BATTAGLIA, Judge.

The issue in this case is whether a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement exists between an employer and an employee when the employer has reserved the right to, within its sole discretion, alter, amend, modify, or revoke the arbitration agreement at any time and without notice, even though it has not exercised that option in the present case.

Appellant, Ronnie E. Cheek, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for breach of contract and related causes of action after his employer, appellee United Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., terminated his employment. United responded with a motion to compel arbitration, which the Circuit Court granted. Cheek appealed, and we granted certiorari prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the arbitration agreement between Cheek and United is unenforceable for lack of consideration because United's promise to arbitrate is illusory and because United's employment of Cheek cannot serve as consideration for the arbitration agreement. Consequently, we shall reverse the order of the Circuit Court compelling arbitration and remand this case for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 17, 2000, United orally offered Cheek a position of employment as a senior sales executive, which was confirmed in writing the same day. The two-page letter set forth various conditions of United's offer of employment, including that Cheek accept United's "Employment Arbitration Policy." Specifically, the letter stated that enclosed with it were "summaries of the United Group Internal Dispute and Employment Arbitration Policy which are conditions of your employment."

In a November 28, 2000, letter to United, Cheek wrote that he was "delighted to accept United Healthcare's generous offer" and that "[a]ll of the terms in your employment letter are amenable to me." He also indicated that he had submitted his resignation that morning to his current employer, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of the District of Columbia.

On January 2, 2001, during Cheek's first day of employment with United, he received a copy of United's Employee Handbook, which contained summaries of United's Internal Dispute Resolution Policy and Employment Arbitration Policy (hereinafter, "Arbitration Policy" or "Policy"). The summary of the Arbitration Policy described the scope of the Policy, the rules applicable in arbitration, how an employee initiates arbitration, and the types of relief available in arbitration. Specifically, the summary of the Policy stated that United "believes that the resolution of disagreements" between employees and United "are best accomplished by an internal dispute review (IDR) and, where that fails, by arbitration based on the rules of the American Arbitration Association." Accordingly, United declared in the summary of the Policy that arbitration "is the final, exclusive and required forum for the resolution of all employment related disputes which are based on a legal claim" and that "any party to [such a dispute] may initiate the arbitration process." Particularly relevant to the disposition of this appeal, the summary of the Arbitration Policy also provided:

United HealthCare reserves the right to alter, amend, modify, or revoke the Policy at its sole and absolute discretion at any time with or without notice. The senior executive of Human Resources has the sole authority to alter, amend, modify, or revoke the Policy.

On January 2, 2001, Cheek signed an "Acknowledgment Form for the Code of Conduct and Employment Handbook." In that Form, Cheek acknowledged that he had "specifically received and reviewed," among other things, an "Internal Dispute Resolution/Employment Arbitration Policy." The Form that Cheek signed also stated:

I understand that UnitedHealth Group Employment Arbitration Policy is a binding contract between UnitedHealth Group and me to resolve all employment-related disputes which are based on a legal claim through final and binding arbitration. I agree to submit all employment-related disputes based on legal claim[sic] to arbitration under UnitedHealth Group's policy.

Within seven months, on July 27, 2001, United informed Cheek that United was eliminating his position as of August 10, 2001, when, in fact, his employment was terminated. In response, on December 31, 2001, Cheek filed a four-count complaint against United in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In the complaint, Cheek sought damages for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of Maryland Code, § 3-501 et. seq. of the Labor and Employment Article. Cheek also claimed under the doctrine of promissory estoppel that United should have been precluded from denying the existence of a valid employment agreement.

On February 6, 2002, United filed a "Motion to Dismiss and/or Compel Arbitration and Stay Lawsuit" with the Circuit Court. On May 15, 2002, after hearing from the parties, the Circuit Court entered an order dismissing Cheek's complaint and ordering him to submit his claims to arbitration. Thereafter, Cheek noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari, Cheek v. United Healthcare, 374 Md. 81, 821 A.2d 369 (2003), prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.

Cheek presents the following questions for review, which we have restructured:

(I) Whether the arbitration agreement between Cheek and United is "unenforceable and void as against public policy" because:

(A) The rules of the arbitration can be altered, revised, or amended at the sole discretion of United;

(B) The arbitration agreement does not allow the arbitrator to conclude that an employee is anything other than an "employee at will;"

(C) The arbitration agreement was "foisted" on Cheek after an employment contract was formed.

(II) Whether United's "sole and absolute discretion" to "alter, amend, modify, or revoke" its arbitration agreement with Cheek at any time renders its promise to arbitrate illusory and the arbitration agreement, therefore, unenforceable.

For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the arbitration agreement in the present case is unenforceable for lack of consideration because United's promise to arbitrate is illusory and United's employment of Cheek did not act as consideration for the arbitration agreement. Consequently, we need not address Cheek's remaining questions.

II. DISCUSSION

Cheek contends that the Circuit Court erred in compelling arbitration and advances several arguments in support of that contention. Cheek claims that the Arbitration Policy "lacks mutuality" and is also "void as against public policy" because it states that United has "the right to alter, amend, modify, or revoke the Policy at its sole and absolute discretion at any time with or without notice." Additionally, Cheek argues that the Arbitration Policy "lacks consideration." In support of that claim, Cheek asserts that he agreed to the Arbitration Policy after he had already entered into a binding oral contract of employment with United. Consequently, Cheek asserts that he "received nothing that he had not already [received]." Cheek further claims that the Arbitration Policy is one of "adhesion" and that he was acting under "duress" when he signed it because he was in an inferior bargaining position, because the arbitration agreement precludes an arbitrator from finding anything other than at-will employment, and because the agreement was offered to him on a "take it or leave it" basis after he had already given up his position at Blue Cross/Blue Shield of the District of Columbia. Finally, Cheek contends that the Arbitration Policy is unenforceable because United's promise to arbitrate is "illusory." In support of that contention, Cheek relies on Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, according to Cheek, that a "substantially similar arbitration scheme was [illusory and therefore] unenforceable."

United, on the other hand, contends that it and Cheek "entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement." Contrary to Cheek's assertion, United claims that the Arbitration Policy is supported by "mutuality of obligation" because United "promised to provide Cheek employment for, inter alia, Cheek's promise to abide by the terms of the [arbitration agreement]," and because it promised to submit to arbitration "all employment related disputes which are based on a legal claim." That United reserved the right to modify the Arbitration Policy, it asserts, "is of no consequence to the issue of mutuality." United also claims that the Arbitration Policy was supported by "adequate consideration." In support of that claim, United rejects Cheek's assertion that the Arbitration Policy was entered into after his employment commenced, and further argues that the "mutual promise to arbitrate" and United's "continued employment" of Cheek each served as adequate consideration to support the Arbitration Policy. Additionally, United argues that the Arbitration Policy is not a contract of adhesion because it is a "simple" four-page document, because there is no evidence of any "great disparity in bargaining power between the parties," and because the Arbitration Policy does not preclude an arbitrator from finding an employment contract. Finally, United asserts that a promise is not illusory "simply because it permits one party to unilaterally modify [an] agreement without notice," and that its right to modify the Arbitration Policy, therefore, does not "destroy [its] promise to arbitrate Cheek's dispute."

We have described arbitration as "the process whereby parties voluntarily agree to substitute a private tribunal for the public tribunal otherwise available to them." Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103, 468 A.2d 91, 95 (1983); see also Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 448, 450 A.2d 1304, 1306 (1982). The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (hereinafter, "Arbitration Act"), found in Maryland Code, §§ 3-201 through 3-234 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), "expresses the legislative policy favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stinebaugh, 374 Md. 631, 641, 824 A.2d 87, 93(203). See also Holmes v. Coverall North America, Inc., 336 Md. 534, 546, 649 A.2d 365, 371 (1994) (observing that the Arbitration Act embodies "the legislative intent to favor arbitration"); Crown Oil Wax Co. of Delaware, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co. of Virginia, Inc., 320 Md. 546, 558, 578 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1990) ("Maryland courts have consistently stated that the [Arbitration Act] embodies a legislative policy favoring the enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate."); Gold Coast Mall, Inc., 298 Md. at 103, 468 A.2d at 95; Charles J. Frank, Inc., 294 Md. at 448, 450 A.2d at 1306.

Section 3-206(a) of the Arbitration Act provides that:

A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy arising between the parties in the future is valid and enforceable, and is irrevocable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.

Section 3-207 allows parties to petition a court to compel arbitration and states:

(a) Refusal to arbitrate. — If a party to an arbitration agreement described in § 3-202 refuses to arbitrate, the other party may file a petition with a court to order arbitration.

(b) Denial of existence of arbitration agreement. — If the opposing party denies existence of an arbitration agreement, the court shall proceed expeditiously to determine if the agreement exists.

(c) Determination by court. — If the court determines that the agreement exists, it shall order arbitration. Otherwise it shall deny the petition.

The determination of whether there is an agreement to arbitrate, of course, depends on contract principles since arbitration is a matter of contract. As such, "a party cannot be required to submit any dispute to arbitration that it has not agreed to submit." Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 579, 667 A.2d 649, 654 (1995) (recognizing that "[a]rbitration is `consensual; a creature of contract'" and that "`[i]n the absence of an express arbitration agreement, no party may be compelled to submit to arbitration in contravention of its right to legal process'") (quoting Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 Iowa L.Rev. 473, 476 (1987) (citations omitted)). See also Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay Townhouse Associates, 313 Md. 652, 658, 547 A.2d 1048, 1051 (1988) (recognizing that "`a valid arbitration agreement must exist for arbitration to be binding'") (quoting Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enterprises, 414 Mich. 95, 97, 323 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1982)).

To be binding and enforceable, contracts ordinarily require consideration. Harford County v. Town of Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 381-82, 704 A.2d 421, 430 (1998) (citing Beall v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 229, 434 A.2d 1015, 1018 (1981)); Broaddus v. First Nat. Bank, 161 Md. 116, 121, 155 A. 309, 311 (1931). See also Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 479, 610 A.2d 770, 774 (1992) (binding contracts "must be supported by consideration"); Peer v. First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Cumberland, 273 Md. 610, 614, 331 A.2d 299, 301 (1975) (a binding contract "must be supported by sufficient consideration"). In Maryland, consideration may be established by showing "`a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.'" Harford County, 348 Md. at 382, 704 A.2d at 430 (quoting Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 191, 517 A.2d 1092, 1096 (1986)). In particular, we have recognized that the "[f]orebearance to exercise a right or pursue a claim," can "constitute[ ] sufficient consideration to support [an] . . . agreement." Chernick, 327 Md. at 480, 610 A.2d at 774 (citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Calvert Fire Ins., 253 Md. 385, 389, 252 A.2d 840, 842 (1969)); Beall, 291 Md. at 230, 434 A.2d at 1019 ("forbearance to exercise a legal right is sufficient consideration to support a promise.").

A promise becomes consideration for another promise only when it constitutes a binding obligation. Without a binding obligation, sufficient consideration does not exist to support a legally enforceable agreement. See Tyler v. Capitol Indemnity Ins. Co., 206 Md. 129, 134, 110 A.2d 528, 530 (1955) (recognizing that "`If [an] option goes so far as to render illusory the promise of the party given the option, there is indeed no sufficient consideration, and therefore no contract. . . .'") (quoting 1 Williston on Contracts, Sec. 141 (Rev. Ed.)). See also Restatement of Contracts 2d § 77 cmt. a (1981) ("Where the apparent assurance of performance is illusory, it is not consideration for a return promise."); 2 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 (2003) (explaining that "an illusory promise is neither enforceable against the one making it, nor is it operative as a consideration for a return promise," and that "if there is no other consideration for a return promise, the result is that no contract is created.").

An "illusory promise" appears to be a promise, but it does not actually bind or obligate the promisor to anything. An illusory promise is composed of "words in a promissory form that promise nothing." Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 (2003). "They do not purport to put any limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor. If A makes an illusory promise, A's words leave A's future action subject to A's own future whim, just as it would have been had A said nothing at all." Id. Similarly, the Restatement of Contracts explains that "[w]ords of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the `promisor' whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise." Restatement of Contracts 2d § 2 cmt. e. Likewise, "the promise is too indefinite for legal enforcement is the promise where the promisor retains an unlimited right to decide later the nature or extent of his performance. The unlimited choice in effect destroys the promise and makes it merely illusory." 1 Samuel Williston, Contracts, § 4:24 (4th Ed. 1990).

United initiated the arbitration with Cheek; it has not revoked nor in any way altered the Arbitration Policy with Cheek at any time. Nonetheless, the fact that "United HealthCare reserves the right to alter, amend, modify, or revoke the [Arbitration] Policy at its sole and absolute discretion at any time with or without notice" creates no real promise, and therefore, insufficient consideration to support an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Indeed, the plain and unambiguous language of the clause appears to allow United to revoke the Employment Arbitration Policy even after arbitration is invoked, and even after a decision is rendered, because United can "revoke" the Policy "at any time." Thus, we conclude that United's "promise" to arbitrate employment disputes is entirely illusory, and therefore, no real promise at all.

In so concluding, we align ourselves with courts from other jurisdictions that have found similar language to be illusory. In Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was called upon to interpret an arbitration agreement between the appellants and a third-party arbitration service provider, Employment Dispute Services, Inc. (hereinafter, "EDSI"), which the appellants were required to enter into in order to be considered for employment by Ryan's Family Steak Houses. Id. at 309. In the agreement, EDSI agreed to provide a forum for arbitration, but reserved the right to alter the applicable rules and procedures of arbitration without any notification to or consent from the appellants. Id. at 310.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that the agreement was unenforceable because there was no "mutuality of obligation" and therefore, no consideration. Id. at 316. In so concluding, the Court reasoned that EDSI's promise to provide an arbitration forum was "illusory" because EDSI had "reserved the right to alter the applicable rules and procedures without any obligation to notify, much less receive consent from" the appellants. Id. at 315-16. The Court explained that "an illusory promise arises when a promisor retains the right to decide whether or not to perform the promised act" and that "[a] promise is also illusory when its indefinite nature defies legal enforcement." Id. at 315. See also Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 759, 761 (7th Cir. 2001) (construing a similar agreement where EDSI had sole, unilateral right to amend arbitration rules; holding that EDSI's promise was illusory, and that the arbitration agreement, therefore, was unenforceable).

Similarly, in the case before us, United has the right to "alter, amend, modify, or revoke the [Employment Arbitration] Policy at its sole and absolute discretion at any time with or without notice" and without consent. United, however, claims that Floss is distinguishable because the Employee Arbitration Policy at issue in the present case, unlike the agreement in Floss, does not allow United to modify the rules of arbitration, which are based on those of the American Arbitration Association. Additionally, United highlights criticism of the Floss decision incorporated in Corbin on Contracts:

If EDSI modified the rules and procedures of its arbitral tribunals in such a way that the resulting rules and procedures continued to resemble something we might recognize as `arbitration,' then EDSI's modification fell within the promise to arbitrate, and EDSI would still be doing what it promised . . . it would do: arbitrate their disputes with Ryan's.

Corbin on Contracts § 5.28 (2003 Supp). Even Corbin on Contracts, however, recognizes that "[t]here might be disputes at the margins," in which a finding of an illusory promise would be appropriate. Id. Certainly, the ability to completely revoke an arbitration policy unilaterally, at any time, even after invocation and decision, and without notice to or consent from the employee, is at that margin.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also has found language similar to the language at hand to be illusory. In Dumais v. American Golf Corp., 299 F. 3d 1216 (2002), Dumais, the employee, signed a "New Co-Worker Authorization Acknowledgment Form" that bound her to the provisions of American Golf Corporation's employee handbook, which included an arbitration provision. Id. at 1217. A provision of the handbook stated that American Golf "reserves the right to at any time change, delete, modify, or add to any of the provisions contained in this handbook at its sole discretion" with the exception of the arbitration provision. Id. Another provision stated that American Golf had the right to amend, supplement, or revise everything in the handbook, and this provision did not exclude the arbitration provision. Id.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Federal District Court for the District of New Mexico denying American Golf's motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 1220. The Court reasoned that the conflicting sections of the employee handbook created an ambiguity that should be construed against American Golf. Id. at 1219. Accordingly, the Court found that American Golf had the ability to "change, delete, modify, or add" to the arbitration provision at any time, which rendered "the alleged agreement between American Golf and [Dumais] to arbitrate their employment disputes illusory." Id. at 1220. See also Phox, 230 F. Supp.2d at 1282 (holding employer's promise to arbitrate "illusory" because employer reserved "the right to modify or cancel the provisions" of an employee handbook, including an arbitration clause, "at its sole discretion"); Gourley v. Yellow Transportation, LLC, 178 F. Supp.2d 1196, 1202 (D. Colo. 2001) (determining that an arbitration agreement between employer and employees was "illusory" because employer withheld "the power to interpret, modify, rescind, or supplement its terms unilaterally").

United, however, claims that there is another source of consideration to support the Arbitration Policy. According to United, its "employment or continued employment of Cheek constituted sufficient consideration for the agreement to arbitrate." United asserts that, by providing Cheek with a job, it has given sufficient consideration for Cheek's promise to arbitrate employment disputes, so that United's promise is not illusory. To agree with United would place this Court in the untenable position of having to go beyond the confines of the arbitration agreement itself and into an analysis of the validity of the larger contract, an inquiry which we cannot make. Moreover, we always would have to find that consideration exists to support an arbitration agreement in situations in which performance of the contract has occurred. We explain.

Maryland's Arbitration Act "expresses the legislative policy favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate." Allstate Ins. Co., 374 Md. at 641, 824 A.2d at 93. The Arbitration Act expresses this policy by "strictly confin[ing] the function of the court in suits to compel arbitration to the resolution of a single issue-is there an agreement to arbitrate the subject matter of a particular dispute." Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 103-04, 468 A.2d at 95; Holmes, 336 Md. at 546, 649 A.2d at 371 (1994) ("The narrow scope of the court's involvement [in a petition to compel, or stay, arbitration] follows from our recognition of the legislative intent to favor arbitration."); Crown Oil Wax Co., 320 Md. at 557-58, 578 A.2d at 1189 (stating that a court is prohibited under Section 3-210 of the Arbitration Act from inquiring into the merits of a claim).

In order to observe this mandate, we have followed the lead of the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967), by considering an arbitration clause of a larger contract to be severable therefrom. In Holmes, we were called upon to determine "whether allegations of fraudulent inducement and violations of the Franchise Act in a franchise agreement containing a broad arbitration clause are sufficient to permit the franchisee to avoid arbitration of a dispute." Holmes, 336 Md. at 541, 649 A.2d at 368. We recognized that the Supreme Court in Prima Paint, supra, in considering the same issue, reviewed the policies of the Federal Arbitration Act favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements, and determined that "where a party opposed a motion for arbitration based on allegations that there was fraud in the inducement of the entire contract, the issue is one for an arbitrator, not a court." Id. at 541-42, 649 A.2d at 368. The "reasoning behind Prima Paint," we noted, "is that the arbitration clause is a severable part of the contract." Id. at 543, 649 A.2d at 369. We then recognized that Maryland's Arbitration Act is the "State analogue" to the Federal Arbitration Act, because both embody a policy of enforcing valid arbitration agreements. Id. at 541, 649 A.2d at 368. Reviewing additional federal and state case law, we observed that mutual promises to arbitrate act as "an independently enforceable contract." Id. at 544, 649 A.2d at 370. In an enforceable arbitration agreement, we explained, each party has promised to arbitrate disputes arising from an underlying contract, and "each promise provides consideration for the other." Id. Thus, in a motion to compel arbitration, a court must determine whether "there is a mutual exchange of promises to arbitrate," and "[o]nce a court determines that the making of the agreement to arbitrate is not in dispute, its inquiry ceases, as the agreement to arbitrate has been established as a valid and enforceable contract." Id. at 544, 649 A.2d at 370.

United, however, invites us to disregard the narrow scope of our role by looking beyond the Arbitration Policy and into the underlying employment agreement to determine whether consideration exists to support an agreement to arbitrate. To accept United's assertion that its employment or continued employment of Cheek constituted consideration for the Arbitration Policy would require that we inquire into, and at least make an implicit determination about, the nature of the underlying employment agreement. Indeed, the merits of the underlying controversy in the present case call into question the type of employment relationship that existed between United and Cheek. In his complaint to the Circuit Court, Cheek claimed, among other things, damages for breach of contract, alleging that United "materially breached its contractual obligation to [Cheek] by failing to pay [Cheek] his base pay, incentive compensation, and other benefits." The November 17, 2000 letter memorializing United's offer of employment to Cheek, however, states that "you [Cheek] retain the right to terminate your employment with [United], at any time and for any reason, as does [United]." Similarly, the employee handbook states in part that its provisions, except for the Arbitration Policy, "do not establish a contract or any particular terms or conditions of employment between [Cheek] and [United]. None of the policies constitute or are intended to constitute a promise of employment." Given the language of the letter and the handbook, and the relief sought in the complaint, it is apparent that the parties disagree about whether the employment relationship between Cheek and United was "at will," in which case employment "may be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party at any time," or whether it imposed contractual employment obligations upon United. Therefore, were we to entertain United's assertion regarding Cheek's employment as consideration, we would be straying into the prohibited morass of the merits of the claims.

United, nonetheless, urges us to find employment as consideration, as the Court of Special Appeals did in Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561, 464 A.2d 1104 (1983). Simko, however, is inapposite. In that case, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that continued employment of an at-will employee for a substantial period beyond the threat of discharge was sufficient consideration to support a post-employment covenant not to compete. Id. at 567, 464 A.2d at 1107-08. The present case involves an arbitration agreement, not a covenant not to compete. As previously discussed, in determining whether an arbitration agreement contained within a larger agreement is enforceable, courts are limited to determining only one thing: whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.

In concluding that United's employment or continued employment of Cheek does not act as consideration in return for Cheek's promise to arbitrate, we join at least two other state courts. In The Money Place, LLC. v. Barnes, 349 Ark. 411, 78 S.W.3d 714 (2002), the Supreme Court of Arkansas determined that an arbitration provision in The Money Place's Deferred Presentment Agreement was invalid. Id. at 715. The plaintiffs in The Money Place filed a class-action suit against that business, "alleging usury in its payday-loan/deferred-check presentment business." Id. In determining that the arbitration agreement was invalid, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected The Money Place's claim that if the entire Deferred Presentment Agreement was supported by sufficient consideration, then the arbitration clause also was enforceable based upon the same consideration. Id. at 717. "To analyze the contract as The Money Place" suggested, the Court stated, would require it "to go to the merits of the underlying case," for if fees collected by The Money Place in its payday-loan/deferred-check presentment business were, "in reality, interest, and are usurious, then the contract [would have lacked] consideration." Id. The Court then stated that it was "follow[ing] the lead of the United States Supreme Court" in declining to address whether there was consideration for the contract as a whole and in "limit[ing][its] inquiry into whether the arbitration provision of the contract . . . is valid." Id.

In Stevens/Leinweber/Sullens, Inc. v. Holm Development and Management, Inc., 165 Ariz. 25, 795 P.2d 1308 (Ct.App. 1990), the Court of Appeals of Arizona concluded that Holm, the owner of a construction project, could not "`borrow' consideration from the principal contract to support an arbitration provision." Id. at 1313. An addendum to the construction contract granted Holm "the absolute option of selecting either arbitration or litigation as the means of dispute resolution" and also gave Holm "the right to reconsider its choice of dispute resolution `at any time, prior to a final judgment in the ongoing proceeding.'" Id. In concluding that the arbitration provisions were void for lack of consideration, Arizona's intermediate appellate court reasoned that it could not look to consideration in the underlying contract because the arbitration provisions constituted a separable and independent agreement.

As support for its conclusion that the arbitration provisions were separable from the construction contract, the Arizona Court looked to two provisions of Arizona's arbitration act, which are similar to the Maryland Act, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint, supra, upon which we relied in Holmes, supra. Section 12-1502 of the Arizona Revised Statute, according to the Court, "restricts judicial review to a determination of whether a valid arbitration provision exists." Id. at 1311. That Section states:

On application of a party showing [a valid agreement to arbitrate] and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party. Otherwise, the application shall be denied.

Section 12-1501, the Court stated, "sets forth the grounds upon which the validity of an arbitration provision may be challenged." Id. That Statute provides:

A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. (Emphasis omitted).

These two statutory provisions, when "[r]ead in conjunction," the Arizona Court declared, "embody the concept of separability endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in" Prima Paint, supra. Id. at 1312. Finally, the Court rejected Holm's contention that the arbitration provision should be considered separate from the underlying contract only when necessary to preserve an agreement to arbitrate, reasoning that nothing in the language of A.R.S. Section 12-1501 warranted such a result, and that the doctrine of separability was in fact "inherent in the language" of that Statute. Id.

We disagree with cases from other jurisdictions that determine that consideration for an underlying contract also can serve as consideration for an arbitration agreement within the contract, even when the arbitration agreement is drafted so that one party is absolutely bound to arbitrate all disputes, but the other party has the sole discretion to amend, modify, or completely revoking the arbitration agreement at any time and for any reason. Indeed, the cases of Kelly v. UHC Mgmt. Co., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Ala. 1997), decided by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division, and McNaughton v. United Healthcare Servs., Inc., 728 So.2d 592 (Ala. 1998), from the Supreme Court of Alabama, both involved the same disclaimer language of United's Arbitration Policy at issue in this case, namely, that United "reserves the right to alter, amend, modify, or revoke this policy at its sole and absolute discretion at any time with or without notice."

The Federal District Court held that United's ability "to alter, amend, modify, or revoke [the Arbitration Policy] at its sole and absolute discretion at any time with or without notice," did not render the Policy unenforceable for lack of consideration. Kelly, 967 F. Supp. at 1258. According to the District Court, the plaintiffs in the case provided consideration by "their promise to arbitrate employment disputes," and United "gave consideration in continuing to employ the plaintiffs in exchange for their signing the arbitration agreements." Id. at 1260.

The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a five-to-four decision, relied in part on the Federal District Court's decision, in concluding that United's Arbitration Policy was a binding agreement. McNaughton, 728 So.2d at 595-96. The Court rejected McNaughton's contention that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation, as well as his argument that the language of the Arbitration Policy rendered it "void under the doctrine of unconscionability/mutuality of remedy." Id. at 596. The Alabama Court also concluded that "under clear Alabama contract law, United's providing at-will employment of McNaughton constituted sufficient consideration in exchange for McNaughton's agreement to arbitrate her employment disputes under United's arbitration policy." Id. at 595.

Other cases, as well, have concluded that consideration from an underlying contract, or continued employment, can support an arbitration clause and render it enforceable. See e.g. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604 n. 3 (3rd Cir. 2002) (noting in dicta that continued employment may serve as consideration for an agreement to arbitrate); Barker v. Golf U.S.A., Inc., 154 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that under Oklahoma law, "mutuality of obligation is not required for arbitration clauses so long as the contract as a whole is supported by consideration"); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 453 (2nd Cir. 1995) (stating that Connecticut courts would conclude that when an arbitration agreement is integrated into a larger contract, consideration for the contract as a whole would cover the arbitration clause as well); Wilson Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Minnotte Contracting Corp., 878 F.2d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that arbitration clause within larger contract did not require consideration independent from consideration of larger contract; also stating that Prima Paint, supra, "does not require separate consideration for an arbitration provision contained within a valid contract."); Avid Engineering, Inc. v. Orlando Marketplace Ltd., 809 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2001) ("Because there was sufficient consideration to support the entire contract, the arbitration provision was not void for lack of mutuality of obligation."); Sablosky v. Edward S. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 538 N.Y.S.2d 513, 535 N.E.2d 643, 646 (1989) ("If there is consideration for the entire agreement that is sufficient; the consideration supports the arbitration option, as it does every other obligation in the agreement.").

We disagree with these cases. As previously discussed, under Maryland law, the role of the courts in a motion to compel or stay arbitration is strictly circumscribed; we may only consider whether an agreement to arbitrate the dispute at hand exists; we must not stray into the merits of any underlying disagreements. To do so could eclipse the role of the arbitrator, should a valid agreement exist, and therefore run afoul of strong Federal and Maryland policies favoring arbitration as a viable method of dispute resolution. We believe that the cases referred to above pay short shrift to this principle. Even if we could touch upon the underlying merits in a motion to compel or stay arbitration, however, we would decline to do so.

If we were to conclude that consideration from the underlying agreement was sufficient to support the arbitration agreement, we would be precluded from ever finding an arbitration agreement invalid for lack of consideration when performance of a contract has already occurred, no matter how illusory the arbitration agreement was.

Finally, we find that the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000), is distinguishable from the present case. In that case, Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree Financial Corporation. Id. at 82, 121 S.Ct. at 517, 148 L.Ed.2d at 378. She signed a Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement that contained a provision providing that all disputes arising from the contract would be resolved in binding arbitration. Id. at 83, 121 S.Ct. at 518, 148 L.Ed.2d at 378. Randolph later sued Green Tree in the United States District Court for the District of Alabama, alleging that they violated the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Id. Green Tree responded with a motion to compel arbitration, which the District Court granted. Id.

Before the Supreme Court, Randolph contended that the arbitration clause contained within the Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement was unenforceable. Id. at 84, 121 S.Ct. at 518, 148 L.Ed.2d at 379. In support of that contention, she claimed that because the clause was silent as to who would pay for arbitration costs, there was a possibility that she would be responsible for the costs, which, if prohibitively expensive, would effectively preclude her from pursuing her statutory claims. Id. at 89, 121 S.Ct. at 521, 148 L.Ed.2d at 382. The Supreme Court rejected Randolph's contention because it was too "speculative." Id. at 91, 121 S.Ct. at 521-22, 148 L.Ed.2d at 383-84. The record, the Court noted, did "not show that Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to arbitration." Id. at 90, 121 S.Ct. at 522, 148 L.Ed.2d. at 383.

The Arbitration Policy in the present case, unlike the agreement in Green Tree Financial, is not "silent" as to who is bound to arbitrate; it clearly and specifically gives United the sole discretion to modify, alter, amend, or revoke arbitration for any reason, at any time, but Cheek is bound to arbitrate "all employment-related disputes." No "speculation" as to the legal consequences of this Policy is necessary. Cheek is bound to arbitrate any disputes arising from the employment relationship, while United can revoke the policy at any time, for any reason, without notice or consent. Consequently, whether United chooses to exercise the option to revoke the policy or not begs the question, because it had not bound itself to a course of action.

We have concluded that the arbitration agreement in the present case is unenforceable for lack of consideration. This is so because United's promise to arbitrate was illusory, and because United's employment of Cheek cannot serve as consideration for the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we need not, and do not, express any opinion as to Cheek's remaining claims.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.