Opinion
CIV-21-597-PRW
07-06-2022
SHEB JIM RAY BENNETT, Plaintiff, v. MS. CLARK, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AMANDA MAXFILED GREEN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, an Oklahoma prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis (without prepayment of fees), filed this action alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 1, 6).United States District Judge Patrick R. Wyrick referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 4). Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 15). Plaintiff did not respond. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED.
Citations to the parties' pleadings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court's CM/ECF pagination.
I. Plaintiff's Complaint
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against four employees of Lawton Correctional and Rehabilitation Facility (“LCRF”) in their individual and official capacities: Tatyana Clark, his case manager; Sandra Marti, a housing unit manager; Cheryl Clark, the trust fund supervisor; and Mark Bowman, the warden. (Doc. 6, at 4-5; Doc. 15, at 1). Plaintiff alleges that “two third-party checks were cashed for $800.00 off my account without my approval .... I was fraud[ul]ently rip[p]ed off by LCRF.” (Doc. 6, at 6). Plaintiff describes LCRF's financial disbursement procedures, which he claims Defendants failed to follow. (Id. at 7, 8). Plaintiff demands that each Defendant reimburse him for the financial loss he suffered due to their “deliberate indifference to correct their own mistakes.” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff states that he “was required to exhaust DOC's grievance process before filing suit. During the grievance process within the LCF facility, the defendants denied [him] relief though there was undoubtedly an extensive protection process to prevent his loss.” (Id.) The Defendants' actions, Plaintiff asserts, violated his “Right of due process - for the protection against inmate on inmate theft; Right to be protected - from financial theft; [and] Ethical Obligation of Positions of Power.” (Id.)
II. Standard of Review - Motion to Dismiss
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010). In applying this standard, the court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[, and t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). The court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
III. Analysis
“A plaintiff seeking to hold a state-actor defendant personally liable under § 1983 must ultimately prove that such defendant, ‘through the official's own individual actions, has violated' a right secured to the plaintiff by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Coburn v. Miller, 2019 WL 1087148, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 6, 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). As an initial matter, Plaintiff's Complaint contains no well-pled facts showing “exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff cannot hold Defendants personally liable under § 1983 by virtue of their alleged job descriptions and responsibilities alone. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 678. “Rather, it is incumbent upon [Plaintiff] to identify specific actions taken by particular defendants” to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against those Defendants. Pahls, 718 F.3d at 1226 (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 1225-26 (“When various officials have taken different actions with respect to a plaintiff, the plaintiff's facile, passive-voice showing that his rights ‘were violated' will not suffice.”).
Construed liberally, Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim related to the alleged deprivation of his $800 in funds. (Doc. 1, at 6-7). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees certain procedural safeguards before a State may deprive an individual of his or her “life, liberty, or property.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). The Supreme Court has held that “when property loss ‘is occasioned by a random, unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than by an established state procedure,'” “the Due Process Clause is satisfied so long as ‘a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.'” Stengel v. N.M. Corr. Dep't, 640 Fed.Appx. 701, 704 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, 533 (1984)); Thompson v. City of Shawnee, 464 Fed.Appx. 720, 724 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]here is no Fourteenth Amendment claim where there is an adequate state post-deprivation remedy.”).
Plaintiff does not allege that the Defendants acted pursuant to a policy or procedure or that their actions were otherwise authorized. Rather, Plaintiff contends that his property deprivation was the result of Defendants' failure to follow LCRF's procedures related to inmate property. (See Doc. 6, at 7-8) (Plaintiff's description of financial disbursement procedure; Plaintiff's allegation that Defendants had “deliberate indifference to correct their own mistakes;” Plaintiff's allegation of Defendants' “failure to follow the rules of procedure established to protect inmates rights,” specifically procedures for the “protection against inmate on inmate theft”). “Therefore, to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff was required to plead the inadequacy or unavailability of a post-deprivation remedy.” Coburn, 2019 WL 1087148, at *4 (citing Durre v. Dempsey, 869 F.2d 543, 548 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's due process deprivation of property claim, and explaining that the complaint “must allege facts sufficient to show deprivation, in this case the lack of an adequate state remedy”)).
“The Supreme Court has recognized that adequate post-deprivation remedies may exist in prison grievance procedures or in state court.” Coburn, 2019 WL 1087148, at *4 (citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535-36, 536 n.15; Williams v. Morris, 697 F.2d 1349, 1351 (10th Cir. 1982); Cooper v. Belcher, 2010 WL 3359709, at *15 (D. Colo. Aug. 25, 2010) (noting that “[a]dequate state remedies are not limited to the filing of grievances, but include filing complaints in state court”)). Plaintiff admits that the prison grievance process was available to him but complains that he “was required to exhaust DOC's grievance process before filing suit” and that “defendants denied [him] relief” during the grievance process. (Doc. 6, at 7). Plaintiff does not allege, however, that he was barred from seeking recourse in state court or that state-law remedies were otherwise unavailable or inadequate. “Courts have found the availability of suit in tort to be an adequate post-deprivation remedy, and such postdeprivation remedies appear to be available in Oklahoma state court for deprivations of property by employees of private correctional facilities.” Coburn, 2019 WL 1087148, at *5 (collecting cases); see Hudson, 468 U.S. at 534-35; Rivera v. Garfield Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 2015 WL 10015375, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 14, 2015) (citing the Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 151 et. seq., as an example of a prisoner's post-deprivation remedy), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 540811 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 9, 2016); Smith v. Bauman, 2009 WL 3271329, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 9, 2009) (same).
Because there are remedies for the deprivation of Plaintiff's property under Oklahoma law and Plaintiff does not allege that they were unavailable to him or inadequate, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object.
For the reasons stated, the undersigned recommends the Court GRANT Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) and DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint (Docs. 1, 6) without prejudice for failure to state a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff is advised of the right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court by July 27, 2022, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Plaintiff is further advised that failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.