a joint decision to buy the dogs, used joint funds to do so, and owned the dogs together. See N.T., 12/2/22, at 5-6, 9-10, 62, 64. This Court must accept the trial court's findings based on its credibility determinations. See Werner, 573 A.2d at 1121.
Further, during the marriage, Wife "filled out the paperwork [for the dogs]. They were licensed to [her]." N.T., 12/2/22, at 21 (emphasis added); see also id. at 48 (Husband conceding that Wife acquired licenses for the dogs, and that "initially in the first year that she had left, I know she had renewed them"). Thus, Husband's concession and the evidence admitted at the hearing established that the dogs were untitled property; the parties acquired them at the same time and with joint funds; and the parties shared possession during the marriage. Therefore, relying on the facts of record, the trial court held that Wife met her initial burden of showing that the dogs were presumptively held by the entireties. See In re Estate of Matson, 542 A.2d at 153; Banko, 451 A.2d at 1011; Jones, 270 A.3d at 14; Fascione, 416 A.2d at 1025-26. Likewise, the trial court reasonably relied on the record in finding the husband did not show by clear and convincing evidence that the ownership of the dogs during the marriage was meant to be individual or separate. See N.T., 12/2/22, at 64. Thus, based on the evidence, and testimony provided, the trial court's determination that the dogs were owned by the entireties was supported by the record facts, and this Court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact, particularly where they rest on credibility. See Werner, 573 A.2d at 1121.
Even if, arguendo, the law required evidence showing the property was in each party's name in order to trigger the presumption of ownership by the entireties, such evidence existed here and actually favored Wife. Again, neither party showed ownership or title with a written instrument. However, Wife testified she and Husband, during the marriage and prior to separation, "went to the store together [to obtain dog licenses,] but I [wife] filled out the paperwork. They were licensed to me." N.T., 12/2/22, at 21 (emphasis added). Husband himself acknowledged the truth of Wife's testimony on this point. See id. at 52 (Husband stating, "That is correct," when asked if Wife "was the one who got the dogs licensed and kept the licenses during the marriage"). Cf. In re Holmes' Estate, 200 A.2d at 747 (stating that "[w]here property or an account is placed in the names of a husband and wife, a gift and the creation of an estate by the entireties is presumed even though the funds used to acquire the property or to establish the account were exclusively those of the husband") (emphasis added). See also Werner, 573 A.2d at 1121 (noting that "we are bound to accept the findings of the trial court . . ., particularly where the findings are largely dependent upon the credibility of the witnesses"). To the contrary, the documentation and testimony offered by the Husband all occurred post-separation. A tenancy by the entireties determination focuses on the status of property during the marriage so, in essence, the only paperwork that tended to show any type of ownership during the marriage were the dog licenses that were admittedly in Wife's name and did not support Husband's burden.
This Court is not entitled to re-weigh evidence found by the trial court. See Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d 520, 523 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that "it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse those determinations so long as they are supported by the evidence") (internal citation omitted). Just because we would find differently does not entitle an appellate court to put itself in the place of the trial court.
I find unpersuasive Husband's argument that section 3507 only applies to titled or real property. The statute contains no such prescription, and it is well established that personal property may be held by the entireties as well as in common. See Madden, 200 A. at 628 (personal property may be held by the entireties); see also In re Engel's Estate, 198 A.2d at 507 (personal property may be held by tenants in common). Contra Husband's Brief at 4, 5. To the extent Husband argues that section 3507 should apply to real property, a separate provision, section 3508 ("Conveyance of entireties property to divorced spouse"), specifically addressing real property. The section states, "Whenever married persons have acquired real estate as tenants by entireties and are thereafter divorced, either former spouse . . . may convey to the other . . . the grantor's interest in the real estate so that the grantee holds the real estate in fee simple ...." Had the legislature intended to limit the application of section 3507 to real estate, it could have easily used language specifying "real estate" as it did in section 3508. See Fletcher v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 985 A.2d 678, 684 (Pa. 2009) (directing that "where the legislature includes specific language in one section of the statute and excludes it from another, the language should not be implied where excluded"). I note, as did the trial court, that a strict reading and application of section 3507 may upset a party's expectation of finality in the resolution of economic claims via equitable distribution. See Trial Ct. Op., 3/10/23, at 5-6. However, this Court is bound to apply the plain language of the statute to the findings of the trial court as are supported by the record, and determine whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Carrozza, 916 A.2d at 566; Spears, 769 A.2d at 524. Furthermore, a party's ability to proceed under section 3507 is not unfettered. A petitioning party must first show that the marital property was held by the entirety, or demonstrate the applicability of the presumption to that effect. Additionally, a respondent may assert that a tenancy by the entirety was terminated either expressly or impliedly, see Fascione, 416 A.2d at 1025, and a section 3507 petition is subject to defenses such as laches. Cf. Werner, 573 A.2d at 1121 (finding waiver of statute of limitations and laches defenses because they were not contained in a responsive pleading).
Furthermore, existing law supports the trial court's conclusion that untitled property can be held as tenancy by the entireties. See In re Matson, 542 A.2d at 153; Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. 1986) (a tenancy by the entireties "exists when property, either real or personal, is held jointly by a husband and wife, with its essential characteristic being that each spouse is seised of the whole or the entirety and not a divisible part thereof") (emphasis added); Gilliland, 751 A.2d at 1172 (stating that a husband and wife may own personal property by the entireties); In re Estate of Navarra, 113 A.3d 829, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015) (cash proceeds from the sale of real property held in the entireties, noting entireties property "is a form of co-ownership in real and personal property held by a husband and wife with right of survivorship.") (emphasis added).
Upon the parties' divorce, that tenancy by the entirety was transformed by operation of law to a tenancy in common. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3507(a); see also Barrett, 614 A.2d at 301. Further, as noted above, because the tenancy in common created by section 3507(a) is only created upon divorce of the parties, a petition for partition under section 3507(a) must necessarily occur after the divorce, and, accordingly, nothing precluded Wife from seeking partition following the divorce decree. See, e.g., Spears, 769 A.2d at 525 (addressing a petition for partition filed twenty-four years after divorce decree); contra Husband's Brief at 9 (implying that a section 3507 partition claim cannot be made after the entry of a divorce decree). To the extent that the Majority implies the passage of the Divorce Code in 1980 precludes a presumption that spouses own "household goods" by the entireties during the marriage, see Maj. Op. at 18, I note that neither Wife, nor the trial court, assumed the presumption of ownership by the entireties based merely on the parties' marriage; rather, she advanced evidence to show the presumption applied. By stipulation, and at the hearing, the parties agreed they had jointly acquired and possessed the untitled property, i.e., the dogs; they had joint access to the dogs, and offered uncontradicted evidence that the dogs' licenses were held in her name during the marriage. Together, these facts triggered the presumption that the personal property was held by the entireties during the marriage. Furthermore, this Court has, well after the passage of the Divorce Code in 1980, affirmed the validity of this presumption. See, e.g., Jones, 270 A.3d at 14-15, 16 n.20.
Insofar as Husband argues Wife impliedly agreed to terminate the tenancy by the entireties, the trial court disbelieved Husband's testimony, and the record supports this determination. See, e.g., N.T., 12/2/22, at 11 (Wife testifying that prior to her divorce from Husband, she believed the parties had agreed she would get the dogs back following the divorce); id. at 20 (Wife testifying that Husband would not permit her to see the dogs after the divorce). See also Werner, 573 A.2d at 1121 (noting that "we are bound to accept the findings of the trial court . . ., particularly where the findings are largely dependent upon the credibility of the witnesses"). Accordingly, Husband's argument that the dogs were his separate personal property, and thus exempt from section 3507(a) because of section 3504 (providing divorced parties freedom to dispose of their separate personal property), is unavailing.
Thus, if the property is owned by the entireties, as the trial court held based on the facts presented, then section 3507 applies. Additionally, a party has a vested interest in property owned by the entireties. Cf. Jones, 270 A.3d at 16 (noting that the appellees failed to show that the property at issue was owned by the entireties, and thus that the wife had a vested interest in the property). See also Clingerman v. Sadowski, 518 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. 1986) (holding that where married persons own property by the entireties, and one spouse dies, the entireties property "automatically vest[s] in [the] surviving spouse"). Therefore, section 3503 would not apply in the instant matter, because section 3503-which terminates property rights dependent upon the marital relation upon the granting of a divorce decree-expressly exempts vested property rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503; cf. Smith v. Smith, 749 A.2d at 924-25 (Pa. Super. 2000) (applying section 3503 and holding that a wife's interest in her husband's pension was terminated following the entry of a divorce decree, and that even though she and husband later remarried and again divorced, her interest in the pension following the second marriage only dated back to the date of the second marriage). Indeed, application of section 3503 in these circumstances nullifies section 3507. Cf. Kowall v. United States Steel Corporation, Inc., 325 A.3d 802, 807-08 (Pa. Super. 2024) (discussing rules of statutory construction and noting this Court is required to construe statutes in pari materia together and as one statute; and every statute is to be construed so as to give effect to all its provisions). The Majority, under the stated aim of clarifying the legislative intent behind section 3507, has taken upon itself to limit the application of the plain language of section 3507 to titled property when no such limitation is contained in the plain language of the statute. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (providing that "[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit"); contra Maj. Op. at 21.
While it would undoubtedly have been wiser for the parties to dispose of thein ir personal property, held by the entireties during the marriage, via equitable distribution, or via a settlement agreement, both parties chose not to pursue that path. This left open the possibility of a section 3507 partition action for property held by the entireties. Cf. Laudig v. Laudig, 624 A.2d 651, 655 (Pa. Super. 1993) (stating that "[o]ne of the recognized purposes of marital agreements is to allow the parties to avoid the operation of equitable distribution"). As unfortunate as I personally find the outcome, the plain language of section 3507 permits Wife's petition and authorizes the trial court's order.
The Majority appears to put the onus on Wife indicating that she was required to file for equitable distribution or enter into a settlement agreement, or else forfeit marital property. See Maj. Op. at 21 ("Because Wife produced no instrument . . . their prospective ownership was [not] subject [to] postdivorce partition pursuant to section 3507, but for a marital settlement agreement or equitable distribution litigated in connection with the Divorce Code. Wife's failure to avail herself of [these] available remedies resulted in the extinguishment of her claim to recover her share of the value of the dogs "). A plain reading of Section 3502 does not compel either party to enter into equitable distribution. And certainly the Husband had equal opportunity to avail himself of an equitable distribution determination, but also chose not to do so. I read nothing in the relevant law that compels a party to avail themselves of settlement or equitable distribution or else forfeit their property rights in these circumstances. In fact, the mere existence of section 3507 belies such a notion. And, as indicated supra, section 3507 remains a valid statutory provision. Furthermore, the holding that a party to divorce must show a written instrument as it relates to personal/untitled property is contrary to law and puts a burden on Wife that does not exist statutorily or in legal precedent.
Likewise, there is record support for the trial court's finding that the dogs were marital property held in the entireties, and the current law supports the trial court's conclusion that untitled property can be held in the entireties. Furthermore, section 3507 is not only valid but applicable based on the trial court's reasonable conclusions of law and fact, and an appellate court is not to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder; rather, the test we apply is not whether we would have reached the same result on the evidence presented, but rather, after due consideration of the evidence which the trial court found credible, whether the trial court could have reasonably reached its conclusion. See G&G Investors LLC v. Phillips Simmons Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 183 A.3d 472, 478 (Pa. Super. 2018). Because the trial court's findings and conclusions were reasonable and supported by the record, and the law was appropriately applied, I would affirm the trial court's order.
As the trial court itself recognized, the outcome in this matter is extremely difficult to accept. The record shows the trial court gave the parties forty-five days to try to settle the matter before it entered its order, hoping cooler and wiser heads would prevail; sadly, they did not. However, it is the province of the General Assembly to amend the Divorce Code should it desire to distinguish dogs and other pets differently from other types of property. This matter "presents a problem for the General Assembly .... Under the guise of construing a statute we cannot amend or extend it, however strongly a poignant case may arouse our sympathy." Hogg v. Kehoe-Berge Coal Co., 101 A.2d 168, 170 (Pa. Super. 1953). Indeed, legislation pertaining to the potential equitable distribution of "companion animals" is currently pending in the General Assembly. See, e.g., 2023 H.B. 1108. Let us hope that the legislature addresses this in short order, and moves in a positive direction to update the law to reflect our current societal principles that pets are more akin to family members than inanimate objects such as lamps.
[*] This case was reassigned to the author on October 22, 2024.