Summary
In Beauvillier v. Finn, 25 Conn. Sup. 361 (1964), for example, Judge (later Justice) Shapiro stated the then apt principle that negligence and recklessness were two entirely distinct causes of action; thus, the raising of a recklessness count after the passage of the applicable statute of limitations, § 52-584 of the General Statutes, was barred by the statute of limitations.
Summary of this case from Podaras v. CorcoranOpinion
File No. 17731
Wanton misconduct is more than negligence; it is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others. As the plaintiffs alleged only negligence in their complaint, their motion to amend by charging the defendant with wanton misconduct stated a new cause of action. The motion could not be granted since the applicable one-year Statute of Limitations had run.
Memorandum filed September 21, 1964
Memorandum on plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. Motion denied.
Weisman Weisman, of Waterbury, for the plaintiffs.
Carmody Torrance, of Waterbury, and Regnier, Moller Taylor, of Hartford, for the defendant.
This is an automobile negligence suit. The accident is alleged to have occurred on January 10, 1963. Various claims of negligent conduct are made against the defendant in the original complaint dated January 7, 1964, and served the same day. On September 1, 1964, plaintiffs filed a motion for permission to amend their complaint. No issue is raised as to counts 1 and 2, but the defendant does object to proposed counts 3 and 4 on the claim that a new cause of action is there alleged and that by virtue of the Statute of Limitations this cannot be done. Gallo v. G. Fox Co., 148 Conn. 327, 330; Veits v. Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 434.
Proposed paragraphs 3 and 4 charge the defendant with "wanton misconduct" and seek exemplary damages. The plaintiff contends that this is not a new cause of action. "No action to recover damages for injury to the person, . . . caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, . . . shall be brought but within one year from the date when the injury is first sustained . . . ." General Statutes § 52-584.
Wanton misconduct is more than negligence; it is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of action. Decker v. Roberts, 125 Conn. 150, 155, and cases cited thereunder. The defense of contributory negligence is not available where injury is inflicted under conditions open to the charge of wilfulness or wantonness. Bordonaro v. Senk, 109 Conn. 428, 433, and cases cited thereunder.
In a case where negligence as well as wanton misconduct was alleged, the court held: "The complaint stated a cause of action not merely for negligence but also one for wanton misconduct. [Italics supplied.] Wanton misconduct is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. . . . Wilful misconduct is intentional misconduct, and wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct, which is the equivalent of wilful misconduct." Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, and cases cited thereunder.
Both counsel agree that the court may rule on this controversy in the form in which it was presented. This will, of course, save time. It might have been raised by first permitting the filing of the amended complaint and then that being attacked by a demurrer, raising the same argument as now. DeMartino v. Siemon, 90 Conn. 527, 528.
One purpose (of statutes of limitation) is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims concerning which the persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution. Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 144 Conn. 170, 174. It is abundantly clear that the Statute of Limitations applies to counts 3 and 4. They obviously allege a new cause of action more than "one year from the date when the injury . . . [was] first sustained." The cases cited as well as the mandate of § 52-584 will not permit the filing of the amended complaint as to counts 3 and 4.